Barriers to School Library Development

Povijest školskih knjižnica u Dalmaciji počinje u 19. st., kada se one formiraju kao diferencirani i definirani subjekti u okviru sustava obrazovanja u Austro-Ugarskoj Monarhiji. U ovom je radu opisano stanje dalmatinskog pučkog školstva do njegove reforme 1869. i institucionalni okvir djelovanja školskih knjižnica pučkih škola nakon reforme, te je konceptualizirana društvena dimenzija njihova djelovanja. Prikazan je društveni, kulturološki i gospodarski sklop u kojemu su provođene reforme, zakoni i pravilnici kojima je uređen rad knjianica, te se pokušalo procijeniti kulturno stanje na dalmatinskom selu prije i nakon reforme. Pošlo se od teze da je škola, a u sklopu nje i školska knjižnica, modernizacijska ustanova. Kao takva, školska je knjižnica osim obrazovnih i odgojnih imala i šire zadaće koje je definiraju u sklopu modernizacijske tranzicije Dalmacije u drugoj polovici 19. stoljeća. Podloga za takav pristup bila je analiza izabranih referentnih tekstova u stručnoj i drugoj periodici i literatura koja se bavi poviješću školstva u Dalmaciji.O reformi pučkog školstva u Dalmaciji objavljeni su mnogi radovi, ali se organizaciji i djelovanju školskih knjižnica, posebice knjižnica pučkih škola, pridavalo malo pozornosti. Ovaj se rad bavi upravo institucionalnim okvirima izgradnje sustava i uspostave školskih knjižnica u Dalmaciji u sklopu reforme obrazovanja koju je Austro- -Ugarska Monarhija provela u drugoj polovici 19. st., tj. zakonskim i organizacijskim okvirima te konceptualizacijom njihova djelovanja u kontekstu tadašnjih socijalnih prilika.

The “Fiske Report” is the popular title for a study conducted in the late 1950s under the auspices of the University of California School of Librarianship with the financial support of the Fund for the Republic, a liberal philanthropic organization. The intended focus was the practice of book selection in school and public libraries, but the key concern that emerged from the study was the practice within the field of “self-censorship.” The period of study ranged from 1956 to 1958, with the final report published in 1959. A symposium in 1958 to investigate the social influences on libraries identified the primary cause of the censorious practices as the ubiquitous female gender of the librarians. Issues the research participants raised related to education for and development of professionalism within the field of practice received cursory attention, and the opportunity to engage the question of the social roles of librarianship remained unaddressed.

The National Library of Indonesia has made a revolution in library development, but not all types of libraries in Indonesia have followed suit. Until now, the results of library development both in terms of quality and quantity have not been optimal. This can be seen in the gap between the number of accredited and unaccredited libraries. The purpose of this study was determine the strategy of the National Library of Indonesia in fostering and developing public libraries, special libraries, school libraries and university libraries in Indonesia. This research method uses qualitative research with a descriptive approach. Data collection techniques using interviews, observation, and literature study. This study examines the strategy of library development in Indonesia is presented in the form of a description or narrative. The development function of the National Library of Indonesia by the work unit of the Public and Special Library Development Center (PPPUK) and the School and College Library Development Center (P3SMPT) with programs are in accordance with their duties and functions as regulators, motivators, and evaluators

The importance of developing and maintaining a regular and systematic collaboration between public libraries and school libraries is established. This relationship is crucial in Spain because of the precarious situation of school libraries. School libraries dedicate major efforts to reading promotion programs, therefore public libraries can collaborate with school libraries in order to promote information literacy programs. An example of this kind of collaboration is the program developed by the Fundación Germán Sánchez Ruipérez, “Biblioteca-Escuela” [Library-School]. Through this program, the Fundación Germán Sánchez Ruipérez works regularly with schools from the city and province of Salamanca to encourage and promote the projects that support teacher’s work and information literacy.

The paper discusses the attitudes of teacher librarians in government schools in Sydney towards cooperation with public libraries and towards a sensible delineation of school and public library roles. Six case studies, based upon interviews conducted by the author, are presented. It is suggested that teacher librarians would like to cooperate, particularly with other school libraries, but that they need greater administrative support and leadership in order to do so. They regard cooperation with public libraries as a low priority, and see it mainly in terms of the public library supplementing the school library's collections. They rarely regard public librarians as colleagues sharing common professional goals.

