Security weakness of a lattice-based key exchange protocol

In cryptography, the key exchange protocol is very important before starting secure communication. Both parties will use an asymmetric key algorithm to exchange their keys for encryption and decryption. One of the methods to securely exchange the keys is Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (DHKE) protocol. DHKE allows both parties to exchange their keys over the insecure public channel safely. However, DHKE protocol does not authenticate the message, making it easily exposed to third-party interruptions like Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack. Therefore, Station to Station (STS) protocols was introduced after modifying the DHKE protocol and adding authentication elements. Thus, this paper proposes to provide the authentication of the STS protocol by using Lamport Digital Signature Scheme. Lamport Digital Signature Scheme, also known as Lamport one-time signature scheme, gives very strong security because it can be built from any cryptographically secure one-way function and usually uses a cryptographic hash function. The results from the study are STS protocol algorithms that provide a verification scheme using the Lamport Digital Signature Scheme. As a result, both parties will obtain a common key for encryption and decryption, in which both parties play a role by using their respective digital signature for verification within the STS of this protocol

The analysis of real-world protocols, in particular key exchange protocols and protocols building on these protocols, is a very complex, error-prone, and tedious task. Besides the complexity of the protocols itself, one important reason for this is that the security of the protocols has to be reduced to the security of the underlying cryptographic primitives for every protocol time and again. We would therefore like to get rid of reduction proofs for real-world key exchange protocols as much as possible and in many cases altogether, also for higher-level protocols which use the exchanged keys. So far some first steps have been taken in this direction. But existing work is still quite limited, and, for example, does not support Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange, a prevalent cryptographic primitive for real-world protocols. In this paper, building on work by Kusters and Tuengerthal, we provide an ideal functionality in the universal composability setting which supports several common cryptographic primitives, including DH key exchange. This functionality helps to avoid reduction proofs in the analysis of real-world protocols and often eliminates them completely. We also propose a new general ideal key exchange functionality which allows higherlevel protocols to use exchanged keys in an ideal way. As a proof of concept, we apply our framework to three practical DH key exchange protocols, namely ISO 9798-3, SIGMA, and OPTLS.

The attack and defense model of network security based on game theory has developed into an effective network security model. It is a hot topic in the field of network and information security to use the idea of game theory to attack and defend the network security. This paper analyzes the general model of game theory in the field of security. This paper also analyzes the general model of network security attack and defense game. This paper also analyzes the game theory model of cryptographic protocol. This paper studies the existing network security methods based on game theory, reviews the development and evolution process and technical core of network security based on game theory, and compares the specificity of network security models based on game theory. Finally, the paper discusses the problems in the field of network security based on game theory, and tries to forecast its future development trend.

Recent progress in quantum physics shows that quantum computers may be a reality in the not too distant future. Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) refers to cryptographic schemes that are based on hard problems which are believed to be resistant to attacks from quantum computers. The supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) key exchange protocol shows promising security properties among various post-quantum cryptosystems that have been proposed. In this paper, we propose two efficient modular multiplication algorithms with special primes that can be used in SIDH key exchange protocol. Hardware architectures for the two proposed algorithms are also proposed. The hardware implementations are provided and compared with the original modular multiplication algorithm. The results show that the proposed finite field multiplier is over 6.79 times faster than the original multiplier in hardware. Moreover, the SIDH hardware/software codesign implementation using the proposed FFM2 hardware is over 31 percent faster than the best SIDH software implementation.

Recent progress on quantum physics shows that quantum computers may be a reality in the not too distant future. Based on new mathematical hard problems, post-quantum cryptography (PQC) has been studied to make sure the attacks from quantum computers can be resistant. The latest supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) key exchange protocol shows promising security properties among various post-quantum cryptosystems. In this paper, we propose an improved modular multiplication algorithm with special primes that can be used in SIDH key exchange protocol. Both software and hardware implementations are provided and compared with original modular multiplication algorithm. The results show that the software results of improved algorithm can be 24% faster than the original software implementation, while the hardware implementation based on the proposed hardware architecture can be 6 times faster than previous hardware implementation.

Diffie-Hellman (D-H) key exchange protocol, first published in 1976 is one of the most distinguished and widely used secured key exchange protocols. The protocol makes it possible to exchange a symmetric key between two parties over an unsecured communication channel without pre-agreement of any shared secret. The D-H key exchange protocol however requires a pre-set public parameters P (a large prime) and g a generator of ℤp to be public i.e. known to all users of the system. This paper proposes a key exchange mechanism without any public parameter. Unlike D-H key exchange mechanism our scheme uses encryption to transmit intermediate data during key exchange stage, thus it is non-vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attach.

