Добродетель и долг в моральной философии Томаса Рида

Eric Schliesser. Adam Smith: Systematic Philosopher and Public Thinker.

Research Summary: The current research aims to know: 1. Human behavior according to Freud's perspective 2. Freud's concept of taboo 3. The concept of virtue according to Freud 4 . Human behavior between pleasure and reality For the purpose of verifying this, the descriptive method was used to study its suitability in achieving the goals of current research in the concept of behavior, its components and interpretations according to Freud B ( consciousness), dividing it into three levels: feeling, pre-feeling, unconscious, feeling .he used an expression that is identical to the meaning used in everyday life, it includes all the sensations and experiences that we are aware of at any moment, and he stressed that human feeling is only a small and limited aspect of our personality because only a small part of our thoughts, and our feelings and our memories exist in the perceived feeling. Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) presented us with a different philosophy that contradicts the philosophical concepts that man's rational nature is distinguished from other living beings by possessing reason and language, proceeding from human behavior not directed by reason, but by what is stronger than reason and more influential in human behavior: he called motives, which means irrational instincts that affect our social life and human civilization, as expressed by desire, need and longing. He explained that the most important part is the most invisible part that exists under the surface (the unconscious), which are not parts of the personality or divisions in the physical sense and are not a qualitative or spatial subject for a person, but they refer to processes, systems or systems of the mind and organize mental life and interact dynamically with each other. In the light of what was presented in the research paper, a number of recommendations and proposals were made

Any engineering design allocates risk among its several constituencies: customers, users, manufacturers, the public at large, and so forth. Techniques for risk management are well known and widely practiced, but the role of virtue in guiding risk allocation is less clear. This essay contrasts two worldviews with contrasting concepts of virtue: that of the naturalist, which holds that the physical universe is all that exists, and that morality derives from human reason alone; and that of the theist, believing the physical universe to be created by divine fiat, and that human reason should be informed by principles set by a high, creator God. Defining a personal worldview is central to the ethics of risk allocation. Persuading students to do this becomes the central issue in teaching ethics in the engineering classroom.

In humanitarian actions, people respond to crisis and disaster situations in which victims are unable to recover on their own and in which their vulnerability puts them at further risk. Individuals involved in humanitarian work are driven by strong motivation which source can be identified using an ethics-based approach. Moral motivation is the basis for the commitment to the moral course of the human agent’s action. Humanitarian ethics shows us it is important to renew the discussion on the role of moral motivation in ethical decision-making. Some of the moral sources of motivation will be critically examined in this study—namely, the partiality, the popularity of ethics, the value declaration, and moral motivation based on moral obligation (according to the ethics of social consequences).

Any investigation into ‘good management’ raises questions about what it means to be a ‘good manager’. This itself suggests that there is more to moral theorising than impartially analysing the specific details of discrete decisions, and that some consideration ought to be paid to moral agents themselves, and what constitutes their good. Such considerations are integral to the virtue ethics tradition. This chapter illustrates how the key features of Aristotelian virtue ethics are necessary for understanding moral issues as they are faced by managers, using the issue of data manipulation as an example. Based on the view that a moral theory will only be useful for management if it can adequately describe such moral issues, it argues that the Aristotelian tradition is thereby well suited for application to managers. Three ways in which the Aristotelian perspective can contribute to good management are then presented, which include consideration of: the virtues or excellences relevant to managerial functions; those relevant to living well qua human; and the importance of both individual and common goods. The chapter closes by drawing attention to how the Aristotelian perspective stands in stark contrast to a common conception of ethics as compliance.

Until man reaches the moderation, it must reform itself and its activities as the infrastructure of society. Since his inception on the basis of moral virtues It also help him to move towards society, thus achieving human development which in turn achieves sustainability. The research addressed virtue as an integral part of morality, from it began the teachings of religion and showed the relationship between him and his environment Based on the concept of moderation to achieve sustainability.the Search attempt to discuss the absence clear imagination of virtue concept and its role in architecture sustainability, so The research aims to clarity the role of the concept of virtue in the permanence of the architecture and its survival on the assumption that virtue has a role in the sustainability of architecture. To achieve this aim the research used Inductive methodology (descriptive, analytical) through election samples and Test, finally Take virtue into consideration in the design process Contributes to the sustainability of the building Conversely in the event of negligence, it may lead to outbreaks of vices and the factors of violence and theft that cause the abandonment of the building is The most important results.

