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The objective of the article was to investigate the contributions of the information platforms of the branches of governments of Brazilian states to build passive transparency. A descriptive study was carried out, through documentary research, with a predominantly qualitative approach. The object of investigation comprises the executive, legislative and judicial branches of governments of Brazilian states. The data were collected in February 2017 using the structured observation technique, through a protocol for recording information. The data obtained were analyzed using the descriptive analysis technique. The indicators for evaluation of the platforms were ‘communication’, ‘login and receipts’ and ‘barriers’, and they presented different configurations in each of the branches. In terms of ‘communication’ and ‘login and receipts’, in general, the state executive branch received better scores compared to the judiciary and legislative branches. On the other hand, the indicator ‘barriers’, was better evaluated in the judiciary and legislative branches. From the results obtained, it is not yet possible to confirm whether the platforms of the executive, judicial and legislative branches of the Brazilian states contribute to build passive transparency.

Twenty-five years ago, students of the American presidency were confronted with the idea that the chief executive had overstepped the reasonable limits of power and was in danger of becoming imperial. Historian and presidential biographer Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. wrote the Imperial Presidency(1) to trace the rise and development of presidential power, to identify where and when executive power had grown into executive dominance, and to warn of the consequences of an out-of-control presidency for the American republic. The idea caught on, and the word itself has become common in contemporary political discourse.(2) However, in the early 1970s, Professor Schlesinger was not seeking to sketch out a broad-based indictment of the presidency. Rather, he identified a specific area of concern, the constitutional allocation of power between the legislative and executive branches with attention to matters surrounding the use of military force in foreign settings. The foreword states, This book does not deal systematically with all facets and issues of presidential power.... It deals essentially with the shift in the constitutional balance--with, that is, the appropriation by the Presidency, and particularly by the contemporary Presidency, of powers reserved by the Constitution and by long historical practice to Congress. ... the imperial Presidency received its decisive impetus, I believe, from foreign policy; above all, from the capture by the President of the most vital of national decisions, the decision to go to war.(3) What brought about the fear of an imperial presidency in the early 1970s? The constitutional balance of power, especially the war power, had tilted in favor of the president. Traditional constitutional assumptions based on shared powers and collective judgment had given way as the political and structural conditions on which they were based were altered. The latter half of this century saw the rise of the United States to superpower status, the concomitant need for permanent standing armies (with American troops permanently based on foreign soil), and the development of technologically sophisticated weapons of mass destruction that reduced the war decision to a matter of minutes rather than days or weeks. Professor Schlesinger feared that these changed conditions had helped push the war power fully and exclusively into the hands of a single individual--a form of tyranny that the founders vigorously debated and sought to avoid.(4) A president that could order military troops and weaponry around the globe without fear of being held accountable by a coequal branch of government was a president who had become imperial. A quarter of a century later, the claims of unchecked presidential power in matters of war remain. Political and military conflicts in Lebanon, the Mediterranean Sea, Grenada, Kuwait, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Bosnia have placed the conflict between the executive and legislative branches and the problem of war powers into bold relief. The constitutional balance has not been addressed in a conclusive and satisfying way. Many observers conclude that we are left with a president imperial by default in that the key issue left unresolved by the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, that of the allocation of the war-making power, remains unclear and unanswered. This article is not meant to be another review of the Imperial Presidency. However, twenty-five years later, the language, approach, and interpretive assumptions used in that work continue to provide a basis for analyses and evaluations of presidential initiatives abroad. The Imperial Presidency was published just as this country confronted an oil crisis, the end of the Nixon presidency; and the less-than-satisfying final chapter of the Vietnam War. The book remains an important signpost from that era, and its author himself remains widely read and respected today. …