Many authentication and key exchange protocols are built using an accepted set of standard concepts such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange, nonces to avoid replay, certificates from an accepted authority, and encrypted or signed messages. We introduce a basic framework for deriving security protocols from such simple components. As a case study, we examine the structure of a family of key exchange protocols that includes station-to-station (STS), ISO-9798-3, just fast keying (JFK), IKE and related protocols, deriving all members of the family from two basic protocols using a small set of refinements and protocol transformations. As initial steps toward associating logical derivations with protocol derivations, we extend a previous security protocol logic with preconditions and temporal assertions. Using this logic, we prove the security properties of the standard signature based challenge-response protocol and the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. The ISO-9798-3 protocol is then proved correct by composing the correctness proofs of these two simple protocols.

Many authentication and key exchange protocols are built using an accepted set of standard concepts such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange, nonces to avoid replay, certificates from an accepted author...

We note that the effective and active struggle of European countries with information terrorism takes place within the framework of the European Union, all its member-countries, as well as neighboring countries and applicants for accession. Therefore, it should be stressed that the EU is pursuing itself a very active policy in the field of information security. At the moment, it brings together highly developed countries that have a tremendous impact on international relations by establishing norms and standards of conduct of states in the political, economic, social, informational and other spheres. The main objective of the EU is to strengthen the European Commission’s dialogue with international organizations and partners on the issue of network security and, in particular, on the growing dependence on electronic networks. Political priorities in the field of information security, defined by the governing bodies of the European Union, are being implemented at the national level by both state authorities and nongovernmental organizations. Analyzing all the above, it can be concluded that within the framework of the EU, information security is considered, first of all, as a state of information networks and systems that provides an adequate level of protection of the integrity, availability, authenticity and confidentiality of information and the appropriate level of counteraction to external negative influences. Priorities of EU policy in the field of information security are the creation and implementation of programs and various technical means of protection of information and communication technologies; development of normative legal acts that establish a list of crimes in the IT sphere and criminal liability; ensuring a high level of public awareness of the risks, threats and ways of protecting their information systems / networks from undesirable effects.

Technologies of virtual and augmented reality are gaining popularity. Virtual reality is used in many areas, including beginning to be used in the field of information and computer security. In addition, virtual reality interfaces are also susceptible to attacks. However, there are still few works on research in this area. This article provides an overview of existing solutions to computer security problems using virtual and augmented reality interfaces, as well as an overview and classification of the identified threats for these interfaces themselves.

Advanced encryption and decryption strategies are of great significance for information protection and data security. Visual optical information encryption and decryption technology plays an important role in the field of information security. However, the current optical information encryption technologies have shortcomings such as the need for external decryption equipment, the inability to read out repeatedly, and information leakage, which hinder their practical application. By combining the excellent thermal response characteristics of the MXene-isocyanate propyl triethoxy silane (IPTS)/polyethylene (PE) bilayer and the structural color generated from the laser fabricated biomimetic structural color surface, an approach of encrypt, decrypt, and transmit information has been proposed. The microgroove-induced structural color is attached to the MXene-IPTS/PE bilayer to form a colored soft actuator (CSA) to realize information encryption and decryption, and information transmission. Benefiting from the unique photon-thermal response of the bilayer actuator and the precise spectrum response of the microgroove-induced structural color, the information encryption and decryption system has the advantages of being simple and reliable, which has the potential application in the field of optical information security.

We propose a new computational problem called the twin Diffie–Hellman problem. This problem is closely related to the usual (computational) Diffie–Hellman problem and can be used in many of the same cryptographic constructions that are based on the Diffie–Hellman problem. Moreover, the twin Diffie–Hellman problem is at least as hard as the ordinary Diffie–Hellman problem. However, we are able to show that the twin Diffie–Hellman problem remains hard, even in the presence of a decision oracle that recognizes solutions to the problem—this is a feature not enjoyed by the Diffie–Hellman problem, in general. Specifically, we show how to build a certain “trapdoor test” that allows us to effectively answer decision oracle queries for the twin Diffie–Hellman problem without knowing any of the corresponding discrete logarithms. Our new techniques have many applications. As one such application, we present a new variant of ElGamal encryption with very short ciphertexts, and with a very simple and tight security proof, in the random oracle model, under the assumption that the ordinary Diffie–Hellman problem is hard. We present several other applications as well, including a new variant of Diffie and Hellman’s non-interactive key exchange protocol; a new variant of Cramer–Shoup encryption, with a very simple proof in the standard model; a new variant of Boneh–Franklin identity-based encryption, with very short ciphertexts; a more robust version of a password-authenticated key exchange protocol of Abdalla and Pointcheval.

