The Capgras delusion: an integrated approach

Columbia Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophies is the first guide to cover both the Anglo-American analytic and European continental traditions. Organized thematically, the volume thoroughly discusses the major movements and fields of each tradition and features the contributions of highly distinguished specialists in their fields. This book is divided into three sections. The first is devoted to highlighting the multidimensional work of philosophers identified with the analytic tradition, with Nicholas Rescher writing on neoidealism, Josephine Donovan commenting on feminist philosophy, Tyler Burge discussing the philosophy of language and mind, and Robert Hanna reflecting on Kant's legacy. The second section presents the thought of those who identified themselves with the continental tradition, featuring Jean Grondin on hermeneutics, Leonard Lawlor on phenomenology, Charles Scott on postmodernism, and Babette Babich on the philosophy of science. This volume also covers logical positivism, naturalism, pragmatism, aesthetics, existentialism, Marxism, the Frankfurt School, structuralism, psychoanalysis, political philosophy, ethics, and the philosophy of religion. The final section addresses concurrent trends in Indian, Chinese, Japanese, and African philosophy, and a comprehensive introduction by the editor not only provides a thorough outline of the problems and issues of the analytic and continental traditions but also boldly challenges the conviction that the two approaches must be rivals. Columbia Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophies is an invaluable overview of the ideas that have shaped a monumentally important century in the history of philosophy, offering an unusually panoramic perspective that allows readers to form their own interpretations of original materials.

The aim of the article is to review the literature devoted to the opposition of analytical and continental philosophy. Despite the existence of various typologies of the philosophy of the 20th century, this opposition is a key characteristic of the current state of affairs in the twentieth century’s philosophy. The article describes various characteristics of the op­position and demonstrates that the establishment of its status stimulated the development of research on the history of opposition and the search for common roots of its sides. The emergence of the opposition is associated with Mill’s criticism of Coleridge’s philosophy and Russell’s criticism of Bergson’s ideas, which meant a certain cultural break between the British and continental philosophical traditions. The article also draws attention to the point of view according to which the opposition of analytical and continental philosophy is a manifestation of the opposition of classical and non-classical philosophical traditions. Certain emblems of the establishment of the opposition were the results of the collo­quium at Royaumont in the 50s of the last century and the written discussion between Derrida and Searle regarding Austin’s ideas in the 70s. At the same time, there are gradu­ally more and more works aimed at a dialogue between the two traditions and at the demonstration the mutual interest of philosophers who belong to different philosophical traditions, to each other’s works. Such a dialogue leads to the study of options for the de­velopment of philosophy in the future – the creation of a “synthetic” philosophy, the pro­posal to replace the opposition with other ones, in particular, “post-analytical/metaconti­nental”. An increasing number of philosophers argue for the connection of this opposition with a different understanding of the very nature of philosophy, which leads to statements about the metaphilosophical nature of the opposition. The review includes works by do­mestic and foreign (mostly English-speaking) authors published, with a few exceptions, in the last two decades; works written in line with both philosophical traditions are presented.

The ArgumentIn this rejoinder to Gyorgy Markus (Science in Context1:5–51), I argue that although there are nonphilosophical hermeneutical studies of communication among scientists (a “weak” hermeneutics) from which much can be learned about scientific practices, there is also the philosophical genre of a hermeneutics of natural science (a “strong” hermeneutics), with which this paper is concerned. The former is the nonphilosophical use of hermeneutics in the study of texts and historical sources; the latter is a philosophy pursued within a working canon of philosophical works defined principally by the writings of Heidegger and Husserl. There is also a hermeneutically sensitive analytic philosophy of science, such as in the work of Kuhn, Toulmin, and Elkana. These genres are distinguished by their literary canons and their basic phenomenologies or critical experiential givens; each genre comprises an exemplary phenomenology as understood with the help of a characteristic fundamental literary canon.I argue that analytic philosophy is pursued within a canon that makes it difficult to raise hermeneutical questions about natural science, and that it assumes a generally positivistic phenomenology. I argue that hermeneutical phenomenology currently defines itself in dialectical opposition to “science” as understood (positivistically) by analytic philosophy, and has failed to exploit the opportunity of making its own positive contribution to the philosophy of science by examining for itself the phenomenology of laboratory work, especially data production, and the transformation of the language of theory into a descriptive language of scientific phenomena. A “strong” hermeneutical philosophy of natural science, then, challenges both analytic philosophy and the existing tradition of hermeneutical phenomenology.

