寡占市場中廠商之平行行為與一致性行為－兼評中油、台塑聯合漲價案

This report, prepared by the Secretariat of the OECD was the basis for a peer review examination of Chinese Taipei at the OECD’s Global Forum on Competition on 9 February, 2006. Competition law in Chinese Taipei has been an important element of the program of economic reforms that moved the economy from centrally directed emphasis on manufacturing and exports to a market-driven emphasis on services and high technology. The competition law follows mainstream practice about restrictive agreements, monopolies and anticompetitive mergers, with a particularly clear statutory basis for concentrating enforcement attention on horizontal collusion. The rules about market deception and unfair practices connect the competition law to consumer interests. There is a risk, though, that rules based on a cultural tradition of fairness might lead to interventions to correct differences in bargaining power, which could dampen competition rather than promote it. The competition enforcement agency, the Fair Trade Commission (FTC), is now a stable, experienced administrative agency. It followed an appropriate sequence in introducing competition policy, emphasising transparency and guidance to encourage compliance before undertaking stronger enforcement measures. General reforms are in process that would clarify the independence of the FTC. To improve enforcement against hard-core cartels, a leniency programme should be adopted, and the special treatment for agreements among small businesses should be limited. Some other aspects of the enforcement tool-kit should be revised, such as the cap on fines and the use of market share as a merger notification test. The most visible regulatory reforms to promote competition have been in telecoms, although an independent regulator for that sector is just now being set up. The government retains holdings in privatised firms that could have implications for market competition, so FTC vigilance about the risk of cross-subsidy or other distortion remains warranted.

In December 2023, the Fair Trade Commission announced that it would introduce the tentatively named ‘Platform Fair Competition Promotion Act’ to pre-designate ‘dominant online platforms’ and prohibit abuse of their market dominant position. The fundamental question is whether online platforms’ self-preferencing can be considered subject to regulation under competition law, and what are the standards for judging its illegality. These controversies include what is the basis for recognition of market dominant position in the online market under the current legal system and whether self-preferencing can be included as a regulatory type of abuse of market dominant position. The Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act prohibits abusive practices of market dominant Position in the relevant market, resulting in the effect of restricting competition. But, it is not easy to determine whether a market dominant position exists or whether there is a competition restriction effect in online platform market. Despite this situation, the Fair Trade Commission is establishing legislative policies to preemptively determine dominant online platforms and prohibit their abusive practices. However, the limitations of the use of the SSNIP test in online platforms did not overcome in ‘the Naver shopping case’, and the theory of monopoly leveraging, which is intended to be applied to determine the effect of restricting competition, has virtually lost its value in the United States, and the related discussions in the EU are different from the judgment standards established in ‘the Posco case’ in Korea. Considering the characteristics of the online platform market, which has the possibility of infinite competition in a multi-sided market without regional restrictions due to technological development, and the efficiency enhancing effect that the various services provided by online platforms will bring, regulation of the online platforms must be cautious.

Determinants of Individual-Firm Markup in Japan: Market Concentration, Market Share, and FTC Regulations

The political prerogatives established by industrial policy and the national effort to “catch up” have limited the political standing and independence of Japan’s Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) over time. In addition to the political constraints, the JFTC’s power to enforce antitrust policy is also constrained by the wording of the Antimonopoly Law (AML) itself, and the interpretation and processes of implementation that developed around the law during the postwar period. By explaining the logic of the Japanese antitrust system, this chapter shows how and why existing legal doctrine makes it difficult for the JFTC to prosecute anti-competitive behavior, in particular regarding the multifaceted activities of self-regulation. While protective self-regulation aims at closing markets and restraining competition, and is thus largely outlawed by the antitrust law, many parts of administrative self-regulation, too, can easily result in entry barriers or other restrictions of exchange. Thus, even the rule-making activities of trade associations sometimes entail boycotts, refusals to deal with nonmembers and similar market constraints. Antitrust law calls such market restrictions “unfair trade practices”, and while they are outlawed in Japan, these practices have not been prosecuted stridently.