Accessible information is an essential resource for equal, meaningful participation in the public life of a democratic society. Such information is particularly vital for the effective functioning of all three branches of government in our constitutional democracy: the administrative branch, which creates government policy and holds state actors accountable to the public; the legislative branch, which scrutinizes old and creates new legislation; and the judicial branch, which reviews the acts of the legislative and executive branches. For the law-reform processes of each branch to effectively foster the informed creation and critique of public law and policy, we require reliable, accessible data depicting the diversity of individuals who make up the broader Canadian public.Beyond this practical purpose, accessible information plays an expressive role as it constitutes a particular notion of the Canadian public. The data created by national population censuses and assembled in welfare reports has the power to “nominat[e] into existence” certain groups of people and, conversely, to “refus[e] to name” others. Such information not only represents the public, it also creates the public, as it stands in for the public at all levels of government. By communicating who we are as a society and how we are changing, census information and welfare reports shape our understanding of ourselves — our laws, policies, government, and place in the world.

Introduction At Commonwealth, State and Territory levels in Australia, the judiciary is a branch of government separate from the legislative and executive branches and independent of them. The functions of the courts also differ from those of the other branches of government. While courts have a capacity to shape the law, it is a limited capacity. The principal function of courts is, of course, to adjudicate disputes according to the law. Judges cannot develop the law except in the course of an adjudication, and then only in an incremental fashion. The judicial branches of government are separate from the other branches in the sense that their members cannot be members of the legislature, and, subject to a few exceptions, judges cannot act as agents of the executive branch. The judicial branches can be regarded as independent of the other branches so long as their members are assured that they are able to exercise the judicial function free from interference by either a legislature or an executive, and also that they cannot be prejudiced by other branches simply on account of their decisions.

When delegates discussed the structure of the presidency at the Constitutional Convention in June 1787, serious objections to a unitary executive were raised. Edmund Randolph warned, for example, that a one-person presidency would become the “foetus of monarchy.” Controversy over the idea of a single president was predictable. Only recently had the framers freed themselves from the tyranny of King George III, and they were firmly committed to creating a new government that would not abuse its powers and oppress its citizens. It must have seemed preposterous to replace a hereditary monarch with an elected monarch.To be sure, the framers invoked important arguments for a unitary executive. While Congress would deliberate, the president would act with decisiveness and dispatch. A single president would bring order and energy to the national government. With the passage of time, however, it has become clear that the founding fathers misjudged the consequences of their choice:They did not anticipate the extent to which executive power would expand and give us an “imperial presidency” that dominates Congress and that too often exercises its authority in ways that are detrimental to the national interest. They did not predict the role that political parties would come to play and how battles to capture the White House would greatly aggravate partisan conflict. They did not recognize that single presidents would represent party ideology much more than the overall public good. And they misjudged the advantages and disadvantages of single versus multiple decision makers.Had the framers been able to predict the future, they would have been far less enamored with the idea of a unitary executive and far more receptive to the alternative proposals for a plural executive that they rejected. Like their counterparts in Europe, they might well have created an executive branch in which power is shared among multiple persons from multiple political parties.If the presidency is to fulfill the founding fathers’ vision and function more effectively, it needs to be reconceived. This need for constitutional change led me to the proposal for reform that I consider in this book — the replacement of the one-person, one-party presidency with a two-person, two-party presidency.A coalition presidency carries the potential for many important benefits — a balancing of power between the executive and legislative branches, a dampening of partisan conflict in Washington, an executive branch more representative of the entire electorate, real opportunities for third-party candidates to win election, and wiser presidential decision making.After more than two hundred years with the Constitution’s one-person presidency, it may seem preposterous to suggest a plural executive. But a coalition presidency would be far more faithful to the framers’ view of executive power. They wanted a president with limited authority who would serve as a co-equal with Congress. They also believed that power should be contained by dividing it and requiring it to be shared. A two-person presidency relies on the framers’ structural devices to promote their core values. And by correcting the dysfunction in Washington and making the executive branch operate more effectively, a two-person, bipartisan presidency can be justified even without reference to original intent.

One of the main characteristics of any political regime is the power correlation between the legislative and executive branches of state power. In a democratic environment, it should reflect a certain balance of branches of power.The Constitution of Ukraine has defined the principle of separation of power into legislative, executive and judicial (art. 6), each of them is independent from the other one and acts within its competence. Theoretically fixed in the Constitution principles of power separation aim between legislative and executive branches. However in the conditions of social-economic crisis, in which the country has been acting since 1990s, between multi-vectored political forces and striving of executive power for widening of its authorities, that is fixed in the Constitution, the presidential-parliamentary form of administration very often has led not only to constitutional cooperation of powers but to the competition between the President and executive power on the one hand, and Verhovna Rada, on the other hand. So, today the need for reconsideration of both the correlation of authorities and cooperation between branches of power in Ukraine has become obvious.
 Keywords: legislative branch of government, executive branch of government, cooperation, political system.

The article presents the results from the study that aimed to investigate the attendance of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of Brazilian states government, towards the legal demands for availability of information to society, by means of passive transparency. The empirical object included 27 state governments, 27 legislative councils and 27 courts of justice. The research is descriptive, operationalized by a documental research, with a qualitative approach. In order to collect the data, an information request was sent to the three branches and was analyzed through the technic of documentary analysis. In the analysis of passive transparency in the Brazilian states government branches, the majority of the states presented better results in their executive branch, if compared to the judiciary or legislative. On the other hand, there have been those who seemed to face difficulties in the attendance of information demands. This detachment between imposed transparency to the governmental entities and its effective accomplishment is highlighted in literature as being a characteristic of formalism.

Transparency of public power is one of the main aspects of civil society. The actions of public administration bodies must be transparent, open, and ensure citizens’ legitimate rights and interests. Large-scale digitalization of society also affects public authorities, opening up new opportunities for improving the transparency of public administration and creating risks at various levels of public administration. The study is devoted to the issue of transparency of public authorities under the influence of digitalization. The normative legal acts of Ukraine, the Strategy of digital development, scientific achievements of domestic and foreign scientists are analyzed. The main elements of transparency of public authorities are identified: transparency, openness, and publicity. The level of digitalization penetration into the bodies of legislative, executive and judicial branches of power is characterized. The main functions that digitalization can perform in relation to public authorities are identified. The main achievements of Ukraine in terms of the public power digitalization, which has increased its transparency level, are described. They include a network of web portals of legislative, executive and judicial authorities, which provide public information in the form of messages, files, open data sets, photo and video information. Another important achievement is the service of providing services online and the introduction in Ukraine of full-fledged digital documents, which are analogs of physical. The main indicators of digitalization and characteristics of public authorities are identified: Digital Development Level, IMD World Digital Competitiveness Ranking, ICT goods exports, ICT goods imports, ICT service exports, Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, Control of Corruption. A canonical analysis of digitalization impact on the transparency of public authorities quantitatively shows that public authorities are closely linked to digitalization and influenced by it.

Political Opposition, Legislative Oversight, and the Performance of the Executive Branch

The original understanding of the Constitution, I wrote not so long ago, was forged not in the courts but in Congress and the executive branch.(1) That was true of the Federalist period, the first twelve years under the new Constitution--a time of great constitutional controversies involving such matters as the Bank of the United States, the Jay Treaty, and the Alien and Sedition Acts and of quaint and curious squabbles now largely forgotten: what call the president, whether he must accept a salary, how the vice president signs a bill. Some of these disputes sound petty, but even they helped define what kind of country the United States would be. All of them were initially, and many of them finally, fought out in the executive and legislative branches. The same was true of the years that followed, when Thomas Jefferson was president. Jefferson's inauguration was a significant victory for the new system, a peaceful transfer of power from one political party another, which at the time was not be taken for granted.(2) We are all Republicans, he said in his inaugural address, we are all Federalists.(3) It was a breath of fresh air. Jefferson's brave words, of course, did not put an end controversy. His presidency was another exciting time: the Burr conspiracy, the embargo, the war against the Barbary pirates--in which Jefferson, following Washington's example, took a refreshingly narrow view of the president's powers as commander in chief.(4) The Twelfth Amendment, designed with the simple goal of avoiding the near disaster of the 1800 election, proved be a surprising can of worms, a monument the difficulty of constitutional drafting.(5) In the great Court fight of Jefferson's first term, which rivaled that of the 1930s, judicial independence suffered grave setbacks in the repeal of the Judiciary Act and the removal of Judge Pickering, only emerge more firmly entrenched than ever after the dramatic acquittal of Justice Samuel Chase.(6) Jefferson's presidency was also a time of significant events in westward expansion: the admission of Ohio, the Louisiana Purchase, and the beginnings of the Cumberland Road. Each of these events raised fundamental constitutional questions. Each was extensively debated in Congress and in the executive branch, not in the courts. And each served as an important precedent when similar issues arose again. I. OHIO The Northwest Ordinance contemplated the creation of three five new states in the territory ceded by individual states the Union after the Revolution.(7) As soon as any of the areas defined in the Ordinance had sixty thousand free inhabitants it was be admitted statehood, and Congress was directed admit it earlier if that was consistent with the general interest of the confederacy.(8) Settlement of the Northwest was retarded, however, by hostile Indians; the first western states admitted were Kentucky and Tennessee.(9) Then Mad Anthony Wayne defeated the Indians at Fallen Timbers, Jay's Treaty dispersed their British protectors, and Thomas Pinckney's treaty opened the Mississippi western goods.(10) The population of the eastern part of the territory grew by leaps and bounds, and it was separated from the remaining portion, which was christened the Indiana Territory, in 1800.(11) By 1802 a number of its inhabitants were banging on Congress's door in search of admission the union.(12) Although the 1800 census reported that the Eastern Division had a population of only 45,365, a House committee recommended that its inhabitants be authorized to form for themselves a constitution and State government.(13) Congress obliged,(14) but not without a little bloodletting on the House floor. The problem was that not everyone in the division favored immediate statehood. Governor Arthur St. Clair did not; the territorial legislature did not; neither did the territorial delegate in Congress, Paul Fearing. …

1. Elissa Passiment, EdM CLS(NCA)[⇑][1] 1. is Executive Vice President of the American Society for Clinical Laboratory Science 1. Address for correspondence: Elissa Passiment EdM CLS(NCA), American Society for Clinical Laboratory Science, 6701 Democracy Boulevard, Suite 300, Bethesda MD 20817. (301) 657-2768, (301) 657-2909 (fax). ElissaP{at}ascls.org Passing legislation in Congress is only the beginning of law-making. Crafting of rules and regulations turns ideas into actual, enforceable laws. Rules and regulations can be thought of as the operator's manual for laws and have the full force of law. Two laws, the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and the Negotiated Rulemaking Act (“neg reg”) control the writing of rules and regulations.1 The APA defines rules and regulations as statements from federal agencies that “regulate the future conduct of either groups of persons or a single person” and “implement, interpret or prescribe law or policy”.2 They are written by executive branch agency staff, not by members of Congress. The Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990 describes a voluntary process that brings interested parties and government together to negotiate the language of a regulation. The committee is chartered under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) and consists of representatives from groups that will be affected by the regulation such as the public sector, public interest groups, industry and practitioners, or individuals. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH The structure of the federal government in the United States is divided into the executive branch, legislative branch, and judicial branch. Each is autonomous and has agencies and commissions that deal with the day-to-day business of government. The agencies of the executive branch are in departments created with the consent of Congress (Table 1).3 Each department is administered by a secretary who serves at the designation of the President and must be approved by Congress.4 Each department is… ABBREVIATIONS: APA = Administrative Procedures Act; APC = ambulatory payment classifications; CBER = Center for Biological Evaluation and Research; CDC = Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; CMS = Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services; CLIA '88 = Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988; CFR = Code of Federal Regulations; DRG = diagnosis-related groups; FACA = Federal Advisory Committee Act; FDA = Food and Drug Administration; HHS = Department of Health and Human Services; OIVD = Offce of In Vitro Diagnostics Device Evaluation [1]: #corresp-1

The rule of law is often cast as the primary governance ideology of Hong Kong. Hong Kong is a capitalist, common law legal jurisdiction that had, at least until a recent political crackdown, strained to differentiate itself from authoritarian, socialist, mainland China over its northern border. This article explores government conceptions of the rule of law in Hong Kong, benchmarked against rule of law standards adopted by member states at the United Nations (UN). We argue that Hong Kong’s ‘official’ rule of law definition is at odds with an evolving international consensus on the rule of law within domestic legal and political systems. This has especially been the case after 2005, with the strengthening of rule of law discourse at the UN General Assembly and the rule of law’s increasing political contestation and weaponisation in Hong Kong. Compared with the contemporary consensus expressed at the UN, Hong Kong’s rule of law definition, as favoured by the territory’s executive, legislative and judicial branches, possesses a narrower ambit, but is also more finely articulated.

Federalism is a system of government in which power is divided between a central authority and various constituent units, such as states, provinces, cantons, etc. Federalism allows for diversity and autonomy of the sub-national units, while also maintaining a common national identity and interest. Different countries have adopted different models of federalism, depending on their historical, political, and social contexts. India is a federal republic with a parliamentary system of government. The Constitution of India, adopted in 1950, provides for a division of powers between the Union and the States, with a concurrent list of subjects on which both can legislate. The United States of America is a federal republic with a presidential system of government. The Constitution of the United States, adopted in 1787, establishes a federal system of checks and balances between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the federal government, and the states. The Constitution also grants certain powers and rights to the citizens, such as the Bill of Rights, which limit the authority of the federal government. Canada is a federal parliamentary monarchy with a constitutional system of government. The Constitution Act, 1867, formerly known as the British North America Act, 1867, created a federation of four provinces: Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick. The Constitution Act, 1982, patriated the constitution from the United Kingdom, and added the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which guarantees the rights and freedoms of the people. Canada has a bilingual and multicultural society, with two official languages (English and French) and a recognition of the rights of the Aboriginal peoples. Australia is a federal parliamentary constitutional monarchy with a Westminster system of government. The Constitution of Australia, adopted in 1901, established a federation of six states and two territories. The Constitution also outlines the roles and responsibilities of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the federal government, and the states. Australia has a common law system, with the High Court of Australia as the final court of appeal. Switzerland is a federal semi-direct democracy with a directorial system of government. The Constitution of Switzerland, adopted in 1848, and revised in 1999, defines Switzerland as a confederation of 26 cantons, which have a high degree of autonomy and sovereignty. The Constitution also provides for a system of direct democracy, in which the people can initiate or reject laws through referendums and popular initiatives. Switzerland has a multilingual and multicultural society, with four official languages (German, French, Italian, and Romansh) and a recognition of the diversity of the cantons.Thispaperwillendeavor to discus s,analyze,andcomparethesystemoffederalismindifferentcountrieswith respect to India and this doctrinal research will focus on the system of governance in the mentionedcountries.

Executive Branch, Government

RésuméCet article examine la relation entre la discrétion administrative et la primauté du droit. L'auteure démontre comment la discrétion administrative, conçue correctement, est non seulement compatible avec une compréhension particulière du principe de la primauté du droit, mais peut aussi devenir un véhicule permettant au pouvoir exécutif d'exprimer son engagement envers ce principe. Selon l'auteure, ceci est possible, premièrement, si la discrétion est conçue selon la métaphore du «dialogue» entre le dirigeant et le dirigé et, deuxièmement, si une compréhension substantive de la primauté du droit est mise de l'avant, à savoir une définition qui considère les trois éléments constitutifs de l'État (les sphères législative, judiciaire et exécutive) comme étant impliqués dans la prévention des actions arbitraires de la part des pouvoirs publics. L'auteure explore ces dynamiques dans le contexte concret de ses expériences en tant que vice-doyenne d'une faculté de droit. Elle cherche à comprendre comment le modèle théorique du dialogue fonctionne dans la pratique et à identifier les aspects particuliers de la théorie qui pourraient nécessiter plus d'étude et de recherche empirique.