Eco-phenomenology developed from the effort of a number of continentally-oriented philosophers exploring the thought of decisive authors in the phenomenological tradition, such as Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, with the purpose of offering a different insight into environmental issues than those predominant in Anglo-American philosophy. This initiative has proceeded not only from Western scholars but has had a resonance also in the distant philosophical tradition of Japan. The present contribution seeks to deepen the thought of a central figure for Japanese phenomenology: Nishida Kitaro. Nishida, indeed, was the first to introduce Husserlian thought in Japan and to seriously dialogue with the German phenomenologist from a Zen-oriented point of view. The purpose of this effort is to throw light on the theoretical origins of modern Japanese (eco)phenomenological thought, in order to grasp also its differences with Western eco-phenomenology, as led by Nishida’s Buddhist reading of Husserl’s works.

The Things Themselves: Phenomenology and the Return to the Everyday H. Peter Steeves. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006. For more than fifty years, significant doctrinal differences among American academic philosophers have turned on commitments either to the analytic or to the Continental traditions: the former focus on language, mathematical logic, and scientific method while Continental adherents (related movements include existentialism and phenomenology) emphasize personal experience, especially its affects. In polemic moments the Continentals accuse the analytically attuned of triviality and mimicking the quantitative disciplines. From their side, analytic philosophers have denigrated what they allege to be the antirationalism and willful obscurity of the Continentally committed. H. Peter Steeves, associate professor at DePaul University, stands sympathetically with the phenomenological tradition (Husserl, Merleau Ponty, Levinas, Heidegger) while stepping back from this intramural strife. The result is enlightening for the study of the social self and culture. Unlike most books written by academic philosophers, The Things Themselves takes a popular direction in both topics and expository language. One of Sleeve's jacket blurbists ranks him-fairly in my estimate-with Roland Barthes and Jean Baudrillard. Steeves shows a Barthian flare for selecting and unfolding the odd but culturally symptomatic arena. And like Baudrillard, Steeves can explore subtly some of the new commercially sponsored illusions that contribute to American hyperreality. The chapters, which include some previously published essays, evoke a wide range of cultural experiences: communicating with animals; visiting Disneyland and Las Vegas; watching Kiana Tom's porn-aerobic exercises on ESPN TV. For readers who have no previous immersion in phenomenological description, Steeves renders intuitively accessible applications of the method. The final chapter narrates his own adventures as a Fulbright professor to Venezuela, where he navigates shopping, politics, and his own near-death encounter with diarrhea. The tale breathtakingly illustrates the truism that we deepen the grasp of our own culture by encountering one that differs from it significantly. The phenomenological orientation is distinguished by systematic attention to feeling qualities, intentions, ascribed identities, and presuppositions about objects. Although Steeves often references other cultural interpreters, he helps us maintain a steady gaze upon experience. The first section of the book deals engagingly with broad subjects rooted in all cultures. Chapter 1, Monkey see examines whether animals can speak symbolic language or simply emit signals. As in other chapters dealing with animals, he articulates more kinship to human language than difference. Chapter 2, Illicit Crossings deals with attitudes toward feral children and Bigfoot creatures, using these phenomena to demonstrate the elasticity and defensiveness of our concept of the human species, hence its remoteness from the scientific precision often ascribed to it. Chapter 3, Lost Dog deals with the social status of dog packs in Venezuela, a topic that leads into animal psyche generally and the rarely posed question of whether dogs can have faces. …

Transcendental arguments were prominent in Western philosophy, German idealism, phenomenological tradition, and P. F. Strawson's thinking. They have fallen out of fashion because of their associations with transcendental idealism and verificationism. They are still invoked by important figures in the analytic tradition even if the very same tradition has cast doubt on such arguments. The nature of transcendental arguments remains unclear: Are they supposed to be deductive? Are they synthetic or analytic? If they are a priori, how are they supposed to be about the empirical world? What are their relations to necessity, conceivability, and essence? This Element takes up the challenge of elucidating the nature of transcendental arguments, embedded in the wider context of transcendental epistemology. It will be argued that the key premise 'transcendental conditional' is synthetic, necessary, and a posteriori.

