A Novel Algorithm for Criminal Statistical Processing

The historical transformation in the distribution of crime between towns and rural areas in the Western world between 1750 and 1950 remains a complex and debated issue. The few comparative studies on long-term crime seem to indicate a sharp decrease in urban crime, although with considerable variation in chronology and intensity. Conversely, the rapid urbanization of industrial cities was accompanied by outbreaks of violence, before declining as well. Certain types of crime are directly related to their environment, such as rural wood theft, arson, poaching, or urban street gang violence; yet most types of crime in towns and countryside share common characteristics. Accordingly, rural banditry shares many features with organized crime in the urban underworld, while the social and economic motivations behind urban riots may not differ so much from rural revolts as previously thought. A geographical history of crime should therefore consider both broader and more specific historical phenomena including the influence of war, immigration, and urban policies, as well as the definition and registration of criminal offenses by the police. Finally, in each country, crime rates were affected differently by the evolution in the relationship between state and society at the national and regional levels.

Global Crime and Justice offers a truly transnational examination of both deviance and social controls around the world. Unlike comparative textbooks detailing the criminal justice systems of a few select nations, or cataloging types of international crimes that span multiple legal jurisdictions, Global Crime and Justice provides a critical and integrated investigation into the nature of crime and how different societies react to it. The book first details various types of international crime, including genocide, war crimes, international drug and weapons smuggling, terrorism, slavery, and human trafficking. The second half covers international law, international crime control, the use of martial law, and the challenges of balancing public order with human and civil rights. Global Crime and Justice is suitable for use in criminology and criminal justice departments, as well as in political science, international relations, and global studies programs. It will appeal to all who seek an academically rigorous and comprehensive treatment of the international and transnational issues of crime and social order.

<p style="text-align:justify">The aim of this study is to examine democracy perception of classroom teachers via metaphor analysis. Study group for research is formed of 253 classroom teachers. “Democracy Metaphors Questionnaire” (DMQ) has been used in collecting data. Content analysis has been used on analysis of qualitative data of research and descriptive statistics have been used on quantitative data. The metaphors that teachers developed with a total 122 metaphor different from one another about democracy are gathered under “Indispensability”, “Equality”, “Social Order”, “Freedom”, “Endeavour”, “Power”, “Variety”, “Progression”, “Conservation”, “Personal Gains” and “Nothingness”. While first three themes under which women teachers gathered being indispensability, equality and endeavour metaphors, men teachers are gathered under indispensability, social order and freedom metaphors. Family environment and upbringing, relations with friends, culture of social environment, political activities in society and news in media tools have been the effective factors in forming democracy perception that the teachers possess.</p>

This paper aims to analyze the data of different crime types in the London area for the past three years. The data is from data.police.uk provided by City of London Police. The R language and ARIMA model were applied to forecast different crime types in London. Seven sets of stable non-white sequences were obtained by preprocessing the original data, stationary test, and non-stationary sequence differential processing. The time series analysis method was used to realize the ARIMA model modelling. After comparison, the prediction was performed with the optimal ARIMA model. In terms of anti-social behaviour (i1), public order (i9), robbery (i10), shoplifting (i11), theft from the person (i12), the predicted results show a small fluctuation. And it shows a large fluctuation trend in bicycle theft (i2), but the overall number is lower than the previous months. Violence and sexual offences (i14) show a downtrend.

This Special Issue is a collection of seven papers that seek to better our understanding of how urban mobility relates to crime patterns, and how day to day movement of people in urban spaces (urban mobility) is related to spatio-temporal patterns of crime. It focusses on urban mobility, or the dynamic movement of people in relation to crime risk. Moreover, it questions how to best measure this risk using an appropriate crime denominator. Building on the work of Sarah Boggs, this special issue contends that we need more than an appropriate denominator related to the type of crime we are measuring, for example violence based on the number of potential victims present (the exposed or ambient population), or the number of burglaries per households in an area, or the number of shoplifting offences per number of shops present. It argues that this denominator needs to be both ‘crime type’ appropriate, and to be spatially and temporally appropriate. When considering urban mobility as flows of people, the challenge is that the denominator can not be considered as a fixed or static concept, and that we need to consider the ‘dynamic denominator’ challenge. Indeed, crime hot spots which do not account for dynamic denominators may be misleading for resource prioritisation. This special issue explores a range of potential solutions to this including mobile/cell phone data, transportation data, land use data, and other possible measures to address this.

