Reflexão política e publicidade

In 1796 a German politico-philosophical manifesto proclaims the 'highest act of reason' as an 'aesthetic act'. The ways in which this transformation relates to the development of some of the major directions in modern philosophy is the focus of this book. The book focuses on the main accounts of the human subject and on the conceptions of art and language which emerge within the Kantian and post-Kantian history of aesthetics. Immanuel Kant's main work on aesthetics, the 'third Critique', the Critique of Judgement, forms part of his response to unresolved questions which emerge from his Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Practical Reason. The early Romantics, who, after all, themselves established the term, can be characterized in a way which distinguishes them from later German Romanticism. The 'Oldest System Programme of German Idealism', is a manifesto for a new philosophy and exemplifies the spirit of early Idealism, not least with regard to mythology. The crucial question posed by the Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling of the System of Transcendental Idealism (STI) is how art relates to philosophy, a question which has recently reappeared in post-structuralism and in aspects of pragmatism. Despite his undoubted insights, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's insufficiency in relation to music is part of his more general problem with adequately theorising self-consciousness, and thus with his aesthetic theory. Friedrich Schleiermacher argues in the hermeneutics that interpretation of the meaning of Kunst is itself also an 'art'. The book concludes with a discussion on music, language, and Romantic thought.

Reviewed by: Kant's Political Legacy: Human Rights, Peace, Progress by Luigi Caranti Frederick Rauscher Luigi Caranti. Kant's Political Legacy: Human Rights, Peace, Progress. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2017. Pp. x + 310. £90.00. In all three areas of Kant's political philosophy that Luigi Caranti covers, he offers compelling and persuasive accounts that sharpen our understanding of Kant and show the value of close study of historical texts for today's philosophy. Recent political philosophy inspired by Kant often draws from his more general moral writings, as exemplified by Rawls's use of the categorical imperative as a procedure. Others, however, cite Kant's works more directly concerned with political philosophy. Caranti assesses these readings in two areas—the foundations for human rights and the conditions for international peace—and adds an assessment of Kant on progress toward a just political order. [End Page 352] The first two topics receive parallel treatment. Caranti devotes one chapter each to reviewing Kant's position, to assessing recent political philosophy on the topic, and to showing how the proper understanding of Kant leads to a better contemporary position. He is clearly at home in both the historical and contemporary worlds and, even better, moves smoothly between them to the benefit of both. Human rights, for Kant, consist in fact of the sole innate right to freedom together with the other rights that it implicitly contains, such as formal equality and being one's own master. While some contemporary theorists would simply base these rights on other goods, or see them as built into the political culture already, or assert without further ground that humans have dignity deserving these rights, Caranti argues that Kant requires that any basis for human rights must show why humanity has value. Caranti sees Kant as insisting that the value of humanity lies not in an end-setting capacity, but in the capacity to have a good will. For contemporary application, he suggests that Kant's own conception of good will as one willing the categorical imperative is too narrow, and that a broader conception of a good will as one that wills some version of a moral law is universal and can serve as the explanation of humanity that grounds human rights. I am skeptical of this solution for two reasons. First, historically, I think that Kant grounded humanity on rational self-governance in general more than on the specifically moral self-governance of the good will. Second, I suspect that broadly acceptable contemporary rights claims must be based on individual value as a basis of moral value rather than moral value, in the guise of the capacity for being moral, as a basis for individual value. Caranti's second main topic, international peace, comprises in my opinion the most successful part of the book. He details the main features of contemporary Democratic Peace Theory (after a thorough assessment of its many variations and critics), which essentially claims that democracies will not war against one another, particularly when they are involved in international institutions with other democracies and are interdependent economically through trade. The resulting "zone of peace" would set these peaceful states off from the remainder of the world; as the zone expands so would overall peace. Kant's explanations of the conditions for peace, however, require not democracy per se but states governed by representatives with a republican (civic) ethos. The international institutions must not be limited to these kinds of states but include all states. Economic interdependence is not alone reflective of the required cosmopolitan conscience that individuals need to develop. Democratic Peace Theory and Kant's actual model offer divergent policy implications. Carenti successfully shows not only that contemporary Democratic Peace Theory has misunderstood Kant's position, but also that what it neglects in Kant would improve its overall position. Since the third main topic, a proof of the inevitability of progress, has not been taken up in contemporary political philosophy, Carenti focuses on a close reading of Kant, with chapters covering Idea for a Universal History and Toward Perpetual Peace. He argues that Kant's history essay provides an empirical argument that stands independently of any regulative or providential claims...

