The Russian-Ukrainian war has highlighted the problem of the relationship between civic loyalty and religious identity, especially against the backdrop of the ambiguous attitude of Muslim countries and movements towards the conflict. In the article, I examine both the reaction on the Russian-Ukrainian war at the level of government structures in Muslim countries and at the level of transnational Islamic movements that have followers in Ukraine. I also examine how Muslim communities in Ukraine address this issue at the level of behavioral strategies, as well as theological and public discourse. Particular attention is paid to how situational identity is expressed in the clash of interests between religious and civil reference groups to which Muslims in Ukraine belong. In the article, I highlight three types of attitudes among Muslim communities towards the war in Ukraine: 1) neutrality (“This is not our war”); 2) support for Russia; 3) support for Ukraine. I conclude that Muslims in Ukraine, despite their diverse origins, form a loyal community to the state, with Muslims born in Ukraine showing the greatest civic loyalty.

For the first time in the Ukrainian historiography, the article analyses the achievements of scholars-members of the All-Ukrainian Learned Association of Oriental Studies (VUNAS) in studying the Afghanistan’s history and contemporary socio-political and socio-economic issues within the context of Ukrainian and Soviet Oriental studies in the 1920s and early 1930s. The paper shows that the short but vibrant history of the VUNAS was a time of formation of Ukrainian Orientalism, which had the potential to evolve into a distinct national academic school. Several generations of established and young scholars founded various focus areas in Oriental studies, resulting in numerous scientific publications. The journal Shìdnij svìt / Chervonyi Skhid played аn important role in the development of Ukrainian Orientalism. The VUNAS worked closely with the Ukrainian Eastern Chamber of Commerce, reflecting the practical orientation of oriental studies. Despite its dependence on all-Union orientalist centres and the growing influence of Marxist-Leninist methodology, the VUNAS in a short period of time has managed to become an authoritative and sought-after scientific and expert centre at the republican level that collaborated with many educational and scientific institutions in the USSR, Europe, and Asia. Afghanistan was not a central focus of the VUNAS’s activities. Despite the obvious ideological and opportunistic features, the professional and analytical publications of Ukrainian scholars, especially O. Gladstern and L. Velychko, retain historical and historiographical value. The solid factual basis, balanced evaluations, understanding of the historical conditions and peculiarities of Afghanistan’s development and its role in the history of the region and world geopolitics of the 19th and early 20th centuries matched the academic standards of both Soviet and global Orientalism of the time. They demonstrated the high potential of Ukrainian Orientalism and Afghan studies, potential that was ultimately stifled by Kremlin repression. Most VUNAS scholars and staff, as well as the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, were repressed on fabricated charges. Studying the Afghan-related legacy of VUNAS scholars may contribute to the establishing modern Ukrainian Afghan studies.

On one of Turkish towers of the outer front of Akkerman Fortress a vertical sundial with a southeast orientation was installed in the last quarter of the 15th century. This is one of the earliest examples of Islamic sundials, which survived in the territory of the former Ottoman Empire. The tower sundial performed a public function and regulated the daily religious life of the city. It was installed and adjusted in December. The tower was erected specifically for the subsequent placement of this device on its façade, that is why the Ottomans called it the “Clock tower”. The Akkerman sundial had two gnomons to indicate the time of the beginning of two afternoon prayers – the noon Zuhr and the evening Asr. The designer of the device was interested in fixing the time for prayers (religious time) according to the canonical recommendations of the hadiths and the Hanafi mazhab. It was impossible to determine the beginning of the Asr prayer in the period from September 3 to April 8 due to the south-east orientation of the sundial. However, throughout the year it was possible to fix the time of the noon prayer, and orient oneself in the days of the equinoxes and solstices. In 1796, the public sundial of Akkerman was damaged. Another slab was installed on the tower over the marble cadran with dismantled gnomons, there was the tugra of Sultan Selim III on it, but it was also removed from the façade in the first quarter of the 19th century.

