Fridtjof Nansen Institute

Abstract Background The aim of the energy policy proclaimed by all German federal governments since the Fukushima incident of 2011 is a fundamental transformation of the national energy system towards renewable (excluding nuclear) energies. However, since German energy policy is embedded into a European multilevel governance system, not only national but also European forces shape the German Energiewende . Main text By analysing the complex political and legal interlinkages, this study identifies fits and misfits between national and European policy initiatives in functionally related energy fields. First, it finds broad coherence between the EU and German energy transition objectives. Objectives deviate in one area, the phase-out of nuclear power in Germany which is not paralleled at the EU level. Secondly, it observes more extensive misfits around the preferred policy instruments that have pressured Germany to change. This concerns instruments tied to the support of renewable energy and the operation of electricity networks in support of the transition. Here, the German policy approach saw a misfit with internal energy market regulations in the EU. Conclusions Whereas European adaptation pressure caused a shift in the German renewable energy support policy, resulting in a slowdown in the expansion of renewable energies, EU pressure to end coal subsidies helped accelerate the phase-out of coal in Germany.

Abstract Extant understandings of how global governance emerges are heavily agentic in character. In this article, we first draw on studies of actor recognition to study how peace and reconciliation diplomacy emerged in Norway and beyond. With the emergence of the League of Nations, space opened up both for societal peace activity and for third-party diplomatic agency and the interstice between them grew denser. As the Cold War waned, it grew even denser. We then go beyond the question of actor recognition by ontically privileging not actors, but relations. This allows us to discuss the emergence of global governance as increasingly dense relations between actors that added up to more than the sum of its parts—resulting in the establishment of peace and reconciliation diplomacy as a new field of global governance.

ABSTRACT The topic of land-use pressures from wind power and second homes is crucial due to the significant challenges they pose to land use, biodiversity and wilderness areas. But the local legitimacy each kind of development enjoys, stemming to a large degree from the respective planning processes they go through, can be starkly different. This article investigates legitimacy and planning outcomes by comparing top-down and bottom-up planning processes for wind power and second homes development in a Norwegian municipality. The study employs energy justice theory, focusing on recognition, procedural, and distributive justice, and uses a comparative case study approach to analyse the planning processes and outcomes. The findings reveal that, compared to wind power development, second homes development is perceived as fairer and more beneficial for the local community. Second homes are perceived to provide local income, employment, and have positive economic ripple effects, while wind power projects are considered to mainly benefit national energy needs and owners of the plants. The top-down planning process for wind power leads to increased resistance and perceptions of unfairness, whereas the bottom-up approach for second homes is seen as more inclusive and legitimate. These differences, combined with local benefits of second homes development, helps to explain the widespread opposition to wind power development and the strong support for second homes in many municipalities, even though second homes development has resulted in the greatest loss of wilderness areas in Norway.

ABSTRACT The 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the 2020 Covid‐19 pandemic triggered large economic stimulus packages in most countries. While aimed primarily at saving the domestic economy from widespread bankruptcies and mass unemployment, these stimulus packages also offered governments windows of opportunity for pivoting toward decarbonization. Drawing on a new dataset covering 40 of the world's largest economies' stimulus spending during the two crises, this article addresses two questions: (1) Did the allocation toward green investments increase in government stimulus packages from the GFC to the Covid‐19 downturn? (2) What country characteristics are associated with green stimulus spending in each crisis? Grounded in distributive‐conflict theory, we hypothesize that the relative strength of green and fossil stakeholders in the economy is decisive in shaping climate policy outcomes. Consistent with this theory, our empirical analysis reveals (1) a (small) uptick in major economies' net green spending from 2008 to 2020 and (2) that robust green industrial interests strongly predict cross‐country variation in green stimulus spending. In contrast, countries' levels of fossil fuels production did not exert a proportional influence. Notably, our research also uncovers a pattern of path dependency, with countries leading in green stimulus spending during the GFC maintaining this position also through the Covid‐19 pandemic. Overall, this article contributes new insights to the comparative political economy literature on climate change by analyzing how economic recessions affect the energy transition and how economic structures drive cross‐country variation in investment‐based climate policy.

As European countries seek to increase the share of renewable energy production, local opposition to energy transition processes has escalated in many places. Drawing on energy justice scholarship, this article examines how local experiences shaped opposition to the one-stop-shop approach to wind energy permitting in a Norway. This question is examined thorough an in-depth case study of a wind power licensing process in Sirdal municipality, which seemed like a favourable location for a wind farm. While confirming earlier research showing that the municipalities have an informal veto power in the licensing process, this study illuminates the shortcomings of such a non-statutory approach to municipal influence in the licensing process. In Sirdal, having an informal veto power and the ear of the licensing authority apparently worked well until the licence was granted, but the top-down licensing system and informal consultation practices proved inadequate in securing democratic legitimacy and social acceptance for wind power development over the long-term. The sale of Tonstad wind power plant to foreign investors and these owners' unwillingness to fulfil the obligations of an economic compensation agreement with the municipality exacerbated the municipality's feelings of being deceived and left powerless. The study concludes that any assessment of energy justice must not only consider the different tenets of justice but also the temporal dimension and long-term consequences for local communities. • A one-stop-shop permitting system increased local opposition to wind power. • Municipal influence only lasted until the wind power licence was granted. • Changing ownership of the wind park negatively affected local acceptance. • Assessments of energy justice require a temporal and multi-level analysis. • Local participation may accelerate rather than slowing down energy transitions.

A core element in the EU’s Governance regulation (Regulation 2018/1999) is the regular production of National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs). The process involves a dialog with the European Commission intended to lead to changed and improved plans. This new policy mechanism has been characterised as ‘harder soft governance’. Although member states are not obliged to specify binding targets for renewables and energy efficiency, they must report their contribution to fulfilling the overall European target. Furthermore, they must develop a plan for how to reach these contributions (the NECP). In this article we discuss NECP implementation in the first round of establishing NECPs in two traditional climate-policy frontrunners in the EU: Germany and Sweden. A key finding is that both countries did not perceive the NECP process as particularly important for national policy-making. Central targets and measures were mainly based on policies developed independently of the Governance Regulation. However, interaction with the Commission was more important for ‘reluctant’ Sweden than ‘Governance supporter’ Germany. Our study shows that both countries eventually produced the required contributions and plans, lending support to the argument that this new regulation has some ‘harder soft governance’ elements that will influence member states.

Abstract Voluntary Sustainability Standards (VSS) are transnational governance instruments that can be leveraged to pursue sustainable development in global value chains. They have proliferated since the 1990s in terms of their number and the share of global production they govern. This paper shares some key insights arising from the considerable body of literature that has analysed the role of these instruments for sustainable production and trade. First, it introduces VSS, traces the evolution of their adoption and takes stock of the research on their sustainability impacts. Next, some major developments in the VSS realm are discussed, related to public policy and the emergence of national sustainability standards. The paper then zooms in on the challenges and limitations of VSS in transforming value chains towards sustainability, focusing on the shortcomings related to inclusiveness and the problems arising from their proliferation. The paper concludes by distilling recommendations on overcoming these challenges, especially in light of recent policy developments, and outlines what different stakeholders can do to make VSS more effective and inclusive instruments for sustainable value chains.