This article examines the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA), launched by the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) in 2022, as a case of informal, networked governance in maritime intelligence-related cooperation. Situating the initiative within debates on informal governance and intelligence cooperation, it argues that informality enables coordination in politically sensitive domains by structuring how maritime information is generated, circulated, and used across existing national and regional systems, rather than through centralized intelligence sharing. Drawing on textual and comparative analysis of official documents and secondary literature, the article analyzes IPMDA’s decentralized architecture, emphasizing voluntary participation, flexible interoperability, and trust-based coordination. It shows that while these features enhance political viability and inclusivity, they also constrain institutional consolidation and long-term sustainability. The article interprets IPMDA as an evolving governance experiment that illuminates how informal, network-based arrangements shape maritime intelligence practices in the Indo-Pacific.

Taiwan engages with global sustainability frameworks through selective participation, outside UN-based institutions. This article explains why a politically limited yet economically central actor invests in Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) standards and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and how functional participation creates opportunities for action without treaty-based participation. Using a dual-level approach, it combines a qualitative, theory-informed analysis of state engagement with a systematic content analysis of ESG reporting by ten Taiwanese firms. The findings reveal a consistent asymmetry in issue areas. At the state level, Taiwan prioritises climate-related visibility and technical alignment, including emissions targets aligned with the Paris Agreement, a 2050 net-zero commitment, and indirect involvement with UNFCCC processes through side events and public–private platforms. Conversely, labour governance is approached more cautiously via low-profile, non-binding channels rather than rights-focused supervisory frameworks. Corporate communication reflects this pattern: environmental disclosure is extensive and standardised, while social and governance reporting is more selective and tailored to external exposure and regulatory pressure. The article demonstrates how selective engagement functions as a strategy for managing regime complexity within fragmented governance arrangements, producing internationally recognisable alignment through standards, disclosure, and risk management.

This study explores Japan’s Defence strategic communication (StratCom) with a focus on its security cooperation in the context of Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). Since the second Abe Shinzo administration, Japan has intensified its use of security cooperation to convey Indo-Pacific vision amid a contested security environment, reflecting the government’s increasingly deliberate use of such cooperation for Defence StratCom purposes. Focusing on the Indo-Pacific Deployment as a case study, this paper examines how security cooperation operates as Defence StratCom by aligning words and actions and producing differentiated signalling across partners and operational contexts. Essentially, the study elucidates Japan’s integration of defence measures into its communication practices as a key instrument for advancing its national strategic objectives and values. This shift points to a notable recalibration of Japan’s approach to regional security and order; however, persistent limitations continue to circumscribe the effectiveness of its Defence StratCom in fully sustaining and reinforcing this recalibration.

Amid the rapid proliferation of minilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, this article probes its impact on the regional security architecture. Using an analytical framework designed to determine the relationship between new and incumbent institutions and applying it to major minilateral mechanisms previously categorized into four distinct groups, it finds that the rise of minilateralism has had no uniformly complementary or competing effect on the pre-existing institutions of the Indo-Pacific security architecture. Nevertheless, the analysis also demonstrates that, collectively, minilateral cooperation has tended to make the regional security architecture less balanced and more polarized. This is mainly because the majority of the newly established minilaterals tend to reinforce characteristics inherent in the pre-existing bilateral US hub-and-spokes layer of the regional security architecture, which is built on collective security, deterrence, and non-inclusiveness. Meanwhile, the pre-existing multilateral layer of the architecture, centered primarily on ASEAN and focused on cooperative security and pan-regional inclusion, is being challenged in multiple ways by a range of very different minilateral platforms. Taken together, minilateralism constitutes a significant addition to the regional security architecture, but—at least in its currently predominant forms—it does not offer a convincing solution to the varied pressing security problems in the Indo-Pacific.

In January 2023, Japan and Italy elevated their bilateral relations to a strategic partnership, signalling a deeper commitment to security and strategic cooperation. This move reflects Tokyo’s strategy of diversifying its security partnerships beyond its longstanding alliance with the United States. Since the late 2000s, Tokyo has sought closer ties with European partners committed to fostering stability across the Transatlantic and Indo-Pacific regions. Italy represents a more recent addition to this network. While both countries share longstanding diplomatic relations, their cooperation in the security domain is a relatively new development that merits closer examination. This article introduces the concept of reputation-based trust to investigate how trust shapes the formation stage of the Japan–Italy strategic partnership. Through interviews with Japanese defence officials and experts, it argues that trust in this emerging partnership is grounded in reputation-based expectations of Italy as a credible, reliable, and trustworthy partner. These expectations are central to the early construction of trust and inform Japanese perceptions of enhanced security cooperation. Nonetheless, gaps in trust remain and must be addressed for the relationship to mature. The article contributes to the literature on strategic partnerships, highlighting the often-overlooked role of trust in their formation and early development.

