ABSTRACT From Marx and Engels to Lawrence Stepelevich, Max Stirner has long been regarded as the last of the Hegelians, with his thought often interpreted as either an imitation or a continuation of the Hegelian system, or even as the ultimate unfolding of Hegelian dialectics. This article challenges this prevailing view by analyzing Stirner’s stance on the relationship between the self and the object. Through an examination of his treatment of key Hegelian concepts such as the dialectical triad and the theory of alienation and freedom, it argues that there was a fundamental rupture between Stirner’s thought and Hegelian philosophy and dialectics. More specifically, I argue that Stirner not only transcended the Hegelian tradition but also embodied a radical resistance to the dominion of thoughts assumed by the Hegelian system. Thus Stirner’s work was not a continuation of Hegelianism and he should be understood as a non-Hegelian thinker. This reorientation, I suggest, contributes to a more accurate assessment of the significance of Stirner’s intellectual legacy.