Kant was the son of an East Prussian saddler. He lived his whole life in Konigsberg where he was appointed to the chair in logic and metaphysics at the University of Konigsberg in 1770. At the time of his appointment he started work on the Critique of Pure Reason, which appeared in 1781. Clothed in a formal academic architecture which seriously obscures its content, the work addresses the question of what reason can know when it operates “purely,” without the assistance of other faculties, such as memory. The central problem of how concepts can be applied to experience was solved by recourse to “schemata,” a capacity to form images or models, an idea that has experienced a recent revival in cognitive psychology. The first Critique was followed by the Critique of Practical Reason and Critique of Judgment In these “critical” works Kant set himself the task of establishing both the authority of science and the autonomy of morals.KeywordsPure ReasonSubjective SourceEmpirical ConceptPure ConceptTranscendental UnityThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

In Kant's Rational Theology, Allen W. Wood explores Kant's views on the concept of God and on the attempt to demonstrate God's existence. We cannot have a full or balanced understanding of Kant's thought on religious subjects, he writes, long as we fail to take account of his reflections, often exceedingly abstract, obscure, and subtle, concerning the rational origin, content, and status of our concept of a supreme being.The importance of this aspect of Kantian thought, according to Wood, lies in its originality, in its historical influence, and in the insights it affords into the tradition of rational theology in medieval and modern philosophy. He believes that it also provides a means of understanding Kant's work as a whole and of achieving a proper appreciation of the contents of Kant's moral faith.The author focuses on Kant's chapter on the ideal or pure reason from the Critique of Pure Reason and also discusses other Kantian writings (especially the Lectures on Philosophical Theology, the Critique of Judgment, and several of Kant's precritical essays) where the topic of rational theology is prominent. A concise recapitulation and critical assessment of Kant's more speculative theses, this book is a complement to Wood's earlier book, Kant's Moral Religion.

In Sept. 1798, eight years after the publication of his three famous critiques, the oid Kant complains, in letter to his friend Christian Gane, that he is tortured by tantalic pain, because he had not found yet any insight of the whole of philosophy. The aim of this - study is to diagnose this pain and to reveal an efficacious therapy. It is explicated that Kant's project of an a priori judging reason suffers from Ihe unsolvable difficulty of application, caused by the total abstrac tion of empirical contents. ln order to break up this difficulty, the rehabi litation of sentiments seems to be necessary. Thus it becomes possible to comprehend the processua.l wholeness of the kantian critiques: the - mutual relationship of feeling (Critique of judgement), thinking (Critique of pure reason) and willing (Ctitique of practical reason). By means of Uds onto-logo-ellzi cal dimension the basic desire of kantian criticism becomes apparent in its positivity: the renovation of metaphy sics by refutation of scepticism and indifferentism.

