Canadian Forces College

LAY SUMMARY This article examines shortcomings of culture change initiatives within the Department of National Defence (DND) and Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). It argues that current one-size-fits-all approaches fail to address unique cultural dynamics in each institution. Using critical theory and various analytic models, the article highlights how social constructions of power contribute to persistent inequities in military and defence environments. By exploring militarized masculinities and intersectional, institutional, and social identity theories, it demonstrates differences between DND and CAF that need to be considered in culture change strategies. Additionally, analytic models such as Richard Scott’s institutional analysis reveal distinct organizational functions shaping everyday interactions within each entity, just as applications of the gender-based analysis plus (GBA Plus) tool uncovers inequitable experiences based on unique social hierarchies of DND versus CAF. Thus, effective culture change requires tailored approaches that recognize distinctions within DND and CAF. The article argues that to foster equity and belonging, diverse theoretical frameworks and tools are needed to address specific challenges faced by DND members and CAF personnel. A deeper understanding of these localized issues is essential for achieving desired cultural transformations.

Artificial intelligence (AI) can be seen as a buzzword. The latest versions of our favorite cell phones all feature some form of AI as part of their market strategy. But as technologists, researchers, students, problem solvers, and educators, we need to see past the hype to understand its applications and its potential.

Though the same descriptors have been applied to Wagner Group and US/Western Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), this article differentiates the two experiences to better appreciate Wagner Group’s unique characteristics. To make this differentiation, the article examines the distinctions between defensive and offensive violence, the access to crewed weapons, and an integrated team approach. In this way, the article presents Wagner Group as offensively minded, kitted out with crewed weapons, and operating outside of an integrated team. The article closes with resulting questions to consider regarding Russia’s stance toward weaponry and how Wagner Group’s characteristics might have contributed to the June 2023 uprising.

Abstract What rules of fighting (armed combat) does Hinduism espouse? The sacred texts are the pre-eminent sources, so these need to be summarized and compared to each other. Teaching mostly through stories, the texts describe deeds of people (especially warriors), gods and demons to show how to behave and not to behave in war. While the injunctions in the Mahābhārata and Arthaśāstra are already covered in the literature, including in this journal, this present work examines the Purāṇas in depth. After a thorough search of all relevant passages, we find the Purāṇas to be very similar to the epics in terms of the list of prescribed and proscribed actions in war that they provide. We also make comparisons to international humanitarian law (IHL); as in the epics, we find that the Purāṇas contain many similar provisions to those found in IHL but that they go above and beyond what is required by IHL in urging that fighting be fair at the tactical level (i.e., between individual fighters). Being religious texts, the Purāṇas also deal with the afterlife consequences of both righteous and unrighteous combat.

Abstract Largely uncredited in public media and academic literature, the United Nations has used armed force frequently in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (drc), probably more than in any other UN peacekeeping operation. Though unheralded, this saved lives and protected cities and towns. However, attacks on civilians in drc are so frequent and widespread that many times the mission has been unable to respond in a timely fashion. To save more lives and gain trust in the local population, a much greater UN effort is needed to support robust measures, with more resources, determination and accountability (for inaction as well as action), even as “donor fatigue” sets in for a mission that has been operating since 1999. Still, it is important for peacekeeping as a whole to recognize and learn from cases of use of force against Congolese illegal armed groups (iag s), like the adf, cndp, fdlr, frpi, and M23. These cases show some remarkable successes, including removing some major poc threats, fracturing rebel groups, increasing UN deterrence, and enhancing the rule of law in the still untamed “Wild East” of the immense African country.

<p> </p> <p>As Canada’s federal police force celebrates its 150th anniversary, the past and future of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police/Gendarmerie royale du Canada (RCMP/GRC) is coming under intense scrutiny. Dogged by historical legacies and endemic external and internal controversies, the gendarmerie is a national police force with military characteristics that serves the Canadian state loyally and professionally. The anachronistic connection with horses in the English name has long outlived its usefulness and it is time that Canada’s federal police force embraced more French, greater inclusivity in the ranks, better accountability, and a functional approach to provision of national security policing at higher levels. A new refresh requires rebranding into a true gendarmerie adequately manned, trained, and equipped for the task, already anticipated in the French name. Refocusing on federal roles at the national level without the distraction of contract policing would give the RCMP/GRC greater purpose and coherence. The aligned symmetry of a Royal Canadian Gendarmerie/Gendarmerie royale du Canada (RCG/GRC) provides a basis for necessary change to happen and reconciliation to begin.</p>

Ever since Canada failed to be elected to the United Nations Security Council as a non-permanent member in June 2020, there have been calls for Ottawa to realign Canadian foreign policy with the national interest. It is hardly the first time that such a plea has been made: critics advocated similarly in the 1870s, the 1930s, the 1960s, and the 2000s. Yet, in each case, they recommended a different policy solution. Having reviewed these episodes, this essay concludes that the real debate in Canadian foreign policy has never been about the national interest, per se. To borrow from the language of strategy, Ottawa’s critics have merely privileged different “ways” of achieving the same “ends,” while everyone yearns for the “means” to do more.