A Plan for Russia

Market Reforms in Russia - Problems and Prospects

Market reforms in Russia have been threatened in recent years by a continuing, dramatic decline in tax revenues. This article analyzes the fiscal data in search of an explanation. While part of the drop in collections can be attributed to rate changes and transitional macroeconomic dislocation, a sizable residual reflects a progressively worsening tax administration. This, in turn, is traced to perverse incentives in the system by which tax revenues are shared between central, regional, and local governments in Russia’s evolving federal system. As in other contexts, divided property rights reduce owners’ motivation to invest in a jointly‐owned asset.

Financial Regulation in the Initial Phase of Market Reforms in Russia and Its Impact on Subsequent Economic Development

On the eve of the market reforms in Russia at the beginning of the 1990s the prominent Russian television journalist organized a talk-show with the suggestive title “Do we need capitalism?” The broadcast was seen as a triumph for liberals over supposedly backward opponents of the new system. A highly regarded economist of the time explained the essence of the new “sole truthful doctrine” to viewers in popular fashion: “Imagine a small pie, cut into equal pieces. That’s socialism. Now imagine a big pie, cut into unequal pieces. Even the small pieces of the second pie are much bigger than in the first. That’s capitalism.” Another guest on the program then pointed to the simple, straightforward road to the promised consumer paradise: the state should get out of the economy. This, it was said, meant of course that the state should make way for ordinary citizens.

“The Concept of long-term socio-economic development of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020”, adopted in 2008 (hereinafter - the Concept), reasonably can be considered as one of the most significant - since the beginning of economic reforms in Russia – attempt to form an idea of the long-term prospects for socio-economic development of the country, as well as the necessary steps to ensure the stability of this development. The document is characterized by a systematic vision of the actual and perspective trends in the economic and social development of the country; the desire to use a scenario approach in setting the goals of the Concept; the intention to provide the formulated priorities with the necessary economic resources, institutional and legal innovations. Among these items of fundamental importance is the policy of developing economic and legal mechanism of federal relations and priorities’ setting for the state policy of regional development. After the Concept was adopted (this document is currently listed as valid in all databases), it was changed several times. The nature of these changes is very different, but their general vector is clearly visible: to remove from the document those benchmarks, targets, etc., which quite soon after the adoption of the document appeared to be clearly unattainable. The article discusses some of the key items of the Concept and the reasons why the document was not implemented.

SummaryThe political economy literature has put forward a multitude of hypotheses regarding the drivers of structural reforms, but few, if any, empirically robust findings have emerged thus far. To make progress, we draw a parallel with model uncertainty in the growth literature and provide a new version of the Bayesian averaging of maximum likelihood estimates (BAMLE) technique tailored to binary logit models. Relying on a new database of major past labor and product market reforms in advanced countries, we test a large set of variables for robust correlation with reform in each area. We find widespread support for the crisis‐induces‐reform hypothesis, as high unemployment and economic crises are robustly correlated to structural reforms. We also find evidence of reform convergence—that is, countries with tighter regulation are more prone to liberalize. Reforms are more likely when other countries also undertake them and when there is formal pressure to implement them. Other robust correlates are more specific to certain areas—for example, international pressure and political factors are most relevant for product market and job protection reforms, respectively.

This chapter examines how party system structures shaped capital market reforms in tandem with internal party organisations in Singapore from the late 1980s to the late 2000s. The central claim is that the highly concentrated party system and the centrally and coherently organised PAP combined to both generate strong incentives for political elites to pursue public-regarding reform policies and enable them to initiate and implement these policies decisively and resolutely. The first section briefly describes the development of policies and regulations concerning the capital market in Singapore prior to the late 1980s to provide a foundation for examining market changes and reforms over the ensuing two decades. The second section explores the process through which major market reforms were enacted from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, and the third section focuses on further and more significant reforms following the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998. The fourth and final section concludes.KeywordsCorporate GovernanceMarket ReformVeto PlayerAsian CrisisSecurity SectorThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

BACKGROUND Recent analyses of long-term trends in respirable dust and quartz concentrations from the long term monitoring program of the European Industrial Minerals Association (IMA- Europe) Dust Monitoring Program (covering the years 2000-2013) showed striking downward temporal trends in exposure which came to a halt at around the year 2009. At sites with less than 50 employees in the most affected Southern European countries temporal trends even reversed. Careful analyses and discussion with occupational health and safety representatives pointed at a direct detrimental effect of the current economic crisis on measured concentrations. This observation led us to hypothesize that similar disruptions of downward temporal trends in occupational exposures might also be visible in other large databases with longitudinal exposure measurements. METHODS Temporal time trends were estimated in two additional databases (ExpoSYN and URALASBEST) each covering more than 50 years of occupational exposure monitoring. More flexible spline analyses rather than standard log linear (multiplicative) models were used to look for reversed trends. RESULTS In all three databases macro-economic and political developments seemed to influence downward trends in occupational exposure concentrations. Effects of economic crises like those of the early 1980s, early 1990s and the most recent one as well as the period of political and economic reform in Russia were clearly visible as reduced downward or even reversed temporal trends in occupational exposure concentrations. CONCLUSIONS In exposure assessment for occupational epidemiological studies long term exposures are often modelled as log linear trends. Approaches allowing for disruptions of these trends by macro-economic and/or political developments are needed for more accurate and precise estimations of long-term exposure and will result in more reliable quantitative risk estimates.

