Aggregating Bipolar Opinions

Judgment aggregation is a recent theory that combines aggregation problems previously studied by social choice theory with logic. Social choice theory is a vast subject, including not only the study of preference aggregation and voting theory but also topics like social welfare and justice. Given the tight links between judgment aggregation and preference aggregation, in this first chapter we give a concise survey on some historical aspects of preference aggregation and then introduce and motivate the more recent field of judgment aggregation. The chapter builds on [Sen99, Sen86, Bla58] for the historical overview on social choice theory, and on [KS93, Kor92] for the informal introduction to judgment aggregation.

A key ingredient of computational argumentation in AI is the generation of arguments in favor of or against claims under scrutiny. In this paper we look at the complexity of argument construction and reasoning in the prominent structured formalism of assumption-based argumentation (ABA). We point out that reasoning in ABA by means of constructing an abstract argumentation framework (AF) gives rise to two main sources of complexity: (i) constructing the AF and (ii) reasoning within the constructed graph. Since both steps are intractable in general, it is no surprise that the best performing state-of-the-art ABA reasoners skip the instantiation procedure entirely and perform tasks directly on the input knowledge base. Driven by this observation, we identify and study atomic and symmetric ABA, two ABA fragments that preserve the expressive power of general ABA, and that can be utilized to have milder complexity in the first or second step. We show that using atomic ABA allows for an instantiation procedure for general ABA leading to polynomially-bounded AFs and that symmetric ABA can be used to create AFs that have mild complexity to reason on. By an experimental evaluation, we show that using the former approach with modern AF solvers can be competitive with state-of-the-art ABA solvers, improving on previous AF instantiation approaches that are hindered by intractable argument construction.

Bipolar Argumentation Frameworks (BAFs) are an important class of argumentation frameworks useful for capturing, reasoning with, and deriving conclusions from debates. They have the potential to make solid contributions to real-world multi-agent systems and human-agent interaction in domains such as legal reasoning, healthcare and politics. Despite this fact, practical systems implementing BAFs are largely lacking. In this demonstration, we provide a software system implementing novel algorithms for calculating extensions (winning sets of arguments) of BAFs. Participants in the demonstration will be able to input their own debates into our system, and watch a graphical representation of the algorithms as they process information and decide which sets of arguments are winners of the debate.

Computational social choice is a new interdisciplinary research area at the intersection of social choice theory and computer science that studies computational aspects of social choice mechanisms as well as applications of social choice ideas in the design and analysis of computing systems. Research on computational social choice now encompasses a variety of topics, including the algorithmic aspects of voting rules, computational barriers to strategic behaviour, collective decision-making in multi-agent systems, preference elicitation and communication issues in voting, fair division, computational aspects of weighted voting games, collective decision-making in combinatorial domains, logic-based formalisms for social choice problems, belief and judgement aggregation, and social software. The aim of this special issue is to build on the spectacular success of two workshops on computational social choice (COMSOC’06, Amsterdam and COMSOC’08, Liverpool), and provide a forum for reseachers in the area to present their ideas on a variety of topics. This special issue is composed of nine research articles and a short note that span a fairly wide range of issues, including voting, mechanism design, judgment aggregation, and fairness, and a similarly wide range of techniques, such as logic, experiments, and computational complexity. The paper by Agotnes, van der Hoek and Wooldridge defines a new modal logic for representing and reasoning about preference and judgment aggregation. The authors show that their logic can be used to express a variety of concepts and results from the social choice domain, including majority voting, the discursive paradox, Arrow’s theorem and Condorcet’s paradox. Baharad, Goldberger, Koppel and Nitzan propose a maximum likelihood estimation-based approach for aggregating voters’ opinions over several issues. They argue that their method is vastly superior to simple majority voting, and use both analytical and empirical evaluation to support their argument. Balan, Richards and Luke deal with the problem of selecting a sequence of actions when the actions have multiple beneficiaries. Their goal is to select the actions according to a lexicographic fairness criterion. The explore the complexity of this problem for both finite and infinite sequences of actions and present both algorithms and intractability results for this problem. The paper by Caminada and Pigozzi applies argumentation theory to judgment aggregation, and proposes aggregation operators satisfying not only the usual property of collective rationality, but another highly desirable property,

Preference aggregation and judgment aggregation are two basic research models of group decision making. And preference aggregation has been deeply studied in social choice theory. However, researches of social choice theory gradually focus on judgment aggregation which appears recently. Judgment aggregation focuses on how to aggregate many consistent logical formulas into one, from the perspective of logic. We try to start with judgment aggregation model based on logic and then explore different solutions to problem of judgment aggregation.

