История, современное состояние и метафилосо­фия оппозиции «аналитическая/континентальная» философия

Philosophy is often divided into two traditions: analytic and continental philosophy. Characterizing the analytic‐continental divide, however, is no easy task. Some philosophers explain the divide in terms of the place of argument in these traditions. This raises the following questions: Is analytic philosophy rife with arguments while continental philosophy is devoid of arguments? Or can different types of arguments be found in analytic and continental philosophy? This paper presents the results of an empirical study of a large corpus of philosophical texts mined from the JSTOR database (n = 53,260) designed to find patterns of argumentation by type. Overall, the results suggest that there are no significant differences between the types of arguments advanced in analytic and continental philosophy journal articles. The findings, therefore, provide no empirical support to the hypothesis that the divide between analytic and continental philosophy has to do with the place of argument in these traditions.

Many have tackled the question 'What (if anything) is analytic philosophy?' I will not attempt to answer this vexed question. Rather, I address a smaller, more manageable set of interrelated questions: First, when and how did people begin using the label 'analytic philosophy'? Second, how did those who used this label understand it? Third, why did many philosophers we today classify as analytic initially resist being grouped together under the single category of 'analytic philosophy'? Finally, for the first generation who described themselves as analytic philosophersAnalytic philosophers , what was their intended contrast class? Relatedly, when did 'continental philosophyContinental philosophy ' become the standard opposition? Some evidence I present justifies received answers to these questions; other evidence supports surprising and unorthodox answers to these questions.

In this path-breaking study Christopher Norris proposes a transformed understanding of the much-exaggerated differences between analytic and continental philosophy. While keeping the analytic tradition squarely in view, his book focuses on the work of Jacques Derrida and Alain Badiou, two of the most original and significant figures in the recent history of ideas. Norris argues that these thinkers have decisively reconfigured the terrain of contemporary philosophy and, between them, pointed a way beyond some of those seemingly intractable issues that have polarised debate on both sides of the notional rift between the analytic and continental traditions. In particular his book sets out to show - against the received analytic wisdom - that continental philosophy has its own analytic resources and is capable of bringing some much-needed fresh insight to bear on problems in philosophy of language, logic and mathematics. Norris provides not only a unique comparative account of Derrida's and Badiou's work but also a remarkably wide-ranging assessment of their joint contribution to philosophy's current - if widely resisted - potential for self-transformation.

Abstract: In a 1978 lecture in Tokyo, Foucault drew a comparison between his own philosophical methodology and that of ‘Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophy’, claiming the label ‘analytic philosophy of politics’ for his own approach. This may seem like a somewhat surprising comparison given the gulf between contemporary analytic and continental philosophy, but I argue that it is a very productive one which indeed might help us reconsider this gulf. I proceed through a comparison between Foucault and the speech act theory of J. L. Austin, one of the analytic philosophers Foucault had in mind in his Tokyo lecture. By focusing on the methodological commonalities between Foucault and Austin, this article identifies the core of a philosophical methodology that cuts across the analytic/continental divide in philosophy in general while constituting a powerful alternative to the methods applied by analytic political philosophers specifically. This approach, which I term ‘analytic critique’, is one that starts from a critical analysis of what happens in ordinary lived experience and theorises ‘bottom-up’ in an avowedly politically engaged way – thereby challenging the conceptual and political aloofness of contemporary political philosophy in the liberal-Rawlsian tradition. Foucault’s appropriation of the label ‘analytic philosophy’, it is argued, ought to function as a call to more imaginative methodological-theoretical engagement across the traditional division between continental and analytic approaches.

Experience and the Ultimacy of God: In Memoriam John Edwin Smith

This volume settles the debate between analytic and continental philosophy. It turns to art, more specifically popular culture, to demonstrate the validity of continental philosophy. Drawing on the philosophy of Georg Hegel (perhaps the most important of continental philosophers), James Kreines holds that reason in the world metaphysically exists. Reasons of the world are reasons of the Hegelian Absolute. Thus, similar to the fact that gravity is curves in the space-time continuum along which matter moves – reasons are the grooves in the Absolute along which human decision-making occurs. Art allows us to conceptualize, understand, speculate about the grooves (reasons) of the Absolute. Two key points can be drawn from Kreines’s position: first, normative values are embedded in reality. Thus, in complete contradistinction to analytic philosophy, there is no bifurcation between the empirical and the normative – to exist is to have normative value. Secondly, the role of social science is to cogitate, explore, identify the reasons of the world that shape social, political norms. Such an approach would decisively move the social sciences away from an emphasis on statistically significant patterns of human behavior (e.g., voting studies) and toward an approach that seeks to analyze the reasons of the world that motivate/shape social and political decisions. Art (particularly popular culture) becomes an important source in identifying the way that people reason about the world and how they perceive political elites reasoning in the world. To adjudicate between continental and analytic philosophy this book on relies on the broadcast iterations of Star Trek, as well as Nazi cinema. With regard to contemporary American politics, in addition to Star Trek, it draws on the television series Game of Thrones, Veep, House of Cards, and The Man in the High Castle. Popular culture is germane to philosophy and contemporary politics because television/movie creators frequently try to attract viewers by conveying authentic philosophical and political motifs. Conversely, viewers seek out authentic movies and television shows. This is in contrast to opinion surveys (for instance), as the formation of the data begins with the surveyor seeking to directly solicit an opinion – however impromptu or shallow.

