Информационные ресурсы Китая для освещения национальной оборонной доктрины и реализации стратегии национальной безопасности

Military doctrine represents military thought and a common language of a military organization. It consists of a doctrinal troika - theory, culture, and authority -which is an important source of command, education, and change for any military organization. Conceptually, military doctrine is controversial; on the one hand, it is binding in a military organisation, but on the other hand, the dynamic nature of the environment requires rationality in its application. In this paper, we examine the ontological question »what is military doctrine«. The main contribution of the paper is to clarify the essence of military doctrine and to stimulate critical thinking among military commanders about its relevance for the coherent functioning of the military organisation.

It may be useful at the outset to define our terms. By military doctrine I shall understand the principles which are laid down as true concerning the deployment and employment of military force in the event of war. In the case of NATO they are embodied in MC 14/3 and amplified by authoritative spokesmen for the North Atlantic Council, the Secretary General of NATO or SACEUR. The doctrine typically establishes the relationship between challenge and response and among the various measures available for response. It should give general guidance to operational planning and the force planning process as well as provide a bridge between foreign policy and military dispositions. By arms control I shall understand measures — tacit or explicit; unilateral, bilateral or multilateral — designed to reduce or otherwise constrain the deployment or employment of military force. It seems clear therefore that military doctrine and arms control may at times constitute opposite sides of the same coin or of very similar coins. The purpose of arms control is to prevent war and limit the damage if a war should break out in spite of the efforts to prevent it. The purposes of a military doctrine is to provide coherence and cohesion to the process of mustering military force to deter and defeat an enemy. The perspective of military doctrine is typically one of maximizing the chance of success at the minimum cost, in other words it is concerned about the efficient allocation of means. The perspective of arms control is to prevent the military means from dictating or dominating political decision-making. Arms-control policy and military doctrine form a complex medley of policy perspectives on the prevention and conduct of war.

The article discusses the main changes in the use of the National Guard of the Republic of Kazakhstan within the framework of the evolution of the state's Military Doctrine. Since the independence of Kazakhstan, six Military Doctrines have been adopted. The author examines each of these doctrines, analyzing their implications and highlighting the role of the National Guard within the national security system, particularly its crucial function in ensuring military security. The article reveals that the construction, development, and strategic use of the National Guard of the Republic of Kazakhstan have been guided by the requirements outlined in the Military Doctrines. It emphasizes the main characteristics and features of modern military conflicts, as well as the primary tasks associated with the development of the state’s military organization, including the National Guard, which is responsible for maintaining internal security.

Globally, military doctrine plays a vital role as it provides the principles, guidelines, and policies that guide decision-making, planning, and operations in military organizations. In connection with this, doctrine development is a continuous process that aims to adapt to new and emerging threats and technologies, enhance operational readiness, and improve strategic effectiveness. Effective military doctrine ensures that military operations are conducted with discipline, efficiency, and effectiveness while minimizing risk to personnel and civilians. It also ensures that military operations are consistent with international law, human rights, and humanitarian norms. In addition, military doctrine fosters interoperability and cooperation among different military organizations, promoting greater stability and security globally. Therefore, the development and implementation of effective military doctrine are essential for ensuring peace and security in the world.

To understand the problems involved in adapting to war, one must first come to grips with the complexities, ambiguities, and nature of war itself. This paper aims at theorizing multi-dimensionality of modern warfare antecedent?s non-state actors and state actor illuminated by Russia military capability to disrupt and deter Western activities and Eastern Europe infrastructure leveraged by the network grid of modern infrastructure as decisive point of victory. A framework for hybrid warfare (adaptive construct at war and peace time) set out a view of the character of conflict, depicts how military doctrine must change because of constrains and influence by globalization, technology and encapsulated by national interest in the battle space today. The framework components are (values/national interest, warfare ecosystem. human capital, infrastructure, scenario and stakeholders) depicting war strategy (ends/ways/ means) recentre of gravity nizing the limits of military expertise for collaboration; where, environmental degradation and food security are decisive point of victory that engage the most effective use of civilian buy-in during war campaign. The consequence of the ability of armed forces and war ecosystem to learn, adapt with distributed leadership capability and foresight to thrive on chaos because ?hybrid warfare? accentuate ?anticipation war doctrine?, war or peace is not declared, but in the continuum that examines the ?military capability? of every nation including the ?extra-terrestrial? like US Space Force, sixth military branch by 2020. Methodology thrives on change and evolution like the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria have shown that irregular warfare breaks from traditional understanding of how military and civilian leaders should each contribute to the overall effort of modern warfare (multi-modality, simultaneity, fusion, and catastrophic).

