Abstract The research aims to understand how neo-Aristotelian rhetoric can operate at the service of justice in contemporary society, governed by legal pluralism and so called “cultural relativism”. The research will adopt an interdisciplinary approach, which seeks to combine rhetorical studies with philosophy of law reflections. The contribution seeks to develop the concept of “mutual cognitive environment” borrowed from studies of C.W. Tindale, representing the possibility of sharing elements between different cognitive environments. In parallel with Tindale’s studies, the Italian legal philosopher V. Villa argues for the presence of sharing elements within different conceptual schemes. It is proposed to converge the studies of these two Authors in the direction proposed by M.C. Nussbaum, and to identify these elements of commonality with what the American Author calls “grounding experiences”, that is, universal spheres of experience comprehensible to every subject regardless of country of origin. Since rhetoric is a techné or art not only involving reason related to emotion but also ethical and pathic aspects of argumentation, it is argued that it is able to capture these universal spheres of experience in order to provide sharable elements over which to build bridges and secure rights between different cultures.

Abstract The principle of charity (PC) is widely discussed in the philosophy of language and argumentation theory. Typically, in these disciplines, it is considered justified for prudential and epistemic reasons. However, the limitation of such arguments lies in their dependence on the goals of the individual interpreter and the usefulness of PC to facilitate them. Ethical reasons based on broadly accepted principles of fairness and rights offer more universal justifications. Stevens (Charity for moral reasons?–a defense of the principle of charity in argumentation. Argumentation and Advocacy 57:67–84, 2021), divides those into the deontological, which refer to respect for dignity, and the consequential, which rely upon the duty to avoid harm. The goal of this paper is to provide a systematic conceptual framework, rooted in the Socratic conception of justice, which strengthens and elaborates these ethical reasons for PC. On a psychological view of harm, the consequential argument seems to suggest an obligation to interpret even the most extreme and harmful claims charitably. To avoid this problematic outcome, we propose an approach to harm as unjust damage, originating with Socrates and refined by Feinberg (The moral limits of the criminal law, vol 1. Oxford University Press, New York, NY; Oxford, UK, 1984). We also apply the distinction between compensatory justice and the principle of equal measure that Ajdukiewicz (On justice. Philosophy of Science 30(1):119–130, 2022) draws from Aristotle (Nicomachean ethics. Oxford University Press, London, UK,1966) to show that the charitable interpretation of arguments is the just desert of a dignified human being, due to their status as a rational subject. In this way, the deontological and consequential arguments put forward by Stevens are united into one ethical support for PC and the potential paradox of charity raised by Lewiński (The paradox of charity. Informal Logic 32(4):403–439, 2012) is dissolved.

Abstract In the growing literature on perceptual learning, most researchers assume it to be a form of skill. In this paper, we argue that at least some forms of perceptual learning are better understood as habits. Focusing on visual cases, we call these visual habits and, when widely shared in a cultural milieu, visual customs. We construe visual habits and customs as automatic enactments of fixed attentional patterns triggered by situational cues. We then consider two main implications of this view. First, perceptual learning is not always advantageous; in certain contexts, it may even hinder the subject. Second, visual habits reveal how historical biases shape perceptual attention.

Abstract The present article approaches the issue of self-narrative from the complex case of a “maximal self”. Conceived in contrast to the standard “minimal self”, the “maximal self” is marked by detailed verbal narration, multiple temporalities and multiple imaginary selves. The concept is developed and discussed through the complex case of self-narrative in the TV series Strappare Lungo I Bordi . After an outline of features of the “maximal self” (Sect. 1), I will work towards an account of the narrative effects of deploying the maximal self, such as “narrative repression”, where a very talkative narrator hides major issues of self-narrative in plain sight (Sect. 3), and “imaginary friends”, where imagined selves turn into dialogue partners that may well break through narrative repression (Sect. 5). In the final section, I will position the complexity of the maximal self in the contexts of research on self-narrative in philosophy and literary studies. The article contributes to debates around self-narratives, first, by expanding the conceptual repertoire of self-narratives with the notions of narrative repression and imaginary friends, and second, by showing how these concepts provide new ways for thinking about the links between narrators and emplotment in the process of self-narration.

Abstract In this paper I present and assess, firstly independently from one another, and then comparatively, the strengths and the weaknesses of three views on semantics: model-theoretic, truth-conditional, and proof-theoretic. The whole philosophical perspective from which I explore these three approaches is motivated by the investigation of the connection between truth and meaning, as well as by the understanding of the role and place of meaning within a physicalist outlook of the world. I also hint at how one can combine and coordinate the three approaches depending on the philosophical issues which those systems seek to model. In the process, I present the philosophical rich and nuanced positions of Donald Davidson who pioneered the Tarski-type truth-conditional semantics for natural languages, and of Wilfrid Sellars who made an essential contribution to the understanding of both semantic and pragmatic aspects of the relations between truth and meaning from an inferentialist (proof) based perspective. I offer a sketch of how certain problems within the Davidsonian framework can be fixed by using the Sellarsian framework. The paper ends with some critical points and challenges that I raise against the proof-theoretic (inferentialist) approach questioning its power to give a complete account of the issue concerning the relationship between truth, meanings, and rules.