This address discusses both the organization of SPEP (the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy) and SPEP as an organization. I take up these issues by describing the foundation of SPEP in terms of a positive insight into a distinctive style of doing philosophy and a subsequent experience of being other. I then suggest that there is an initial and fundamental phase of openness characteristic of SPEP as “eyes wide open” and another narrowing moment of SPEP that runs counter to this as “eyes wide shut.” In a fourth section, I depict a difficulty in which SPEP finds itself today: a “continental drift,” when SPEP becomes identified with continental philosophy. Whereas continental philosophy might find itself in antagonist relations to, for example, “analytic philosophy,” SPEP does not necessarily find itself in this way. It is therefore necessary to understand continental philosophy as a participant in and from SPEP, not SPEP as an allegiance to a discipline or as an organ of continental philosophy. SPEP is an organization that edges beyond itself and, according to its distinctive style, is characterized by openness to the things themselves and their structures in terms of an orientation to problems, experience, context, and critique.

Introduction

Columbia Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophies is the first guide to cover both the Anglo-American analytic and European continental traditions. Organized thematically, the volume thoroughly discusses the major movements and fields of each tradition and features the contributions of highly distinguished specialists in their fields. This book is divided into three sections. The first is devoted to highlighting the multidimensional work of philosophers identified with the analytic tradition, with Nicholas Rescher writing on neoidealism, Josephine Donovan commenting on feminist philosophy, Tyler Burge discussing the philosophy of language and mind, and Robert Hanna reflecting on Kant's legacy. The second section presents the thought of those who identified themselves with the continental tradition, featuring Jean Grondin on hermeneutics, Leonard Lawlor on phenomenology, Charles Scott on postmodernism, and Babette Babich on the philosophy of science. This volume also covers logical positivism, naturalism, pragmatism, aesthetics, existentialism, Marxism, the Frankfurt School, structuralism, psychoanalysis, political philosophy, ethics, and the philosophy of religion. The final section addresses concurrent trends in Indian, Chinese, Japanese, and African philosophy, and a comprehensive introduction by the editor not only provides a thorough outline of the problems and issues of the analytic and continental traditions but also boldly challenges the conviction that the two approaches must be rivals. Columbia Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophies is an invaluable overview of the ideas that have shaped a monumentally important century in the history of philosophy, offering an unusually panoramic perspective that allows readers to form their own interpretations of original materials.

Critique of Continental Feminism Elaine P. Miller It could be argued that nominally continental feminism emerged as a category of philosophy in 2007 with the founding of philoSOPHIA: A Society for Continental Feminism by Kelly Oliver, even though, of course, philosophers such as Judith Butler, Luce Irigaray, and even Simone de Beauvoir had already been de facto writing in the genre for decades. As part of the initial group of continental feminist philosophers who met and formed the society and the journal, we to a certain degree assumed the self-evidence of our identity: we were all feminists whose work in continental philosophy had already established us to some degree as professional philosophers, and the feminist perspective allowed us to both turn a critical eye toward and bring new meaning out of the classical texts that were most often our subject of research. Today, as that self-evidence is being queried and sometimes critiqued, a demand arises to look more closely into the meaning of the designation "continental feminism." What do we mean when we name this category? In particular, we must ask ourselves if, in aligning ourselves, however non-mindfully, with the "continent" of Europe, we repeat injustices inherent in Western language and systems of thought. In addition, we might inquire into the value of reading canonical texts from the history of European philosophy, and ask if this can be done in a way that exhumes and reinvigorates rather than entombs the ideas within them. I will proceed by looking at the meaning of the word "continent," its terrain and its implications, as does one of my co-discussants in this roundtable, Jami Weinstein. "Continent" comes from the roots continens, or continuous, and terra, or earth. Although, as Andrew Cutrofello notes, the very notion of continental philosophy is in large part a negative, "Anglo-American disciplinary [End Page 149] formation" (Continental Philosophy, 25), continental philosophy has embraced its given name. The continent of Europe, in contradistinction to the island countries that neighbor it, connects many nations to each other, allowing them to share some kind of common identity, one that is continually being negotiated even today. Not coincidentally, questions of earth, territory, and the related concepts of blood, kinship, nation, and race, are concepts that, predominating in Western philosophy as a whole, also mark continental philosophy, although it prides itself in subjecting the history of metaphysics and all its stable categories and concepts to critique. What, then, does it mean to "add" feminism to continental philosophy, and can this new discipline really be considered an addition, an accretion, or is it important, necessary even, that feminism, along with antiracism, anticolonialism, and attention to disability and sexual identity, disrupt the continuity, the disavowed yet omnipresent assumption of totality, foundationalism, and belonging that the word terra evokes? Andrew Cutrofello discusses continental philosophy as a divergent (from that of Anglo-American philosophy) approach to the conclusions of Kant. Both schools of thought wrestled with the clear distinction Kant draws between concept and intuition, seeking to overcome this dichotomy either by sensualizing concepts (British empiricism) or by intellectualizing appearances (German idealism). Continental philosophy in a sense emerges out of the impossible task of attempting to overcome what Kant took to be a necessary and insurmountable division.1 Cutrofello argues that it is Kant's conception of reflective judgment, which Kant introduces in the Critique of Judgment, that is the inspiration for much of continental philosophy's ability to go beyond analyzing the basic building blocks of reality or the conditions under which we may know or should act. Cutrofello allies reflective judgment with the "spontaneous receptivity" of intuition as opposed to the "receptive spontaneity" of the understanding; rather than subsuming an object of intuition under a pre-given concept of the understanding, reflective judgment calls attention to our inability to subsume a form under any concept that we possess (2). Reflective judgment's promise is thus one of possible newness, opening to a universal that is not predetermined. As such it has been associated with aesthetics, just as determinative judgment is associated with science, and, as Cutrofello points out, it is also at the origin of Hegel's and Schelling's...

