A Framework for Universally Composable Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

In cryptography, the key exchange protocol is very important before starting secure communication. Both parties will use an asymmetric key algorithm to exchange their keys for encryption and decryption. One of the methods to securely exchange the keys is Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (DHKE) protocol. DHKE allows both parties to exchange their keys over the insecure public channel safely. However, DHKE protocol does not authenticate the message, making it easily exposed to third-party interruptions like Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack. Therefore, Station to Station (STS) protocols was introduced after modifying the DHKE protocol and adding authentication elements. Thus, this paper proposes to provide the authentication of the STS protocol by using Lamport Digital Signature Scheme. Lamport Digital Signature Scheme, also known as Lamport one-time signature scheme, gives very strong security because it can be built from any cryptographically secure one-way function and usually uses a cryptographic hash function. The results from the study are STS protocol algorithms that provide a verification scheme using the Lamport Digital Signature Scheme. As a result, both parties will obtain a common key for encryption and decryption, in which both parties play a role by using their respective digital signature for verification within the STS of this protocol

Diffie-Hellman (D-H) key exchange protocol, first published in 1976 is one of the most distinguished and widely used secured key exchange protocols. The protocol makes it possible to exchange a symmetric key between two parties over an unsecured communication channel without pre-agreement of any shared secret. The D-H key exchange protocol however requires a pre-set public parameters P (a large prime) and g a generator of ℤp to be public i.e. known to all users of the system. This paper proposes a key exchange mechanism without any public parameter. Unlike D-H key exchange mechanism our scheme uses encryption to transmit intermediate data during key exchange stage, thus it is non-vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attach.

Many authentication and key exchange protocols are built using an accepted set of standard concepts such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange, nonces to avoid replay, certificates from an accepted author...

Many authentication and key exchange protocols are built using an accepted set of standard concepts such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange, nonces to avoid replay, certificates from an accepted authority, and encrypted or signed messages. We introduce a basic framework for deriving security protocols from such simple components. As a case study, we examine the structure of a family of key exchange protocols that includes station-to-station (STS), ISO-9798-3, just fast keying (JFK), IKE and related protocols, deriving all members of the family from two basic protocols using a small set of refinements and protocol transformations. As initial steps toward associating logical derivations with protocol derivations, we extend a previous security protocol logic with preconditions and temporal assertions. Using this logic, we prove the security properties of the standard signature based challenge-response protocol and the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. The ISO-9798-3 protocol is then proved correct by composing the correctness proofs of these two simple protocols.

This chapter explains the elements of key exchange, specifically the steps in a key exchange protocol, the parties that are involved and the messages which may be sent. It details key exchange security models and protocols, considering first the simpler case of unauthenticated key exchange before turning to authenticated protocols. The chapter deals with key exchange protocols designed to be secure against a passive adversary. It examines that unauthenticated protocols may be used as building blocks for authenticated key exchange protocols. Key exchange protocols that allow parties to verify the identity of other participating parties are called authenticated key exchange protocols. Key exchange has a long history and a vast literature, yet remains a very active research area with significant practical impact. It is inevitable that as new computational assumptions emerge as the basis for cryptographic security, so will their use in key exchange be relevant.

After going through past research, it is observed that the security of data depends on five important key features such as authentication, data Integrity, mutual authentication between two parties, non-repudiation, and key exchange algorithm. Even if one of these features fail then it may breach security in real-world scenarios. The Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (DHKE) algorithm allows securing one feature called key exchange in the cryptography field. However, this key exchange algorithm is unable to provide authentication. As a result, this key exchange scheme is prone to a hostile attack named as Man-In-The-Middle Attack (MITM). To solve this type of attack, a novel algorithm has been proposed called modification of the DHKE algorithm. In this algorithm, they claim that the MITM attack on classical DHKE can be prevented by applying the necessary functionalities like encryption and Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP). Although, after going through result analysis and working techniques, it is observed that the modified DHKE algorithm is still suffering from MITM attack. In this paper, the main objective is to develop an algorithm for finding out this type of security flaw in the existing modified DH algorithm which includes the concept of required authentication and encryption functions and able to perform the MITM attack on the existing modified DHKE algorithm.

The Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) and the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange are famous methods for encryption. These methods depended on selecting the primes p and q in order to be secure enough . This paper shows that the named methods used the primes which are found by some arithmetical function .In the other sense, no need to think about getting primes p and q and how they are secure enough, since the arithmetical function enable to build the primes in such complicated way to be secure. Moreover, this article gives new construction of the RSA algorithm and DH key exchange using the
 primes p,qfrom areal number x.

In this paper, we first give an overview of security architecture of mobile WiMAX network. Then, we investigate man-in-the-middle attacks and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks toward 802.16e-based Mobile WiMAX network. We find the initial network procedure is not effectively secured that makes Man-in-the-middle and Dos attacks possible. In addition, we find the resource saving and handover procedure is not secured enough to resist DoS attacks. Focusing on these two kinds of attacks, we propose Secure Initial Network Entry Protocol (SINEP) based on Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol to enhance the security level during network initial. We modify DH key exchange protocol to fit it into mobile WiMAX network as well as to eliminate existing weakness in original DH key exchange protocol.