Part 1 Overview: Hume, human nature and the foundations of morality, David Fate Norton. Part 2 Practical reason: was Hume a Humean?, Elijah Millgram Kantian tunes on a Humean instrument - why Hume is not really a sceptic about practical reasoning, Elizabeth Radcliffe. Part 3 Moral anti-rationalism, is and ought, and the status of moral judgments: Hume on moral judgement, Philippa Foot Hume on is and ought, W.D. Falk variants of sentimentalism, J.L. Mackie gilding or staining the world with sentiments and phantasms, Barry Stroud is Hume a non-cognitivist in the motivation argument?, Rachel Cohon. Part 4 The origin and refinement of the moral sentiments: another look at Hume's account of moral evaluation, Pall S. Ardal the common point of view in Hume's ethics, Rachel Cohon justice and the foundations of social morality in Hume's Treatise, Jacqueline Taylor constructing character - Hume on moral approval, love and the general point of view, Christine Korsgaard. Part 5 The artificial virtues and society: Hume's noble lie - an account of his artificial virtues, Marcia Baron Hume's account of social artifice - its origin and originality, Annette Baier artificial virtues and the sensible knave, David Gauthier. Part 6 Moral motivation and obligation: is Hume an internalist?, Charlotte Brown how does the Humean sense of duty motivate?, Elizabeth Radcliffe motive and obligation in Hume's ethics, Stephen Darwall natural obligation and normative motivation in Hume's treatise, Tito Magri. Part 7 Character and utility: character - a Humean account, Jane McIntyre Hume on the characters of virtue, Richard Dees Hume and the Bauhaus theory of ethics, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord Hume and the invention of utilitarianism, Stephen Darwall.

The novel category of a moral subject—an individual who is a subject of moral motivation but who cannot be held responsible for what she does—is introduced in this chapter, and distinguished from the familiar categories of moral agent and moral patient. Reasons are identified for thinking that the category of moral subject collapses into that of moral agent: that is, that there can be no moral motivation without moral agency. The central argument of the book is identified: the category of moral subject is a legitimate one that does not collapse into that of a moral agent. Animals are moral subjects, but not moral agents.

SUMMARY. This paper explores the issue of ethics in relation to library discard practices, and attempts to address the weeding process from a philosophical point of view. An overview of some of the origins of ethical theories, including those of Kant, Epicurus and Epictetus, is given and related to college library weeding practices. Moral obligation is a key phrase when considering the concept of ethics. Honesty, objectivity, competency, and loyalty as they relate to the moral obligation most libraries have to keep their collections current, is examined. It is argued that these concepts do indeed substantiate the assumption that discarding is an ethical practice. Ethics has long been an area of concern to the American Library Association. An analysis of the professional status of librarians and the concept of ALA Codes of Ethics is addressed in this paper in order to place the issue in historical perspective. Finally, the issue of ethics versus law, and where discarding/weeding practices fit into that scheme, is discussed.

The Development of Ethics is a selective historical and critical study of moral philosophy in the Socratic tradition, with special attention to Aristotelian naturalism. It discusses the main topics of moral philosophy as they have developed historically, including: the human good, human nature, justice, friendship, and morality; the methods of moral inquiry; the virtues and their connexions; will, freedom, and responsibility; reason and emotion; relativism, subjectivism, and realism; the theological aspect of morality. This volume examines early modern moral philosophy from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. Volume 3 will continue the story up to Rawls’s Theory of Justice. The present volume begins with Suarez’s interpretation of Scholastic moral philosophy, and examines seventeenth- and eighteenth-century responses to the Scholastic outlook, to see how far they constitute a distinctively different conception of moral philosophy. The treatments of natural law by Grotius, Hobbes, Cumberland, and Pufendorf are treated in some detail. Disputes about moral facts, moral judgments, and moral motivation, are traced through Cudworth, Clarke, Balguy, Hutcheson, Hume, Price, and Reid. Butler’s defence of a naturalist account of morality is examined and compared with the Aristotelian and Scholastic views discussed in Volume 1. The volume ends with a survey of the persistence of voluntarism in English moral philosophy, and a brief discussion of the contrasts and connexions between Rousseau and earlier views on natural law. The emphasis of the book is not purely descriptive, narrative, or exegetical, but also philosophical. Irwin discusses the comparative merits of different views, the difficulties that they raise, and how some of the difficulties might be resolved. The book tries to present the leading moral philosophers of the past as participants in a rational discussion that is still being carried on, and tries to help the reader to participate in this discussion.

