Vojaška Doktrina V Vlogi Teorije Zmage

It may be useful at the outset to define our terms. By military doctrine I shall understand the principles which are laid down as true concerning the deployment and employment of military force in the event of war. In the case of NATO they are embodied in MC 14/3 and amplified by authoritative spokesmen for the North Atlantic Council, the Secretary General of NATO or SACEUR. The doctrine typically establishes the relationship between challenge and response and among the various measures available for response. It should give general guidance to operational planning and the force planning process as well as provide a bridge between foreign policy and military dispositions. By arms control I shall understand measures — tacit or explicit; unilateral, bilateral or multilateral — designed to reduce or otherwise constrain the deployment or employment of military force. It seems clear therefore that military doctrine and arms control may at times constitute opposite sides of the same coin or of very similar coins. The purpose of arms control is to prevent war and limit the damage if a war should break out in spite of the efforts to prevent it. The purposes of a military doctrine is to provide coherence and cohesion to the process of mustering military force to deter and defeat an enemy. The perspective of military doctrine is typically one of maximizing the chance of success at the minimum cost, in other words it is concerned about the efficient allocation of means. The perspective of arms control is to prevent the military means from dictating or dominating political decision-making. Arms-control policy and military doctrine form a complex medley of policy perspectives on the prevention and conduct of war.

The article discusses the main changes in the use of the National Guard of the Republic of Kazakhstan within the framework of the evolution of the state's Military Doctrine. Since the independence of Kazakhstan, six Military Doctrines have been adopted. The author examines each of these doctrines, analyzing their implications and highlighting the role of the National Guard within the national security system, particularly its crucial function in ensuring military security. The article reveals that the construction, development, and strategic use of the National Guard of the Republic of Kazakhstan have been guided by the requirements outlined in the Military Doctrines. It emphasizes the main characteristics and features of modern military conflicts, as well as the primary tasks associated with the development of the state’s military organization, including the National Guard, which is responsible for maintaining internal security.

Globally, military doctrine plays a vital role as it provides the principles, guidelines, and policies that guide decision-making, planning, and operations in military organizations. In connection with this, doctrine development is a continuous process that aims to adapt to new and emerging threats and technologies, enhance operational readiness, and improve strategic effectiveness. Effective military doctrine ensures that military operations are conducted with discipline, efficiency, and effectiveness while minimizing risk to personnel and civilians. It also ensures that military operations are consistent with international law, human rights, and humanitarian norms. In addition, military doctrine fosters interoperability and cooperation among different military organizations, promoting greater stability and security globally. Therefore, the development and implementation of effective military doctrine are essential for ensuring peace and security in the world.

To understand the problems involved in adapting to war, one must first come to grips with the complexities, ambiguities, and nature of war itself. This paper aims at theorizing multi-dimensionality of modern warfare antecedent?s non-state actors and state actor illuminated by Russia military capability to disrupt and deter Western activities and Eastern Europe infrastructure leveraged by the network grid of modern infrastructure as decisive point of victory. A framework for hybrid warfare (adaptive construct at war and peace time) set out a view of the character of conflict, depicts how military doctrine must change because of constrains and influence by globalization, technology and encapsulated by national interest in the battle space today. The framework components are (values/national interest, warfare ecosystem. human capital, infrastructure, scenario and stakeholders) depicting war strategy (ends/ways/ means) recentre of gravity nizing the limits of military expertise for collaboration; where, environmental degradation and food security are decisive point of victory that engage the most effective use of civilian buy-in during war campaign. The consequence of the ability of armed forces and war ecosystem to learn, adapt with distributed leadership capability and foresight to thrive on chaos because ?hybrid warfare? accentuate ?anticipation war doctrine?, war or peace is not declared, but in the continuum that examines the ?military capability? of every nation including the ?extra-terrestrial? like US Space Force, sixth military branch by 2020. Methodology thrives on change and evolution like the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria have shown that irregular warfare breaks from traditional understanding of how military and civilian leaders should each contribute to the overall effort of modern warfare (multi-modality, simultaneity, fusion, and catastrophic).