This chapter will review competition policy and law (CPL) in ASEAN and provide some lessons for improving legal technical assistance (LTA) on CPL to ASEAN and intensifying intra-ASEAN cooperation in competition law enforcement. In 2021 Cambodia finally enacted its competition law and all ASEAN Member States have established respective competition law regimes. While they share various common features in the texts of the laws, the degree of implementation varies. The independence of competition authorities is one of the underlying causes of this difference and the lack of enforcement resources and expertise is crucial, particularly for CLMV Countries. The chapter will propose Japan Fair Trade Commission to extend LTA based on its experiences of the Antimonopoly Act enforcement for 75 years. Intra-ASEAN cooperation on CPL could support the efforts by young competition authorities in CLMV Countries to implement respective competition laws and coordinate enforcement activities to address anticompetitive mergers and other practices with regional dimension. In this context, the chapter will also examine the future developments of ASEAN-wide CPL, comparing with EU competition law and its institution.

Total Allowable catches (TACs) for whitefish in European Union (EU) waters have been reduced each year for the past five years, thereby reducing fleet revenue. During the same period prices increased, partly offsetting income reductions. However, price changes depend on the structure of the market within which they are formed. Therefore, this paper examines the structure of the European first-hand market for whitefish. A Vector Auto Regressive (VAR) model in Error Correction form (ECM) is used to analyse landing prices among the main fishing nations, using co-integration tests and tests for the Law of One Price (LOP) to determine the degree of market integration. A partially integrated European first-hand market for whitefish is identified and as a part of this, a perfectly spatially integrated cod market. The existence of this relatively loose market integration is explained by the presence of rigidities on the supply side. The implications are discussed in relation to reductions in EU whitefish TACs and...

Exchange-traded funds (ETFs) have become popular investments since first introduced in 2004. These funds offer investors a simple way to gain exposure to commodities, which are thought of as an asset class suitable for diversification in investment portfolios and as a hedge against economic downturns. However, returns of futures-based commodity ETFs have deviated significantly from the changes in the prices of their underlying commodities. The pervasive underperformance of futures-based commodity ETFs compared to changes in commodity prices calls into question the usefulness of these ETFs for diversification or hedging. This article examines the sources of the deviation between futures-based commodity ETF returns and the changes in commodity prices using crude oil ETFs. The authors show that the deviation in returns is serially correlated and that a significant portion of this deviation can be predicted by the term structure of the oil futures market. They conclude that only investors sophisticated enough to understand and actively monitor commodity futures market conditions should use these ETFs.

Competition in the business and mass media industry globally began to be felt in Indonesia. This is evident in the structure of the mass media market in Indonesia, where media conglomeration has become commonplace. The industry and structure of the mass media in Indonesia has developed with many variants of mass media that can be consumed by audiences, whether they are conventional media types (old media) or internet based digital media (new media). The purpose of the research in this article is to find out the reality of industry and the structure of the mass media market in Indonesia. The research in this article uses qualitative research methods, precisely the descriptive-qualitative method, by focusing data from the literature review. The results of the research show that industrial conditions and the structure of the mass media market in Indonesia can be viewed from several perspectives, i.e. the number of media buyers and sellers, product differentiation, and barriers to competition. Meanwhile, to explore the structure of the mass media market in Indonesia, we can use The Theory of The Firm, which consists of four types of markets. The four types of markets are monopoly market, oligopoly market, monopolistic competition market, and perfect competition market. Media management from an art perspective can be used as a basis for the media industry; and globally, industry and the structure of the mass media market in Indonesia are not much different from other countries that adhere to the ideology of democracy in the world.