School libraries are the weakest part of the Italian library system. They do not exist as institutions; likewise, there are no professionals to manage them. Most school libraries have poor or outdated collections, scarce opening hours, and unqualified personnel. The few active school libraries are managed by enlightened headmasters and operated by volunteers; in 1999 and 2000, two-fixed term projects funded their promotion and development. The factors that hinder the development of school libraries are: no institutional recognition of school libraries and of the professionals that should be in charge; no stable budgeting; no perception of the educational role of the library by teachers themselves, let alone in curricula. A bill under way, a new project aimed at subsidizing innovative school libraries over time and a plan for more comprehensive teacher training may produce some change.

Many U.S. teens spend hours each day communicating with friends via social technologies like Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and Flickr. To develop a better understanding of the state of library support of teens' social technology practices, we are conducting a national survey of a representative sample of 750 public and 750 school libraries in the United States about their current policies and social media strategies. Preliminary results indicate that public and school libraries' use of social media differ in terms of policy and strategies, and that rather than enabling libraries to harness the power of social networking tools, library policies often serve as use barriers.

Although the roots of the modern school library lie in the past, the movement is rightly considered a twentieth century development of four stages: first, the initial phase which was limited fairly well to ideas such as the one expressed by Benjamin Franklin in 1743 when he proposed the establishment of an academy that would be equipped with a library. Second, a limited amount of concrete evidence of interested citizens resulted in the establishment of a few school libraries that were regarded primarily as depositories for certain volumes, and were under the supervision of a school custodian or clerk. This period began in the middle 1830's and continued until the mid1870's, and featured the rise of school district libraries. Third, during this stage the school library came to be looked upon as an aid in classroom instruction as well as a source for leisure-time reading. A professional librarian was provided, though she was not likely to possess the qualifications of a classroom teacher. Fourth, this stage has seen the school library come to be regarded second only to the teacher as the really important feature of the school. In addition to being a person trained in her profession, the librarian of today is likely to be a qualified teacher, too, capable of instructing not only students but other teachers as well.

Information professionals in a globalized world: Kosova libraries: Where practical steps are most needed

The Mission of "Little Star":Juana Manrique de Lara's Contributions to Mexican Librarianship Phillip Jones (bio) In the wake of the Mexican Revolution and after a year studying library science in the United States, Juana Manrique de Lara returned to Mexico City to begin work as library inspector for the Federal District. The story of her life and career in public and children's library service and library education is an historical narrative of both her emerging profession and her nation. This study focuses on Manrique de Lara's formative years (1899–1925) as she acquired an education and began her life's work in the midst of Mexico's prolonged civil war and subsequent reconstruction. Foremost, this study is a tribute, intended to share what too few librarians, even in Mexico, know: Juana Manrique de Lara helped establish librarianship in Mexico and passed her enthusiasm for the profession to a generation of librarians. Every society of the West today needs a certain number of doctors, magistrates, soldiers, and librarians—to cure their citizens when sick, to administer justice to them, to defend them, and to make them read. —José Ortega y Gasset, "Misión del bibliotecario" You have no idea of the enthusiasm I had, the love I felt for my profession. Indeed, it was my life, and they paid me. —Estela Morales Campos, "Entrevista: Juana Manrique de Lara" In the summer of 1924 and in the wake of the Mexican Revolution, twenty-seven-year-old Juana Manrique de Lara returned to Mexico City fresh from a year of study at the Library School of the New York Public Library to begin work as inspectora de bibliotecas (library inspector) for the Federal District. Manrique de Lara's mission, so well articulated over the course of her nearly forty-year career, was to recognize and respond to the needs of Mexicans of all ages for reading and for public libraries. In the midst of civil war she acquired an education, forged a career, and [End Page 469] Click for larger view View full resolution Figure 1. Juana Manrique de Lara, first professional librarian of the Departamento de Bibliotecas. In Estela Morales Campos, Educación bibliotecológica en México, 1915–1954 (Mexico City: UNAM, 1988), 97. made lasting contributions to librarianship in her homeland. The depth and reach of Manrique de Lara's work are reflected in her professional passions, which first encompassed children's library service, expanded to public library management, and then found tandem expression in teaching library education and as a government-appointed library consultant. Remarkably, as a young professional she succeeded by both conforming to and defying bureaucratic practice to bring children's library service, public libraries, and library education to the federal government's attention in the midst of and following the Mexican Revolution. There is very little scholarship that mentions Manrique de Lara and even less that examines her life and work in any depth. Accordingly, piecing together Manrique de Lara's early life and career is a challenging task. To do so, one must draw from a limited number of articles or sections of monographs, a single interview, contemporaneous government sources, and Manrique de Lara's own writings, almost all of which are Spanish-language materials published in Mexico and found in few public, university, or research libraries across North America. The foremost scholarship on Manrique de Lara is the work of Mexican library historian Martha Alicia Añorve Guillén, whose master's thesis led to two published articles on Manrique de Lara's contributions to the federal [End Page 470] government's library programs and to children's library services during the 1920s. Her conclusion, based on close comparisons of Manrique de Lara's early articles and Secretaría de Educación Pública (SEP) documents, is that although no official attribution was ever made, we can infer that the SEP heard and incorporated Manrique de Lara's suggestions into its now-landmark library planning between 1920 and 1924.1 Ample, yet not abundant in number, Manrique de Lara's own writings comprise the most compelling testament to her life, work, and ideas. With the exception of children's stories...