This article investigates Malaysia’s strategic responses to the intensifying United States (U.S.)–China semiconductor rivalry, where semiconductors have become key geopolitical assets shaping global supply chain realignments. Positioned as a critical node in the back end of the semiconductor supply chain, Malaysia faces mounting pressures to reconcile its technological dependencies with its industrial upgrading ambitions. Drawing on policy documents and industry data, this study develops a three-dimensional analytical framework—techno-geopolitical drivers, structural constraints, and adaptive strategies—to systematically assess how Malaysia navigates this strategic landscape. It addresses three core questions: how U.S. and Chinese semiconductor strategies influence Malaysia’s position, what structural constraints it confronts, and how it adapts to achieve industrial upgrading while preserving autonomy. It finds that Malaysia is advancing three interlinked mechanisms: technological diversification, supply chain adaptation, and institutional balancing. These strategies enable Malaysia to mitigate external shocks, preserve strategic flexibility, and pursue resilient integration into a fragmented global semiconductor order. The findings contribute to debates on middle power agency, supply chain resilience, and strategic technology governance in the Global South.

Small states, especially developed and democratic states in Europe, have been important players in international security and diplomacy. From joining NATO military operations, gaining a seat in the UN Security Council, to providing economic aid for poorer countries, small democratic states have demonstrated the inclination to acquire status and elevate their influence in international politics. But we know less about the status-seeking of small authoritarian states in the developing world. This paper fills the gap by examining Cambodia’s quest for a positive international reputation and its intended benefits for the Cambodian People’s Party’s rule. We argue that Cambodia wants to be perceived as a good state useful to the international community and this favorable international image can boost the ruling party’s political legitimacy at home. The argument is illustrated with three case studies in the areas of international peacekeeping, global health, and regional sports. Accounting for these dynamics advances our understanding of the role of small authoritarian states in world politics with important implications for democracy promotion in the developing world.

Why does China challenge global norms in climate governance while selectively accepting norms in peacebuilding governance? We argue that the focus on domestic factors in much existing literature is insufficient to explain this difference. Instead, we propose an outward-looking approach centered on factors related to international institutions. We conduct a comparative analysis of explanatory factors using a theory of international regime complexity—specifically Henning and Pratt’s framework on the joint effects of authority and differentiation within regime complexes. This analysis utilizes Chinese official documents in English aimed at international audiences. We found that China partially accepts existing norms while proposing alternatives to hierarchical structures in situations where there is a leading institution overseeing similarly functioning institutions. This is the case in peacebuilding governance. In contrast, China largely challenges norms in global governance systems that lack a hierarchical structure and involve institutions with distinct, specialized roles. This is the case for climate governance. We argue that the variation in China’s contestation of global governance norms can be explained by the level of hierarchy and functional differentiation between institutions in each governance regime. The article contributes a new perspective to debates about China’s norm contestation in global governance.

After China launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, Japan followed by launching its Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (PQI) in 2015. Scholarly comparison focuses on competition and norm diffusion perspectives, but the question remains open in terms of what drives the design of infrastructure policies. We develop a theoretical framework consisting of geopolitical competition and selective policy learning as the dual drivers for infrastructure policy design. While geopolitical competition results in specialisation and the occupying of strategic niches, policy learning results in convergence, through direct and indirect interactions. We analyse them from the dimensions of (1) definition, (2) character of state support and (3) degree of multilateralisation of the two initiatives. In addition to reviewing policy design, we provide empirical evidence from railway projects in Indonesia to illustrate how China as a late comer occupy a niche in infrastructure development to compete with Japan that had a long infrastructural presence. Despite being often framed as competitors, both China and Japan demonstrated policy learning after the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway (HSR) bidding competition. China adopted policy learning in the implementation stage of Jakarta-Bandung HSR and Japan adopted policy learning in the second phase of Jakarta mass rapid transit (MRT) project.

Despite a clear and common threat from North Korea, why has the security cooperation between Japan and South Korea been less developed than the security cooperation between Australia and Japan? This paper explains this puzzle by focusing on policymakers’ perceptions of the rise of China. The paper concludes that, not only historical issues between Japan and South Korea, but different threat perceptions of China between Australia, Japan, and South Korea can best explain why Australia-Japan security cooperation has developed more than Japan-South Korea security cooperation in terms of the degree of institutionalization and the scope of cooperation. Throughout the post-Cold War era, Australian and Japanese policymakers were increasingly concerned about the rise of Chinese power and influence. This has ultimately led Tokyo and Canberra to strengthen their bilateral and trilateral cooperation with the United States as a means of hedging or balancing against the rise of China. On the other hand, South Korean policymakers were less concerned about China and more concerned about North Korean threat. Indeed, some Korean policymakers understood China as the indispensable power to maintain peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula. Thus, many Korean policymaker were reluctant to enhance security cooperation with Japan in areas beyond Northeast Asia. However, with rapidly changing security environments and the intensifying U.S.-Sino rivalry, as well as deteriorating relations with China, Korean policymakers’ perceptions of China have become increasingly closer to those of Australia and Japan. Accordingly, there has been growing momentum for stronger security cooperation between Japan and South Korea not only in Northeast Asia, but also in broader Indo-Pacific.