APPENDICE V: A propos de la locution Πληρώσας τòν περί τινoς λóγoν...

This article argues for an emendation in Aristotle's Metaphysics A 10, 993a13–15. The emendation is based on a hitherto overlooked reading preserved in Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary on A 7. First, the article problematizes the reading of the Metaphysics manuscripts in terms of syntax, diction and content. Second, it shows that Alexander's reading is free of all three problems. Third, it argues for the originality of Alexander's reading according to the principle utrum in alterum abiturum erat? and based on the fact that the new reading reveals a subtle didactic link between A 7 and A 10 that sheds new light on the argumentative architecture of Metaphysics Book A.

In this article, I argue that Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas read a certain passage of Aristotle's Metaphysics on the nature of metaphysical curiosity in a way that is inconsistent with the earlier reading of the same passage by Alexander of Aphrodisias. The passage has to do with Aristotle's use of mechanical automata as a metaphor for kinetic mimesis in his metaphysics. The result of the variant reading of the passage in question is that these Scholastic readings emphasize universal causality as a vehicle of “wonder banishment” in metaphysics at the expense of recognizing the key metaphysical principle that Aristotle is suggesting. Such readings actually turn out to be difficult to maintain with the example of mechanical automata that Aristotle employs. I argue that the absence of the availability of Alexander's commentary to Albert and Aquinas contributes to their variant and inconsistent reading. There are three main parts and a conclusion. Part I discusses the passage from Aristotle's Metaphysics in question, which I call the thaumata passage, as well as Alexander's commentary on it. Part II discusses the unavailability of Alexander's commentary to Albert, Aquinas and their predecessors. Part III discusses the variant scholastic readings of the thaumata passage and how these readings, which take Aristotle's mechanical automata as chance occurrences result in an emphasis on wonder banishment through universal causal reasoning that is inconsistent with the example Aristotle uses in the thaumata passage. By way of conclusion I suggest that even had Alexander's commentary been available to Aquinas, he would have understood the passage as more akin to remarks on magic than to metaphysics.

Preface. List of Abbreviations and a Note on the Quotation and Translation. Introduction. Rene Descartes and Modern European Mathematics. 1: The Formation of Descartes's Mathematical Thought. 1. Descartes and Jesuit Mathematical Education. 1. Descartes and the Jesuit College of La Fleche. 2. The Curriculum at La Fleche. 3. Mathematical Studies in the Ratio Studiorum 4. Motives for the Teaching of Mathematics in the Jesuit Colleges. 2: The Mathematical Thought of Christoph Clavius. 1. Descartes and Clavius. 2. The Philosophy of Mathematics of Clavius. 3. Pappus in the Works of Clavius. 4. Diophantus in the Works of Clavius. 5. Descartes's Mathematical Background before the Encounter with Beeckman. 3: The First Attempt at Reforming Mathematics. 1. 'An Entirely New Science': The Idea for the Unification of Arithmetic and Geometry. 2. The Mathematics in the Cogitationes privatae. 3. The De Solidorum Elementis. 4. Descartes's Mathematical and Philosophical Dream of 1619. 4: The Mathematical Background of the Regulae Ad Directionem Ingenii. 1. The Old Algebra: The First Fruit of 'An Entirely New Science'. 2. The Mathematics in the Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii. 3. Mathesis Universalis. 5. The Geometrieof 1637. 1. The Pappus Problem. 2. The Composition of the Geometrie. 3. Descartes's Place in the Formative Period of the Modern Analytic Tradition. 4. Beyond Cartesian Mathematics. Interim Consideration. Descartes and the Beginnings ofMathematicism in Modern Thought. II: The Concept of 'Mathesis Universalis' in Historical Perspective. 6. 'Universal Mathematics' In Aristotle. 1. Aristotle's Metaphysics and Posterior Analytics. 2. Greek Commentators: Alexander of Aphrodisias and Asclepius of Tralles. 3. Medieval Commentators: Ibn Rushd (Averroes), Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and the Scotist Antonius Andreae. 4. Renaissance Commentators: Agostino Nifo and Pedro da Fonseca. 5. The Status of Mathematics in the Aristotelian Scheme of Learning. 7: 'Mathesis Universalis' in the Sixteenth Century. 1. Proclus Diadochus and Francesco Barozzi. 2. Adriaan van Roomen. 8: 'Mathesis Universalis' in the Seventeenth Century. 1. Reviewing Descartes's Concept of 'Mathesis Universalis' from His Philosophy of Mathematics. 2. The Leibnizian Synthesis. Conclusion: Descartes and the Modern Scheme of Learning. Bibliography. Indices. Name Index. Subject Index. Treatise Index.

This volume deals with the rapports among the extant Greek commentaries on Aristotle's Metaphysics: Alexander of Aphrodisias, Syrianus, Asclepius, Ps. Alexander. It traces the precise map of these texts and provides a starting point for any future research in the field.

Aristotle's account of place in terms of an innermost limit of a containing body was to generate serious discussion and controversy among Aristotle's later commentators, especially when it was applied to the cosmos as a whole. The problem was that since there is nothing outside of the cosmos that could contain it, the cosmos apparently could not have a place according to Aristotle's definition; however, if the cosmos does not have a place, then it is not clear that it could move, but it was thought to move, namely, in its daily revolution, which was viewed as a kind of natural locomotion and so required the cosmos to have a place. The study briefly outlines Aristotle's account of place and then considers its fate, particularly with respect to the cosmos and its motion, at the hands of later commentators. To this end, it begins with Theophrastus' puzzles concerning Aristotle's account of place, and how later Greek commentators, such as Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius and others, attempted to address these problems in what can only be described as ad hoc ways. It then considers Philoponus' exploitation of these problems as a means to replace Aristotle's account of place with his own account of place understood in terms of extension. The study concludes with the Arabic Neoplatonizing Aristotelian Avicenna and his novel introduction of a new category of motion, namely, motion in the category of position. Briefly, Avicenna denies that the cosmos has a place, and so claims that it moves not with respect to place, but with respect to position.