New England Law

This chapter reviews how the recent sanctions have been enforced, both by domestic authorities and through multilateral cooperation. chapter also examines strategies taken by would-be sanctions evaders to conceal their attempts to circumvent the broad sanctions. Enforcement plays a key role in the ability of the sanctioning jurisdictions to effectively implement their sanctions and incentivize change in the behavior of the target or by parties indirectly affected by the sanctions.

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New England Law Review. Vol. 51(3)(2018). While federal constitutional law has changed over the two hundred plus years since the framing, relatively little of that development was the result of the formal amendment process prescribed by Article V. Rather, significantly more change to our understanding of numerous constitutional provisions has come about through litigation over the meaning of the text. Regardless of the source of constitutional alteration, we regard the result as valid constitutional law. But that difference in source has fueled a great many efforts to legitimize judicial interpretation as a mode of constitutional change—to legitimize, that is, constitutional development by the least representative, least accountable department of the federal government. State constitutions, on the other hand, tell a different story. In the state constitutional context, the tension between litigation-driven change and amendment-driven change is diminished by the fact that formal amendment is a more realistic proposition that it is under the U.S. Constitution. This piece is an introduction to a Symposium on the relationship between state courts and constitutional change under state constitutions. The Symposium focuses on Jonathan Marshfield’s article, “Courts and Informal Constitutional Change in the States,” and includes responsive essays by Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Associate Justice Scott Kafker, Justin Long, James Gardner, Yaniv Roznai, and Robert Williams.

In 2015, Congress passed a law regarding victims who become pregnant from rape. Specifically, the new federal law offers funding incentives to encourage state legislatures to enact laws related to parental rights when rapists impregnate their victims. Since that time, and even prior, many states have been proposing and passing legislation on the topic. This article addresses the ways that such laws ignore the important constitutional rights of rape victims and how these laws create rather than prohibit parental rights for rapists by assuming, incorrectly, that parentage is caused by DNA alone. This article tracks the law in Massachusetts after an impregnated fourteen year-old rape victim was forced by the criminal court judge presiding over her rape case to participate in family court for 16 years with her attacker. The victim objected to the jurisdiction of the family court on the grounds that the criminal court judge had no authority to send her to family court and that the rapist had no parental rights to adjudicate in any court. She also argued that she had a constitutional right not to be forced by the government to participate in family court proceedings for one day, much less 16 years, with the man who raped her.