Royal Danish Defence College

This study examines psychological processes during narrow-task artificial intelligence (NT-AI) implementation in radiological practice, focusing on how professionals cope with tensions arising from discrepancies between intended and experienced expertise practices with NT-AI. Such tensions may hold a particular threat to professionals’ sense of agency (SoA) and are therefore particularly important to address in a process of AI implementation. Using ethnographic methods across two Danish hospitals, we observe professionals’ typical coping strategies to core experiences of tension-based challenges: disruption, re-validation, vigilance, rejection, and practice transformation. We analyze these coping responses based on a typology of four distinct ideal types of human-AI collaboration: Parallel expertise, Forwarded expertise, Augmented expertise, and Collective expertise. Our study contributes to a nuanced understanding of human-AI collaboration by demonstrating how professionals adaptively navigate between these ideal types to transform their professional practice and reconstitute their SoA.

ABSTRACT The growing fascination with so‐called emerging and disruptive technologies (EDT) such as artificial intelligence (AI) is already transforming military affairs in profound ways, even if these technologies are not yet properly integrated into military practices and organizations. To make sense of this, the paper examines the sociotechnical imaginaries (STIs) tied to military EDTs and considers their broader political implications. Concretely, it interrogates two distinct albeit interrelated perspectives on how war and military affairs are currently being (re)imagined in light of new technological developments. These are: (1) the emergence of new forms of agency that arise in the interplay between combatants and AI and (2) new forms of political authority that emerge from the growing influence of technology corporations on STIs of war and military affairs. Together, these examples showcase the multifaceted ways in which STIs become entangled with and shape technopolitical transformations in the context of war and military affairs.

This research explores the evolution of policing practices in the digital era, focusing on the rise of digital police patrols as a transformative aspect of contemporary law enforcement, which prompts an emerging online police métier . Mediated by digital technology, policing in online spaces creates radically new opportunities and challenges for police officers and has further led to significant changes to the traditional police métier. The study, based on qualitative research of Norwegian digital police patrols, establishes a framework to comprehend the shifts in the police métier resulting from the transition to online policing. Three identified trajectories of change include the de-monopolization of online policing, the de-acceleration of online policing emphasizing reflection over decisive action, and the emergence of the infotainment cop , transforming online police officers into semi-celebrity figures. Collectively, these changes signify a comprehensive de-territorialization of the police métier in the digital era, challenging traditional policing strategies in the online world.

Arktisk Råd, og dets arbejdsgruppe Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR) og det uafhængige Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF) udgør de otte arktiske staters væsentligste organer for samarbejde vedrørende beredskab. Dog beskæftiger ingen af dem sig med militære forhold eller såkaldt hård sikkerhed, hvilket fra begyndelsen har været holdt ude af samarbejdet i Arktisk Råd. Denne artikel diskuterer – med udgangspunkt i Kongeriget Danmark som case – hvordan samfundssikkerhed kan forstås i en arktisk kontekst og undersøger, hvordan beredskab i regionen er organiseret med særligt henblik på funktionen og betydningen af Arktisk Råd og tilgrænsende samarbejdsorganisationer i et fremtidsperspektiv. Metodisk tilgås emnet ud fra de fire faser i katastrofehåndteringsmodellen: Forebyggelse, Forberedelse, Respons og Retablering. Resiliensbegrebet anvendes, som det er beskrevet dels i den bredere forebyggelses- og beredskabslitteratur, dels i NATO’s resiliensdagsorden, til at diskutere samfundssikkerhedsbegrebets relevans for Arktisk Råd. Abstract in EnglishSocietal Security – a New Agenda for the Arctic Council?The Arctic Council and its working group Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR) and the independent Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF) constitute the eight Arctic states’ most important fora for collaboration on emergency preparedness. Neither, however, are concerned with military affairs or so-called hard security, which from the outset has been exempt from the Arctic Council. This article discusses how societal security may be interpreted in an Arctic context and investigates how preparedness is organized in the region with a special emphasis on the function and meaning of the Arctic Council and other collaborative organizations in a future perspective. The four phases of the disaster management cycle: Prevention, Preparedness, Response and Recovery guide the analysis, and the concept of resilience as found in the broader literature on prevention and preparedness as well as the current NATO agenda is applied to discuss the role of societal security for the Arctic Council.