Military Ratchets Up Effort To Prevent Suicides

Although inter-state tensions have generally been easing after the Cold War, military power remains a dominant factor in Asian regional politics. As China, operating the world's largest army, grows stronger, there are ongoing debates over the implications for Asia's regional security. This book argues that it is imperative to look beyond the empirical observations and conventional materialist reading of Chinese military development to understand its dynamics and directions in doctrinal terms and put it in a readiness context for evaluation. Military doctrine has long been under-studied and is often treated as a subject separate from force development. But, as this study contends, this factor is necessary for interpreting the making and purposes of China's military power because it forms the intellectual foundation of military structural and hardware development. When loaded with political rhetoric, it also communicates to us the intended uses of the military power. The role of doctrine is reinforced in the context of military readiness, which defines what for and how the army is getting ready. Force development is evaluated in structural, operational and directional terms.The importance of this analytical framework based on military doctrine and readiness is demonstrated in a survey of the evolutionof Chinese military doctrine and force development. As the Chinese People's Liberation Army has continued to adjust its military structure and operation to follow the doctrinal lead, its switches between the doctines of local war and total war have seen corresponding changes to the emphasis between operational and structural readiness.

Soviet military debates reveal the logic from which their military doctrine and strategy develop. That logic, based on the defense of Soviet territory and the acquisition of sufficient military power to deny military victory to any coalition of enemies, has not changed radically over time. The continuity in Soviet military doctrine and objectives should not, however, result in the failure to recognize the dynamic nature of Soviet military thought and military strategy. That dynamism in the European theater is the subject of this chapter which examines the evolution of deterrence-Soviet style. Its major thesis is that from Stalin to Gorbachev the political leadership has, through its military doctrine, tasked the armed forces to plan and develop military forces and strategies to deter nuclear war against Soviet territory. Military strategy has evolved with dramatic and often sudden shifts in response to American threats, Soviet capabilities, and changes in political leadership. This thesis is not new to Soviet specialists.1 The emphasis here is on Soviet potential for flexibility in war and how its evolution differs from NATO concepts of flexible response.

Italian armed forces have undergone important transformations since the end of the Cold War. Exogenous changes in the strategic and operational environment have driven a reshaping of armed forces in all NATO countries, but the differences between the national responses that have emerged has not always been thoroughly analysed. Deep restructuring in military doctrine, field experience linked to intense force deployment and budgetary constraints interact in shaping the direction of transformation, sometimes in ways that deviate from classic hypotheses on what drives change in the military. The picture that emerges is a complex one, where relevant innovations co-exist with the persistence of problems that call into question the sustainability of the Italian defence model

In the geopolitical conditions of the confrontation between states, one of the means of protection and sovereignty is military force, therefore each state has its own military doctrines that determine the development of army equipment and training for various types of troops. China has a doctrine called the National Military Defense Doctrine. The problem of studying the coverage of this topic abroad and within the country becomes important for the scientific community interested in the problems of political communication.

This study provides a critical examination of the feasibility and necessity of incorporating the Bangladesh Army into the nation’s disaster management architecture, specifically targeting the seismic vulnerability of its urban centres. While Bangladesh has achieved global recognition for its resilience against hydro-meteorological hazards such as cyclones and floods, its urban governance structures remain dangerously unprepared for high-impact, low-frequency seismic events. This paper interrogates the “governance gap” between the military’s logistical prowess, characterised by rapid deployment and discipline, and the civilian administration’s policy frameworks, which currently relegate the military to a reactive role. Utilising a hybrid thematic analysis of secondary data, including government reports, military doctrines, and international comparative studies, this research identifies systemic institutional bottlenecks: specifically, fragmented civil-military coordination, a lack of specialised Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) doctrine within the armed forces, and political hesitancy regarding the militarisation of civilian governance. The analysis reveals that while the Bangladesh Army is the de facto first responder for major crises, its current capabilities are optimised for surface-level logistics rather than the technical complexities of extracting victims from collapsed urban infrastructure. The study proposes a revised National Plan for Disaster Management (NPDM) that institutionalises the military’s role through pre-authorised “Aid to Civil Authority” mandates, focusing on heavy resource mobilisation and engineering support. By synthesising lessons from the Indonesian TNI’s “Military Operations Other than War” and the Japanese “Self-Defence Force” integration with local prefectures, the research suggests that Bangladesh must move beyond ad-hoc arrangements to a formalised partnership that leverages military strength while preserving democratic civilian oversight.

The modern cast of disaster relief actors includes host nations, non-governmental organisations, private volunteer organisations, military organisations and others. Each group, civilian or military, has valuable skills and experiences critical to disaster relief work. The goal of this paper is to supplement the study of civil-military relief efforts with contemporary anecdotal experience. The paper examines the interaction between US military forces and other disaster relief actors during the 2005 Kashmir earthquake relief effort. The author uses direct observations made while working in Pakistan to contrast the relationships and activities from that effort with other accounts in prevailing scholarly disaster literature and military doctrine. Finally, this paper suggests that the Kashmir model of integration, coordination and transparency of intent creates a framework in which future humanitarian assistance operations could be successfully executed. Recommendations to improve civil-military interaction in future relief efforts will also be addressed.