The study of computational models for argumentation is a vibrant area of artificial intelligence and, in particular, knowledge representation and reasoning research. Arguments most often have an intrinsic structure made explicit through derivations from more basic structures. Computational models for structured argumentation enable making the internal structure of arguments explicit. Assumption-based argumentation (ABA) is a central structured formalism for argumentation in AI. In this article, we make both algorithmic and complexity-theoretic advances in the study of ABA. In terms of algorithms, we propose a new approach to reasoning in a commonly studied fragment of ABA (namely the logic programming fragment) with and without preferences. While previous approaches to reasoning over ABA frameworks apply either specialized algorithms or translate ABA reasoning to reasoning over abstract argumentation frameworks, we develop a direct declarative approach to ABA reasoning by encoding ABA reasoning tasks in answer set programming. We show via an extensive empirical evaluation that our approach significantly improves on the empirical performance of current ABA reasoning systems. In terms of computational complexity, while the complexity of reasoning over ABA frameworks is well-understood, the complexity of reasoning in the ABA+ formalism integrating preferences into ABA is currently not fully established. Towards bridging this gap, our results suggest that the integration of preferential information into ABA via so-called reverse attacks results in increased problem complexity for several central argumentation semantics.

The problem ofjustifying democracy arises when a society sees the need for cooperative, collective action. Collective action may be needed to solve coordination problems, public goods problems, Prisoner's Dilemmas, and other structural problems of human interaction or perhaps to realize common ideals of justice in concrete political institutions. Once the need for collective action is established, one must ask how the goals of a cooperative endeavor are to be secured. Cooperation requires that individuals, at least over a specified range of activity, pursue a joint strategy. To assure voluntary compliance in a joint venture, cooperation must be to each person's advantage. However, each person may have an incentive to induce others to cooperate and to defect from the joint strategy in the hope of enjoying the fruits of cooperation without incurring the opportunity costs of compliance. This is the essence of the Prisoner's Dilemma, and considerations of this sort suggest that if collective action is to succeed, policies or strategies formed collectively must be coercively enforceable. Coercion, however, requires justification. Because solving the problem of rational noncompliance requires that collective decisions be coercively enforceable, the rules by which collective decisions are reached require justification. Douglas Rae neatly puts the problem of justification that emerges when political solutions are coercively enforceable as follows: "Once a political community has decided which of its members are to participate directly in the making of collective policy, an important question remains: 'How many of them must agree before a policy is imposed on the community?"" This is essentially the question to which the principle of democratic rule provides an answer: by what process are collective decisions to be made? Answering Rae's question requires a normative framework. We could say that a procedure for making collective decisions is justified if and

We explore how judgment aggregation and belief merging in the framework of fuzzy logic can help resolve the “Doctrinal Paradox.” We also illustrate the use of fuzzy aggregation functions in social choice theory.

We introduce Incomplete Bipolar Argumentation Frameworks (iBAFs), the extension of Dung’s Abstract Argumentation Frameworks (AAFs) allowing the simultaneous presence of supports (borrowed from BAFs – Bipolar AAFs) and of uncertain elements of the argumentation graph (borrowed from iAAFs – incomplete AAFs). We investigate the computational complexity of verification problem (under the possible perspective) and the acceptance problem, by studying its sensitivity to the semantics of supports and the semantics of extensions. On the one hand, we show that adding supports on top of incompleteness does not affect the complexity of the acceptance. On the other hand, surprisingly, we show that the joint use of bipolarity and incompleteness has a deep impact on the complexity of the verification: for the semantics under which the verification over AAFs is polynomial-time solvable, although moving from AAFs to BAFs or to iAAFs does not change the complexity, the complexity of the verification over iBAFs may increase up to NP-complete.

