American Accounting Association

Psychological evidence indicates that decision quality declines after an extensive session of decision-making, a phenomenon known as decision fatigue. We study whether decision fatigue affects analysts' judgments. Analysts cover multiple firms and often issue several forecasts in a single day. We find that forecast accuracy declines over the course of a day as the number of forecasts the analyst has already issued increases. Also consistent with decision fatigue, we find that the more forecasts an analyst issues, the higher the likelihood the analyst resorts to more heuristic decisions by herding more closely with the consensus forecast, by self-herding (i.e., reissuing their own previous outstanding forecasts), and by issuing a rounded forecast. Finally, we find that the stock market understands these effects and discounts for analyst decision fatigue.

Founders make significant financial contributions in creating US private foundations. Therefore, we hypothesize that founders monitor foundation operations and predict a positive relation between founder participation and foundation efficiency. In contrast, we propose competing hypotheses in examining the relation between other family member participation and foundation efficiency. Other family member participation has the potential to enhance foundation efficiency if founders are able to transfer their philanthropic values to their progeny. However, other family participation also has the potential to diminish foundation efficiency if the founders’ withdrawal leaves their foundations without true principals to monitor managerial actions. We find that both founder and other family participation are positively associated with foundation efficiency. We also provide limited evidence that the positive association between founding family participation and foundation efficiency is transferred to second generation family members, but is not transferred to subsequent generations.

Abstract This paper examines the influence of dividend covenants in corporate bonds on investment and operating performance. Prior literature analytically demonstrates that by limiting dividend distribution to shareholders, dividend restrictions effectively place a minimum on investment expenditures. This suggests a positive relation between dividend covenants and investment. The literature also conjectures that the influence of dividend covenants on investment (1) mitigates the under‐investment problem associated with debt financing; or (2) exacerbates over‐investment. We empirically document that the presence of dividend covenants is associated with a higher level of investment and poorer future performance. Further analyses confirm that the higher level of investment is consistent with dividend covenants exacerbating over‐investment, not mitigating under‐investment. Our results shed light on the cost aspect of dividend covenants proposed in prior literature.

SUMMARYOn September 24, 2015 the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) solicited public comments on a proposed Accounting Standards Update of the FASB Accounting Standards Codification. The stated objective is to improve the effectiveness of footnote disclosures to financial statement users. The focus of the Update is to clarify the way materiality should be considered when assessing requirements for providing information in the notes. The comment period ended on December 8, 2015. This commentary summarizes the contributors' views on these amendments.Data Availability: The exposure draft of Proposed Accounting Standard Update: Notes to Financial Statements (Topic 235): Assessing Whether Disclosures Are Material is available at: http://www.fasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c= Document_C&pagename=FASB%2FDocument_C%2FDocumentPage&cid=1176166402325

With scarce empirical support, prior literature argues that managers tend to withhold good news and promote bad news to preserve their bargaining power against labor unions. This paper provides empirical evidence of this rarely supported argument. Using comprehensive firm-level data from South Korea, where labor unions have a long tradition of making credible threats, we find that overall disclosure frequency is negatively related to labor union strength, and that this relation is more pronounced in firms with good news. We also find that firms with strong labor unions withhold good news during the labor negotiation period and release it in a gradual fashion afterward and that this pattern is more prominent than that of firms with weak or no unions, implying that managers time news disclosures according to bargaining schedules to achieve better outcomes in labor negotiations. These results are robust to various sensitivity tests.Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2075 .This paper was accepted by Mary Barth, accounting.