Reviewed by: Kant and the Concept of Community ed. by Charlton Payne, Lucas Thorpe Jennifer Mensch Charlton Payne and Lucas Thorpe, eds., Kant and the Concept of Community. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2011. 321 pp. Kant and the Concept of Community, edited by Charlton Payne and Lucas Thorpe, gathers together some of the best-known figures in contemporary Kant scholarship. This fine collection traces Kant’s concept of community from its precritical roots to its role in The Critique of Pure Reason, before going on to investigate the subsequent transformations it would undergo in Kant’s later works on ethics, religion, history, politics, and aesthetics. With very few exceptions, all of the essays in this collection are interesting and informative, with signature pieces by Béatrice Longuenesse, Paul Guyer, Allen Wood, Onora O’Neill, and Susan Shell. This is a highly recommended collection suitable for advanced undergraduates, graduate students, and professionals. The starting point for this collection lies in the table of categories provided by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781, 1787, 2nd ed.). Here, in the so-called [End Page 273] first Critique, Kant had described twelve categories that he took to be lying at the heart of the processes making up mental cognition. Under the title “Relation,” were three of the twelve categories listed: substance and accident, cause and effect, and community (Gemeinschaft). Kant’s understanding of community in this case was connected to its logical basis as a disjunctive judgment, where disjunction was taken to be a mental act of dynamic reciprocity. When faced with an either/or decision, in other words, the nonchosen object remained an active participant in the logical judgment, according to Kant, insofar as its negation was necessary for the chosen object to be simultaneously determined as the reciprocally positive choice. This formed the background for Kant’s added description of community as “reciprocity (Wechselwirkung) between agent and patient” (A80/B106). Assuming this part of Kant’s argument was clear enough, however, things became decidedly murky once Kant took on the task of explaining how the category of community worked when applied to judgments of experience. For it certainly was not clear to many of his commentators, for example, why our perceptual judgments regarding simultaneously existing objects should rely necessarily on our judging those objects to be related in a state of reciprocal determination: I could see the moon, for example, and shifting my gaze I could see the field below it, but why was there a necessary reciprocity between the perceived moon-object and the perceived field-object in that event? With these and other complaints in the air, Kant’s discussion of community languished in the pile of other arguments deemed wanting in comparison to the best moments of the first Critique. Adding to this dismissal, moreover, was a general awareness of the many places where Kant separately discussed religious, moral, and political communities—not to mention the important role played by the sensus communis in his work on aesthetics, the Critique of Judgment (1790)—without any obvious attempt on his part to connect these discussions to the original account of community as something logically identifiable with reciprocal determination. It comes as no surprise, therefore, to see that there has been little interest among scholars in investigating possible threads of continuity between the original account and the rest of Kant’s work. This, however, is precisely what the editors of Kant and the Concept of Community attempt to redress with the essays in their collection. Given the aims set forth by Payne and Thorpe, it is clear that the first task will be some sort of attempt at rehabilitation with respect to Kant’s original discussion of community in the Critique of Pure Reason. The first two pieces, by Longuenesse and Watkins, take up this challenge, with Longuenesse essentially elaborating a line of argumentation first developed by her in Kant and the Capacity to Judge (Princeton UP, 1998). Longuenesse admits that her interest in the concept of community lies in the fact that it is the most difficult of Kant’s arguments to defend, before going on to attempt this defense by showing how Kant relied on...

Kant's critical philosophy is rife with conflicting and aporetic doctrines.  Amongst several difficult doctrines, one of the most salient and obscure discussions surrounds Kant's view of the imagination, Einbildungskraft .  One finds Kant's initial discussion of the imagination in the section entitled the Transcendental Deduction in his Critique of Pure Reason ; by Kant's own admission, the section that cost him the most labor. Instrumental in these most critical passages is Kant's discussion of the imagination, but, due to revisions and emendations and a seeming change in doctrine from the 1st to the 3rd Critique , Kant's considered view of the imagination remains unclear.  Many scholars eschew the discussion altogether, considering it arcana of an obsolete faculty pyschology. Even prominent Kant scholars have typically overlooked or marginalized pivotal sections in Kant's works in order to avoid dealing with this issue.  Recently, however, a new interest in the imagination has resurfaced. This volume is a collection of essays that addresses the many uses of imagination throughout Kant's entire critical corpus, and intends to gain a better understanding of this lacuna .

Kant is arguably the most influential modern philosopher, but also one of the most difficult. In this short introduction Roger Scruton tackles Kant's exceptionally complex subject with a strong hand, exploring the background to his work

Immanuel Kant's philosophy of law represents one of the most consistent theoretical foundations for reflection on justice, particularly for its systematic articulation of freedom, morality, and practical reason. This paper aims to analyze the foundations of justice in Kantian Philosophy of Law, understanding how these elements relate to the structuring of a normative system guided by the autonomy of the will and rationality. The choice of this topic is justified by the permanence and relevance of Kantian thought, which provides conceptual tools for assessing the legitimacy of legal norms, the limits of state action, and the role of institutions in the social order. The relevance of this research lies in the opportunity to deepen the understanding of the principles that underpin the notion of justice and to highlight its contribution to the contemporary legal debate, marked by challenges surrounding the realization of rights and human dignity. The research will be conducted through a bibliographic review, using as central references the Doctrine of Right and the Critique of Practical Reason, as well as commentators who analyze Kant's work from a legal and philosophical perspective. The method will allow us to reconstruct and interpret the main concepts formulated by Kant, systematizing their relationships and implications. Among the study's potential contributions are the systematization of foundations that remain relevant to law, the strengthening of the debate on justice on rational grounds, and the provision of support for critical reflection on the legitimacy of legal norms and institutions today.

