Brigadier General Tyree H. Bell, C.S.A.: Forrest's Fighting Lieutenant

CUSTER'S "LAST STAND"TREVILIAN STATION, 1864 Jay Monaghan "Again I am called on to bid you adieu for a short period," Brigadier General George Armstrong Custer wrote his bride in June, 1864. ". . . Need I repeat to my darling that while living she is my all, and if Destiny wills me to die, wills that my country needs my death, my last prayer will be for her, my last breath will speak her name and that Heaven will not be Heaven till we are joined together." He ended the letter with, "Yours through time and eternity, Autie."1 At the moment he penned this rare prose, young Custer had been married less than four months and had just been ordered to join the expedition to Trevilian Station. Having been on active service since his marriage, he carried in his field desk a packet of love letters and an ambrotype of Mrs. Custer. Along with these cherished memorabilia, two devoted civilian waifs ornamented Custer's headquarters. One was Johnnie Cisco, a white boy who washed the General's shirts, waited table, and led his extra horses during battle. Custer's other ragamuffin retainer, Eliza, was an escaped slave girl who followed him with a special cooking outfit in an antique carriage which had been "requisitioned " on some plantation, presumably because the picturesque contraption would not take an oath of allegiance to the Union. In any event the old rattletrap caused much good-natured amusement in Federal ranks and undoubtedly prompted other daring cavalry officers to forage far and wide in search of more grandiose and disreputable vehicles. Eliza thoroughly enjoyed her position in Custer's Michigan Brigade, and her chuckling quips about her erstwhile masters and war in general were often repeated by the troopers, who called her "the Queen of Sheba." Custer's bride, Libbie, had succeeded so far in making only one change in her eccentric and resplendent husband. For the wedding he Jay Monaghan, consultant for the Wyles Collection of Lincolniana at the University of California in Santa Barbara, is the author of eleven books on Lincoln and the Civil War period. His latest, a biography of George A. Custer, appeared in 1959. 1 Marguerite Merington (ed.), The Custer Story (New York, 1950), p. 103. 245 246 JAY MONAGHAN had cut off his long golden locks which had earned him the informal title of "the Boy General with the flowing yellow curls." Custer's rise in the army had been as miraculous as the nickname implied. While he was a lieutenant on the staff of General Alfred Pleasonton in 1863, that cavalryman jumped him all the way to brigadier general. Captains, majors, and colonels complained that the promotion showed rank favoritism, and when Pleasonton was transferred to theWest the following spring, some prophesied the Boy General's downfall . Custer himself feared that his good fortune—"Custer Luck" he called it—might end as tough, hard-fighting Phil Sheridan assumed Pleasonton's command in Virginia in April, 1864. Sheridan's firstact was toreorganize the cavalry corps. Custer's Michigan Brigade—which included the 1st, 5th, 6th, and 7th Michigan regiments —together with Colonel Tom Devin's and Brigadier General Wesley Merritt's brigades, became the new First Division. Brigadier General Alfred T. A. Torbert, a slow but competent regular army infantryman inclined to be unappreciative of Custer's reckless aggressiveness, assumed command. Brigadier General Douglas McMurtrie Gregg, under whom Custer had fought at Gettysburg, headed the Second Division. The Third was assigned to Brigadier General James H. Wilson. Like Custer, Wilson had risen rapidly. He was destined for a long and distinguished military career, but did not show it during the weeks ahead. U. S. Grant had just arrived from the West, and he and George Meade mounted the 1864 spring offensive against Richmond and Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. Early in May the Union troops pushed into the Wilderness , with Custer guarding the wagon trains—scarcely the place for a cavalryman to show Sheridan his mettle. Wilson, assigned an advance position, promptly led the army into a trap. During the fighting which followed, neither the Confederate nor the Federal forces won much of a victory, and the...

In this chapter, interviews have been conducted with global leaders in sport, peace, and human rights, including a Nobel Peace Winner who also serves as president of his nation, Olympians, the Dean of the International Olympic Committee, humanitarian and peace leaders, former United Nations officials, and sport leaders from within the Olympic movement. The principal author was interviewed by Brigadier General A. Philip Moses, a veteran of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET). The interviewees speak from intimate personal experience and observation – in both sport and peace. The chapter looks at peace leadership and civil society, peace leadership and the Olympic movement, and Timor Leste: nation building facilitated through sports peace leadership. The chapter closely examines the role of sport for development and the millennium development goals and sport in the quest for statehood.