Purpose - The purpose of this study was to investigate market power of soybeans exported by the United States to Korea. Particularly, this paper considered dichotomous characteristics of genetically modified (GM) soybeans and non-GM soybeans and conducted empirical analysis of these two segregated soybean markets to understand key tenets of market power in international soybean trade. Design/methodology - The difference in market power between GM and non-GM soybeans was analyzed using Residual Demand Elasticity (RDE) and Residual Supply Elasticity (RSE) models over the period of 2008~2018. RDE and RSE models under an imperfect competition condition were used to estimate market margins and determine whether GM and non-GM exporters or importers exercised market power in the destination market. Findings - Empirical results suggested that the U.S. had a market power on both GM and non-GM soybean exports. GM exports had greater market power than non-GM exports (14% vs. 9%). By contrast, Korea showed an inability to grab market margin or exert market power in soybean imports. Both export supply by the U.S. and import demand by Korea were found to be more responsive to price changes of GM soybeans than to prices changes of non-GM soybeans. This might be due to a self-interested, profit-seeking strategy by the exporter and many concerned consumers regarding potential adverse effects of GMOs in the importing country. Originality/value - This paper fills the literature gap by exploiting market power in both GM and non-GM markets with explicit consideration of price correlations between GM and non-GM soybeans in Korea. A number of existing studies have provided evidence for market power broadly embedded in international commodity trade. However, studies focusing on Korean markets are limited. No study has explored the country’s soybean trade. Furthermore, the majority of prior studies have almost exclusively focused on the market power from a standpoint of exporting countries without discussing importers’ market structure. This paper also sought to understand potentially distinguished patterns of market power between GM and non-GM markets.

This paper examines the completed administrative system of ”Rule of Origin” (ROO) in Taiwan's imported agricultural products. The goal is to improve the current traceability system for imported agricultural products, the mechanism in the origin labeling and application for the import goods. Hence, it is necessary to establish the standards for domestic and imported agricultural products, traceability, origin labeling, comprehensive identification and the keeping of production records. A traceability mechanism has to be established for the sale and distribution of food, thereby increasing the dependability of transaction information, and improving food security and operating efficiency. In establishing these standards, the technological aspects, economic information management and public regulations are all very important factors. They should also encompass the coding and uncoding inspections in production. The ”Products Labeling Act” could be applicable to voluntary labeling in agricultural products, but it's difficult for some agricultural products to be labeled. Still, the agricultural Products Labeling Act is essential and needs to be enhanced. In the competitive agricultural market, although there are some governmental acts to support, active examination of these acts is lacking. At the same time, the ”Fair Trade Commission” regulates competition, but other agricultural authorities are actively responsible for enforcing compliance. For the purpose of strengthening ROO, the tariff rules and classification system for some imported agricultural products has to be amended further in the future. Finally, it's not enough for the ROO regulations and administrative measures to be implemented. Some imported agricultural products still have ambiguous origins. In particular, those measures lack the clear regulatory authorization and inter-departmental cooperation mechanisms to regulate domestic sales distribution. The ability to trace the origin of some products is ineffective, damaging the normal development for agriculture in Taiwan.