This chapter examines the development of Kant’s moral philosophy in the 1770s, focusing on the first, foundational half of Kant’s lectures on ethics in the mid-1770s (“Moral Kaehler”). It argues that Kant deploys his account of practical ideas and develops a theory of the moral motive and obligation, both of which are based on the goodness or perfection of the good will. Kant identifies an intellectual criterion for valid moral judgment, which, in one formulation, appeals to universalizable intentions and, in another, to the dignity of humanity. He also distinguishes these claims about the moral motive and principle of judgment from questions about the nature of obligation and the virtuous “execution” of it in human action, which require an incentive to virtue provided by a combination of moral feeling and a hope for deserved happiness that is grounded in divine legislation.

African conceptions of virtue, in comparison with the virtue-ethical perspectives of the letter to Titus, have foundational and narrative tensions, yet they are in tandem in some important respects. Consequently, appropriating a virtue ethic that is relevant to African contexts and simultaneously accountable to the virtue-ethical perspectives of Titus requires the application of a synthetic methodology. Hence, this article newly develops and describes such a methodology as “progressivenegotiated- ethics”. In applying this methodology, the article negotiates, imagines and emerges a virtue-ethical horizon that is simultaneously African and biblical, described as “African biblical virtue ethics”. Such a third virtue-ethical space, negotiated from the two distinct virtue concepts of African ethics and biblical ethics, takes both the intricacies of biblical ethics and the complexities of African ethics seriously.

There is an evident difference in the implementation level of animal welfare (AW) across the societies and countries worldwide. Although multiple factors contribute to these differences, we can summarize them into a three pillar concept, the three aspects of applied farm AW. The objective of this review is to analyse applied AW on farms from the ethical, economic and animal health aspects. Modern ethics emphasizes biocentrism against anthropocentrism, the modern ethical concept of bioethics. Additionally, beside the differences among the major ethical concepts, there is a consensus that AW deserves a respectful place. An animal?s economic value is not only limited by its material value determined by the inputs and outputs. Thus, rather than being simply considered as a ?stock-good? machine, animals are valued as a sentient beings with ?added value?, which has an impact on the final product price. Animal health and welfare are interconnected and are based on the impact of AW on health and vice versa. The implementation of higher welfare standards to farm animals is only possible if AW is accepted as part of the health of the animal. The applicability of this concept is presented through the European Union AW legislation, which is based on public opinion, economy and animal health. As a conclusion, applied AW is possible only at the level at which the three pillars are equally balanced, and the initiatives in this field should work and be focused on ethics, economics and health.

Transcendental arguments against skepticism claim that the skeptical argument depends on the falsehood or the unbelievability of the skeptical hypothesis. This chapter argues that the skeptic needs to presuppose the moral or practical rationality of the subject, requiring the existence of an external world with certain features (strongest arguments), the falsehood of the skeptical hypothesis (strong arguments), or the subject’s belief in such a world (weak arguments). The argument starts with rational agency and investigates the sense of moral obligation, moral motives, and virtues that would exist in “vat morality,” arguing that although the skeptic needs to presuppose the rational and moral agency of the subject, the skeptical hypothesis denies or undermines the subject’s agency. The chapter ends by considering whether the skeptic can retreat to Pyrrhonian skepticism to save the skeptical project, concluding that he cannot.

One clear reason why human agents often act badly is because they are insufficiently attentive to moral considerations and concerns, or tempted to ignore these in pursuit of more immediate satisfactions. In so far as madness, insanity or mental instability may be regarded as undermining moral agency, it might also be supposed that such madness attaches more to the non‐moral than the moral reasons or motives of agents. Still, the well‐known quote from Chesterton at the start of this paper may give pause to conventional thought on this matter. With reference to the ideas of Plato and Freud, as well as attention to literary and cinematic “case studies,” this paper argues that moral reasons and motives – of an apparently Chestertonian kind – may be a prime source of morally “insane” conduct.