Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Scholars of environmental politics and voting often use natural disasters as a proxy for environmental shocks. However, the simultaneously human and natural origins of these disasters muddle their connection to political outcomes. We look at an overtly human-caused disaster − earthquakes induced by gas drilling in the Netherlands − to see whether it correlates with pro-environment voting. Combining polling station-level voting data with precisely calculated measures of earthquake impact, we find that Green Party vote share is higher in affected locations, especially in provinces adjacent to but removed from the drilling due to non-linear effects of disasters on voting. These findings suggest that environmental shocks strengthen preferences for Green parties, a relationship that will become increasingly important as environmental conditions worsen.

Border fortifications have proliferated in recent decades. One prominent rationale given for fortifying the border is to limit illegal incursions, but how successful are fortifications at this task? Current theories fail to account for the fact that illicit actors may be strategic in their choices in order to influence state policies. I accommodate this strategic behaviour in a formal model to demonstrate that this capacity for strategy means that border fortifications are rarely optimal. In the model, states can learn the capacities of illicit actors through the latter’s past transgressions to inform border security policy. Anticipating this, illicit actors may moderate their actions to discourage fortifications. States therefore only secure their borders when illicit actors are powerful enough such that the threat of fortifications does not deter them into moderation. This reveals an inefficiency in border security that gives new insight into the dynamics of border politics.

ABSTRACTOnly one trip planner is needed for a group of friends to enjoy a pleasant trip and only one country is needed to coordinate on international talks that can be beneficial for all participating countries. We study a dynamic volunteering dilemma game in which two players choose to volunteer or wait given there have not been any volunteering actions in the past. The players can be procrastinators and the benefits of volunteering arrive later than the costs. We fully characterize the stationary Markov Strotz‐Pollak equilibria. When the cost of volunteering is sufficiently small or agents' present‐bias parameters are sufficiently close, there always exists an equilibrium in which both players randomize. This equilibrium features stochastic delay, and the delay is exacerbated if one or both agents become more present‐biased. However, if the agents differ significantly in their present‐bias parameters, this difference may act as a 'natural coordination device' and the unique stationary equilibrium predicts that only the less severe procrastinator volunteers, and this may result in an even quicker provision compared with the case of two exponential discounters.

Abstract This article introduces the new International Tax Institutions (ITI) database, a unique collection of the most relevant statutory tax indicators for the whole world. It includes taxes on corporate and personal (earned and capital) income, consumption taxes, as well as anti-tax avoidance rules (thin-capitalization and earnings-stripping rules, CFC rules and transfer pricing regulations). Our main objective is to provide a broad overview on key features, (time- and cross-sectional) variation, and regularities in the data, with a focus on international tax issues. We present a vast number of new variables – such as effective tax and institutional measures – that allow for a comprehensive description and comparison of countries’ taxes and tax systems.

Leaders from across the political spectrum are often accused of manipulating the media to their benefit. Contemporary developments have proliferated the number of media sources available to citizens. We argue that new, independent media sources may actually be a boon for vulnerable leaders. In a simple formal model, we give citizens a limited capacity for attention and allow states to expend effort to selectively obstruct information sources. We demonstrate a phenomenon of “displacement”—where the presence of alternative sources of information can actually reduce the required effort for states to succeed in obfuscating citizen learning. This is because alternative media sources mean that states only need to divert citizen attention without resorting to complete obstruction, reducing the necessary effort expended. This result advances our understanding of how contemporary states navigate increasingly complex media landscapes. We supplement the model with discussions of the media policies of Malaysian and Turkish governments.

Abstract This chapter examines Pillar One of the OECD proposal to address changes in the allocation of taxing rights of business profits at an international level. This initiative comes as a reaction to the tension generated by the inadequacies of the international tax regime that are significantly exacerbated by the digitalization of the economy, and aims at achieving a long-standing, consensus-based solution on the matter. The chapter analyses issues related to the outdated character of the international tax regime, the formation of the Unified Approach advocated by the OECD in which Pillar One is integrated as a possible solution, the specific components of the proposal, and evaluates Pillar One from a normative standpoint and its compromise-based rationale.