Проблематика реальности в философии И. Канта

This essay examines the significance of Kant's transcendental philosophy by focusing on the central metaphors used in his works. The four metaphors singled out here are those of (a) the Copernican turn, (b) the land of truth and the ocean of illusion, (c) the starry heavens and the moral law, and (d) of perpetual peace. The author emphasizes the strong and the weak points of Kant's philosophy that these metaphors reveals, and argues that these central metaphors work together and point toward the two essential concerns of Kant's entire philosophical opus: (1) an active role of the creative subject in all forms of human experience, and (2) the boundaries of the subject's creativity. Further reflection should not only reveal some other metaphors and their role in Kant's philosophy, but also clarify how he himself understand the nature of metaphors: Are metaphors the expression of our creativity, or of the limitations of our creativity?.

Kant's critical philosophy is rife with conflicting and aporetic doctrines.  Amongst several difficult doctrines, one of the most salient and obscure discussions surrounds Kant's view of the imagination, Einbildungskraft .  One finds Kant's initial discussion of the imagination in the section entitled the Transcendental Deduction in his Critique of Pure Reason ; by Kant's own admission, the section that cost him the most labor. Instrumental in these most critical passages is Kant's discussion of the imagination, but, due to revisions and emendations and a seeming change in doctrine from the 1st to the 3rd Critique , Kant's considered view of the imagination remains unclear.  Many scholars eschew the discussion altogether, considering it arcana of an obsolete faculty pyschology. Even prominent Kant scholars have typically overlooked or marginalized pivotal sections in Kant's works in order to avoid dealing with this issue.  Recently, however, a new interest in the imagination has resurfaced. This volume is a collection of essays that addresses the many uses of imagination throughout Kant's entire critical corpus, and intends to gain a better understanding of this lacuna .

In this study of Kant's theory of imagination and its role in interpretation, Rudolf A. Makkreel argues against the commonly held notion that Kant's transcendental philosophy is incompatible with hermeneutics. The charge that Kant's foundational philosophy is inadequate to the task of interpretation can be rebutted, explains Makkreel, if one fully understands the role of imagination in his work. In identifying this role, Makkreel also re-evaluates the relationship among Kant's discussions of the feeling of life, common sense, and the purposiveness of history.

The medieval doctrine of transcendentals is closely connected with a metaphysical conception of reality. In some studies suggested that nominalism meant beginning of end of metaphysics. John Buridan a medieval philosopher whose modernity claimed because of an alleged agreement between his metaphysics and Immanuel Kant's transcendental philosophy. In Buridan's thought a transformation would have occurred from a transcendental consideration in medieval sense to a transcendental consideration in Kantian sense, according to which objectivity is founded on human intellect itself. The consequence was that the transcendental consideration in medieval sense possesses only a nominal but no real significance. Buridan adopts main nominalist innovation of doctrine of transcendentals, logico-semantic approach. The subject of metaphysics is term being, convertibility of being and one is explained by theory of supposition, and their difference is understood according to connotation model.Keywords:Buridan; doctrine; medieval sense; metaphysics; nominalism; philosophy; transcendentals

In Freedom and the End of Reason, Richard L. Velkley offers an influential interpretation of the central issue of Kant's philosophy and an evaluation of its position within modern philosophy's larger history. He persuasively argues that the whole of Kantianism - not merely the Second Critique - focuses on a critique of practical and is a response to a problem that Kant saw as intrinsic to reason itself: the teleological problem of its goodness. Reconstructing the influence of Rousseau on Kant's thought, Velkley demonstrates that the relationship between speculative philosophy and practical philosophy in Kant is far more intimate than generally has been perceived. By stressing a Rousseau-inspired notion of reason as a provider of practical ends, he is able to offer an unusually complete account of Kant's idea of moral culture.