This paper introduces a new format of academic debating called the “Cracovian debate,” designed with a single goal: the cognitive gain of all participants. Its cooperative nature supports this aim and distinguishes it from competitive debate formats. The Cracovian debate is based on the dialectical principle of charity, understood as a procedural framework for critical discussion. We begin by identifying the need for such a format, showing how the competitive structure of existing academic debates can hinder one of their key purposes—learning through the exchange of differing views. We then critique the metaphor of war that underlies adversarial debate and propose an alternative metaphor that encourages cooperation instead. Following this, we outline the Cracovian debate’s structure, goals, and flow, all derived from the dialectical principle of charity. We argue that this format complements competitive debating by fostering essential intellectual skills, including: (1) openness to new information and disconfirming feedback; (2) the ability to reconstruct opposing arguments in ways acceptable to their proponents; (3) careful argument analysis; (4) collaboration with people holding different viewpoints; and (5) depolarisation—viewing interlocutors as partners rather than opponents. The format has been tested in pilot research conducted between 2021 and 2024, which yielded valuable insights into debate dynamics and supported the initial hypotheses. The model now offers a foundation for further studies, such as corpus analysis, to evaluate its effectiveness in promoting argument quality, depolarisation, and cognitive outcomes. Appendix 1 presents the research results; Appendix 2 includes a facilitator’s manual for classroom use; and Appendix 3 provides a full transcript of a sample Cracovian debate.

Abstract While the psychological benefits of narrative practices are widely acknowledged, how—and which—modalities of self narration bring psychological gains, as well as for whom and in which contexts, are open questions. Taking its starting point in this lacuna, this article investigates potentialities of the practice of creative writing, with focus on the element of the creative and on the writing act. The article establishes as a problem in many existing accounts of creative writing interventions and narrative identity the lack of clear conceptualization of writing and of the adjective creative. The article shows that reconsideration of creative writing practices within a framework of 4E cognition can lead to more precision in this regard, arguing that such a framework invites distinguishing between two dimensions of the creative element: one of them cognitive-imaginative and the other to do with aesthetic form and craft. The framework, in addition, allows explaining how the dimensions of form/craft and of imagination are linked. The article improves our understanding of how the elements of the creative and of writing, as brough together in acts of creative writing, can enable writers to step out of harmful self-narratives, develop alternatives, and increase a sense of their lives as holding possibilities. The article also addresses practical, methodological, and theoretical implications of its insights about possibilities of creative-writing forms of self-narration for therapeutic contexts and beyond.

Abstract Throughout her vast body of non-fiction, Hilary Mantel’s narration is interwoven with personal perspectives, and experiential details, enriching “the life story she began in her [2003] memoir, Giving Up the Ghost” (Pearson 2023, p. xiii). As Mantel’s editor, Nicholas Pearson puts it, “a patchwork of a life revealing itself” emerges “in her journalism and essays” (2023, p. xi). Focusing specifically on Mantel’s portrayals of memory in selected passages from two inter-related non-fiction genres—namely, her memoir and two personal essays—this interdisciplinary discussion demonstrates how her self-narration in these differing contexts conveys this personal, experiential patchwork via varying viewpoints on the integral mnemonic components of autobiographical knowledge, prospective memory and human recall’s inherent creativity. The introspective, self-narrational content of memoir—which “derives from the French word for memory” (Couser 2012, p. 19)—is largely constituted by the author’s “memory-bound sense” of self-interpretation (Bartkevicius 1999, p. 134). My analytical framework thereby positions Mantel’s memoir, Giving Up the Ghost (2013), as the primary textual vehicle for her self-narration of personal memories and her understanding of memory processes more broadly. My analyses compare examples of Mantel’s mnemonic viewpoints in the memoir with other insights about memory that emerge in two of her personal essays—a genre widely perceived as the cousin of the memoir. These essays—“Touching Hands with the Lost” (2007) and “The Day is for the Living” (2017)—have been specifically chosen for their thematization of memory. Given the memoir’s analytical framing as the primary self-narrational source of Mantel’s mnemonic perspectives, I position her personal essays’ self-narration of memory processes within the realm of the paratextual—texts that surround, and have connections with the focal text, but are not constituent components of it. Drawing on cognitive research into the processing of memory—particularly autobiographical knowledge, prospective memory, imagination’s role in remembering, and the creativity of memory—my literary analyses highlight mnemonic congruences and discrepancies that emerge in these inter-related self-narrational contexts. I show how perspectival shifts in Mantel’s personal narration can both create possibilities and impose potential limitations pertaining to the textual representation of one’s personal memories and memory function more broadly, while also suggesting how these shifting self-narrational viewpoints may potentially impact the reader’s understanding of memory and remembering. Having highlighted some of the benefits and possible downsides of Mantel’s varying mnemonic viewpoints, my concluding analyses underscore the advantages of adopting a broad, dialogic readerly approach, wherein the memoir’s and the paratexts’ differing narrational mnemonic perspectives are perceived as neither didactic, nor discrete representations, but as an interwoven, self-narrational ‘patchwork’ of insights that collectively shed light on the hidden recesses of memory cognition and the subjective complexities of remembering.

Abstract Drawing principally on the work of Michel Foucault, this paper considers how the relations between habit and repetition have been construed in the exercise of different forms of power: disciplinary, pastoral, governmental, and algorithmic, for example. It does so by reviewing a range of the pathway metaphors that abound in the literature on habit, paying particular attention to how these differ in their interpretation of habit’s relations to repetition and the role they accord different authorities – theological, philosophical, psychological, sociological – in guiding the conduct of different social agents along the pathways that those authorities superintend. This involves considering how strategies for governing conduct are differentiated by the “politics of gapped time” according to which some populations but not others – differences constituted in a mix of classed, raced, and gendered terms – are accorded the ability to review and redirect their conduct when habit’s repetitions are periodically interrupted. These processes of habit formation, perpetuation, interruption, and re-formation are considered in the context of their operation in different social machineries and technologies.