On 5 November 1916 a proclamation in the name of Emperor Wilhelm II and Emperor-King Francis Joseph I called to life the Kingdom of Poland and Polish Armed Forces, while a Provisional State Council was summoned soon afterwards. On the council, Brigadier General Józef Piłsudski of the Polish Legions mounted an effort to engage the Central Powers and breathe life into the project. Unwilling to settle for building the elements of statehood, Piłsudski sought nothing less than a government and an army with real power. From the outset Piłsudski dangled the Legions, a military contribution, as the object of negotiation, in a process he called ‘licytacja’ or ‘bidding up’. Taking the offensive granted control of the agenda and enhanced his power. This strategy involved political work as well as building military organs. Above all, it meant driving the state council, using pressure from within and without, to press for concessions and withhold cooperation until the former materialized. Although the Legions were moved to the kingdom, German and Habsburg officials deflected requests for national control. German intransigence as well as the US entry into the war and revolution in Russian led Piłsudski to adopt progressively more radical positions. He came to favour a dramatic gesture, putting at risk the kingdom. In July 1917 he engineered a demonstration by the soldiery, rejecting an oath of loyalty. This put paid to the idea of a government and army, while it put Piłsudski behind bars. Analysis reveals the dynamics between great powers and their clients. While the former held all the cards, the latter could not conform to the role of supplicants. Piłsudski’s strategy of withholding cooperation, saying ‘no’, conferred a measure of power vis-à-vis the Central Powers. This power was necessarily fleeting and, in the end, had only the capability of sabotaging collaboration. The case sheds light on political conditions and national action in the period, during which imperial regimes began to crumble, but a new order had yet to take shape.

Review of Our Great Spring Victory by General Van Tien Dung; Grasshoppers and Elephants by Wilfred Burchett; The War Managers by Brigadier General (ret.) Douglas Kinnard.This article can also be found at the Monthly Review website, where most recent articles are published in full.Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.

This chapter introduces one of Sayyed Ahmad Yazdi's clients, a retired officer in the police force of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Brigadier General ʻAli Shirazi had overseen arrests of occult specialists like rammals and fortune-tellers on numerous occasions during his career. He was a deeply pious man and cognizant of the dangers of involving oneself with the occult. However, Shirazi himself had sought the assistance of occult specialists to tackle seemingly intractable problems, including one criminal case that he had solved with the help of an accused charlatan whose arrest he had ordered himself. The chapter considers the four ingredients to Shirazi's commitment to virtuous caution and highlights his case as evidence of tensions that exist between state governmental rationality on the one hand, and Islamic ethicolegal reasoning on the other.

: In June 1984, the Chief of Staff of the Army directed the DCSOPS to begin a project to capture lessons learned in Active Component (AC) Division command. The project consists of War College students interviewing selected Division Commanders (AC) allowing them to reflect on what they had learned during their time in command. Several Division Commanders (AC) have been interviewed, their answers compiled by category and published in a booklet available to potential Division Commanders (AC). No such program exists with respect to the Reserve Component (RC) of the Army, specifically as it relates to command of Major U.S. Army Reserve Commands (MUSARCs). There are forty-five MUSARCs in the Army Reserve, each commanded by a Major General or Brigadier General. This paper represents the initial effort to capture lessons learned from one such MUSARC Commander, namely MG William F. Ward, Jr. Commander 77th ARCOM, New York City, New York. MG Ward subsequently served as Chief, Army Reserve our country's 'top citizen soldier'

The right learning strategy can improve teaching effectiveness. In learning, there are several goals that must be achieved. Of course, in PBL (Problem Based Learning) based biology learning, there are many obstacles faced by teachers in achieving their learning goals, the weakness of making lighter materials designed by teachers with various student characteristics. The method used in this research is a qualitative method in the form of interviews and observations that have been carried out at SMAS Kartika 1-2 Medan which is located on Jl. Brigadier General H.A.Manav Rubis, Central Helvetian District. Medan Helvetia, Medan City, North Sumatra on March 26, 2024 with the subject of biology teacher research class XI IPA. Based on the analysis of the existing problems, there are challenges in making lighter materials with different student characteristics. It can be concluded that teachers have difficulty in making lighter materials with various student characteristics as a form of stimulation to encourage active participation in the student learning process in order to achieve the objectives of learning. abstrak. Strategi pembelajaran yang tepat dapat meningkatkan efektivitas pengajaran. Dalam belajar, ada beberapa tujuan yang harus dicapai. Tentunya dalam pembelajaran biologi berbasis PBL (Problem Based Learning) banyak kendala yang dihadapi guru dalam mencapai tujuan pembelajarannya, kelemahan pembuatan materi pemantik yang dirancang oleh guru dengan berbagai karakteristik siswa. Metode yang digunakan pada penelitian ini yaitu metode kualitatif berupa wawancara serta observasi yang telah di laksanakan di SMAS Kartika 1-2 Medan yang berlokasi di Jl. Brigadir Jenderal H.A.Manav Rubis, Distrik Helvetian Tengah. Medan Helvetia, Kota Medan, Sumatera Utara pada tanggal 26 Maret 2024 dengan subjek penelitian guru biologi kelas XI IPA . Berdasarkan hasil analisis mengenai permasalahan yang ada, terdapat tantangan dalam pembuatan materi pemantik dengan perbedaan karakteristik siswa. Dapat disimpulkan bahwa guru kesulitan dalam pembuatan materi pemantik dengan berbagai karakteristik siswa sebagai bentuk stimulasi untuk mendorong partisipasi aktif dalam proses belajar siswa guna mencapai tujuan dari pembelajaran.