The problematic of reality is necessarily included in any thorough philosophical system. Kant's transcendental philosophy is no exception. However, Kant is traditionally understood as an idealist and constructivist, and on this basis, attempts to reconstruct his "conceptions of reality" do not seem particularly productive. This article seeks to do just that - to clarify Kant's understanding of this issue, especially since the concept of reality is one of the most frequently used terms. The first part of the article analyzes the ontological structures of Kant's philosophy and the problems associated with the relation of phenomenon, noumenon, and thing-initself, and their complex coordination. The second part considers the significance of the problematics of the objective for clarifying the conceptions of reality. The third part analyzes assessments of Kant's metaphysical project in the studies of S.L. Katrechko, V.V. Vasiliev, S.A. Chernov, A.N. Kruglov, and V.E. Semenov. Researchers of Kantian philosophy do not agree on how to define the form of theoretical analytics given by the Critique of Pure Reason: is it a continuation of the metaphysical tradition, can it in a certain sense be attributed to ontology, is it a new - transcendental - logic, or should it still be treated as a "critical method"? In Kant himself one can find grounds for contradictory answers regarding the aims of his critical philosophy. This article is devoted to clarifying the reasons for this kind of disagreement between the followers of Kant's philosophy and its analysts. In Kant's "shadow" appears all further European philosophy, in one way or another oriented towards the anti-realist foundations of analyticis, in particular phenomenology and anti-realism. The aim of this article is to reconstruct the ontological foundations of Kant's critical method and to clarify his understanding of reality in this context.

Bookmarks In a comment buried in the center of his Critique ofJudgment, Immanuel Kant explains why jokes are funny: Laughter ¿s an affect that arises if a tense expectation is transformed into nothing (§ 54). Jokes "must contain something that can deceive us for a moment. That is why, when the illusion vanishes, [transformed ] into nothing, the mind looks at the illusion once more in order to give it another try, and so by a rapid succession of tension and relaxation, the mind is bounced back and forth. . . ." If all this bouncing and agitation makes you tired, he says, it's also cheering and even healthy. To illustrate, the good professor tells a couple ofstories himself. One concerns an Indian who is having dinner with an Englishman in Surat. The Englishman opens a bottle of ale and the Indian watches all wide-eyed as the foam pours out. "What's so amazing in that?" asks the Englishman. "Oh, I'm not amazed at its coming out," replies the Indian. "It's how you managed to get it all in!" If you're tempted to read diis story with a Peter Sellers accent, go ahead, but Kant is at pains to deny that thejoke is merely a put-down, ethnic or otherwise; die humor, he says, comes from the incongruity of the Indian's tense gaze and our understanding of bottled brew—his tension becomes ours and then is transformed into nothing. Similarly, Kant goes on, in the case of an heir who arranges a solemn funeral for a rich relative. He's exasperated to find that things are going wrong with the mourners he's hired: "The more money I give them to grieve, the more cheerful they look." Talk about oldjokes—these two, at least in Kant's telling, are almost precisely two centuries old, since the Critique ofJudgment was published in 1790. Many readers otherwise familiar with Kant's ideas and the style of such works as the Critique ofPure Reason may be surprised that he tells these stories at all, let alone that they can still get a laugh. However, the Critique ofJudgment, the third and last of his great critiques, is replete with surprises of all sort. Where else in the literature of the eighteenth century will you find a discussion of the aesthetics of muzak (well, he calls it Tafelmusik)? Such music, Kant says, is hardly aesthetic; radier it is "a strange dring which is meant to be only an agreeable noise [at dinner] serving to keep the minds in a cheerful mood, and which fosters the free flow of conversation between each person and his neighbor, without anyone 's paying the slightest attention to the music's composition" (§ 44). He doesn't mention die supermarkets of Königsberg, but we get the point. 426 Bookmarks427 Or ecology: Kant says that in contemplating the beauty of nature, we love wildflowers, insects, and birds, and would not want nature to be without them, even if they provided no benefit (and maybe even inflicted some harm) to the human species (§ 42). Hejustifies our interest in preserving the wild realms of nature to which neither we nor any other human beings may ever have access. We don'tjust like nature for its form, we like it for its existence. We don't want an unspoiled Antarctica, we might say today, so we or somebody else can visit it: we want itjust to be there. Moreover, Kant claims, we would be offended by artificial flowers or mechanical birds stuck into some idyllic natural scene. He asks, "What do poets praise more highly than the nightingale's enchantingly beautiful song in a secluded thicket on a quiet summer evening by the soft light of the moon?" Yet if some "jovial innkeeper," unable to supply the bird, instead plants in the bushes a boy who cleverly imitates a nightingale, his guests will only be charmed by the scene so long as they don't know. Agreed, so far— but things slide over the top with the professor's insistence (comment, following§ 22) that birdsong is superior to human song. As one who will take Kiri Te Kanawa over a crow most any...