It has been for several decades now that criminological literature has addressed the issue of crime prevention in societies. Helena Kołakowska-Przełomiec argued in 1984: “While trying to formulate a definition of crime prevention, on no account should we disregard the fact that a criminal offence may be committed only by an individual who lives in a certain specific setting, in a society. Crime prevention can therefore be associated with the conditions of the external world in which a person lives, the constraints of social interactions, interpersonal relations, as well as with the person’s own identity, selfdevelopment, lifetime experience, attitudes, aspirations, and the scope of individual activities. Accordingly, crime prevention may be associated with all that effectively makes up the fabric of an outside world in which the person lives, with the overall diversity of human activity, groups of people, and individuals. Indeed, such activity may be closely linked to crime prevention, or only indirectly related to it, or it may also be very far removed from crime prevention. Crime prevention may also exist objectively, without any human activity linked to it whatsoever (e.g. in a mountainous area devoid of roads it is effectively impossible to commit traffic offences).” The author formulated the following definition: “crime prevention is construed as any and all actions which might lead, be that directly or indirectly, to inhibiting the incidence of criminality at large, of criminal offences, and the development of criminal phenomena all over the world.” Ten years later, another definition of crime prevention was proposed by Janina Czapska: “crime prevention should to be construed as all measures aimed at reducing the overall crime incidence and load, either by limiting the circumstances conducive to committing criminal offences, or by exerting an impact on a potential perpetrator, as well as on all members of a society.” In a document of 2002 promulgated by the UN Economic and Social Council, crime prevention is construed as a set of policies and measures that “seek to reduce the risk of crimes occurring, and their potential harmful effects on individuals and society, including the fear of crime.” Modern Europe is a world of people who keep migrating, moving between countries. The presence of foreign nationals (i.e. those who are not the nationals of a particular country) in each of the EU Member States is a natural phenomenon, as they are the EU citizens and the third-country nationals. Criminal offences committed by foreign nationals are also natural enough, from random offences to fully premeditated ones, from minor offences to serious crimes, from common offences to criminal offences specific to foreign nationals in a particular country and during a specific period, committed under certain social, economic and political conditions. In Poland, police crime statistics have taken due note of foreign nationals as suspects since 1984. The proportion of foreign nationals to suspects in total in the period spanning 1984–1988 ranged from 0.1% to 0.5%. This proportion increased throughout the 1990s, from 0.8 in 1991 to 1.8% in 1996, and then to 2.02% in 1997. A decrease in this proportion was noted – 1.6% in 1998, 1.3% in 2000, 0.67% in 2004, and 0.43% in 2012. Foreign nationals suspected of committing criminal offences in Poland in the first decade of the 21st century come from 61 countries. 30% of them are EU citizens. The most numerous are citizens of Germany, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic. Foreign nationals from non-EU countries constitute 70% of all foreign national suspects, among which the most numerous come from the neighbouring countries: Ukraine, Belarus, the Russian Federation and Armenia. In short, foreign nationals suspected of committing criminal offences in Poland originate from the neighbouring countries: Ukraine, Belarus, Germany, Lithuania, and Russia. The overall picture of criminal offences committed by foreign nationals in Poland in the first decade of the 21st century is as follows: a negligible share of foreign suspects in the human crime category, a high proportion in the specific offences category, i.e. driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, whereupon, in the absence of a natural person victim, the only ‘aggrieved’ party is public order, i.e. road traffic safety. The high share of foreign suspects in the offences against the credibility of documents means that foreign nationals who hold residence in Poland, or who enter Poland, make use of forged IDs or travel documents. The overall picture that emerges from the police crime statistics still needs to be supplemented by such rare events as terrorist crime, crime committed in organized groups, or hard to detect crimes, e.g. illegal cigarette or illicit drug manufacturing. In line with the definitions cited above, with regard to each particular type of criminal offence committed by foreign nationals, an appropriate strategy needs to be determined. In each individual case and for each type of crime a separate listing of crime risk factors should be compiled. Smuggling (duly registered by the Customs Service) seems one of the ‘favourite’ types of a criminal offence committed by foreign nationals in Poland (even though Polish nationals also perpetrate this kind of crime). Smuggling takes place both at border crossings and elsewhere, along usually rather desolate, woodland areas straddling a state border, not subject to heavy patrolling by border guard troops. Moving contraband across the border stands to bring substantial profits to all parties involved. In 96% of cases, the contraband commodity of choice are the tobacco products. Foreign nationals are also registered in Poland as the perpetrators of business-related crimes: criminal offences aimed at obtaining material benefits at the expense of other parties involved in business activity. Judicial statistics indicate that foreign nationals are convicted for breaching the Industrial Property Act, including its provisions pertaining to trademark protection, followed by offences under the Copyright and Related Rights Act; here, for the most part, crimes involve illicitly replicated software, music, and movies on the market. The perpetrators of these offences are mostly Bulgarian, Romanian, Ukrainian, Belarussian, Armenian, Slovakian, and Georgian citizens. In the area of business crime, organized criminal groups appear to dominate. As may be gleaned from the case records, most groups dealt with violations of the trademark protection provisions, copyright, money counterfeiting, capital fraud, including bank loan fraud, offences related to ATM cards and Internet accounts, followed by insurance fraud and the offences related to trading in liquid fuels. The groups comprised criminals from nearly 20 nationalities, mostly from Bulgaria, Lithuania, Romania, Ukraine, and Armenia, and less frequently the citizens of the UK, Vietnam, China, Moldova, and Georgia. In the period spanning 2015–2016, a brand-new type of crime was uncovered, i.e. professionally organized illicit manufacture of cigarettes in Poland. The report on the status of national security in Poland for 2014 draws attention to the involvement of foreign nationals in criminal activities. Tax fraud committed by foreign nationals from EU countries appears to be on the rise. Foreigners register business ventures in Poland and then proceed to abuse the Polish tax system with a view to benefiting from undue VAT refunds. Combating business crime, as referenced in the Report, requires fostering closer cooperation between various departments, authorities, and statutory bodies involved in preventing and combating crime. This approach has already spawned a government programme for the prevention and combating business crime for 2015–2020, in which the key principles of the actual action plan have been laid down. Research on organized crime groups, including those involving foreign nationals, reveals that all groups intended to profit from criminal activities, were managed by strong leaders, with ethnicity being of much lesser importance in their operations. They are mobile, moving both across the territory of Poland and beyond its borders. Organized crime groups involving foreign nationals are multi-disciplinary; they are involved in drug-related offences, business crime, and other types of criminal pursuits. Variability in the actual type of criminal activity pursued is always dictated by the principal objective – the achievement of material gain. Prevention and combating terrorist threats in Poland is provided for in the National Counter-Terrorism Programme for 2015–2019. There is no single system for preventing and combating crimes committed by foreign nationals, and hence we are not going to formulate its objectives here. Prevention, i.e. the identification of risk factors for criminal offences committed by foreigners, may be pursued in relation to a particular type of crime committed at any one time (types of criminal offences vary over time). Combating or controlling the criminal behaviours of foreign nationals, to express it in modern lingo, may be pursued through obtaining adequate insight into the actual aetiology of various kinds of criminal offences committed by foreign nationals, and an appropriate penal policy.