Purpose – The purpose of this article is to determine the types of collaborative activities public youth services and school librarians in rural locations engage in and to ascertain whether there are methods that youth service librarians believe can be employed to improve collaborative activities with public school librarians. Design/methodology/approach – A mixed method design was implemented with an online self-administered survey. The survey contained open and closed-ended questions. Findings – The findings indicate that many public librarians serving youth in rural locations find it important to collaborate with school librarians. Yet, they struggle to build strong collaborative relationships. Factors such as time, a lack of school librarian administrative support, and a lack of understanding about the roles of school librarians and public librarians, are collaborative barriers. Research limitations/implications – The study was limited to a purposive sample of 80 public librarians serving youth in rural areas in the United States. Practical implications – Librarianship training programs can help school librarians and youth services librarians learn how to form collaborative partnerships through mentorship programs, requiring pre-service school and youth services librarians to collaborate on projects, and educating them about the similarities in their goals. School and public librarians can also benefit from training to teach them how to build community partnerships. Originality/value – The results provide evidence that public librarians serving youth in rural areas favor building stronger collaborative relationships with school librarians. Building these relationships can improve the quality of education for youth in these locations. This article also includes proposed strategies for improving these relationships.

A survey of teachers' perceptions of school libraries was conducted in 1998 in Ohta-ku in Tokyo, Japan and in the Honolulu District in Hawaii, USA. The results were compared to find similarities and differences and to examine possible influences on the development of school libraries in these locations. Most survey respondents in Ohta-ku and Honolulu acknowledged the importance of the pedagogical role of school libraries and school librarians. Teachers in Honolulu had higher expectations of service from school librarians than did teachers in Ohta-ku. This result was probably due to differences in policy and in the availability of trained school library personnel. There were some other interesting differences between the survey responses of teachers from Ohta-ku and Honolulu, probably because of major differences in the nature of school library development in the two areas.