Modern key exchange protocols are usually based on the Diffie–Hellman (DH) primitive. The beauty of this primitive, among other things, is its potential reusage of key shares: DH shares can be either used a single time or in multiple runs. Since DH-based protocols are insecure against quantum adversaries, alternative solutions have to be found when moving to the post-quantum setting. However, most post-quantum candidates, including schemes based on lattices and even supersingular isogeny DH, are not known to be secure under key reuse. In particular, this means that they cannot be necessarily deployed as an immediate DH substitute in protocols.In this paper, we introduce the notion of a split key encapsulation mechanism (split KEM) to translate the desired key-reusability of a DH-based protocol to a KEM-based flow. We provide the relevant security notions of split KEMs and show how the formalism lends itself to lifting Signal’s \(\mathsf {X3DH}\) handshake to the post-quantum KEM setting without additional message flows.Although the proposed framework conceptually solves the raised issues, instantiating it securely from post-quantum assumptions proved to be non-trivial. We give passively secure instantiations from \(\mathsf {(R)LWE}\), yet overcoming the above-mentioned insecurities under key reuse in the presence of active adversaries remains an open problem. Approaching one-sided key reuse, we provide a split KEM instantiation that allows such reuse based on the KEM introduced by Kiltz (PKC 2007), which may serve as a post-quantum blueprint if the underlying hardness assumption (gap hashed Diffie–Hellman) holds for the commutative group action of CSIDH (Asiacrypt 2018).The intention of this paper hence is to raise awareness of the challenges arising when moving to KEM-based key exchange protocols with key-reusability, and to propose split KEMs as a specific target for instantiation in future research.KeywordsPost-quantumKey encapsulation mechanismsKey exchangeSignal protocolX3DH

As the utilization of Underwater Acoustic Sensor Networks (UASNs) in industrial and military operations increases, there is a requirement to guarantee the confidentiality and integrity of the data being transmitted. However, protecting communication in UASNs is very challenging as they are often deployed in unattended environments without physical protection. The slow propagation speed of underwater acoustic waves and low channel bandwidth are additional challenges affecting the design and implementation of security mechanisms. This paper outlines the main disadvantages of using conventional key-exchange protocols in resource-constrained environments such as UASNs, and proposes the utilization of implicit certificates and Hashed One-pass Menezes-QuVanstone (HOMQV) key-exchange protocol as an alternative. We implemented the proposed solution on several computing platforms and present the performance evaluation results in terms of computational time and communication overhead. Our analysis shows that using HOMQV in combination with Elliptic Curve Qu-Vanstone (ECQV) protocol for implicit certificate generation can significantly reduce communication and power consumption requirements compared to Diffie-Hellman (DH) protocol based on X.509 certificates.

We propose a new computational problem called the twin Diffie-Hellman problem. This problem is closely related to the usual (computational) Diffie-Hellman problem and can be used in many of the same cryptographic constructions that are based on the Diffie-Hellman problem. Moreover, the twin Diffie-Hellman problem is at least as hard as the ordinary Diffie-Hellman problem. However, we are able to show that the twin Diffie-Hellman problem remains hard, even in the presence of a decision oracle that recognizes solutions to the problem — this is a feature not enjoyed by the ordinary Diffie-Hellman problem. In particular, we show how to build a certain “trapdoor test” which allows us to effectively answer such decision oracle queries, without knowing any of the corresponding discrete logarithms. Our new techniques have many applications. As one such application, we present a new variant of ElGamal encryption with very short ciphertexts, and with a very simple and tight security proof, in the random oracle model, under the assumption that the ordinary Diffie-Hellman problem is hard. We present several other applications as well, including: a new variant of Diffie and Hellman’s non-interactive key exchange protocol; a new variant of Cramer-Shoup encryption, with a very simple proof in the standard model; a new variant of Boneh-Franklin identity-based encryption, with very short ciphertexts; a more robust version of a password-authenticated key exchange protocol of Abdalla and Pointcheval.