Military Ratchets Up Effort To Prevent Suicides

Although inter-state tensions have generally been easing after the Cold War, military power remains a dominant factor in Asian regional politics. As China, operating the world's largest army, grows stronger, there are ongoing debates over the implications for Asia's regional security. This book argues that it is imperative to look beyond the empirical observations and conventional materialist reading of Chinese military development to understand its dynamics and directions in doctrinal terms and put it in a readiness context for evaluation. Military doctrine has long been under-studied and is often treated as a subject separate from force development. But, as this study contends, this factor is necessary for interpreting the making and purposes of China's military power because it forms the intellectual foundation of military structural and hardware development. When loaded with political rhetoric, it also communicates to us the intended uses of the military power. The role of doctrine is reinforced in the context of military readiness, which defines what for and how the army is getting ready. Force development is evaluated in structural, operational and directional terms.The importance of this analytical framework based on military doctrine and readiness is demonstrated in a survey of the evolutionof Chinese military doctrine and force development. As the Chinese People's Liberation Army has continued to adjust its military structure and operation to follow the doctrinal lead, its switches between the doctines of local war and total war have seen corresponding changes to the emphasis between operational and structural readiness.

Italian armed forces have undergone important transformations since the end of the Cold War. Exogenous changes in the strategic and operational environment have driven a reshaping of armed forces in all NATO countries, but the differences between the national responses that have emerged has not always been thoroughly analysed. Deep restructuring in military doctrine, field experience linked to intense force deployment and budgetary constraints interact in shaping the direction of transformation, sometimes in ways that deviate from classic hypotheses on what drives change in the military. The picture that emerges is a complex one, where relevant innovations co-exist with the persistence of problems that call into question the sustainability of the Italian defence model

This study provides a critical examination of the feasibility and necessity of incorporating the Bangladesh Army into the nation’s disaster management architecture, specifically targeting the seismic vulnerability of its urban centres. While Bangladesh has achieved global recognition for its resilience against hydro-meteorological hazards such as cyclones and floods, its urban governance structures remain dangerously unprepared for high-impact, low-frequency seismic events. This paper interrogates the “governance gap” between the military’s logistical prowess, characterised by rapid deployment and discipline, and the civilian administration’s policy frameworks, which currently relegate the military to a reactive role. Utilising a hybrid thematic analysis of secondary data, including government reports, military doctrines, and international comparative studies, this research identifies systemic institutional bottlenecks: specifically, fragmented civil-military coordination, a lack of specialised Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) doctrine within the armed forces, and political hesitancy regarding the militarisation of civilian governance. The analysis reveals that while the Bangladesh Army is the de facto first responder for major crises, its current capabilities are optimised for surface-level logistics rather than the technical complexities of extracting victims from collapsed urban infrastructure. The study proposes a revised National Plan for Disaster Management (NPDM) that institutionalises the military’s role through pre-authorised “Aid to Civil Authority” mandates, focusing on heavy resource mobilisation and engineering support. By synthesising lessons from the Indonesian TNI’s “Military Operations Other than War” and the Japanese “Self-Defence Force” integration with local prefectures, the research suggests that Bangladesh must move beyond ad-hoc arrangements to a formalised partnership that leverages military strength while preserving democratic civilian oversight.