ECONOMICS AND DEVELOPMENT Ray Bush. Economic Crisis and the Politics of Reform in Egypt. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1999. xv + 184 pp. Tables. Figures. References. Index. $55.00. Cloth. Economic Crisis and the Politics of Reform in Egypt is simply dazzling. In this book, Ray Bush provides us with an innovative approach for looking at the economic crisis not only in Egypt, but in other developing countries as well. By placing the small fanner at the core of the economic reform process, Bush has turned the neoclassical orthodox paradigm on its head. The book's six chapters critically investigate the prevailing strategies for economic liberalization in terms of the relationships between the Egyptian state, its society, and its agricultural sector. In the first, Bush introduces his main thesis, that although economic and political reforms have been necessary in Egypt, the strategy promoted by the international financial institutions (IFIs) and the Government of Egypt (GoE) is inappropriate to the needs of the country. The author then discusses the origins of Egypt's current economic crisis by tracing its history from Gamal Abdel Nasser's government (1954-70) through Anwar el-Sadat's (1970-81) to that of Hosni Mubarak (1981-present). In chapter 3, Bush assays remedies for the political economy of the country, and in the following chapter evaluates the impact of the the GoE's reforms by looking at aggregate data such as productivity levels, exports, poverty levels, and income. Next he extends his general critique by analyzing new data from the Delta governorates. Finally, in the last chapter he provides evidence to support his contention that Egypt is at a turning point in its economic crisis. Bush describes the three pillars of IFI economic orthodoxy before debunking them. The first of these is that distortions in the Egyptian economy are promoted by the dominance of an unproductive, rent-seeking state. Thus liberalization and privatization (i.e., the state's retreat from economic activity) will permit the country to discover its true comparative advantage. second, rising overall levels of welfare will offset increased inequality associated with the economic reforms. Therefore, the state's retreat from economic activity will make it possible for a productive private market structure to emerge. Third, reforms will promote a more open and transparent policy framework. For the sake of brevity, I will discuss only what I perceive to be Bush's three main counterarguments. His first major finding is that policy-makers are preoccupied with monetary aggregates of the productive economy, thereby ignoring human resources, issues dealing with the reproductive economy, and indicators of health, nutrition, and skill development. …

The political foundations of economic and financial crises have been examined solely vis-a-vis populist macroeconomic policies, but the political consequences of such economic crises have seldom been discussed in the literature. There have been ten notable political crises and six major economic crises in the last half-century of Turkish history. All political crises in Turkey involved a priori economic slowdown. Some of them even followed economic crises, especially sharp devaluations. Secondly, all political crises had social implications, as they all occurred as a result of severe welfare losses of the civilian and military bureaucracy due to inflation. Thirdly, the nature of political crises has recently changed, as they no longer involve overt military interventions. On the contrary, consecutive coups have enhanced the deepening of democracy, as there is a stronger embrace of civil democracy and hostility against the military intentions by the society. Our research demonstrates that all economic crises have occurred during populist right-wing governments and involved budget deficit problems, while only some of them also involved foreign debt crises. Naturally, all economic crises had political consequences.

By the spring of 1999, Romania was facing its deepest economic crisis since the collapse of Communism. The immediate symptoms were reflected in two consecutive years of falling gross domestic product (GDP), industrial output and investment in 1997 and 1998; and an abnormally high current account deficit in 1998 (US$3 billion) which had contributed to the run-down of reserves at the National Bank of Romania (NBR). This, combined with a bunching of debt repayments in the first half of 1999 and problems in securing credits from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), created the possibility of a default on foreign debt.1 The majority of economic or financial crises reflect a combination of short- and long-term factors, while the depth and duration of the crisis will largely depend on the latter. Although the Romanian crisis in the spring of 1999 was not as serious as that faced by Russia in August 1998 or Bulgaria in 1997, it reflected deep structural problems in the Romanian economy which will not be overcome without substantial long-term structural changes to the economic system.

Counting carbon costs

Rapid progress of the market-oriented reform in Russia has led to the emergence of urban housing markets. The intraurban spatial differentiation in market valuation of housing suggests a conceptually new insight into the internal structure of the socialist city. This paper demonstrates that apartment prices in Moscow are largely determined by accessibility to the center of the city, social status of the neighborhood residents, and proximity to certain amenities such as recreational facilities or disamenities such as noxious industries.

Economic Well‐Being and Popular Support for Market Reform in Russia

This book's basic premise is that a historical perspective may be helpful in illuminating current obstacles to economic development in Mexico. It thus looks at Mexico's present development policies and problems from a historical perspective by reviewing long-term trends in the Mexican economy and examining in particular some past episodes of radical shifts in development strategy and in the role of markets and the state. The book provides an overview of Mexico's economic development since independence that examines and compares the successive periods of stagnation and growth that alternately have characterized Mexico's economic history. It gives special attention to developments since 1940 and presents a re-evaluation of Mexico's development policies during the state-led industrialization period from 1940 to 1982 and during the more recent market reform process. This re-evaluation is critical of the dominant trend in the economic literature and, indeed, revisionist by arguing in particular that the market reforms undertaken by successive Mexican governments since 1983 have not addressed the fundamental obstacles to economic growth.