Fertility decline in most countries of sub-Saharan Africa has thus far started later and proceeded more slowly than in countries in Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean undergoing the transition in fertility since the 1950s from high levels to near-replacement or even below-replacement levels (Bongaarts and Casterline 2013). Yet there is considerable variation among countries in sub-Saharan Africa: in the duration and magnitude of fertility decline, whether stalls in fertility decline have occurred, shifts in the timing of births, and even the economic and population subgroups that have led declines in family size (Caldwell, Orubuloye, and Caldwell 1992; Bongaarts and Casterline 2013; Cleland, Onuoha, and Timæus 1994; Cohen 1998; Ezeh, Mberu, and Emina 2009; Garenne 2008; Kirk and Pillet 1998; Rossier, Corker, and Schoumaker 2015; Timæus and Moultrie 2008). With current fertility estimated at 5.1 births per woman in the region and 19 countries in sub-Saharan Africa at or above that level and another 21 countries with at least four births per woman on average (United Nations 2015a), the pathways that future fertility takes will significantly determine population growth and age structure shifts not only in the region, but increasingly for the world. Sub-Saharan Africa is projected to grow from 840 million people in 2010 to nearly 1.4 billion in 2030 (United Nations 2015a). Above-replacement fertility is projected to account for 61 percent of this population increase from 2010 to 2030 compared to 4 percent from mortality reduction, 37 percent from a young age structure in 2010 (population momentum), and a small negative contribution from migration (United Nations 2015b). These projections draw on the United Nations medium variant and do not take into account the uncertainty around current and future fertility levels, uncertainty that only increases the farther the projection period extends. For high-fertility countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the wide uncertainty around where fertility is headed can result in substantial differences in population projections (Ezeh, Mberu, and Emina 2009; Fuchs and Goujon 2014; Gerland et al. 2014). Beyond population numbers alone, the uncertainty about fertility decline also bears on policy-relevant questions such as the degree to which the region may realize a demographic dividend (e.g., how fast the shift will occur toward a higher ratio of working-age population to non-working-age population and the consequent effects on economic growth) (Bloom et al. 2013) or the extent to which greenhouse gas emissions might be reduced by slowing population growth (O'Neill et al. 2010). Earlier reviews of the fertility transitions in sub-Saharan Africa through the 1980s and 1990s showed fertility declines underway in most countries and particularly rapid declines in several countries in Eastern Africa (Kenya, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe) and Southern Africa (Botswana and South Africa) (Cleland, Onuoha, and Timæus 1994; Cohen 1998; Kirk and Pillet 1998). Subsequent survey data suggested an apparent slowdown in the pace of fertility decline in more than ten sub-Saharan African countries (Bongaarts 2008). Further analyses of the data indicated far fewer stalls in fertility decline had in fact occurred in the region, with evidence strongly supportive of stalls in Kenya and Rwanda, and the stalls that do occur have been of relatively short duration (Garenne 2011; Machiyama 2010; Schoumaker 2009, 2014). Most countries in sub-Saharan Africa still lack complete and accurate vital registration data on births, so these and other analyses of fertility trends will continue to rely heavily on survey data and require reconciling estimates from different sources (Alkema et al. 2012; United Nations 2015c). Our aim in this chapter is to provide an updated and concise description of the diversity of fertility decline patterns among countries1 in sub-Saharan Africa, drawing on the latest series of fertility estimates that take into account many different data sources and that are harmonized with other demographic components (United Nations 2015d). We focus on the level of fertility prior to the start of fertility decline, the time period of the fertility transition, and the estimated pace of decline. We also explore the implications of different fertility decline patterns for future fertility and population projections in the region. We draw on the distinct patterns of fertility decline among countries worldwide that are advanced in (or have completed) their first fertility transition to construct probabilistic fertility and population projections for sub-Saharan African countries. The illustrative comparisons of projections highlight the demographic impact if future fertility decline in sub-Saharan countries were to accelerate and follow the rapid pace of decline already experienced by a diverse group of countries. The UN Population Division publishes estimates and projections of period total fertility rates in World Population Prospects (WPP) every two years. The estimates of total fertility presented in this chapter are from the 2015 Revision and are for five-year time periods for countries or areas with 90,000 persons or more in 2015 (United Nations 2015a). The most recent data underlying the total fertility estimates from the 2015 Revision for 50 sub-Saharan African countries2 (United Nations 2015c) are from the period 2013–2014 for 14 countries, 2010–2012 for 30 countries, and 2005–2009 for six countries. A common challenge in estimating total fertility over time, especially for countries without accurate or complete vital registration data,3 is that estimates vary across data sources and by the methodology used to derive those estimates. Schoumaker (2014) showed that the underlying data from standardized, high-quality surveys such as the Demographic and Health Surveys vary considerably within and across countries, yielding total fertility estimates from recent fertility data of good quality (e.g., Gabon, Lesotho, Namibia, and Zimbabwe) and of poor quality (e.g., Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, and Uganda). Total fertility estimates based on births in the last three years tend to be under-estimated by 10 percent or more in most of the surveys with poor quality fertility data from retrospective birth histories. Figure 1 illustrates the variation in total fertility estimates based on survey data and estimation methods (direct methods (D) and cohort-completed (C) fertility) for Nigeria for the period 1985 to 2015. The thick lines show the total fertility estimates from the 2010, 2012, and 2015 Revisions of WPP. Given new data from the 2008 DHS and other surveys, total fertility in the 2012 Revision was re-estimated at a higher level than the 2010 Revision beginning in the mid-1980s, resulting in almost half a birth per