On March 6, 2007, Jean Baudrillard died in Paris at the age of 77 after a long fight with cancer. Associated with postmodern and poststructuralist theory, Baudrillard is difficult to situate in relation to traditional sociology and social theory (for earlier takes on Baudrillard, see Kellner 1989a, 1994, 1995: ch. 8; Best & Kellner 1991, 1997: ch. 3). His work combines philosophy, social theory, and an idiosyncratic cultural metaphysics that reflects on key events of phenomena of the epoch. A sharp critic of contemporary society, culture, and thought, Baudrillard is often seen as a major guru of French postmodern theory, although he can also be read as a thinker who combines theory and social and cultural criticism in original and provocative ways, and as a writer who has developed his own style and forms of writing. He was an extremely prolific author who published over 50 books and commented on some of the most salient cultural and sociological phenomena of the contemporary era, including the erasure of the distinctions of gender, race, and class that structured modern societies in a new postmodern consumer, media, and high‐tech society; the mutating roles of art and aesthetics; fundamental changes in politics, culture, and human beings; and the impact of new media, information, and cybernetic technologies on the creation of a qualitatively different social order, providing fundamental mutations of human and social life.

This paper analyzes how justice expenditure—spending on public order and safety—in Chinese counties is affected by local and national political factors. Despite the central government’s apparent concern over social order and stability, under the institutional framework of weak downward accountability and limited upward accountability local leaders are not incentivized to respond effectively to either public demand or national imperatives for public order and safety. Confirming the influence of local leaders’ political career incentives, a panel data regression analysis on a comprehensive county-level data set for the years from 1997 through 2002 suggests that the share of justice spending reaches the lowest point during a chief executive's third year in office and a party secretary's fourth year in office. In contrast, national political factors, such as the centrally mandated anti-crime campaigns or the nationally designated minority or poor counties, have no consistent effect on and could even depress local justice spending.

This chapter discusses social functions of law at the macro and micro levels. The macro functions of law cover law and public order, political order, social order, economic order, international order, and moral order. They also include the resolution of social problems, the regulation of human relationships, and the educative or ideological function of law. The micro functions of law include defining the limits of acceptable behaviour, the consequences of certain forms of behaviour, and processes for the transaction of business and other activities, as well as creating regulatory frameworks, giving authority to agents of the state to take actions against citizens, preventing the abuse of power by officials, giving power/authority to officials to assist the public, and prescribing procedures for the use of law.