최근 정부는 공정거래법상의 다양한 문제점을 개선하고자 공정거래법 전면개정을 입법예고 했다. 구체적으로는 과징금 부과상한을 상향하고, 경성담합에 대한 전속고발제를 폐지하며, 불공정거래행위에 대해서는 사인의 금지청구제도를 도입하는 등 민사, 행정, 형사적 규율수단을 종합적으로 개선하고, 경제력 집중 억제시책을 합리적으로 보완·정비하여 대기업집단의 일감 몰아주기와 같은 잘못된 행태를 시정하고 기업집단의 지배구조가 선진화될 수 있도록 하는 것 등이다. 특히 대기업집단의 잘못된 지배구조나 거래행태를 개선하고 중소기업의 정당한 경쟁 기회를 보장하기 위하여 편법적 지배력확대 수단 등에 대한 규율을 강화하며, 4차 산업혁명 시대의 도래에 따라 기업의 혁신생태계 기반을 마련하기 위해 벤처지주회사 제도, 기업결합 신고제도 등 관련 규제를 개선함으로써 혁신성장, 공정경제구현 등을 제도적으로 뒷받침하려는 것이다. 이번 공정거래법의 개혁은 대기업 내지 시장지배적사업자의 지위남용과 과도한 경제력의 집중을 방지하고, 소상공인이나 중소기업 등 경제적 약자의 지위를 보호하는 한편 이 법의 목적인 실질적이고 공정한 경쟁과 국민경제의 균형있는 발전 및 경제정의의 실현을 더욱 공고히 하기 위한 것으로 이를 위해 경쟁 및 경제활동의 자유에 대하여, 한편에서는 불필요한 제한을 풀고, 다른 한편에서는 규제를 더욱 강화하는 것을 내용으로 한다고 볼 수 있다. 우리 헌법상의 경제질서는 사유재산제도와 경제상의 자유와 창의 및 자유경쟁을 바탕으로 하면서도, 재산권에 대한 사회적 기속과 규제 및 경제질서에 대한 국가의 조정과 간섭을 가미하는 사회적 시장경제질서라고 할 수 있는데, 현행 공정거래법상의 경제규제조항들, 최근 입법 예고된 개정내용들 및 기타 관련 법규의 내용들은 바로 이러한 사회적 시장경제질서와 헌법상의 사회국가원리 및 헌법 제9장의 경제조항들에 의하여 정당화될 수 있다. 그러나 다른 한편 이러한 경제질서에 대한 규제와 간섭은 자기 목적적인 것이 아니고 어디까지나 사유재산제도의 보장과 경제상의 자유와 자유경쟁적 경제질서의 확립을 위한 수단이라는 점이다. 즉 각자의 능력과 창의를 바탕으로 하는 자유경제질서가 제 기능을 발휘하지 못하고 궤도를 이탈했을 경우에 이를 회복시켜서 경제질서를 원궤도에 올려놓기 위한 불가피한 수단으로서 제한적이고 보충적으로 경제질서에 대한 국가의 규제와 조정이 이루어져야 한다는 것이다. 경제영역에 대한 국가개입은 앞서 열거한 바와 같이 관련 경제주체들의 경쟁의 자유를 비롯한 다양한 기본권을 제한하게 된다. 따라서 국가개입과 규제는 비례의 원칙, 신뢰보호의 원칙, 평등의 원칙, 포괄적 위임입법금지의 원칙 등 다양한 헌법상의 원칙과 한계들을 준수해야 한다. 따라서 최근 거론되는 공정거래법의 전면개정과정에서 그리고 그의 세부시행령 등을 제정ㆍ개정하는 과정에서 이러한 제한 및 한계원칙들을 준수하도록 하는 세밀한 검토가 이루어져야 할 것이다.Recently, the Government preannounced the complete revised bill of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act. The bill includes, concretely, raising of the upper limit of penalty surcharges, restriction of the exclusive complaint system by the Fair Trade Commission, introduction of the right to request prohibition by private individuals against unfair trade practices, supplement of prevention policy measures of excessive concentration of economic power, advancement of corporate governance, etc. It, especially, plans to reform the wrong governance system of conglomerates, to guarantee fair competion opportunity of small and medium-sized businesses, and to improve the venture holding company system and report system of business combination for realization of fair economy. In short, the purpose of the reformation is to prevent any abuse of market-dominating positions by enterprisers and any excessive concentration of economic power, to protect the positon of small and medium-sized businesses, to promote fair and free competition, and to strive hereby for balanced development of the national economy. The diverse regulations of the Act including the reformation and other relating statutes can be justified by the economic order of the Constitution, namely so called the social market economy order, and economic the povisions of the chapter 9 of the Constitution. On the other hand, they, however, should obey a number of principles of the Constitution which function as a limitation and restriction of legislation to regulate the freedom of competition and economic activity, because the regulation restricts the free market system and the relating constitutional rights, for example the right of property, the freedom of occupation, the right of consumers, etc. They comprise the principle of proportionality, the principle of equality, the principle of trust protection, ban on inclusive delegated legislation, etc. In the process of the revision of the Act, therefore, these principles should be complied.