In the 1980s, nurses became more recognized as interprofessional healthcare partners who actively participated in the advancement of patient care and the nursing profession. There is a significant gap in the nursing literature about the significant contributions of executive military nurse leaders. The purpose of the interview with Brigadier General (Brig Gen) Hale O'Connor was to explore the personal stories, experiences, leadership strategies, lessons learned, and impact of her leadership on the future development of nursing as a profession. The oral history method provided a framework for the interview and the analysis. In compliance with the Oral History Association guidelines, the primary investigator obtained Institutional Review Board permission, participant informed consent, and an audiotaped interview. A graduate research assistant transcribed the 3-hour audiotaped interview verbatim. The participant reviewed the transcription, provided clarification, and validated accuracy. Three independent coders extracted prevalent themes and subthemes during analysis. Researchers compared findings and reached a consensus when resolving minor discrepancies. Two broad thematic qualities, commitment to duty and fairness, emerged from the data with their respective subthemes. Subthemes of trust, patriotism, loyalty, and assiduousness supported the main theme of commitment to duty. Pillars of alignment, equality, and advocacy supported the broad theme of fairness. Although the team did not use the Reina Trust Model as a framework, the trust-building behaviors emerged from the transcribed interview during the analysis. Surprisingly, many of the leadership strategies utilized by Brig Gen Hale O'Connor fit well into the Reina Trust Model, published 25 years following O'Connor's tenure as Chief, Air Force Nurse Corps. In addition, several of Brig Gen Hale O'Connor's leadership accomplishments are still relevant today, solidifying the observation that the foresight of Brig Gen Hale O'Connor was fundamental to the advancement of nursing during her tenure and for those who followed.

Reviewed by: Steel and Blood: South Vietnamese Armor and the War for Southeast Asia Jay Veith Steel and Blood: South Vietnamese Armor and the War for Southeast Asia. By Ha Mai Viet. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2008. ISBN 978-1-59114-919-4. Maps. Photographs. Appendixes. Notes. Selected bibliography. Index. Pp. xi, 458. $40.00. Of the several thousand tomes published about the Vietnam War, only a few English-language viewpoints written by our Vietnamese allies grace the bookshelves. The South Vietnamese perspective, constrained by cultural and linguistic [End Page 1020] barriers, is unfortunately marginalized in the war's literature for Americans. Due to these barriers, U.S. historians, even if interested in South Vietnamese motivations and actions, are left with little except military adviser reports, obscure embassy cables, or shallow news articles. Thus reduced to bit players, the South Vietnamese have become caricatures; either cowardly incompetents or corrupt warlords, with an occasional brave soul or hard-fighting unit briefly mentioned. A more balanced and deeper picture of America's wartime partner has long been needed. Former armor Colonel Ha Mai Viet has offered precisely that, a penetrating insight into the battlefield contributions of the South Vietnamese tank officers who fought alongside their American friends. His book details the contributions of a small but influential element of the ARVN, its armor/cavalry forces. Unknown to most, by war's end the armor branch had grown considerably from its French roots. In 1975, Brigadier General Tran Quang Khoi's 3rd Armored Cavalry Brigade, the III Corps organic tank unit, was undoubtedly the most powerful brigade-size element in the ARVN. Reflecting a rare combined arms outlook, Khoi built a formidable combat out-fit from previously independent armor, artillery, engineer, and ranger units. His merged brigade was still defending outside of Saigon when the final surrender came. Viet spent ten years traveling the globe, tracking down and interviewing many of his former comrades-in-arms. He portrays the heroic deeds of his fellow soldiers while unflinchingly condemning South Vietnamese leadership errors. Covering two main topics, Combat and Military History, Viet outlines twenty-three separate battles from the ARVN side. The bulk of the Combat section covers the Tet Offensive, Lam Son 719, the Easter Offensive, and the bloody retreat in 1975 from the Central Highlands. He also provides rich details on unknown battles such as the terrible clash at Dambe in Cambodia in 1971. The Military History part provides unique facts on the formation and growth of the ARVN armor/cavalry branch from 1954 to 1975, including unit commanders, weapons, and organizational structure. Brilliantly translated, no future work on Vietnam battles will be complete without reviewing this publication. Colonel Viet has provided a tremendous amount of fresh information, almost all of it oral history. That is the strength and weakness of the book. Like all interviews, the ones in this book only provide the participant's side. For example, the account by Colonel Nguyen Van Dong concerning the Central Highlands retreat, while new and highly informative, perpetuates the myth that Brigadier General Pham Duy Tat, the II Corps Ranger Commander, was responsible for the convoy on Route 7B. Tat, when presented with Dong's remarks, categorically denied the accusations, a point of view absent from Viet's book. This is not to cast fault, as Viet was only interested in the stories of his armor colleagues. Yet without access to That's perspective, the unsuspecting historian would perpetuate the story. Unfortunately, as General Cao Van Vien once told the reviewer, the war remains much like the movie "Rashomon": the truth is subjective to the individual. Colonel Viet nevertheless deserves enormous credit for his industrious research and fine account. His is a major and much needed addition to the history of the Vietnam War. [End Page 1021] Jay Veith Bear, Delaware Copyright © 2009 Society for Military History