German idealistic thinking can be approached in many different ways, each of which has peculiar advantages and problems. According to the standard view, the German idealist movement is best looked at as a philosophical program that was developed in the wake of Kant's Critical philosophy with the intention of improving his transcendental idealism in various directions. The now-dominant version of this view has it that, starting with K. L. Reinhold, a whole generation of young German philosophers embarked on the project of arriving at new foundations for Kant's philosophy, of distinguishing what was taken to be the highly promising spirit of his philosophical conception from its rather poor literal expression by Kant himself, and of providing the missing premises for the conclusions of his theory. Although this project was approached from very different points of view by each of the main figures of that movement - J. G. Fichte, F. W. J. Schelling, and G. W. F. Hegel - there were some convictions that they shared.

Freedom and Necessity of the Development of Mind from the Viewpoint of Kant's Transcendental Philosophy

The history and philosophy of science (HPS) plays a special role in education. An elective HPS course on the philosophy of scientific experimentation for young scientists and graduate students of natural science is presented. The course bears a pragmatic character, and its main aims include the development of critical thinking (CT), familiarization with philosophical problems in the relevant areas of knowledge, and the cultivation of a taste for reflective, critical analysis, both individual and group based, which contributes to a deeper understanding of the features of scientific practice in the context of modern complex group cooperation. Students are offered a classical HPS program that included debates on the relationship between empiricism and rationalism, the role of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, modern topics associated with the practical success of rationalism in the emergence of modern natural science, and the theory-ladenness of experimentation. Particular attention during the course is paid to the problems of megascience, the inclusion of which is justified by the specifics of the students’ engagement with science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM). Emphasis is placed on the structure and typology of the collective subject in the modern educational process as well as in experimental practice. Lessons on the methodology of expert text analysis (META), which are aimed at the development of critical thinking skills and the creation of an interdisciplinary discussion space, are included in the course and relied on the example of the history and philosophy of high-energy physics to motivate professional reflection. META classes included in the course prepare graduate students for teamwork in big science, proto-megascience, and megascience. The course offers practical recommendations that could be applied to students’ own research and could be useful for practitioners.

This paper takes a fresh look at a classical theme in philosophical scholarship, the meaning of transcendental idealism, by contrasting Kant's and Husserl's versions thereof. I present Kant's transcendental idealism as a theory distinguishing between the world as in-itself and as given to the experiencing human being. This reconstruction provides the backdrop for Husserl's transcendental phenomenology as a brand of transcendental idealism expanding on Kant: Through the phenomenological reduction Husserl universalizes Kant's transcendental philosophy to an eidetic science of subjectivity. He thereby furnishes a new sense of transcendental philosophy, rephrases the 'quid iuris?,' and provides a new conception of the thing-in-itself. What needs to be clarified is not exclusively the possibility of a priori cognition, but instead, starting much lower, the validity of objects that give themselves in experience. The thing-in-itself is not an unknowable object, but the idea of the object in all possible appearances experienced at once. In all these innovations Husserl remains committed to the basic sense of Kant’s Copernican Turn. I end with some comments on how both Kant and Husserl view the relation between theoretical and moral philosophy