The modern cast of disaster relief actors includes host nations, non-governmental organisations, private volunteer organisations, military organisations and others. Each group, civilian or military, has valuable skills and experiences critical to disaster relief work. The goal of this paper is to supplement the study of civil-military relief efforts with contemporary anecdotal experience. The paper examines the interaction between US military forces and other disaster relief actors during the 2005 Kashmir earthquake relief effort. The author uses direct observations made while working in Pakistan to contrast the relationships and activities from that effort with other accounts in prevailing scholarly disaster literature and military doctrine. Finally, this paper suggests that the Kashmir model of integration, coordination and transparency of intent creates a framework in which future humanitarian assistance operations could be successfully executed. Recommendations to improve civil-military interaction in future relief efforts will also be addressed.

Soviet military debates reveal the logic from which their military doctrine and strategy develop. That logic, based on the defense of Soviet territory and the acquisition of sufficient military power to deny military victory to any coalition of enemies, has not changed radically over time. The continuity in Soviet military doctrine and objectives should not, however, result in the failure to recognize the dynamic nature of Soviet military thought and military strategy. That dynamism in the European theater is the subject of this chapter which examines the evolution of deterrence-Soviet style. Its major thesis is that from Stalin to Gorbachev the political leadership has, through its military doctrine, tasked the armed forces to plan and develop military forces and strategies to deter nuclear war against Soviet territory. Military strategy has evolved with dramatic and often sudden shifts in response to American threats, Soviet capabilities, and changes in political leadership. This thesis is not new to Soviet specialists.1 The emphasis here is on Soviet potential for flexibility in war and how its evolution differs from NATO concepts of flexible response.

What effect does ever really have on an army's behavior? That's a strange question, perhaps, for a journal such as this. At least since the founding of the US Army Training and Command (TRADOC) in 1973, there has been a great deal of debate in the US Army and wider defense community about what should be: attritional? maneuverist? AirLand Battle? More recently, further doctrinal debates have emerged about jointness and the revolution in military affairs. All such discussions seem to assume that doctrine--formal written doctrine--really matters, that it is what determines how an army will fight. Is that true? A survey of the history of armies and their doctrines suggests that, in fact, has a weak-or perhaps a better way to put it would be indirect--effect on the actual behavior of armies in battle. Fundamentally, how armies fight may be more a function of their culture than of their doctrine. Just What is Doctrine Anyway? Disconcertingly, the very meaning of doctrine in the military sense is not altogether easy to get at. Today, the US Army officially defines as: Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. [1] The word springs from the Latin doctrina, meaning teaching, [2] and was originally used in a religious context by Roman Catholics to designate the body of correct beliefs taught by the church. This original concept has been adopted by militaries to describe the body of concepts and precepts which they teach. But there has always been a strong element of the written word to doctrine. is what is written down, usually at the highest levels, for dissemination throughout an army, the usual intention being therefore to instruct and standardize. In this sense, military has roots in the earliest drill manuals, which date back at least to the time of Maurice of Nassau at the beginning of the 17th century, outlining the precise tactical evolutions in which all troops were to be trained. [3] The modem concept, however, goes considerably beyond this; indeed, like the official definition above, modern writers of are generally at pains to avoid prescribing overly precise, drill-like procedures. They are seeking rather to describe the conceptual framework of how best to prosecute military operations. This is an approach that developed over the course of the 19th century; neither Wellington nor Napoleon had doctrinal manuals describing for them the principles of war and what approach they should take toward operations. However, even while Napoleon was still campaigning, the famous Swiss military commentator Baron Henri Jomini began publishing works purporting to explain Napoleon's method. This approach gathered momentum throughout the 19th century. As militaries professionalized and standardized (and bureaucratized), there came about an increasing tendency to formalize not just the tactical details of drill, but the very approach to war that higher commanders should take. Perhaps to a certain extent this was driven by the proliferation of staff and war colleges, and this approach was not without its critics. Some argued that such a prescriptive attitude stifled original thought and led to doctrinaire solutions to military problems, [4] but by 1914 this approach was quite firmly established in all major Western forces, to a greater or lesser extent. Doctrine, then, is the officially sanctioned approach to military actions--the considered opinion as to the best way to go about things, if you will. More specifically, it is found in certain official texts. [5] In other words, it is meant to form behavior--specifically, the behavior of armies in battle. This, however, raises a real question of cause and effect: To what extent does actually affect behavior in battle? …