UN peace operations increasingly deploy police forces and engage in policing tasks. The turn to ‘police peacekeeping’ has generally been met with enthusiasm in both academic and policy circles. Policing is often understood to provide a more civilian instrument of intervention, and rebuilding local police forces along democratic, liberal lines is seen as a prerequisite for a successful transition towards peace and stability. This book questions this optimistic reading of police peacekeeping. It demonstrates that the logic of policing leads to the depoliticization of conflict and the criminalization of those who are deemed to threaten not just public order but social order, authorizing violence against them in the name of law enforcement. The book proposes a new way of studying peace operations that focuses not on their success or failure, but on how they allow people and ideas to circulate transnationally. It shows that peace operations act as a point of cross-fertilization for the creation and transmission of policing discourses and practices globally. In so doing, these missions contribute to (re)producing social orders that are based on the exclusion of often racialized, socio-economically marginalized populations, both ‘domestically’ (in countries of intervention) and ‘internationally’ (in troop contributing countries). The book contributes to critical understandings of police power that show that police forces were never meant to protect all equally. Drawing on interpretive, feminist, and postcolonial methodologies that emphasize relations, processes, and situatedness, the book’s in-depth study of UN intervention in Haiti shows how a single site can help illuminate global processes.

This chapter examines the challenges faced by governments in enforcing public order during epidemics in pre-industrial Europe and, more specifically, in relation to plague in seventeenth-century Florence. The question of the maintenance of public order will be analysed both from the point of view of those who ran governments, and of those at the level of neighbourhood, street, and household, and how they interpreted and reacted to the massive regulation of their lives. The main theme lies, then, in the interaction of civic authority and the public, based on one of the most detailed collections of trial records relating to plague to have yet been analysed for this period.

The social order of the current system has brought an increase in the public dissents and turned to a ‘normalized sociological pathology’ of the postmodern world. The unyielding public resistance examples in different cultural geographies, which are fragmented, limited and yet significant and expanding struggles, convey the message that the global order of the Powerful has entered the age of stagnation. This article aims to shed new light on the relationship between the social protests and global order that has given rise to new identities of local and global injustice. I argue that social protests in the last years display discernible patterns of a change in cultural perceptions of the activists in different public spaces. On the one hand, this signals the emergence of a new public order in the 21st century. On the other hand, the ravages of social catastrophe shape the very dynamics of the same public culture. ‘Enduring and resisting public cultures’ is introduced in this article as a benchmark to identify ethnographic struggles of the activists for the quest of a new public space, which represents ‘Another World’.

In the progress of modernization, it is still a project to be further explored how we can establish an effective and rational public order. Non-governmental organizations are the interactive vehicles that form the part and whole system. Through an analysis of the co-existing relationship between non-governmental and governmental organizations, this study intends to examine the functions that the non-governmental organizations perform in the structuring the social order. Accordingly, we will systemize, institutionalize and structurize the corporate system. Only on the basis of the inscape of the regional social order can we find a pattern that will lead to a generally harmonious one. In this way we can get our ideas into shape how to develop the present Chinese society harmoniously.

This article primarily focuses on the survival or revival of the French concept of state of siege (état de siege) within the Belgian legal sphere. According to the reasoning of the drafters of the Belgian Constitution, this legal entity should have been abolished at the founding of the Belgian State. In practice, however, this proved not to be the case. Both jurisprudence and practical application show that the state of siege, with the army acting as enforcer of public order, remained a customary response to social unrest. Based on this observation, the article seeks to examine how the state of siege survived. The central argument is that the state of siege was never formally repealed and survived as a pragmatic and ad hoc instrument, repeatedly invoked in times of crisis. Its continued use can be explained by three interconnected factors: (1) the fragmented nature of Belgian (military) legislation, (2) a culture of pragmatic (legal) continuity, and (3) a perception of social unrest as an existential threat to the political and social order. To support this argument, several case studies were analyzed in which the state of siege was used to manage social unrest, covering the period from 1831 to 1886. The research draws on a broad range of primary sources: case-law, military doctrine, and archival materials, alongside extensive literature on military intervention in public order during the nineteenth century.

Road courtesy is traditionally based upon rules of civility between drivers or road users. This is not the case in cities of the Democratic Republic of Congo, however, where road courtesy refers to periods when, in an attempt to combat corruption and harassment, the public authorities prohibit police officers from stopping drivers in their vehicles. Contrary to what is often found in the literature, this article shows that “petty corruption” generates a certain social order in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi; the public authorities would do well to turn a blind eye to such practices, intervening solely when public order is threatened by a breakdown of relations between police and road users.