Theological Empiricism: Aspects ofJohann Georg Hamann's Reception of Hume Hans Graubner The philosophical Enlightenment in Germany executed in none of its phases as clean a break with the theological tradition as the English and especially the French. To its very end it pleaded for a theology of Creation, however thin this plea had become, that is, for an adherence to the first article of the Creed. On the other hand, a philosophical adherence to the second article, that is, to christology, had no chance left owing to the rationalist Bible criticism of the 17th and 18th centuries and was not considered a serious philosophical position in the controversy between natural religion and revealed religion. Its mere link-up with historic facts that were considered epistemologically inferior made it unthinkable in the eyes of the dominating rationalists. In 18th century Königsberg this controversy determined the life-long argument between Hamann and Kant. Hamann attacks Kant and the German philosophy ofthe Enlightenmentfrom the position ofrevealed religion. In doing so, he refers to David Hume from the very beginning. In Hume's thoughts Hamann saw a chance of regaining a serious position for the Christian religion, that is, of its christology, in philosophical discussion. Thisveryaim ofHamann's shows thathe proceeds fromcompletely different philosophical interests than does Hume. But there are certain basic attitudes that make it understandable why Hamann refers to Hume, even declares him to be his philosopher. These attitudes, which they have in common, maybe called criticism ofreason, epistemological empiricism, and subjectivism. In spite of these attitudes, which they share, the difference between their ways ofthinkingleads to Hamann's practise of not adopting any of Hume's ideas unchanged. Instead of speaking ofreception it would be better to speak ofa transformation of Hume's thoughts into the totally different world of Hamann's ideas. The latter is determined by at least three basic motives: Firstly, by the sharp criticism of an over-estimation of reason in philosophy. This criticism is directed both against the rationalism of the recognized German philosophy as well as against Hume's scepticism and Kant's transcendental philosophy. Secondly,- by his personally being affected by Christianity, which renders itimpossible for him to separate the personal from the theoretiVolume XV Number 2 377 HANS GRAUBNER cal, and philosophy from the way a philosopher sees himself and from his own historical background. Thirdly, by a concentration of all philosophical energy on language as the fundamental empirical and historical fact, which, for Hamann, becomes the centre of his theological, ontological and anthropological reflection. It is my intention to show how Hamann unfolds his basic motives by following certain ideas of Hume's, for example, the idea of geometry, that of belief and that of image. In the end I shall summarize Hamann's criticism of scepticism and point out the significance ofanthropomorphism in Hume's and Hamann's understanding ofreligion. Referring to the understanding of Hamann's Hume-reception so far, I want to emphasize three results: 1.Hamann's Hume-reception is due, above all, to his repeated study ofthe Treatise, which musthave begun earlier than was assumed before. 2.Hamann's reference to Hume is not restricted to the discussion of the concept of belief, but is far more extensive. 3.Neither is Hamann's Hume-reception a total "misunderstanding "1 of Hume nor is his passing-on of Hume's ideas to the German romanticism "a strange paradox"; rather it is a conscious transformation ofempiricism into a theology oflanguage, which has had an effect even on romantic and idealistic secularization. Now I shall come to my first point. I. Geometry After having finished his studies in Königsberg and before his conversion experience at London in 1758 that was to determine his whole life, Hamann, from 1752 to 1756, became a private tutor for two aristocratic families in Courland. During this time he definitely read the German translations ofHume's "Political Essays" and ofhis Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. That Hamann, who had a good command of the English language, knew even the Treatise at this time, can, according to my hypothesis, be gathered from his use of Hume's conception ofgeometry in an unpublished philosophic...

The distinction between concept and intuition is of the utmost importance for understanding Kant's critical philosophy. For, as Kant himself claimed, all the distinctive claims of this philosophy rest on, and develop out of, a detailed account of the way all our' cognition of things requires both intuitions and concepts.2 Unfortunately, interpreting Kant's distinction between concepts and intuitions remains a vexed matter. The locus classicus for these controversies is the Critique of Pure Reason's famous taxonomy of representations (called the Stufenleiter, or step-ladder):