The Singapore government since 2000 has stated their goals to have a strong and capable Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). The urgency of having a strong and capable SAF cannot be separated from the multidimensional threats that Singapore has to deal with. China's growing military capability coupled with increased aggressiveness in the South China Sea and relations with two conflicting neighbors are examples of traditional threats facing Singapore. Non-traditional threats, especially terrorism, also haunt Singapore. This article argues that the Revolution in Military Affairs implemented by Singapore is the mitigation of such strategic disadvantage. Through the implementation of the Revolution in Military Affairs which was marked by the acquisition of advanced weaponry technology and followed by changes in military doctrine and organizational adaptation, the SAF has already been transformed into a powerful military in the region.

The year 2023 was characterized by the continuation of the major conflict in Ukraine and its amplification at the European level, as well as by the exacerbation of global crises, such as the energy, food and refugee ones. The major conflict, started in February 2022, with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, continued without a break in 2023, being amplified by the support given by the West (NATO, the EU and G7) to the Ukrainian Armed Forces and by some BRICS states and G20 to the Russian forces, thus becoming an international war conducted through proxies. The Kremlin's ‘Special Military Operation’ was launched and conducted under a new Allied strategic approach of the competition continuum on the operating environment, in which there is no longer a clear distinction between peace and war, only different degrees of violence in the relations between state and/ or non-state actors, depending on the pursued political goals. As a result, many military 8 experts see this conventional war in Ukraine as a continuation of the hybrid war started by the Kremlin in 2014, with the deterrence phase taking place in 2021. Moreover, the events and conflicts that have unfolded since the beginning of this century until now have shown us that conventional operations no longer have the scope of the conventional wars of the last century, nor can they fulfill, on their own, strategic objectives and the national interests of regional powers. Thus, Kremlin decided to give a special touch to the Military Art, combining conventional operations with hybrid actions, as specified by the vision of the head of the Russian General Staff, General Valeri Gherasimov, regarding the new Russian military doctrine of ‘active defense’ and ‘limited actions’. In turn, the conventional operations carried out by both belligerents in Ukraine went beyond the meaning of military doctrines and manuals, carrying out innovative actions on tactics and techniques adapted to different periods of the war. This new approach to the Military Art has been amplified by the use of cutting-edge products of emerging and disruptive technologies, such as hypersonic missiles or recconaisance and combat drones. Even though this year also does not mark the end of the war in Ukraine, and no participant can claim victory so far or declare that they have achieved their political goals, there are new lessons identified for the military domain that should be considered for the future security of Europe and the international environment as well. This document represents a continuation of my 2022 and 2023 specialised studies related to post-industrial society and artificial intelligence, as well as conventional and hybrid aspects of the first year of the Russian war in Ukraine.

Several countries have recently adopted network-centric ideas into their military doctrines. Network-Centric Warfare originally is designed for a military force that is superior in many respects. When network-centric ideas are modified to cases where superiority cannot be assumed, usefulness of network-assisted operations must be investigated in all possible situations, including network-assisted resistance. Network-assisted resistance is not only interesting to the defender. both sides of the war can gain by investigating the possibilities and limitations for network-assisted operations in guerilla warfare type resistance. The article describes three network services for the defensive side by looking at the goals of the defender. These network services must be provisioned over public networks that are being monitored by the attacker. Therefore cryptographic mechanisms are not the best solution. The article defines two new security dimensions. un-discoverability and evidence-freeness, and proposes a way of hiding information over public networks filling these dimensions, providing sufficient bandwidth and conveying the essential information for command and control in the given applications.