Behavioral momentum theory (BMT) provides an integrative framework for evaluating the strength of a response when it contacts a disruptor, such as the discontinuation of reinforcement (i.e., extinction). Grounded in Newtonian physics, BMT distinguishes response rate (behavioral velocity) from response strength or persistence (behavioral mass). Behavioral velocity is affected by response-reinforcer contingencies, whereas behavioral mass is affected by stimulus-reinforcer contingencies (Nevin and Wacker 2013). We describe the determiners of behavioral mass, as well as common sources of disruption that are used to measure behavioral mass. Learning activities are embedded throughout this discussion to help readers better understand BMT and its implications for practice across a range of contexts.

In "Behavioral Pragmatism: No Place for Reality and Truth," Barnes-Holmes (2000) proposed a behavior-analytic version of philosophical pragmatism he called behavioral pragmatism (BP), a perspective which challenges two bedrock tenets of Western culture: (1) metaphysical realism, the view that an external, physical reality exists which is mind-independent and (2) the correspondence theory of truth (CTT), a theory which maintains that true statements are those which correspond to mind-independent reality. Many (perhaps most) behavior analysts accept both of these tenets (though they typically name and describe these tenets using different terms). By contrast, in lieu of the first, BP offers, as a replacement tenet, nonrealism, in place of the second, the pragmatic truth criterion. The account of reality and truth of BP has gained increasing prominence within behavior analysis because of its inclusion within relational frame theory, a perspective with a growing number of adherents. In this paper, I first argue that the realism/pragmatism dispute needs to be resolved because it threatens the coherence of radical behaviorism as a philosophy of science. Next, I present a detailed account of the differing conceptions of reality and truth as articulated within: (1) metaphysical realism, (2) behavioral pragmatism, and (3) Richard Rorty's version of pragmatism (Rortian pragmatism). Finally, using the insights of Rortian pragmatism (RP), I offer three proposals for modifying the core tenets of behavioral pragmatism. If adopted, these proposals would help narrow the realism/pragmatism divide, thereby reducing the threat to radical behaviorism's coherence.

Throughout history, individuals have changed the world in significant ways, forging new paths; demonstrating remarkable capacity to inspire others to follow; and repeatedly showing independence, resilience, consistency, and commitment to principle. However, significant cultural change is rarely accomplished single-handedly; instead, it results from the complex and dynamic interaction of groups of individuals. To illustrate how leaders participate in cultural phenomena, I describe how a few individuals helped to establish the Cold War. In this analysis, I distinguish two types of cultural phenomena: metacontingencies, involving lineages of interlocking behavioral contingencies, and cultural cusps, involving complicated, unique, and nonreplicable interrelations between individuals and circumstances. I conclude that by analyzing leaders' actions and their results, we can appreciate that cultural and behavioral phenomena are different, and although cultural phenomena are inherently complex and in many cases do not lend themselves to replication, not only should the science of behavior account for them, cultural phenomena should also constitute a major area of behavior analysis study and application.

The negative perception of behavior analysis by the public, and conveyed in mass media, is well-recognized by the professional community of behavior analysts. Several strategies for correcting this perception have been deployed in the field by organizational behavior management practitioners, in particular, with encouraging results. These strategies include (a) reframing behaviorism in a more resonant format, (b) pushing direct outcome comparisons between behavior analysis and its rivals, and (c) playing up the "warm and fuzzy" side of behavior analysis (see Freedman 2015, in this issue, for a thorough description of these strategies). This article outlines three additional strategies that the author believes will position behavior analysis as a "contemporary science of what works in behavior change." These new strategies are (a) creating a cohesive, easily understandable framework; (b) personally communicating a more contemporary, sophisticated message; and

A background in elementary education set the stage for Dr. Beth Sulzer-Azaroff’s search for methods to promote productive student performance. Once introduced to the power of applied behavior analysis as a science and technology, she used it to conduct research, consult, and teach across a broad range of populations. She first taught at Southern Illinois University, subsequently at the University of Massachusetts, Florida International University, the University of North Texas, and Florida Gulf Coast University. She frequently consulted on methods for promoting performance quality in business, service, and educational and training organizations. Author or co-author of 17 books or major book revisions, 100+ published papers and text chapters, she also served as the first female president of ABAI and co-founder of the Berkshire Association for Behavior Analysis and Therapy, member and Chair of the American Psychological Association’s (APA) Division 25 (Experimental Analysis of Behavior), Board of Scientific Affairs and Committee on Continuing Education; Chair of the Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies and others. She has been Associate Editor of the Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis (JABA) and an editorial board member for numerous other behavioral journals. She was elected to the Connecticut Academy of Science and Engineering, Fellow of six divisions of APA, plus the Association for Behavior Analysis, International, Academy of Behavioral Medicine, and the American Psychological Society. In addition, her colleagues have been gracious enough to award her several awards as well for her work (Fig. 1).

Skinner's radical behaviorism incorporates private events as biologically based phenomena that may play a functional role with respect to other (overt) behavioral phenomena. Skinner proposed four types of contingencies, here collectively termed the contingency horizon, which enable certain functional relations between private events and verbal behavior. The adequacy and necessity of this position has met renewed challenges from Rachlin's teleological behaviorism and Baum's molar behaviorism, both of which argue that all "mental" phenomena and terminology may be explained by overt behavior and environment-behavior contingencies extended in time. A number of lines of evidence are presented in making a case for the functional characteristics of private events, including published research from behavior analysis and general experimental psychology, as well as verbal behavior from a participant in the debate. An integrated perspective is offered that involves a multiscaled analysis of interacting public behaviors and private events.

Misconceptions abound about teleological behaviorism (TB). Because very few people other than the author publicly call themselves teleological behaviorists, the fault must be mine. The present article is an attempt to clear up those misconceptions. First I will try to indicate what teleological behaviorism is not. Then, in the form of six fables (loosely connected stories, allegories, analogies, fairy tales, and arguments), I will try to give the reader an understanding of what teleological behaviorism actually is.

Although the field of behavior analysis provided the formative experiences and much of the profession training that have fueled a long and satisfying career, I now find that I am turning away from behavior-analytic research and teaching. My reasons for making this change stem from concerns about the costs and potential benefits of basic behavior-analytic research strategies and the isolation of behavior analysis from mainstream science. I offer some suggestions for strengthening the profession.

Stimuli that precede aversive events are typically less preferred than stimuli that precede nonaversive events. It has recently been demonstrated that stimuli that follow less preferred events may become favored more than stimuli that follow more preferred events. This phenomenon has been investigated under a variety of names, most commonly, within-trial contrast and state-dependent valuation. Although this effect has been replicated, there have been several failures to replicate and it is still little understood. This paper reviews and summarizes the literature on within-trial contrast and state-dependent valuation. Procedural variations across studies are identified and discussed. The two current models that explain the phenomenon are then outlined and the limitations of each model are described. A third explanation is offered that incorporates the concept of motivating operations. Last, the predictions of all three models are compared.