For public organizations to harvest the benefits of co-producing emergency response, incident commanders must trust citizens to carry out hazardous tasks under immense pressure. This article examines how non-profit organizations (NPOs) serve as trust-supporting infrastructures that facilitate the co-production of emergency response operations. Reporting on a qualitative study of emergency management co-production in Denmark and Norway, it shows how NPOs provide temporary structures, procedures, and practices for registering, leading and commanding engaged citizens that enhance trust and thus sustain co-production of emergency response. Comparing intermediated co-production to organized volunteerism, however, the study also shows how intermediated co-production suffers from inherent trust limitations. Eliciting the role of NPOs as trust-building intermediaries, the study contributes with new knowledge for scholars, practitioners and policymakers involved in issues of co-production within and beyond the field of emergency management.

Abstract While united in initial responses to Putin’s aggression in Ukraine, NATO members face challenges as the alliance adapts to a significantly worsened security environment. Although Russia’s war in Ukraine provided NATO with a unifying threat, we argue that external factors are not sufficient to maintain its cohesion. This forum contribution develops a conceptual tool to assess alliance cohesion across both political and military dimensions, thus highlighting the agency of the “architects”, “bricoleurs”, and “agnostics” in shaping NATO’s internal politics. This approach allows for estimating the degree to which allies coordinate their political objectives, as well as the effectiveness of strategies to achieve them. To estimate the strength of alliance cohesion, we introduce four cohesion drivers—security threats, norms, institutions, and leadership—and assessment criteria. This article outlines three scenarios modelled on the war in Ukraine, suggesting that alliance cohesion suffers the most during prolonged security crises. Using this assessment tool can provide the “architects” of European security with ideas for policies aimed at strengthening NATO cohesion.

ABSTRACT At a time of heightened sensitivity to the military’s role in national security and domestic politics, senior officers are more likely than ever to “play the neutral card” – i.e. to act in ways that simply emphasize their supposedly apolitical role. Two of the dominant schools of civil-military relations theory insist that this is virtually the only card officers can play, positing in effect that any political influence by officers on policy-making is inappropriate. However, a third tradition has long argued the opposite: officers do and should engage in consistent dialogue with civilian principals in the hope of producing better policy outcomes. This article adjudicates between the three perspectives, finding that while the third perspective is most persuasive, it too suffers from serious limitations. We provide a new perspective on how senior officers influence their political environments, highlighting their power and the range of options open to them.

In 2014, Denmark launched its first national strategy for cyber resilience of critical infrastructure (CI). The ‘National Cyber and Information Security Strategy’ and its two subsequent successors from 2018 and 2022 follow the Sector Responsibility Principle (SRP). According to the principle, the state distributes the task of achieving and maintaining societal resilience to individual sectors, for example, health, energy supply, or finance, while maintaining central oversight and responsibility for implementation. Denmark is not alone in taking this approach: in fact, all the Nordic countries have applied some version of SRP. Danish governments have over the last decade taken significant steps to implement and facilitate societal cyber resilience through development of institutions, strategies, legal measures, and public-private partnerships (PPP). That said, Danish governments have gone less far than, for example, Finland’s to take measures to achieve efficacy, and significant weaknesses are still left to be addressed. The article outlines the principles behind SRP and, using mainly Danish examples, demonstrates why implementation of SRP is both legally, organisationally, and echnically difficult but also politically ‘unpleasant’. Resilience is desirable but also a tedious chore. An inherent risk with SRP at both strategic, political level and individual private or public entity level are incentives to strive for legal compliance, rather than operational efficacy and act more according to a ‘sector responsibility avoidance principle’. In that light, the article outlines how the SRP has been implemented in Denmark so far, along with examples of both what drives the effort and challenges to successful SRP implementation.

ABSTRACT The reasons for Russia’s attack on Ukraine have become a much-debated topic. In this introductory article to this special issue, we identify three types of explanations that focus, respectively, on (1) Putin’s imperial ambitions, (2) domestic factors inside Russia, and (3) external pressures. We show that each perspective offers valuable insights but fails to provide a convincing stand-alone account. Building on this, we put forward an integrated, multi-causal explanation of why Russia attacked Ukraine in February 2022.