Parsons criticizes Dummett’s recent argument that Husserl was not an analytic philosopher because Husserl did not accept that a philosophical account of thought can be attained only through a philosophical account of language, the thesis which Dummett takes to define the analytic tradition. Dummett locates the beginning of the conceptual break between the analytic and the continental traditions in Husserl’s transcendental turn of 1905–1907, after which Husserl came to subscribe to a essentially non-linguistic general conception of intentionality. Parsons agrees with Dummett that Husserl did not view the philosophy of language as basic to the philosophy of thought, but argues that Husserl was quite aware of the need for an account of the linguistic expression of thought. The problem that led Husserl away from accepting the fundamental status of philosophy of language was whether particular perceptual experiences must have a propositional or language-like structure in order to be said to have genuine content. In concluding that not all perceptual experience is propositional in structure, Husserl’s position is relevant to contemporary debates about thought and consciousness, especially the notion of non-conceptual mental. Through this critique of Dummett’s interpretation, Parsons suggests that the distinction between the analytic and continental traditions is neither as sharp nor as philosophically principled as many have supposed.

In the philosophical thought of twentieth century, the notion of world of life frequently confronts as an ontological concept that expresses the existence of the subject in the world. This notion is presented as a multi dimensional and multiple meaning concept, which represents all elements of the relationship between the subject and the world, all modes of this relationship and it also constitutes the ground of this relationship. In this sense, the phenomenological and pragmatist perspectives, that identify this notion with the interactional experience of the subject, become especially prominent. On the other hand, the concept of anthropological culture is a common concept and comes in sight based on the notion of experience in the views of both philosophical traditions, especially John Dewey’s and Merleau-Ponty’s. In this context, the aim of this study is on the one hand to analyze the philosophical basis of the concept of anthropological culture and on the other hand to evaluate and compare the presentation of this concept on the ontological ground by pragmatist and phenomenological traditions.

At first, one "naked and lonely" fact: nobody saw that philosophy was over. So, at least by induction, we can argue that philosophy never ends. This is regardless of the fact that throughout the history of philosophy, it is accompanied by announcements of the final conclusion, of the end, of philosophy death. From this point of view, Ludwig Wittgenstein does not seem to me to be a figure of the "past," a figure of the archive ― a figure of historical reconstruction. Moreover, the figure of "internal" conceptual deconstruction ― of an influential and respectful way/means of philosophical work ― analytical philosophy. Just the opposite. Ludwig Wittgenstein seems to be a figure of the future of philosophy, a figure of her pure authentic movement. Symbolic figure, but also, actual figure ― a figure of "never-not-complete" philosophy. A figure who signs not a word, spoken in philosophy. But which signs the point of “potential field voltage” of implementation philosophical displaying ― of not indicating things, but of registering traces of truth in individual states, to the limit brought... It is important to understand that this article is not about the philosophical tradition of analytical philosophy. And not about the philosopher himself, about the philosophy of L. Wittgenstein ― in terms of chronology, doxography, the "history of ideas" or theoretical reconstruction in the context ― one or another ― of the "philosophical present", or even, not about "universal with a signature." In this article, in fact, an attempt is opened to show, that analytical philosophy, as a definite way of acting to realize the event of thinking ― all analytical philosophy, as an attempt, as a beginning, as a movement, as a matter, as an activity, ― is phenomenal "natura naturans." It is such as a "topos of reproduction of thinking" in a purely ontological sense. In exchange with it (topos), in fact, Ludwig Wittgenstein, also, unique and one and only here, again, in a completely ontological sense, "demonstrates," that is, it is the actual, "living," perhaps irreplaceable "key" to the problem of limb, access, philosophical content and act. Perhaps having access is it correctly to put an access problem? Therefore, speaking with the help of Maître himself, philosophy is a work and luck to choose the right examples.

Philip Kitcher I want to begin by thanking Judith Green for organizing this symposium, and all the contributors for their thoughtful attention to my work. Pragmatism is currently undergoing an apparent revival, with a number of philosophers not normally associated with the movement claiming to have joined the club: following the lead of Dick Rorty, Isaac Levi, and Hilary Putnam, Robert Brandom and Huw Price have also declared their pragmatist allegiance. I, too, have signed on. But, as Seth Joshua Thomas astutely notes in his essay, should those who have labored long and hard during times when the writings of Peirce, James, and Dewey were neglected (and often brusquely dismissed) take these selfascriptions seriously? After all, none of us newcomers has anything like the depth of understanding of the pragmatist canon exhibited by many distinguished scholars— people like Richard Bernstein, Larry Hickman, Christopher Hookway, Cheryl Misak, and Ruth Anna Putnam. Neopragmatism is inspired by particular themes in the writings of Peirce, James, and Dewey, and aims to extend the pragmatist tradition by developing those themes in the context of contemporary philosophical discussions. That context might draw on ideas in Anglophone philosophy—as Brandom integrates pragmatist insights with recent views about meaning—or it might use the writings of the classical pragmatists to elaborate European approaches to social philosophy (as with Jurgen Habermas and Axel Honneth), or it might borrow eclectically from various philosophical traditions and from the circumstances of life today to launch philosophical inquiry in new directions. A personal neopragmatist confession: I care less about whether my readings

