Artificial intelligence governance in Latin America is emerging through new legislative proposals that increasingly draw on the European Union’s Artificial Intelligence Act. This article asks how Latin American countries are designing artificial intelligence oversight and enforcement mechanisms, and whether they are replicating the European institutional model for supervisory authorities. Existing scholarship has examined the circulation of European regulatory models in data protection law, but it has not yet adequately addressed how that influence operates in the early institutional design of artificial intelligence governance in Latin America. The article develops a comparative legal analysis of the Ibero-American context, with particular focus on Brazil and Chile, in order to assess how European regulatory templates are received, adapted, and operationalized. It argues that Latin American artificial intelligence regulation is likely to follow a pattern already observed in second-generation data protection reforms: the adoption of broad statutory frameworks inspired by European law, but reshaped by local institutional capacities, budgetary constraints, and regional political economy. The analysis shows that the central dilemma concerns whether to extend the mandate of existing data protection authorities to artificial intelligence or to establish specialized supervisory agencies. Brazil and Chile illustrate two especially significant pathways, given Brazil’s regional influence within BRICS and MERCOSUR and Chile’s role as an open economy deeply integrated into transnational digital governance networks. The article contributes to comparative scholarship on artificial intelligence regulation by showing how supervisory design becomes a crucial site of legal translation between European regulatory influence and Latin American institutional realities.

I would like to thank the editors of the University of Bologna Law Review for kindly inviting me to contribute these few pages, which, given the current circumstances, offer readers some rather somber reflections on the future of liberal constitutionalism.Over the last decade, constitutional law scholars have taken a systematic interest in the phenomenon of populism 1 and, above all, in its impact on the structures of constitutional democracy.In doing so, they have used various terms to describe this impact, including "authoritarian reversion," "constitutional retrogression," 2 "democratic backsliding," "constitutional rot," and "constitutional crisis." 3 In academic reflection, scholars have not been limited to dealing with the question of "How to Do Constitutional Theory While Your House Burns Down" 4 ; they have also been trying to address how to "repair" 5 constitutional democracies following an illiberal government.The debate on Poland is particularly instructive in this regard.Even countries regarded as "cradles" of liberal constitutionalism have suffered significant blows to their centuries-old structures.One need only think of what Brexit has meant for the UK constitutional system 6 or the disastrous effects of the two Trump presidencies in the United States. 7 Scholars are also divided on how to respond to these phenomena.On the one hand, some 1 See Corrias's remarks, made only nine years ago, on the lack of interest in populism among scholars of constitutional theory and constitutional law: Luigi Corrias, Populism in a Constitutional Key:

Two of the most important categories of government intervention in response to COVID-19 are business closures and mask mandates. The scientific literature supports the efficacy of mask-wearing to reduce the transmission of respiratory viruses (including COVID-19). However, the efficacy is greater in stopping outbound transmission (meaning that my mask protects you) than inbound transmission (meaning that my mask protects me). Evidence suggests that the full benefits to society of wearing masks are far greater than the full costs to society of wearing masks. The author argues that mask-wearing is far more cost effective than business closures in controlling the spread of COVID-19. Moreover, the author argues that highly infectious diseases have an externality dimension. The person infected with COVID-19 makes a decision regarding whether to wear a mask based on their own perceived costs and benefits of mask-wearing, but that decision has consequences for those they come in contact with: the infected person’s decision not to wear a mask imposes costs on others that are external to the infected person’s decision process not to do so. The author further argues that some possible methods by which to deal with such an external cost (individual negotiations, a tax on spreading COVID-19, or as subsidy for wearing masks) are impractical. This makes a mask-wearing government mandate economically valid.

In recent times, private industry has made great advancements in the commercialization of outer space. Such advancement represents a monumental shift from a period in which outer space activities were the business of national governments. However, the traditional interpretation of Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty still assigns responsibility for private space activities to States despite private industry’s increased ability to conduct outer space activities without government involvement or assistance. Ultimately, the blanket application of State responsibility associated with the traditional interpretation of Article VI may be unworkable or inequitable as private industry becomes a dominant force in outer space. Therefore, this Article evaluates the shortcomings of the traditional interpretation of Article VI and proposes a solution based on the customary law of State responsibility in order to ensure that both private and public actors in outer space are unhampered by an overly broad interpretation of Article VI.