Delusions are studied in two philosophical traditions: the continental or phenomenological tradition and the Anglo-American or analytic tradition. Each has its own view of delusions. Broadly stated, phenomenologists view delusions as a disturbed experience whilst most analytic researchers view them as beliefs. It is my contention that the most plausible account of delusions must ultimately incorporate valuable insights from both traditions. To illustrate the potential value of integration I provide a novel model of the Capgras delusion which describes how an analytic, cognitive neuropsychological two-factor account of the Capgras delusion and the phenomenological view of delusions might be integrated.

From around the start of the 1970’s many non-analytic philosophers in the English-speaking world began to use the title “Continental Philosophy” to identify their own area of interest and expertise. In this chapter the development of this trend of self-identification is discussed and explained. The basic argument is that in the English-speaking world there were (and still are) a number of professional philosophers with a serious interest in teaching courses and pursuing research on texts by authors whose work was (and largely remains) not at all well regarded by most mainstream analytic philosophers. Prior to the 1970s courses on such work went under a diverse range of titles. However, in the 1970s a growing number of people started to changeover to the Continental title in order to include in their own teaching and writing the new movements that were coming to be known as ‘post-structuralism,’ ‘postmodernism’ and ‘French feminism’. “Continental philosophy”, analytic philosophy’s already-to-hand catch-all category, provided a convenient title for courses and writings covering both the old and the new.

In this paper, the author argues that within the current philosophical debate, pragmatism has a distinct advantage over its rivals—on the one hand, Anglo-American analytic philosophy and, on the other hand, continental philosophy. By refusing to succumb to `naturalizing’ tendencies, pragmatism is able to overcome scientistic tendencies in contemporary analytic philosophy. At the same time, by emphasizing the `natural’, pragmatism provides a helpful correction to metaphysical tendencies in continental philosophy.

Analytic philosophy as a historical movement has not done much to provide an alternative to the consolations of religion. This is sometimes made a cause for reproach, and for unfavorable comparisons with the continental tradition of the twentieth century, which did not shirk that task. That is one of the reasons that continental philosophy has been better received by the general public: It at least tries to provide nourishment for the soul, the job by which philosophy is supposed to earn its keep Analytic philosophers usually rebuff the complaint by pointing out that their concerns are continuous with the central occupations of Western philosophy from Parmenides onward: metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and ethical theory. Those topics have been pursued in a great tradition of works that are often technical and difficult, and that are not intended for a broad audience. The aim of that tradition is understanding, not edification.

abstractEfforts to understand the division between analytic and continental philosophy in strictly philosophical terms seem slated to disappointment. Nevertheless, the worldwide dominance of these two models and their numerous subvarieties is the most salient feature of the passage of philosophy through the twentieth century. This paper explores this dominance and offers an assessment of developments that point toward a change from the model of two models. Specific attention is paid to Jacques Derrida's work on philosophical nationalism, which suggests that this change reflects the growing extension of the English language across the world and, hence, belongs to a profoundly ambiguous development. According to Derrida, on the one hand, this development holds out the chance for something radically nonparochial: “the universal penetration of the philosophical and of philosophical communication,” while on the other hand, it raises the threat that certain forms of “dogmatism and authority” that are linked to particularities of nation and history will impose “an axiomatic of philosophical discourse without any possible discussion.”1 The future of continental philosophy is assessed in light of this ambiguous development.