The efficiency benefits of US rail industry deregulation have been widely documented. This research provides new insight regarding the accrual of benefits within the US grain industry. A study of rail grain rates from 1980 to 2000 finds railroads decreased rates for all grain shippers. The greatest gain in benefits was to producers in the most competitive market environments. Regions and products with less competitive transportation markets will become increasingly disadvantaged if the trend continues. Rail rates are a key determinant in grain market viability and producer profitability in these rail dominated markets.

Using firm‐level panel data we investigate whether reform of the trade and industrial policy regimes in India introduced in 1991 resulted in a reduction in market power and/or an acceleration in productivity growth, consequences that have been predicted in theory. Econometric testing of the theory for every industry group at the two‐digit level in India yielded limited evidence of acceleration in productivity growth and no evidence of a reduction in market power. This is interpreted as suggesting that in the case of Indian industry trade liberalization has not exhibited the potential often attributed to it.

When there are two groups of officials in a public organization, we show that depending on the groups’ behavior – collusive or competitive – increasing the level of monitoring and punishment may have different impacts on corruption. If the two groups of public officials had been demonstrating collusive behavior, increased monitoring or punishment reduces both the level of corrupt activities and the corrupt officials’ bribe revenues. However, if the groups had not been colluding, increased monitoring reduces the level of corruption, but increases the corruption revenues collected. Only after reaching the optimum level of monitoring, is this result reversed.

Most models of trade policy determination and rent‐seeking abstract from the problem of commitment: both the politician's commitment to implement a policy and the lobbyist's commitment to contribute to the politician. This article shows that the commitment problem is a static prisoner's dilemma, in which neither lobbying nor inefficient policies occur. The only way to rationalize the existence of lobbying and protection within a finite time horizon is in a repeated game with uncertain duration. I construct a model in which the uncertainty comes from periodic elections. The model has implications for redistribution and political influence across political systems and institutions.

This study develops a dynamic general equilibrium model in which optimizing agents evade taxes by operating in the underground economy. The cost to firms of evading taxes is that they find themselves subject to credit rationing from banks. Our model simulations show that in the absence of budgetary flexibility to adjust expenditures, raising tax rates too high drives firms into the underground economy, thereby reducing the tax base. Aggregate investment in the economy is lowered because of credit rationing. Taxes that are too low eliminate the underground economy, but result in unsustainable budget and trade deficits. Thus, the optimal rate of taxation, from a macroeconomic point of view, may lead to some underground activity.

Defined benefit pensions are still an important part of retirement income security for 44 million people. After 2000, these plans experienced extreme difficulties. Although the magnitude of the problem was unprecedented, its causes were not. Interest rate and asset prices decline in a recession, when earnings are low. Pension funding rules reflect this regularity. This requires additional contributions when times are bad. We address this counter‐cyclicality through three proposed rule changes. We use a simulation model to evaluate these. Our results indicate that counter‐cyclicality would have diminished, while funding adequacy would have improved.

Proposals for monetary reform based on inflation targeting, in Iraq and elsewhere, face a variety of practical and theoretical difficulties. In evaluating attempted reforms based on inflation targeting, we suggest some propositions broadly consistent with the new institutionalist critique. In particular, we stress the importance of recognizing path‐dependent features of the economic system. An awareness of the reduced generality of theoretical results in light of institutional limitations, combined with an impossibility criterion for economic policy technologies, holds promise for designing a set of readily attainable reforms. We argue that these criteria, far from being esoteric, actually interact in a way that underpins foundational results in monetary theory due to James E. Meade and Robert A. Mundell.

In Africa, institutions were not established at independence that took proper account of the pluralism of the societies, while civil society failed to press for institutions to control the state. Political leaders have had little self‐interest in pursuing good economic policies, and there is weak civil societal demand for such policies. Foreign aid and the proposed peer review mechanism of the African Union could help strengthen this demand. Social scientists can help by focusing on corruption in top political leadership, reducing ethnicity, and improving political leadership. Selectivity for aid can be ex ante, with resoluteness in withdrawing aid for not keeping promises.

Standard policy advice at times of fiscal adjustment is to protect public spending on the poor. However, the political economy of fiscal adjustment could well indicate the opposite direction, to protect the non‐poor from adjustment. This point is illustrated by three case studies based on research on social programs in Argentina, Bangladesh, and India, focusing on how targeting performance varied with aggregate outlays. The results suggest a tendency for program spending on the non‐poor that is protected from budget cuts.

This paper examines transition dynamics in a search economy. We contrast two extreme cases: a completely unexpected reform and a fully anticipated reform. We show that announcing the reform in advance leads to stagnation in anticipation and output cycles after the implementation, that are more volatile than had a reform of identical magnitude been implemented immediately. However, the more volatile output trajectory of the anticipated case yields a higher PDV of output than an unanticipated reform of equal magnitude. This suggests that an anticipated reform is better than an unanticipated reform, even though the former induces greater volatility.