woman difference in the 2005–2010 period. The 2015 Revision used new data from the 2013 Demographic and Health Survey. The 2013 survey estimates highlight a recurring pattern in which fertility estimates based on a recent reference period are consistently lower than fertility estimates from reconstructed birth histories for the same time point. Looking only at fertility estimates from a three-year reference period, the 2013 DHS shows a decline in total fertility to 5.5 births per woman from a stalling pattern of 5.7 births per woman in the 2003 and 2008 DHS. Yet the absolute differences are large between these three-year reference period estimates and those for the same time point from the reconstructed birth histories: about half a birth difference in the mid-2000s (comparing the 2008 and 2013 survey estimates) and about one birth difference in the early 2000s (comparing the 2003 survey estimate to those from the 2008 and 2013 surveys). Estimates of the total fertility rate for Nigeria 1985–2015 based on various data sources and estimation methods, and WPP estimates from the 2010, 2012, and 2015 Revisions NOTES: DHS = Demographic and Health Survey; MICS = Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey; MIS = Malaria Indicator Survey. (C) refers to cohort completed fertility (i.e., average number of children ever born) for women aged 40–44 and 45–49 at the date of the survey and backdated using their mean age of childbearing. (D) refers to direct fertility estimates based on maternity histories or recent births in the 12 or 24 months preceding the survey. SOURCES: Federal Office of Statistics of Nigeria (1992); National Bureau of Statistics (2008, 2012); National Population Commission (2000, 2002, 2004, 2009, 2012, 2014). WPP fertility estimates consider as many types and sources of empirical estimates as possible, including retrospective birth histories and direct and indirect fertility estimates (Gerland 2014). The 2015 Revision updated all total fertility estimates taking into account new data and the inconsistencies among estimates. Moreover, total fertility estimates are derived to ensure as much internal consistency as possible with all other demographic components and intercensal cohorts enumerated in successive censuses (United Nations 2015d). The advantages of this approach are that the estimates are internally consistent within a country over time and with respect to other related demographic information. A disadvantage is that the estimates can depart from a country's official estimates of fertility. Figure 2 shows the estimated trends in period total fertility for sub-regions of sub-Saharan Africa from 1950 to 2015. It was high (above six births per woman) in all sub-regions in 1950–1955. Fertility remained high in Eastern and Western Africa until the 1980s, after which it began a slow decline to 4.9 births per woman in Eastern Africa and 5.5 in Western Africa in 2010–2015. Fertility in Middle Africa began to decline a decade later and more slowly, reaching 5.8 births per woman in 2010–2015. Southern Africa departed from the overall trends with a decline beginning in the 1950s and dropping below three births per woman in the 2000s. The 2010–2015 estimate of 2.5 births per woman in Southern Africa is about half the total fertility level in Eastern, Middle, and Western Africa. Sub-regional trends in total fertility, sub-Saharan Africa, 1950–2015 SOURCE: United Nations 2015a The sub-regional fertility levels mask diverse levels among countries. Figure 3 shows country-specific total fertility levels in 2010–2015. Among the 16 countries in Western Africa, total fertility ranged from 2.4 in Cabo Verde to 7.6 in Niger. One additional country had a fertility level of more than six births per woman (Mali), six countries had fertility between five and six births per woman (Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea, Nigeria, and Senegal), and seven had fertility between four and five births per woman. Total fertility levels in countries in Africa, 2010–2015 SOURCE: United Nations 2015a. Total fertility levels ranged even more widely among the 20 countries in Eastern Africa, from 1.5 in Mauritius to 6.6 in Somalia. One additional country in Eastern Africa still had a fertility level above six in 2010–2015 (Burundi) and six countries had fertility between five and six births per woman (Malawi, Mozambique, South Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zambia). Eight countries had fertility levels between four and five births per woman. The lowest levels of fertility were in Djibouti (3.3 births per woman) and in the small island countries of Mauritius, Réunion, and Seychelles (less than three births per woman). The nine countries of Middle Africa all had fertility levels at or above four children per woman. In Angola, Chad, and DR Congo, fertility levels were six or more births per woman, and in the remaining six countries fertility levels were between four and five births per woman. While fertility in Southern Africa is largely dominated by South Africa's pattern, the range in fertility among the five countries in the sub-region is narrow, from 2.4 births per woman in South Africa to 3.6 in Namibia. Both Botswana and South Africa now have fertility levels below three births per woman. The start of the fertility transition also varies widely across sub-Saharan Africa. We analyze when and at what level of fertility a country experienced a maximum total fertility level before the onset of fertility decline. This maximum is defined as the most recent five-year time period where total fertility is within half a child of the overall maximum fertility in the country over the 1950–2015 estimation period, thus excluding random fluctuations in pre-transition fertility (Alkema et al. 2011). Figure 4 shows the diversity across countries and within sub-regions in the level and time period of the maximum fertility level before the onset of fertility decline, as assessed in the 2015 Revision. By the late 1970s, 29 sub-Saharan countries were on the verge of a fertility decline, increasing to 40 countries by the early 1980s. While the maximum fertility before the onset of fertility decline was reached in all countries in Southern Africa by the late 1970s, the range of experiences was much wider among countries in Eastern Africa (from the early 1950s in Réunion to the late 1990s in Somalia), Middle Africa (from the late 1960s in Angola to the late 1990s in Chad and DR Congo), and Western Africa (from the early 1960s in Cabo Verde to the late 1990s in Niger). Maximum total fertility in the time period before the onset of fertility transition, sub-Saharan African countries by sub-region SOURCE: United Nations 2015a. The maximum fertility before the onset of fertility transition ranged from less than six births per woman in five countries (Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Lesotho, and