The Koryo-saram associations in post-Soviet countries declared the revival of national traditions, customs, culture and language as a key objective in preserving Korean identity among their members. On the other hand, South Korean citizens, inspired by their country’s “success story”, readily embraced the role of cultural “authorities”. According to the researcher Valeriy Khan (2001), South Korean businessmen, professors and pastors believe that Koryo-saram should follow the patterns of behavior and consciousness of South Koreans. However, this raises an important question: who has the authority to define what is being “Korean” and what is not? And what is “Korean culture” itself? At the same time, integration into the globalized world has influenced South Korea’s social structure. In an effort to “embrace” ethnic Koreans – whether to address demographic decline or for other reasons – the South Korean government implements various programs that appeal to Korean identity values. Additionally, ROK laws regarding overseas ethnic Koreans grant certain advantages to Koryo-saram. Many ethnic Koreans arrive to the homeland of their ancestors primarily in search of a better life. Interestingly, Koryo-saram associations also emerged in South Korea. If preserving their “Korean-ness” within the ROK is not the point, then what does motivate the newcomers to unite? In order to address the questions raised above and examine the current state of relations between the Koryo-saram and their “ancestral home”, this paper analyzes relevant South Korean official discourses on “overseas Koreans”, explores testimonies on the acceptance of Koryo-saram by South Korean society, and revises evidence from Koryo-saram regarding how they perceive their position within South Korean society.

This exploratory case study investigates the dynamics of Ukrainian migration to Turkey following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, while addressing the migration dynamics prior to the invasion. Drawing on both literature review and a small-scale field research conducted in Istanbul from October 20–28, 2023, the paper explores Turkey’s policies towards foreigners, with a particular focus on Ukrainian nationals, and their potential future within the country. In the initial stages of this conflict, approximately 844,000 Ukrainian nationals entered Turkey. However, by May 2023, around 822,000 had left. Despite this decrease, Turkey continues to host a number of forcibly displaced Ukrainian persons, exceeding the figures in several European countries. Presently, it is estimated that around 38,500 Ukrainian nationals are living in Turkey, either holding valid residence permits or being under international protection. The research primarily aims to shed light on their future in the country by focusing first on the legal procedures and support measures directed towards them. Additionally, the article delves into the distinct resettlement processes for Turkic ethnic groups, particularly Meskhetian Turks and Crimean Tatars, within the broader scope of Ukrainian forced migration. These groups, while part of the larger displaced population, follow different legal procedures due to their ethnic ties with Turkey. The study also addresses the different types of residence permits chosen by Ukrainians and argues that many of these individuals are more accurately described as “refugee-like” rather than fitting the formal refugee definition under international law. By evaluating Turkey’s response to the Ukrainian migration crisis, this article aspires to serve as a foundational source on this topic, which has been scarcely addressed in the literature.

The article presents the political activity of Nur-Devlet – the Crimean and Qasim Khan. His image in the Crimean chronicles and in the contemporaries’ correspondence is analyzed. It has been suggested that before the enthronement, Nur-Devlet killed his older brother Devlet-Yar. The concepts of duumvirate in the Crimean Khanate and dating of Nur-Devlet’s second reign in 1477 are further developed. The key aspects of the khan’s foreign and internal policy are defined. The reasons that twice led to his dethronization have been traced. It has been found that Nur-Devlet was a prominent khan of the Qasim Khanate. Contemporaries recognized Nur-Devlet as a legitimate Crimean monarch because he was elected by Kurultai. Only in the 18th century his image was distorted. Hacı Geray didn’t create system of succession, so various applicants disputed his heritage. Before the enthronement, Nur-Devlet committed a seditious act. Most likely it was murder of Devlet-Yar, after which he could claim the throne on the principle of seniority. After long struggle, the khan established himself in power (first with co-ruler Meñli Geray, later as independent ruler). He had a conflict with Mamak and was focused on supporting of Poland and the Horde elite (the Kungrats and Akhmed-khan). The Crimean Tatars sought to become independent of Saray – therefore, the khan’s policy led to dethronization. Nur-Devlet had to seek refuge in Kaffa. There he became a participant of intrigues. It caused to imprisonment from which the Ottomans released him. In 1475 Nur-Devlet didn’t become khan for the second time. In fact, he received the Berat in 1477 and ruled with Hayder. The khan had tense relations with Eminek and the co-ruler, tried to collaborate with Casimir IV, lost power and was forced to flee. At the Muscovian service and as the Qasim Khanate ruler, Nur-Devlet proved himself capable military leader. Therefore, the khan can be characterized as an intermediate Crimean ruler, but an outstanding ruler of the Qasim Khanate.