This paper is a sociological and historical analysis of the Brazilian Administrative Council for Economic Defense - C.A.D.E. The main objective is to indicate that C.A.D.E. has become a reference for the development of the Brazilian System of Competition Defense due to institutional factors. I argue that a fundamental process of strengthening C.A.D.E.’s power was the institutional learning process incorporated at the structural level, which allowed the agency the ability to review its positions and constantly rebuild its structures and functions during different moments in Brazilian antitrust history. Besides the institutional learning, C.A.D.E. was also subject to different institutional influences over the past decades. A decisive moment was the 1990s when a national privatization program was carried out and the competitive protection system was articulated with regulated sectors and policies in Brazil. An important framework to understand these transformations are the systemic sociology of organizations and legal developmentalist literature. Both approaches – with different backgrounds – help to clarify that many institutions are derivative from previous ones, and that they are also embedded in certain operations related with society. In C.A.D.E.’s case, Brazil’s judiciary and executive branch played an important role in shaping the agency divisions and functions. The paper underscores four different moments of the agency: the Malaia law C.A.D.E.; the 1962 C.A.D.E. – a collegiate agency of the ministry of justice; the 1994 C.A.D.E. – an autonomous federal agency – and the new C.A.D.E. per the Antitrust Act. Finally, C.A.D.E.’s case confirms that the existence of previous institutions has become an indispensable assumption for their development in light of a continuous institutional learning process.

In the 21st Century, the commerce is not confined to the boundaries of any single-nation state. Hence, we have been witness to the transactions and disputes involving multiple parties and legal systems. Assuming that you are an in-house counsel in an MNE. Do you ever wonder whether the parent or sister companies' counsel or the opposing counsel may make contact with you about the arbitral proceedings that your client has never agreed on in the first place? Is it possible whether the non-signatory parties are bound by or benefit from the arbitration agreement, and what could be the possible legal grounds given the doctrine of privity of contract? This article discusses one of these grounds, the group of companies doctrine, in the context of Turkish and US legal systems comparatively and explores its applicability in light of precedents.

The ability to successfully discern and communicate the relevant aspects of a judicial opinion is a fundamental skill that legal professionals must have. Despite its importance, many in the legal arena lack the ability to effectively demonstrate this skill. Needless to say, law students suffer from this same shortcoming. After years of reading inadequate briefs submitted by lawyers and reviewing deficient submissions by law students, I developed an original case synthesis method. This method, titled the “Bell Case Synthesis Method,” teaches one how to select supporting cases and how to adequately explain the relevant aspects of selected cases. This original method has been tested for years and has proven to be quite valuable for memo and brief writing, as well as for the higher level thinking that is needed for success in law school and the practice of law. This article will benefit a broad audience, including lawyers, law students, paralegals, law clerks, inmate counsel and legal educators. In addition, it is timely, given the recent emphasis on producing practice-ready law school graduates.

Money laundering is the clandestine movement of cash from one region to another without notifying it to the government authorities with the purpose of evading taxes, disguising ill-gotten incomes, and converting illegally earned money into legitimate assets. Money laundering involves three steps: the placement of cash into a foreign bank, performing transactions as layers of cash, and then capitalizing the withdrawn cash into legitimate investments. The failure of financial institutions, including banks, in detecting the laundered cash is a major reason for money laundering. On the other hand, round tripping, cash structuring, bank controlling, N.G.O. funding, and foreign exchange agencies’ illegal money transferring activities are some of the methods of performing money laundering, which in the long run cause disastrous effects to the economy, especially on the private sector and emerging markets. Money laundering also invites social costs, which expedite the elevation of other serious crimes such as drug trafficking, smuggling, arms trafficking, and the financing of terrorism. Through effective legislation and implementation of anti- money laundering laws, as well as cooperating with international anti-money laundering agencies, the illicit crime of money laundering can be prevented at both regional and global levels.

When aprivate party enter into arbitration with a State Owned Enterprise (S.O.E.), there always a concern as to how the arbitral award might be enforced. It becomes even more worry some if the assets of the S.O.E. are mainly located in its own country or in a country, which practices absolute immunity principle and treats S.O.Es as part of a State. Such practice creates an uncertainty for the private parties who are doing businesses with S.O.Es. On a practical side it is also well known that S.O.Es are big market player as buyer or seller and therefore they cannot be ignored at least in commercial sense. This paper analyses the two distinctive approaches adopted by courts in the U.K. and in Hong Kong on a similar set of facts in which the same group of S.O.Es were involved. As both Hong Kong and the U.K. are part of the same common law tradition, this paper also attempts to highlight that courts are now ready to see S.O.Es as a pure commercial entity rather that as an instrumentalities of a State so far as enforcement of arbitral awards are concerned.