Abstract The African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement 2018 and its Protocols are some of the most notable efforts by the African Union to improve economic integration in recent times. These instruments are timely because Africa has remained the weakest continent in the area of trade, investments and economic integration. Although, African States have previously concluded agreements to harmonise the domestic trade and investment policies for economic integration, it is expected that the Protocol to the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area on Investment 2023 (Investment Protocol) will have a more far-reaching impact. However, to achieve this, the available dispute settlement mechanisms must be adequate and perceived to be legitimate given the backlash against traditional investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS), particularly investor-State arbitration. Accordingly, this article makes proposals for reform of ISDS rules and mechanisms for the Investment Protocol and concludes that these are crucial for economic integration in Africa.

Abstract This article discusses recently adopted amendments to the text of the ECT through the lens of the right to regulate. In doing so, it critically analyses how contracting parties attempted to incorporate right to regulate into the ECT framework and identifies related developments in general treaty drafting practice. It introduces a typology of such attempts and developments, enabling the author to demonstrate increasing creativity in treaty drafting practice of IIAs. The concept of the right to regulate is approached narrowly, solely in the context of climate actions of host states. It is argued that discussed attempted expressions of the right to regulate should in principle be viewed as having attributes of quasi rights carrying the potential to influence and steer interpretation and application of treaty norms, however failing to provide host states with a binding and enforceable legal right.

Abstract Much ink has been spilled on the US-China tech and trade war, particularly the role of US export controls in containing China and preserving America’s tech dominance. Less attention, however, has been paid to other critical nodes in the global semiconductor supply chain – Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and the Netherlands – which we coin as ‘chokepoint economies’. Taiwan alone produces over 90% of the world’s most advanced chips, vital to the digital age and the future of AI in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Using Taiwan as a case study, this paper shows how chokepoint economies navigate competing pressures amid intensifying great power rivalry. We enrich the scholarly and policy debates by making three interrelated claims. First, while the US has relied heavily on extraterritorial export controls to limit China’s access to advanced chips, chokepoint economies like Taiwan may adopt more permissive policies. This potential divergence reflects their distinct roles and agendas in the supply chain and strategic balancing between economic and geopolitical interests. Such regulatory gaps, in turn, raise important questions about where legal responsibility lies and how effective US unilateralism can be over time. For one, if China’s restricted access results primarily from US laws rather than chokepoint economies, any legal challenge would target the US – which has substantially disengaged from the WTO dispute system – while others remain committed to the rules-based order. China may thus retaliate through unilateral tools, such as imposing export bans on critical raw materials, adding further complexity to the global supply chain. For another, the durability of US unilateralism is uncertain. Gaps in enforcement and heavy reliance on extraterritorial reach may drive the US to further reshore production for greater control. This will deepen ‘Silicon Statecraft’, as seen in TSMC’s 2025 massive investment project in Arizona, where Washington bypassed Taiwan’s government to deal directly with its companies – further fueling concerns over unilateralism and the erosion of the postwar liberal rule-based system.

Abstract The international tax regime has developed for more than a hundred years. While it has been dominated by double tax treaties, more recently the OECD has brought forward various initiatives which add significant complexity to the regime. At the same time the strong position of the OECD and the non-inclusiveness of its decision-making bodies have caused dissatisfaction with the regime. The most recent initiative on a United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation (UNFCITC) is the result of this policy rejection. Considering the advantages and disadvantages offered by plurilateral agreements, inspired by the WTO system, plurilateralism could prove to be very valuable to overcome existing flaws of the current regime. Indeed, the UNFCITC if designed carefully could help to overcome many weaknesses of the current international tax regime and become the most meaningful development of the century in international tax law.

Abstract The rise of the digital economy has prompted states to turn to domestic law – including data localization, source code disclosure requirements, digital asset restrictions, and digital services taxes – to address its challenges. Simultaneously, states are increasingly leveraging plurilateral frameworks, such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), and plurilateral agreements, such as the Joint Statement Initiative (JSI) on e-commerce in the World Trade Organization (WTO), to address the economic and geoeconomic challenges posed by the digital economy. The article examines the role of plurilateralism and plurilateral agreements in regulating the digital economy. It explores plurilateralism as a regulatory strategy for digital technologies in international trade, both within and outside the WTO. It also compares digital plurilateralism with other modalities of international governance, including multilateral and regional approaches. The article concludes by underscoring the merits of plurilateralism as a form of ‘unilateral multilateralism’ and explores its potential to shape future international ordering in the digital economy.

Abstract This article discusses the promising role of plurilateral agreements in international investment, particularly how these agreements can integrate ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) criteria into the investment protection landscape. Existing investment agreements have been slow to incorporate ESG considerations, which are becoming increasingly important due to global focus on human rights and environmental protection. At the same time, there is increasing resistance toward traditional bilateral and multilateral investment agreements by States concerned with an encroachment on their right to regulate on issues concerning the public welfare. Plurilateral agreements, which involve a subset of countries focusing on specific issues, offer a potential solution to embed ESG standards within investment arbitration frameworks. Plurilateral agreements offer a more flexible and rapid mechanism for incorporating ESG standards compared to more comprehensive multilateral agreements. Plurilateral agreements could also begin to replace bilateral investment agreements or bring an additional layer of uniformity with respect to the complex web of bilateral investment treaties currently in force.

Abstract Fragmentation in the international trading system, following the proliferation of free trade agreements (FTAs), has been a longstanding phenomenon. However, fragmentation in the systems for settling trade disputes has emerged only recently. The demise of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) has caused a gradual change of preference of governments as to where and how to resolve disputes. Outside the WTO, an increasing number of disputes are brought under FTAs. Within the WTO, the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) is leading to fragmentation. This trend is fragmenting the interpretation and enforcement of trade rules, thereby diminishing predictability. Although the MPIA has to some extent maintained an appellate system, it is not a typical plurilateral and does not provide a long-term solution to the Appellate Body crisis. A critical mass-based, open plurilateral under the multilateral framework might offer an alternative path to rebuild an effective appellate mechanism.

Abstract This article analyses the interpretation by arbitral tribunals of investment treaties’ provisions on the territoriality of the investment and its consistency with the general rule of interpretation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The first section focuses on the decisions rendered in Bayview and Canadian Cattlemen, where the tribunals inferred the existence of a territorial requirement not expressed in NAFTA’s Chapter Eleven. The second section deals with the decisions rendered in Fedax, Abaclat and Ambiente Ufficio, where the tribunals decided that, in cases concerning financial transactions, it was not necessary for the investment to be actually made in the territory of the respondent State even if the investment treaty expressly required the investment to made in the territory of the State. The article concludes that the tribunals misapplied the general rule of interpretation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaty in these cases.