Seychelles) to more than eight births per woman in two countries (Kenya and Rwanda). There was a positive but weak relationship between the maximum fertility level and the timing of when fertility transition commenced (R2 = .04). The transition from the maximum fertility to the current estimated fertility level in 2010–2015 has been slow for most countries in sub-Saharan Africa. We examine both the maximum decline in fertility in a five-year period and the duration of time between the maximum fertility level and when a country achieved a 10 percent decline in total fertility. A 10 percent decline in total fertility is one of several empirical rules that researchers have used to identify when fertility has begun to decline in a sustained manner from a pre-transitional maximum (Bongaarts and Casterline 2013; Coale and Treadway 1986; United Nations 2014), including differences in the time period selected to identify the onset of fertility decline (Casterline 2001) and the magnitude of decline (e.g., 5 percent decline with further conditions for subsequent changes applied, see Bryant 2007). While the different rules all strive to distinguish sustained decline from random fluctuations in fertility levels, each rule will have different repercussions for interpretations about the timing of onset of fertility decline, duration and pace of decline, and correlations with levels of development and other indicators. In seven countries the first steps of fertility decline took place over a long time period. In Angola, Gambia, and Uganda, a 10 percent decline from the maximum fertility level took 40 years; and in Lesotho, Mozambique, Niger, and Tanzania, it took 30 to 35 years (Appendix Table 1).4 In other countries the fertility decline never gained speed. Overall declines from the country-specific maximum fertility level to the level in 2010–2015 were very slow in nine countries (Angola, Congo, Gambia, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Uganda, and Tanzania), where average fertility declines were 0.2 children per woman or less, a pace at which it would take at least 25 years to realize a decline of one birth per woman (Appendix Table 1). During the fertility transition, some countries experience an acceleration of fertility decline that, based on historical experience of past transitions in Latin America and the Caribbean and Asia, might reach a decline of more than one birth per woman in a five-year period (United Nations 2015a). In most countries in sub-Saharan Africa, however, the maximum fertility decline is much smaller. The largest declines of more than one birth per five-year period were registered in the early-transition countries in Eastern Africa before 2000 (Djibouti, Mauritius, Mayotte, Réunion, Rwanda, Seychelles, and Zimbabwe). For some countries the maximum fertility decline is projected to be reached in the future: one country in Eastern Africa (Mozambique), four in Middle Africa (Angola, DR Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tome and Principe), and five in Western Africa (Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria). Figure 5 shows that countries reaching the maximum fertility decline later tend to reach it at lower levels (the correlation across the 50 countries is R2 = .45). Maximum five-year decline in total fertility since the onset of fertility transition, actual and projected, sub-Saharan African countries by sub-region SOURCE: United Nations 2015a. The pace of fertility decline is illustrated in Figure 6 for Ethiopia and Nigeria, the two most populous countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Estimated levels of total fertility from 1950–1955 to 2010–2015 are shown with a fitted model of the fertility transition. Both countries reached maximum fertility levels before the onset of fertility decline between the late 1970s and early 1980s, and both reached a 10 percent decline from this maximum in the early 2000s. While Ethiopia reached the peak pace of fertility decline in 2005–2010 (a decline of nearly one birth in the five-year period), Nigeria's fertility decline has been consistently slow, with a low peak pace of decline. The maximum fertility decline per five-year period in Nigeria is projected to be reached in the future (a decline of 0.3 births in 2020–2025). The difference in the pace results in current total fertility of 4.6 births per woman in Ethiopia and 5.7 in Nigeria. The 80 percent prediction intervals (dashed lines in Figure 6) around the probabilistic projections of total fertility indicate the magnitude of the different fertility changes that could reasonably happen. For example, by 2045–2050 there is a one in ten chance that total fertility in Nigeria could be as low as 2.6 or as high as 4.4 (Figure 6 and Appendix Table 2). Observed decline in total fertility from 1950–1955 to 2010–2015, predicted decline, and time period of maximum TFR and maximum decline, Ethiopia and Nigeria SOURCES: United Nations 2015a and computations by authors. Given the slow pace of fertility decline in most sub-Saharan African countries thus far and the uncertainty around the pace of future declines, what might be the impact on future fertility levels and the growth in total population if fertility declines in the region followed an accelerated pace that has already been experienced by countries that have completed or are nearing completion of the fertility transition? To answer this question, we generated probabilistic fertility scenarios for 2015–2100 using a modeling approach described in Alkema et al. (2011) and implemented in a publicly accessible software package BayesTFR (Ševčíková, Alkema, and Raftery 2011). The standard United Nations 2015 probabilistic results pool the experience of all countries having similar fertility levels and trends (the baseline scenario). An alternative probabilistic scenario was created using only the fertility transition experiences of 21 countries5 that shared a similar pattern of accelerated decline in fertility (the accelerated scenario): specifically, a slow pace at the start of the transition that sharply rises to a peak pace of decline before steadily tapering off after total fertility has reached about four births per woman. These 21 countries, which include—among countries with more than 10 million inhabitants in 2015—Bangladesh, China, El Salvador, Morocco, Peru, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey and Uzbekistan, represent disparate institutional, social, economic, and cultural contexts and yet experienced a similar pattern of a relatively abrupt acceleration of fertility decline. The objective of this exercise is to examine the impact on population size of fertility decline that is more rapid than currently projected, and to illustrate the implications of such a hypothetical scenario. While we do not theorize or analyze the factors that produced these rapid fertility declines, the