This paper presents an investigation on the relationship between social network distances and shared mental models in military command and control organizations. Previous research has shown that physical distance is the gold standard for high performance (Olson & Olson, 2000). However, social network distance may be equally or more important, as social network graphs inherently take into account the group's context and environment (Krackhart, 1994). We conducted this research on a new 56-member command and control organization using computer-based collaborative tools as they engaged in a five day simulation exercise. As military command and control organizations are difficult to evaluate based on outcome and performance, we chose shared mental models as a proxy. We hypothesized that in a command and control organization, social network distance and physical distance are independent of one another. Further we hypothesized that social network distance would be a predictor of mental model congruence. We found that there is a very weak positive correlation between social network distance and physical distance. Further, we found that, controlling for physical distance, social network distance is a predictor of mental model congruence. This research validates that high frequency of communication, mediated by computer based collaborative tools, can effectively generate shared mental models.

The failure of the Russians in the beginning of the Ukrainian conflict in 2022, amid faulty assumptions, has brought to the fore a less popular topic in the literature on operational planning, namely the influence of one’s own biases on the outcome of the process. Uncertainty, which is part of the nature of warfare, makes it impossible to predict exactly how events will unfold. For this reason, most of the operational planning products are based on assumptions. They are the result of the thought processes of those involved in the process and are therefore subject to human error. The ability to see things from different perspectives and to accept constructive criticism can go a long way towards confirming or invalidating these assumptions and thus increasing the chances of operational success. In this context, employing a qualitative research approach, the article brings the concept of ‘Red Teaming’ to the attention of Romanian military commanders and planners in order to ensure an optimal framework for operational planning and decision-making. Through documentary analysis, multidisciplinary examination, and comparative analysis research methods, the main objective of this article was to provide a thorough understanding the concept of ‘Red Teaming’ and its potential benefits, and to develop a practical framework that enhances decision-making by reducing planning errors. The study’s findings offer valuable insights and practical applications for military commanders throughout the operations planning process, highlighting the role of critical thinking in reducing planning errors and improving decision-making.

This paper describes the structure of a concept of the land brigade command information system that is a product of the research work of numerous experts throughout the years done in the then-Yugoslav Army, Army of Serbia and Montenegro and today's Army of the Republic of Serbia. The institution formed for this purpose is the Centre for Command Information Systems and Information Support where command information systems are studied continuously and systematically. Today the KIS represents a primary source needed to obtain an efficient military command management system and an instrument for multiplying combat power without increasing the number of units and combat resources. The KIS is a complex multidisciplinary system requiring the implementation of prototype evolution methodology. Due to its complexity, importance end sensitivity, the KIS has to be realized in one's own military R&D institutions belonging to the Ministry of defense, because only these institutions have adequate knowledge and facilities. Fast and ad-hoc solutions in this area are unacceptable from the military, specialized and economic point of view. The primary KIS br KoV structure concept relies on six types of KIS, five technical subsystems and a number of adequate information systems. The key segment are technical systems that represent one open technical and technological (hardware and software) platform in the realization of any KIS type. The KIS is a dynamic permanent system following the users' needs and technical technology changes. It is not, therefore, a closed and finally defined system, it is the system in continuous evolution, under construction and implementations. Introduction The concept described in this paper is the result of work of numerous people, authors included, engaged in the last twenty years of KIS research. The real balance of forces in combat does not depend so much on the potentials of warring parties but rather on the efficiency of command of combat units as well as of the speed of collecting, analyzing and using information with the main goal to make the optimal decision and make the most of one's own potentials, terrain features and enemy's weaknesses. Command and information systems A general definition of command and information systems is that they are the collection of hardware and software solutions used for real-time integration of all organizational structures, military doctrines, technical and technology systems, information flows and processes aiming at the realization of efficient and rational functioning of the military (units, headquarters, etc.). Basic elements in analyzing command management and command information systems A command information system is an element of the land brigade command system intended for the support of command management in securing and leading complex combat operations. The basic principles of the KIS architecture evolution The key factor is the fact that the KIS is a very complex multidisciplinary system requiring the application of the methodology of prototype evolution together with encompassing human and material resources for better effectiveness. Concept of the land brigade command information system On the basis of long-term research and the obtained experiences with practical solutions, the concept of the KIS br KoV is based on the decomposition model of the military command management system which is decomposed onto functional parts (macro-functions) and command unit operations in real time during combat. Conclusion Command information systems (KIS) today represent the basic instrument for efficient military command management systems rather than an instrument for the multiplication of combat power without increasing the number of units and combat resources. The KIS is a complex multidisciplinary system requiring the application of the prototype evolution methodology.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS