Regulatory agencies involved with the clinical laboratory.

Implementation of the federal advisory committee act: An overview

This article talks about the relationship of the National Assembly with the executive and judicial powers. The author came to the conclusion that under the parliamentary model, the functions performed by the state authorities are actually not equal in nature and differ from each other in legal force and content, that is, the activities of the legislative branch are of a legislative nature, and the judicial and executive authorities are of a sub-legislative nature. The article also emphasizes the idea that the legislative branch has so-called “functional superiority” over other branches of government, which in itself should not be considered as a violation of the constitutional balance between the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government. Because the essence of the principle of separation and balancing of powers is not to preserve equal functions for the branches of government, which, due to the nature of the functions of the branches of government, are no longer equal, but to ensure the necessary and sufficient powers of each branch of government.Addressing the issue that one of the central issues in the relationship between the branches of legislative and executive power is parliamentary control over the executive power, and emphasizing that in such conditions it is necessary to ensure effective mechanisms to curb the dominance of the executive power (Prime Minister) becomes of key importance, the author as a political guarantee of the implementation of high-quality control in relation to the executive branch, it takes into account the presence of a strong parliamentary opposition, because the main criterion for creating an opposition is not power, law, but the limitation of power by law.

The objective of the article was to investigate the contributions of the information platforms of the branches of governments of Brazilian states to build passive transparency. A descriptive study was carried out, through documentary research, with a predominantly qualitative approach. The object of investigation comprises the executive, legislative and judicial branches of governments of Brazilian states. The data were collected in February 2017 using the structured observation technique, through a protocol for recording information. The data obtained were analyzed using the descriptive analysis technique. The indicators for evaluation of the platforms were ‘communication’, ‘login and receipts’ and ‘barriers’, and they presented different configurations in each of the branches. In terms of ‘communication’ and ‘login and receipts’, in general, the state executive branch received better scores compared to the judiciary and legislative branches. On the other hand, the indicator ‘barriers’, was better evaluated in the judiciary and legislative branches. From the results obtained, it is not yet possible to confirm whether the platforms of the executive, judicial and legislative branches of the Brazilian states contribute to build passive transparency.

Twenty-five years ago, students of the American presidency were confronted with the idea that the chief executive had overstepped the reasonable limits of power and was in danger of becoming imperial. Historian and presidential biographer Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. wrote the Imperial Presidency(1) to trace the rise and development of presidential power, to identify where and when executive power had grown into executive dominance, and to warn of the consequences of an out-of-control presidency for the American republic. The idea caught on, and the word itself has become common in contemporary political discourse.(2) However, in the early 1970s, Professor Schlesinger was not seeking to sketch out a broad-based indictment of the presidency. Rather, he identified a specific area of concern, the constitutional allocation of power between the legislative and executive branches with attention to matters surrounding the use of military force in foreign settings. The foreword states, This book does not deal systematically with all facets and issues of presidential power.... It deals essentially with the shift in the constitutional balance--with, that is, the appropriation by the Presidency, and particularly by the contemporary Presidency, of powers reserved by the Constitution and by long historical practice to Congress. ... the imperial Presidency received its decisive impetus, I believe, from foreign policy; above all, from the capture by the President of the most vital of national decisions, the decision to go to war.(3) What brought about the fear of an imperial presidency in the early 1970s? The constitutional balance of power, especially the war power, had tilted in favor of the president. Traditional constitutional assumptions based on shared powers and collective judgment had given way as the political and structural conditions on which they were based were altered. The latter half of this century saw the rise of the United States to superpower status, the concomitant need for permanent standing armies (with American troops permanently based on foreign soil), and the development of technologically sophisticated weapons of mass destruction that reduced the war decision to a matter of minutes rather than days or weeks. Professor Schlesinger feared that these changed conditions had helped push the war power fully and exclusively into the hands of a single individual--a form of tyranny that the founders vigorously debated and sought to avoid.(4) A president that could order military troops and weaponry around the globe without fear of being held accountable by a coequal branch of government was a president who had become imperial. A quarter of a century later, the claims of unchecked presidential power in matters of war remain. Political and military conflicts in Lebanon, the Mediterranean Sea, Grenada, Kuwait, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Bosnia have placed the conflict between the executive and legislative branches and the problem of war powers into bold relief. The constitutional balance has not been addressed in a conclusive and satisfying way. Many observers conclude that we are left with a president imperial by default in that the key issue left unresolved by the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, that of the allocation of the war-making power, remains unclear and unanswered. This article is not meant to be another review of the Imperial Presidency. However, twenty-five years later, the language, approach, and interpretive assumptions used in that work continue to provide a basis for analyses and evaluations of presidential initiatives abroad. The Imperial Presidency was published just as this country confronted an oil crisis, the end of the Nixon presidency; and the less-than-satisfying final chapter of the Vietnam War. The book remains an important signpost from that era, and its author himself remains widely read and respected today. …

When delegates discussed the structure of the presidency at the Constitutional Convention in June 1787, serious objections to a unitary executive were raised. Edmund Randolph warned, for example, that a one-person presidency would become the “foetus of monarchy.” Controversy over the idea of a single president was predictable. Only recently had the framers freed themselves from the tyranny of King George III, and they were firmly committed to creating a new government that would not abuse its powers and oppress its citizens. It must have seemed preposterous to replace a hereditary monarch with an elected monarch.To be sure, the framers invoked important arguments for a unitary executive. While Congress would deliberate, the president would act with decisiveness and dispatch. A single president would bring order and energy to the national government. With the passage of time, however, it has become clear that the founding fathers misjudged the consequences of their choice:They did not anticipate the extent to which executive power would expand and give us an “imperial presidency” that dominates Congress and that too often exercises its authority in ways that are detrimental to the national interest. They did not predict the role that political parties would come to play and how battles to capture the White House would greatly aggravate partisan conflict. They did not recognize that single presidents would represent party ideology much more than the overall public good. And they misjudged the advantages and disadvantages of single versus multiple decision makers.Had the framers been able to predict the future, they would have been far less enamored with the idea of a unitary executive and far more receptive to the alternative proposals for a plural executive that they rejected. Like their counterparts in Europe, they might well have created an executive branch in which power is shared among multiple persons from multiple political parties.If the presidency is to fulfill the founding fathers’ vision and function more effectively, it needs to be reconceived. This need for constitutional change led me to the proposal for reform that I consider in this book — the replacement of the one-person, one-party presidency with a two-person, two-party presidency.A coalition presidency carries the potential for many important benefits — a balancing of power between the executive and legislative branches, a dampening of partisan conflict in Washington, an executive branch more representative of the entire electorate, real opportunities for third-party candidates to win election, and wiser presidential decision making.After more than two hundred years with the Constitution’s one-person presidency, it may seem preposterous to suggest a plural executive. But a coalition presidency would be far more faithful to the framers’ view of executive power. They wanted a president with limited authority who would serve as a co-equal with Congress. They also believed that power should be contained by dividing it and requiring it to be shared. A two-person presidency relies on the framers’ structural devices to promote their core values. And by correcting the dysfunction in Washington and making the executive branch operate more effectively, a two-person, bipartisan presidency can be justified even without reference to original intent.

Accessible information is an essential resource for equal, meaningful participation in the public life of a democratic society. Such information is particularly vital for the effective functioning of all three branches of government in our constitutional democracy: the administrative branch, which creates government policy and holds state actors accountable to the public; the legislative branch, which scrutinizes old and creates new legislation; and the judicial branch, which reviews the acts of the legislative and executive branches. For the law-reform processes of each branch to effectively foster the informed creation and critique of public law and policy, we require reliable, accessible data depicting the diversity of individuals who make up the broader Canadian public.Beyond this practical purpose, accessible information plays an expressive role as it constitutes a particular notion of the Canadian public. The data created by national population censuses and assembled in welfare reports has the power to “nominat[e] into existence” certain groups of people and, conversely, to “refus[e] to name” others. Such information not only represents the public, it also creates the public, as it stands in for the public at all levels of government. By communicating who we are as a society and how we are changing, census information and welfare reports shape our understanding of ourselves — our laws, policies, government, and place in the world.

In a unique cooperative relationship in foreign affairs between the executive and legislative branches, the president appoints and the Senate confirms two members of Congress each year to help articulate U.S. policies in the UN General Assembly. But crossing the separation of powers and acting as executive diplomats pose real problems for incumbent members of Congress. They must decide how to balance their ongoing obligations in Congress with their executive-diplomatic obligations in the Assembly when the sessions between the two coincide. In the Assembly, as members of the USUN they must depend on its executive leadership to accept and use them as meaningful actors. And they must decide whether to articulate executive-determined foreign policies when these conflict with those of their own. However these problems were resolved, on the whole both executives and legislators associated with the USUN in the period 1946-1990 agreed that each benefits significantly from such congressional participation. Nevertheless, in the 1980s it became clear that members of Congress, particularly senators, were increasingly reluctant to carry through on their part of this executive-legislative relationship.

Political Opposition, Legislative Oversight, and the Performance of the Executive Branch

The original understanding of the Constitution, I wrote not so long ago, was forged not in the courts but in Congress and the executive branch.(1) That was true of the Federalist period, the first twelve years under the new Constitution--a time of great constitutional controversies involving such matters as the Bank of the United States, the Jay Treaty, and the Alien and Sedition Acts and of quaint and curious squabbles now largely forgotten: what call the president, whether he must accept a salary, how the vice president signs a bill. Some of these disputes sound petty, but even they helped define what kind of country the United States would be. All of them were initially, and many of them finally, fought out in the executive and legislative branches. The same was true of the years that followed, when Thomas Jefferson was president. Jefferson's inauguration was a significant victory for the new system, a peaceful transfer of power from one political party another, which at the time was not be taken for granted.(2) We are all Republicans, he said in his inaugural address, we are all Federalists.(3) It was a breath of fresh air. Jefferson's brave words, of course, did not put an end controversy. His presidency was another exciting time: the Burr conspiracy, the embargo, the war against the Barbary pirates--in which Jefferson, following Washington's example, took a refreshingly narrow view of the president's powers as commander in chief.(4) The Twelfth Amendment, designed with the simple goal of avoiding the near disaster of the 1800 election, proved be a surprising can of worms, a monument the difficulty of constitutional drafting.(5) In the great Court fight of Jefferson's first term, which rivaled that of the 1930s, judicial independence suffered grave setbacks in the repeal of the Judiciary Act and the removal of Judge Pickering, only emerge more firmly entrenched than ever after the dramatic acquittal of Justice Samuel Chase.(6) Jefferson's presidency was also a time of significant events in westward expansion: the admission of Ohio, the Louisiana Purchase, and the beginnings of the Cumberland Road. Each of these events raised fundamental constitutional questions. Each was extensively debated in Congress and in the executive branch, not in the courts. And each served as an important precedent when similar issues arose again. I. OHIO The Northwest Ordinance contemplated the creation of three five new states in the territory ceded by individual states the Union after the Revolution.(7) As soon as any of the areas defined in the Ordinance had sixty thousand free inhabitants it was be admitted statehood, and Congress was directed admit it earlier if that was consistent with the general interest of the confederacy.(8) Settlement of the Northwest was retarded, however, by hostile Indians; the first western states admitted were Kentucky and Tennessee.(9) Then Mad Anthony Wayne defeated the Indians at Fallen Timbers, Jay's Treaty dispersed their British protectors, and Thomas Pinckney's treaty opened the Mississippi western goods.(10) The population of the eastern part of the territory grew by leaps and bounds, and it was separated from the remaining portion, which was christened the Indiana Territory, in 1800.(11) By 1802 a number of its inhabitants were banging on Congress's door in search of admission the union.(12) Although the 1800 census reported that the Eastern Division had a population of only 45,365, a House committee recommended that its inhabitants be authorized to form for themselves a constitution and State government.(13) Congress obliged,(14) but not without a little bloodletting on the House floor. The problem was that not everyone in the division favored immediate statehood. Governor Arthur St. Clair did not; the territorial legislature did not; neither did the territorial delegate in Congress, Paul Fearing. …

In China, the dynamics of the central–local relations vary significantly within legislative, executive, and judicial branches. In the field of law enforcement oversight, signs of cooperative federalism have emerged, presenting a drastic contrast to the unitary system. The lacking of a legal basis to directly supervise local governments forces the National People’s Congress Standing Committee to actively seek cooperation from local governments. Three different approaches have been applied by the top legislature to achieve the goal. Easing the resistance from local governments through delegating the oversight power represents a move of compromise. Removing hurdles affecting law enforcement, reducing law enforcement cost, and soliciting suggestions on statutory revision from localities is a form of reciprocity. Eliminating local protectionism, enhancing cross-regional law enforcement, and sharing law enforcement experiences is an act of altruism.

In this article we investigate and compare the theoretical perspectives of presidency-centered versus president-centered accounts of executive veto use—a form of institutional conflict between the executive and legislative branches. We argue that constitutional arrangements between Congress and the executive branch, as well as enduring institutional relationships, better explain this form of institutional conflict than differences between specific presidential admin istrations. Using a disaggregated monthly analysis of presidential vetoes from 1954 to 1992, we compare a series of event count models. We found considerable evidence that presidential vetoes result largely from institutional arrangements and cycles that are beyond the control of individual administrations. In addition, we found little consistent evidence that differences between specific presidents account for executive reliance on the veto when taking institutional relationships into account. Consequently, we provide additional support for the presidency-centered theoretical perspective of executive behavior.

This chapter explores two theories central to understanding the behavior of federal prosecutors. First, principal-agent theory is introduced to frame the relationship between national political actors, or principals, in the executive and legislative branches and their agents—U.S. Attorneys (USAs). In that exploration, the chapter focuses on problems of adverse selection and the monitoring of agents by principals. Second, the chapter considers career ambition theory as it pertains to the post-service employment opportunities of USAs. That discussion focuses on the potential of USAs to ascend to higher positions in the administration or secure nomination to the federal bench, both of which require the approval of principals in the executive branch.

Journal Article Executive Decree Authority and Lawmaking Environment in Brazil: A Broader View of Provisional Measures Get access Felipe de Paula Felipe de Paula * * PhD candidate at University of São Paulo and at Leiden University. Email: f.de.paula@law.leidenuniv.nl. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Statute Law Review, Volume 36, Issue 3, October 2015, Pages 233–252, https://doi.org/10.1093/slr/hmv011 Published: 09 July 2015

The purpose of this study is to describe in quantitative and qualitative terms the use of social media by the US government. During the autumn of 2012 the researchers collected and examined over 1,500 unique social media sites used by the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. This data was collected as part of a national web archiving initiative known as the End of Term Harvest, where US government websites are web archived in anticipation of changes prompted by the election. We found that social media is used heavily across all federal agencies and that they utilize a variety of social media platforms, with the most popular being Facebook, Twitter, You Tube and Flickr. The qualitative examination revealed that agencies use social media to provide the public with information and to engage the public in conversation through the feedback and comment mechanisms enabled by the social media providers. However, we did not find evidence that social media is enabling high levels of collaboration between government and citizens, which was a goal stated in Obama's Transparency Memorandum.

The article presents the results from the study that aimed to investigate the attendance of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of Brazilian states government, towards the legal demands for availability of information to society, by means of passive transparency. The empirical object included 27 state governments, 27 legislative councils and 27 courts of justice. The research is descriptive, operationalized by a documental research, with a qualitative approach. In order to collect the data, an information request was sent to the three branches and was analyzed through the technic of documentary analysis. In the analysis of passive transparency in the Brazilian states government branches, the majority of the states presented better results in their executive branch, if compared to the judiciary or legislative. On the other hand, there have been those who seemed to face difficulties in the attendance of information demands. This detachment between imposed transparency to the governmental entities and its effective accomplishment is highlighted in literature as being a characteristic of formalism.