Collective decision making is the process of mapping the individual views of several individual agents into a joint decision. The need for collective decision making mechanisms is abundant, not just in the realm of politics, but also for a wide range of scientific and technological applications. These include, for instance, logistics, grid computing, and recommender systems. The alternatives to be decided upon often have a combinatorial structure: an alternative is characterised by a tuple of variables, each ranging over a finite domain. Classical approaches to collective decision making, developed in social choice theory, do not take the computational limitations induced by the combinatorial nature of the problem into account. For instance, if we are asked to elect a committee consisting of k representatives, choosing from a pool of n candidates, then we are in fact faced with a social choice problem with $(^n_k)$ alternatives. Asking each voter for their full preferences over these $(^n_k)$ alternatives may not be feasible in practice. Similarly, if we have to choose between accepting or rejecting each of n different propositions, then we are dealing with a social choice problem with 2 n possible outcomes. In this talk I will report on a number of recent developments in the area of collective decision making in combinatorial domains. This includes the study of languages for the compact representation of preferences [2,4], the design of voting rules for multi-issue elections [1], and the analysis of the computational complexity of decision problems arising in judgment aggregation [3].

Neural language models (NLMs) are susceptible to producing inconsistent output. This paper proposes a new diagnosis as well as a novel remedy for NLMs' incoherence. We train NLMs on synthetic text corpora that are created by simulating text production in a society. For diagnostic purposes, we explicitly model the individual belief systems of artificial agents (authors) who produce corpus texts. NLMs, trained on those texts, can be shown to aggregate the judgments of individual authors during pre-training according to sentence-wise vote ratios (roughly, reporting frequencies), which inevitably leads to so-called discursive dilemmas: aggregate judgments are inconsistent even though all individual belief states are consistent. As a remedy for such inconsistencies, we develop a self-training procedure—inspired by the concept of reflective equilibrium—that effectively reduces the extent of logical incoherence in a model's belief system, corrects global mis-confidence, and eventually allows the model to settle on a new, epistemically superior belief state. Thus, social choice theory helps to understand why NLMs are prone to produce inconsistencies; epistemology suggests how to get rid of them.

This is an advance summary of a forthcoming article in the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Please check back later for the full article.Narrowly understood, social choice theory is a specialized branch of applied logic and mathematics that analyzes abstract objects called preference aggregation functions, social welfare functions, and social choice functions. But more broadly, social choice theory identifies, analyzes, and evaluates rules that may be used to make collective decisions. So understood, social choice is a subfield of the social sciences that examines what may be called “voting rules” of various sorts. While social choice theory typically assumes a finite set of alternatives over which voter preferences are unrestricted, the spatial model of social choice assumes that policy alternatives can be represented by points in a space of one or more dimensions, and that voters have preferences that are plausibly shaped by this spatial structure.Social choice theory has considerable relevance for the study of legislative (as well as electoral) institutions. The concepts and tools of social choice theory make possible formal descriptions of legislative institutions such as bicameralism, parliamentary voting procedures, effects of decision rules (e.g., supramajority vs. simple majority rule and executive veto rules), sincere vs. strategic voting by legislators, agenda control, and other parliamentary maneuvers. Spatial models of social choice further enrich this analysis and raise additional questions regarding policy stability and change. Spatial models are used increasingly to guide empirical research on legislative institutions and processes.

In recent years, judgement aggregation has emerged as an important area of social choice theory. Judgement aggregation is concerned with aggregating sets of individual judgements over logically connected propositions into a set of collective judgements. It has been shown that even seemingly weak conditions on the aggregation function make it impossible to find functions that produce rational collective judgements from all possible rational individual judgements. This implies that the step from individual judgements to collective judgements requires trade-offs between different desiderata, such as universal domain, rationality, epistemological quality, and unbiasedness. The typical application for judgement aggregation is the problem of group decision making. Juries and expert committees are the stock examples. However, the relevance of judgement aggregation goes beyond these cases. In this survey, I review some core results in the field of judgement aggregation and social epistemology and discuss their implications for the analysis of distributed thinking.

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We develop a method of reasoning using an incrementally constructed bipolar argumentation framework (BAF) aiming to apply computational argumentation to legal reasoning. A BAF that explains the judgment of a certain case is constructed based on the user’s knowledge and recognition. More specifically, a set of effective laws are derived as the conclusions from evidential facts recognized by the user, in a bottom-up manner; conversely, the evidences required to derive a new conclusion are identified if certain conditions are added, in a top-down manner. The BAF is incrementally constructed by repeated exercise of this bidirectional reasoning. The method provides support for those who are not familiar with the law, so that they can understand the judgment process and identify strategies that might allow them to win their case.