fact that a similar pattern of fertility decline took place within such a diverse group of countries raises the possibility that a similar decline could occur within a region that also reflects quite distinctive and diverse contexts. Each fertility scenario is used to simulate 10,000 probabilistic population projections for 2015–2100 under identical conditions (i.e., using the same mortality and migration assumptions) that show the population growth trajectories if sub-Saharan African countries were to follow a specific fertility decline pattern.6 The implications of this specific fertility decline pattern for future fertility trends are shown in Figure 7 for Ethiopia and Nigeria. The accelerated fertility decline scenario leads to much more rapid declines for these countries. By 2045–2050, median projected total fertility in Ethiopia would decline from 2.3 (baseline) to 2.0 (accelerated decline) and in Nigeria from 3.6 (baseline) to 2.6 (accelerated decline) (see Appendix Table 2). Probabilistic fertility projections (median and 80 percent prediction intervals) for two scenarios: baseline and accelerated fertility decline, Ethiopia and Nigeria SOURCES: United Nations 2015a and computations by authors. The accelerated fertility scenario has greater implications for projected fertility in Nigeria, where the recent pace of fertility decline has been much slower than in Ethiopia. The projected medians of the accelerated scenario are similar to the lower bound of the baseline scenario for parts of the projections, suggesting that Ethiopia and Nigeria would need to experience a rapid fertility decline, similar to the rapid declines experienced by the group of 21 countries, in order to realize the lower-bound fertility level of the baseline scenario. The assumption that Ethiopia and Nigeria would follow the fast fertility decline experiences of these 21 countries leads to substantially lower population projections compared with the baseline scenario (Figure 8 and Appendix Table 3). If Ethiopia experienced an accelerated fertility decline, the projected population grows from 99 million in 2015 to 182 million by 2100 (80 percent prediction interval of 93 million to 324 million) compared with the higher median projection of 234 million under the baseline scenario. If Nigeria adopted the accelerated fertility decline pattern, the projected population grows from 182 million in 2015 to a median of 466 million by 2100 (80 percent prediction interval of 282 million to 777 million) rather than the faster projected growth to 737 million under the baseline scenario. Probabilistic population projections (median and 80 percent prediction intervals) for two scenarios: baseline and accelerated fertility decline, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and sub-Saharan Africa SOURCES: United Nations 2015a and computations by authors. The counterfactual of sub-Saharan African countries following an accelerated fertility decline, as experienced by the group of 21 countries, results in a projected increase in total population in the region from 962 million in 2015 to 3.2 billion by the end of the century (with 80 percent probability of being between 2.8 and 3.7 billion). The total population projection for the baseline UN 2015 scenario would lead to a median projection of about 4 billion, or a difference of 770 million people with an 80 percent prediction interval mostly above the upper bound of the accelerated fertility decline scenario. We presented here an updated description of fertility decline in sub-Saharan Africa and have explored the implications for fertility and population projections if sub-Saharan African countries follow a pattern of accelerated fertility decline. Because estimates of fertility in the region rely almost entirely on survey and census data, there is still uncertainty about fertility change over time. Our analyses of trends over time were based on a new historical time series of total fertility estimates for the period 1950 to 2015 from the 2015 Revision of World Population Prospects. Fertility has remained persistently high in Eastern, Middle, and Western Africa (4.9 births per woman or higher as of 2010–2015) and declined rapidly in Southern Africa, which currently has about half the total fertility level of other sub-regions births per woman). Southern Africa is dominated by South Africa, TFR of 2.4 is the lowest in the Yet there is wide variation in total fertility across countries, even within from below fertility births per woman) in Mauritius to 7.6 births per woman in Niger. The fertility level before the onset of decline was high in all countries in sub-Saharan Africa, from less than six births per woman in five countries to more than eight births per woman in two countries. By the late 1970s, 29 countries were on the verge of fertility decline, increasing to 40 countries by the early 1980s. The transition from these maximum levels of fertility prior to the onset of fertility decline to current levels has been slow for most countries, including seven in which it took 30 years or more to a 10 percent decline in total fertility. While countries in Asia and in Latin America and the Caribbean experienced an acceleration in fertility decline of more than one birth per five-year time period, this level of acceleration has been experienced thus far by only seven countries in Eastern Africa before the The pace of fertility decline in sub-Saharan Africa will a large in the magnitude of future growth in We showed through an illustrative scenario that an acceleration in the pace of fertility decline to that already experienced by 21 countries South Africa) would the growth in future population in the region from a projected billion by to billion and total population size from a projected 4 billion people by the end of the century to 3.2 While these 21 countries represent a wide range of institutional, social, economic, and cultural a similar fast decline from fertility levels of six or more children per woman in the past to less than two or three in recent years. this accelerated pace of fertility decline to countries at of transition illustrates the substantial impact on future population growth of other possible patterns of fertility decline in sub-Saharan Africa. of this are assumption that the fertility estimates from the World Population Prospects are and the fact that uncertainty around the estimates of period total fertility in recent is not into By scenarios on the distinct fertility decline patterns that have been experienced thus far by countries that have completed or are advanced in their fertility we new patterns of fertility decline in the Because most countries in Middle Africa and Western Africa are still in the early of fertility transition, an sub-Saharan African pattern of fertility decline may still and Timæus The is not for the or of by the authors. than be to the for the

The purpose of this article is to describe the historical development of Library and Information Science (LIS) schools on the African continent from the colonial period to the present. It highlights the factors that contributed to the growth of library schools and challenges experienced in their development. This study was based entirely on literature review and the author’s extensive knowledge, teaching experience and research in LIS education in Africa. Information was obtained from both published and non-published sources. Colleagues in LIS education also contributed immensely to the outcome of the work. It was found that the earliest schools were initially known as library schools. The term changed to LIS schools much later, after independence. Library schools started in the colonial era, initially in South Africa, moving all the way through West Africa to East Africa. The curricula used in the schools were based on programmes prevailing in the mother country. Unesco played an important role in the development of library schools on the continent. It came up with the concept of regional library schools. Public and academic libraries were instrumental in agitating for the establishment of library schools. With the onset of independence on the continent, the concept of regional schools died, giving rise to self-sufficiency. Currently, LIS schools are mushrooming all over the continent. It is concluded that if this trend is not checked, it could have a serious effect on the quality of the graduates. Although the future of LIS schools is bright, it will greatly depend on how the library profession is marketed. LIS schools will need to match the rapid changes taking place in the information industry.

Public libraries face a plethora of challenges in the information age. However, in spite of that, they are expected to deliver library services and to maintain their relationship with both current and potential users. The purpose of this study was to investigate the implementation of market orientation (MO) in library services provision in public libraries in the Northern Region of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), South Africa. Using both quantitative and qualitative approaches, questionnaires and interview guides were used to collect data from the managers and librarians in the public libraries of the Northern Region of KZN. The collected data was tabulated in headings and sub-headings, and presented using themes, tables and frequencies. The study established that MO is still a developing concept for non-profit making organisations, such as public libraries. The managers and librarians as professionals in different levels have limited understanding of the concepts and its implications. This calls into question the implementation of this strategy in the provision of library services tailor-made for users. Although there are policies which guide MO and the provision of library services, it is doubtful that they are consulted and implemented. There are challenges which hinder the public libraries in this region from fully implementing MO for the benefit of the users. There is a need to create awareness of MO and its benefits to public libraries. Training librarians, and allocating funding for resources and infrastructure that will improve the implementation of all the strategies for improved library services, are some of the recommendations of the study.