Pragmatism is an American‐born philosophical tradition, closely linked with German (neo)Kantianism, the Boasian tradition, and linguistic anthropology. This entry explores the sociohistorical, philosophical, and scientific backgrounds of pragmatism, focusing on Charles Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and G.H. Mead. Classical pragmatism is explicated in relation not only to twentieth‐century American philosophy, including logical empiricism, (post)analytic philosophy, and neopragmatism, but also to the social sciences and activism, focusing on intertwined developments in the Midwest (Ann Abor and especially Chicago), involving Dewey, Mead, Cooley, Jane Addams and Hull House, Chicago sociology, symbolic interactionism, and in New York City, involving Dewey, Boas, Herskovitz, W.E.B. Du Bois, and Alain Locke. Finally, this entry tries to explain Peircean pragmaticism/semiotics in terms of its architectonic principles and (con)textual relationships with Kant, Wilhelm von Humboldt, Völkerpsychologie, Boas, Sapir, Jakobson, and semiotic/linguistic anthropology, as well as with Latour, Whitehead, and the “ontological turn.”

Philosophical reflection on music is more than two thousand years old but it is patchy. Beyond a handful of names, beginning, perhaps, with Plato and Aristotle and leaping two thousand years to Eduard Hanslick and Edmund Gurney, most of what has been written is only of interest to historians of ideas. But the past two decades have seen an extraordinary flowering in the aesthetics of music that has eclipsed earlier speculations. This philosophical activity has been predominantly analytic in style. It prizes and expects clarity and detail in argument. There are other philosophical traditions but I am not aware that there has been any sudden efflorescence in writing on the aesthetics of music in these other provinces. The newcomer to analytic philosophy may easily form the impression that a great deal of it is devoted to the invention and solution of rather arcane problems requiring considerable intelligence but rather remote from the rest of humanity and life as we know it. There is some substance in this but it is not an entirely just verdict. Analytic philosophy can have implications for our lives by making us reflect upon unconsidered presuppositions; sometimes it may lead us to reflect on our lives and our values and cause us either to value things differently or perhaps more directly to alter our conduct. If utilitarians persuade people that they should grade their actions solely on the principle of what maximizes happiness, then people will change.

Decompositions and Transformations: Conceptions of Analysis in the Early Analytic and Phenomenological Traditions

Conceptions of analysis in the early analytic and phenomenological traditions: Some comparisons and relationships

Musa Akrami AbstractMany philosophers and logicians have contemplated the relationship between ontology and logic. The author of this paper, working within a Bolzanoan-Husserlian tradition of studying both ontology and logic, considers ontology as the science of the most general features of beings and the most general relations among them. He considers logic as the science concerning the most general statements of all (natural or artificial) languages and the most general relations among them from an inferential point of view. It is possible to see logic in a broader sense as the science of all kinds of relations among all kinds of entities, acts, and processes stating some (objective, subjective, artificial, or conventional) reality. These entities, acts, and processes are not individual; rather, they are idealized, such that their universals may be instantiated at all times and in all places. In formal ontology we search for the properties of those structures of the reality that are formally similar. So we may find some formal truths applying to all things and/or properties and/or processes in different areas of objective/subjective/fictional reality. Surveying briefly the most important relations of logic and ontology in both analytic and phenomenological traditions, the author focuses on this central point: If reality is one as the unity of more or less interconnected and interactive beings of all physical, nonphysical and artificial types, the system of inference too may be one as the unity of more or less interconnected statements of all natural and artificial types. The universal system of inference may be divided into several relatively separate subsystems (having a more or less degree of connection) just as the unified reality has divided into several relatively separate fields (having a more or less degree of connection and interaction). According to such a model for corresponding realities and sciences within the unified reality and the unified science, the author assumes the possibility of beginning to construct both the comprehensive system of reference and the comprehensive formal ontology, both covering all possible members of their own field and being parallel and correspondent to each other; a long-run work, of course, very difficult to do.