Fifty years ago Hannah Arendt taught a series of lectures on Immanuel Kant's political philosophy in the New School for Social Research in New York; a course that made an entrance to the contemporary history of political philosophy for its acumen of interpretation of a classic so long unassessed on his reflections on politics and especially for its polemical idea that Kant's work contained two distinct models of political philosophy. The first of them (the traditional one) would be centered around the activity of practical reason, therefore exposed in the Critique of pure reason, Critique of practical reason and Metaphysics of Morals, as for the second one, "Kant's unwritten philosophy", it would relate itself more closely to the activity of the reflecting power of judgement in the Critique of Judgement and in the political essays Toward Perpetual Peace and The Conflict of Faculties. Since its publication on 1982 Arendt's lectures have stir up many controversies on the studies of Kantian philosophy (Kantsforschung) and on contemporary political thought: considerations on its interpretative method, criticism on its philosophical refusal of practical reason and varying inspirations to search for "sensible politics" concerning social interrelations of people. Considering this manifold reception, we can say that the objective of this study is to gather, reassemble and, luckily, open up a few possible considerations on political reflection concerning Kant's thought. For that end, we shall investigate the political and social role that the concept of sensus communis may imply as a "community sense" which comes out of the reflecting power of judgement, that is, a certain type of reflection oriented toward sociability, communicability and publicity of ways of thought on its plurality and especially on its political and social conflicts. We suggest that such an investigation must be conducted through the philosophical and political contests that spreads through two of Kant's main political essays published after the Critique of Judgement: the criticism of empirical politics in Theory and Praxis and the criticism of political prudence in Toward Perpetual Peace. Regarding our analysis, we aim to show in which ways (political and juridical) social conflict should be mediated by freedom of thought and State transparency. Both are grounded in a conception of political reflection that instead of render itself a priori to an idea of practical reason signalizes empirically the general orientation of the publicly manifested way of thoughtfor example, such as happens with the enthusiasm of the spectators of the French Revolution. At the end we consider that the concept of publicity actually conceives a concept of reflection able to assess political phenomenon from an empirical, common (popular) and social orientation according to the three maxims of common understanding (think for one self, think on the place of everybody else, think coherently).

Kant is arguably the most influential modern philosopher, but also one of the most difficult. In this short introduction Roger Scruton tackles Kant's exceptionally complex subject with a strong hand, exploring the background to his work

The article discusses aspects of the digital transition that is being intensively carried out in higher education. They affect not only the structural and functional elements of higher education, but also the most fundamental as-pects of anthropological discourse. Either dig-ital reality will replace the anthropological features of the educational environment, or it will open up new opportunities for human realization. Which line will ensure the most harmonious development of the student's personality? The purpose of the article is to explicate the basic ideas of the two discours-es, which largely determine the concepts of philosophical anthropology in the era of the digital turn. The first discourse, Kant's, repre-sents consciousness through its unity and striving from the analysis of phenomena to their synthesis. The second one, presented by object-oriented ontologists, demonstrates the mechanism of splitting reality through regres-sion to the digital structure, which is opposite to Kant's understanding of consciousness. The main idea of the author is that the last dis-course leaves no room for actualization of meanings that are absent in it a priori due to the presence of a nihilistic intention not only to the Heideggerian ontological, but also in relation to the ontic planes of being. Continu-ing the tradition of metaphysics, in which Be-ing understood non-consciously was subject to elimination, new ontologists form gaps in the description of consciousness. By that, in a sense, they are rolling back the achievements of scientific knowledge expressed by the con-cepts of quantum physics and Kant's philoso-phy, on which the author of the article relies. Aspects of the elimination of subjectivity from the environment of higher education in the era of the digital turn are shown by the ex-ample of the concepts of Spitzer, Strelnikova, teaching practice of Startsev, Dzhabrailov, Khlebnikov. The author comes to the conclu-sions that the anthropological discourse of the unity of consciousness can be overcome by returning the dominance of the category of number, a mathematically “verified” new materialism, within which complex deanthro-pologization is carried out through the priva-tion of access to the integral consciousness. Privation, in turn, is conditioned by the whole movement of European philosophy along the path of increasing the role of intel-ligence and knowledge, on the one hand, and decreasing the role of subjectivity, on the other. The realities of the digital transfor-mation of the higher education environment are a consequence of this movement of digital thinking.

O presente artigo busca elucidar a epistemologia de Arthur Schopenhauer, aludindo principalmente à forma como este pensador utilizou-se da filosofia transcendental kantiana para desenvolver seu sistema filosófico. Assim aborda-se de maneira sistemática e crescente, concretizando os alicerces, delimitando conceitos e expandindo pouco a pouco o entendimento das características essenciais envoltas pelo tema, tendo por objetivo principal atingir um maior entendimento sobre os pontos centrais daquilo que Schopenhauer enxergava como os problemas da filosofia kantiana e que buscou superar e justificar em seus textos, sendo eles principalmente o problema da coisa em si e as noções de causalidade, tempo e espaço.