Abstract. This essay examines current debates in political philosophy regarding the problems of war and peace and of human rights protection. Two contrasting approaches are analyzed: one represented by “democratic peace” theories, and the other by the movement for a cosmopolitan order. At the heart of both approaches are conflicting interpretations of Kant's political philosophy, especially his project of “perpetual peace.” An analysis of M. Doyle's recent conception of “liberal democratic peace” shows the flaws in his justification of the tendency of liberal states to be war‐prone toward nonliberal states. Alternatively, the development of Kant's ideas in the theories of “discourse ethics” (K. O. Apel and J. Habermas) and “cosmopolitan democracy” confirms the relevance of Kant's cosmopolitan ideal to current discussions about peace and human rights. The analysis also affirms that the true solution to the problems of securing peace and protecting human rights can only be achieved by peaceful means, based on international law with the United Nations as its legitimate political representation.

In the Critique of Pure Reason, the notion of representations being of, or standing for, objects is crucial. Kant's chief problem in that book is to explain why and how mathematics, natural science, and metaphysics yield substantive a priori knowledge of objects. Such knowledge, he says, is obtainable because the mind embeds in its objects those very kinds of features about whose character and existence a priori knowledge is possible. This embedding is required if we are to have any empirical knowledge, for then, by the nature of a mental state's representing an object in the knowledge about which that state is involved, the object must be represented as satisfying a priori perceptual and conceptual conditions. Specifically, Kant holds that a representation is of an object when the manifold, or variety, of parts which that representation contains is connected by the rule provided by a concept of the object. When one realizes (with Parsons [23]: 38 or Wolff [27]: 109-10) that such representations have the property Brentano called intentionality, of standing for an object which need not exist or be the object of representation under each of its descriptions, deep parallels are revealed between Kant's theory and the recent semantical interpretations Hintikka and others have developed for epistemic and perceptual concepts. Possible world semantics for such concepts then appears in an unexpected historical perspective, and itself offers a guide to a lucid, unitary interpretation of Kant's work. I want here to lay the basis for such an interpretation. In part II of this essay, I investigate Kant's notions of intuition and judgment, and in part III I complete this investigation. Developing a purified view of intuition, I argue that empirical intuitions are for Kant analogues of demonstrative singular terms, and that synthesis of

The paper deals with the review of the translation of Kant’s “Critique of Practical Reason”, published by Vitaly Chorny in this magazine last year as a continuation of the review by I. Ivashchenko and V. Terletsky (treating the translation of “Critique of Pure Reason”) which is scrutinized in the previous issue. The new review turned to be a similar attempt to prove a biased statement about the unsatisfactory quality of Ukrainian translation. It is shown that this attempt is even more unsuccessful than the previous one: it is characterized by a much lower level of professionalism and significant illogicality. The vast majority of its claims to translation are proven to be again insolvent or insignificant, i. e. in both cases they are only imitations of proof of its pretended unsuitability. The cardinal flaw of the review, as well as the previous one, is the lack of any appropriate method of translation evaluation. The reviewer tries to compensate for the weakness of the argument by sharp rhetoric, unrestrained exaggerations, such as “terminological chaos”. The justification of the last verdict is unsuccessful: in fact only a few translation omissions and some minor shortcomings are given. In the same way, the allegations of a large number of gross translation errors due to the translator's incompetence remained unproven, excepting adduction of a few real flaws due to oversight. In fact, the review, like the previous one, proves only that the translation, as any other one, is not error-free. In addition to the obvious damage, there is some benefit from it, namely a modest contribution to the list of corrections to the translation.

This chapter examines the account of the moral law and its relation to the idea of freedom that Kant presents in the Critique of Practical Reason and argues that this relation can be interpreted as the paradigmatic example of the real use of pure reason. It provides a detailed account of what Kant means by practical cognition, and shows how practical cognition of the moral law as a fact of reason enables the immediate practical cognition of transcendental freedom. It also provides an explanation of why Kant takes this result to enable a supersensible extension of pure reason, leading to the affirmation of the practical subject’s existence as a causa noumenon. The chapter concludes by showing how this feature of Kant’s view enables a positive resolution to the Third Antinomy presented in the Critique of Pure Reason and, accordingly, a real, constitutive use for the idea of freedom.