A key exchange protocol is an important primitive in the field of information and network security and is used to exchange a common secret key among various parties. A number of key exchange protocols exist in the literature and most of them are based on the Diffie-Hellman (DH) problem. But, these DH type protocols cannot resist to the modern computing technologies like quantum computing, grid computing etc. Therefore, a more powerful non-DH type key exchange protocol is required which could resist the quantum and exponential attacks. In the year 2013, Lei and Liao, thus proposed a lattice-based key exchange protocol. Their protocol was related to the NTRU-ENCRYPT and NTRU-SIGN and so, was referred as NTRU-KE. In this paper, we identify that NTRU-KE lacks the authentication mechanism and suffers from the man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. This attack may lead to the forging the authenticated users and exchanging the wrong key.

Cryptographic Primitives that Resist Backdooring and Subversion

The key exchange protocol is the most important cryptography mechanism to protect end-to-end communications by the secret session key encryption. This paper focuses on the four-party key exchange protocol in a environment in which two clients (or UEs) are registered under two distinct servers. We propose a Three-Way Key Exchange and Agreement Protocol, denoted by TW-KEAP. It makes two communication parties have a secret session key to protect their subsequent communications on an efficient way, and intends the servers to involve with the key exchange procedure to derive the session key for the lawful interception support. Security analyses show that it provides mutual authentication, replay attack protection and perfect forward secrecy. Furthermore, the TW-KEAP has not only the shortest total service time based on the experimental results but also the shortest queuing delay from the queuing model analyses, as compared with current alternatives.

Recently, Canetti and Krawczyk (Eurocrypt'2001) formulated a notion of security for key-exchange (ke) protocols, called SK-security, and showed that this notion suffices for constructing secure channels. However, their model and proofs do not suffice for proving more general composability properties of SK-secure ke protocols.We show that while the notion of SK-security is strictly weaker than a fully-idealized notion of key exchange security, it is sufficiently robust for providing secure composition with arbitrary protocols. In particular, SK-security guarantees the security of the key for any application that desires to set-up secret keys between pairs of parties. We also provide new definitions of secure-channels protocols with similarly strong composability properties, and show that SK-security suffices for obtaining these definitions.To obtain these results we use the recently proposed framework of universally composable (UC) security. We also use a new tool, called noninformation oracles, which will probably find applications beyond the present case. These tools allow us to bridge between seemingly limited indistinguishability-based definitions such as SK-security and more powerful, simulation-based definitions, such as UC security, where general composition theorems can be proven. Furthermore, based on such composition theorems we reduce the analysis of a full-fledged multi-session keyexchange protocol to the (simpler) analysis of individual, stand-alone, key-exchange sessions.

In this paper, we revisit multi-party Diffie-Hellman key exchange (DHKE) protocols by using multi-linear mappings and Weil pairings over elliptic curves. We show how to construct a 4-linear Weil pairing and illustrate the approach by examples. Finally, we present several necessary conditions to find a distortion map for a 5-party DHKE protocol.

As the utilization of Underwater Acoustic Sensor Networks (UASNs) in industrial and military operations increases, there is a requirement to guarantee the confidentiality and integrity of the data being transmitted. However, protecting communication in UASNs is very challenging as they are often deployed in unattended environments without physical protection. The slow propagation speed of underwater acoustic waves and low channel bandwidth are additional challenges affecting the design and implementation of security mechanisms. This paper outlines the main disadvantages of using conventional key-exchange protocols in resource-constrained environments such as UASNs, and proposes the utilization of implicit certificates and Hashed One-pass Menezes-QuVanstone (HOMQV) key-exchange protocol as an alternative. We implemented the proposed solution on several computing platforms and present the performance evaluation results in terms of computational time and communication overhead. Our analysis shows that using HOMQV in combination with Elliptic Curve Qu-Vanstone (ECQV) protocol for implicit certificate generation can significantly reduce communication and power consumption requirements compared to Diffie-Hellman (DH) protocol based on X.509 certificates.

Modern key exchange protocols are usually based on the Diffie–Hellman (DH) primitive. The beauty of this primitive, among other things, is its potential reusage of key shares: DH shares can be either used a single time or in multiple runs. Since DH-based protocols are insecure against quantum adversaries, alternative solutions have to be found when moving to the post-quantum setting. However, most post-quantum candidates, including schemes based on lattices and even supersingular isogeny DH, are not known to be secure under key reuse. In particular, this means that they cannot be necessarily deployed as an immediate DH substitute in protocols.In this paper, we introduce the notion of a split key encapsulation mechanism (split KEM) to translate the desired key-reusability of a DH-based protocol to a KEM-based flow. We provide the relevant security notions of split KEMs and show how the formalism lends itself to lifting Signal’s \(\mathsf {X3DH}\) handshake to the post-quantum KEM setting without additional message flows.Although the proposed framework conceptually solves the raised issues, instantiating it securely from post-quantum assumptions proved to be non-trivial. We give passively secure instantiations from \(\mathsf {(R)LWE}\), yet overcoming the above-mentioned insecurities under key reuse in the presence of active adversaries remains an open problem. Approaching one-sided key reuse, we provide a split KEM instantiation that allows such reuse based on the KEM introduced by Kiltz (PKC 2007), which may serve as a post-quantum blueprint if the underlying hardness assumption (gap hashed Diffie–Hellman) holds for the commutative group action of CSIDH (Asiacrypt 2018).The intention of this paper hence is to raise awareness of the challenges arising when moving to KEM-based key exchange protocols with key-reusability, and to propose split KEMs as a specific target for instantiation in future research.KeywordsPost-quantumKey encapsulation mechanismsKey exchangeSignal protocolX3DH