This article provides empirical evidence on the effects of alternative market structures and ownership modes on prices and service offerings in the cable television industry. We analyze the underlying characteristics and behavior of competing versus monopoly operators on the one hand, and privately versus nonprivately owned operators on the other. We find that competition and nonprivate ownership are associated with lower prices for basic cable television service. We also find that cable television price and quality differentials vary with certain characteristics of competing operators, and that market structure and ownership status influence changes in price and quality over time.

TNC takeovers in Brazil: The uneven distribution of benefits in the market for firms

The purpose of this study was to find out differences in marketing margin of tilapia and the factors that influence it, to know the structure, behavior and appearance of tilapia fish market, to know the benefits received by tilapia traders in Banjarbaru, and analyze the strategies and policies of the local government towards the system that has been running. The research was started from October 2014 until December 2014. The research location was determined intentionally (purposive), i.e. Bauntung Market Banjarbaru, South Kalimantan. It was intended to know prices and marketing costs at the retailer level. The results showed that the analysis of marketing margins of the value of marketing margin was relatively constant/was not much different. Based on F test of all the factors that influenced the marketing margin, they were free variable volume of marketing (X1), transportation costs (X4), cost of sales (X5) and profit of traders (X6), with 99% confidence level, it was found that there was no real effect on the marketing margin of tilapia. While the selling price (X2), the purchasing price (X3) at 99% confidence level really influenced the marketing margin of tilapia in Banjarbaru. The analysis of market integration indicated that I () = 0867, which means that market integration was not perfectly integrated yet. This means that the marketing of tilapia in Bauntung Market Banjarbaru was in imperfect competitive market structure. The value of relationship of price changes amounted to 0.87 (r ≠ 1). This means that the relationship of price changes in traders level and the price change in retailers level were not strong (not perfect). The elasticity value of price transmission (ET) was low. The transmission elasticity was <1, the value was 0.763. This means that the price elasticity inelastic or in other words the market is not efficient. The benefits gained by retailers was in average Rp. 2.213,88-/kg.

Very few industries are as profoundly influenced by regulation as the pharmaceutical industry. All aspects of the life-cycle of new drugs are regulated, from patent application, to marketing approval, commercial exploitation, patent expiration and competition with generics. The nature of demand for drugs, the identity of drugs brought to market, and the nature of competition in the drug market over time are all shaped by regulation. Throughout much of the world, administrative regulation, rather than competition policy, dominates efforts to afford consumers and governments adequate access to affordable drugs.As a result, the nature of competition in this market is sui generis. A significant number of infringements to competition law in this sphere across the world are concerned with practices that seek to take advantage of or manipulate the regulatory framework, including misuses of the patent system (e.g. ever-greening or patent clustering), spreading misleading information or inducing product switching, among others. A proper understanding of how competition law works in this area requires a solid knowledge of the structure of the market and its regulation. In the European context, any such analysis must also take into account free movement law, which provides a regulatory underpinning for integrated European markets in pharmaceutical products while also acting as a parallel tool to competition law in promoting and deepening market integration.This chapter will provide an overview of free movement cases on pharmaceuticals, with a view to frame such case law within the European regulatory framework and to identify its impact on competition law enforcement. It is structured as follows: a first section will provide an overview of the structure of the European market for pharmaceuticals, including the basic European regulatory framework; a second section will review the case law on free movement and pharmaceuticals; and a last section will detail how the basic pharmaceutical regulatory framework, free movement law and competition law interact to determine the shape of European pharmaceutical markets.