This discussion examines the ideology and practices of the mass daily press in Singapore within the socio-political context of ‘imagining’ the nation (Anderson, 1991). Most discussions see Singapore’s press as synonymous with the strict controls under which it operates; however, even this is rarely examined within the context of its interaction with the larger agenda of nation-building. Yet, when Brigadier General (BG) Lee Hsien Loong (then Trade and Industry Minister; Second Minister for Defence) outlined his mandate for the national press before members of the Singapore Press Club (Lee, 1988), he made it very clear that their primary purpose was to ‘contribute to nation building. Anyone endeavouring to do this and working towards these goals can hold his head high in the full confidence that his is an honourable profession’. There are three main parts to this discussion. In the first, I will establish the presence of the mass press in the daily lives of Singaporeans, and its position within the imagining of the nation. I will then unpack how specifically that position within the national agenda has been defined and practised. The last section focuses on the various forms of control on the press, and how the government’s intervention is conditioned by the socio-political and ideological climate of the nation.

Paul Tibbets Jr., the pilot of the Enola Gay who released the Little Boy atomic bomb above Hiroshima, is part of a family with a legacy of military service. He was father to Paul Tibbets III, who served in the military as an Army reservist pharmacist and hospital administrator and eventually retired as a colonel. His son— grandson of Tibbets Jr.—is also Paul Tibbets. Paul Tibbets IV is a retired Air Force brigadier general and decorated bomber pilot. This legacy is not lost on his fellow airmen. They gave Tibbets IV the callsign “Nuke” early in his flying career. Tibbets IV flew the B-1 bomber and then the B-2 stealth bomber, a nuclear-capable, longrange strike aircraft. His 29 years of military service include combat missions in the Middle East, Afghanistan, and the Balkans—and a flight in a restored B-29 with his grandfather. In commemoration of the 75th anniversary of the atomic bombs and his grandfather’s historic role, Tibbets IV spoke with Los Alamos National Laboratory.

This chapter describes the maneuvers of Sharp's brigade and Johnston's brigade against Union skirmishers. Brigadier General Jacob Hunter Sharp's Mississippi brigade occupied the center of Brigadier General John C. Brown's line while General Joseph E. Johnston's Alabama brigade held down the right wing, both of which covered a surprisingly wide extent of the battlefield, in part because the Confederate line had been extended a great deal. Both units conducted their attack with enough spirit and determination to challenge the opposing Federal line and pressed three Union brigades and part of a fourth. Brown's division would ultimately fail in breaking the main Union line, yet his troops had thus far driven back the Federal skirmishers (although not by any means on a permanent basis) and cleared the Lick Skillet Road for Confederate use.

Reviewed by: Kill Jeff Davis: The Union Raid on Richmond, 1864 by Bruce M. Venter Buck T. Foster Kill Jeff Davis: The Union Raid on Richmond, 1864. By Bruce M. Venter. Campaigns and Commanders ( Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2016. Pp. xxii, 356. $29.95, ISBN 978-0-8061-5153-3.) Bruce M. Venter, CEO of America's History, LLC, has spent several years guiding groups of interested tourists across Virginia and the East and has written about the French and Indian War and the American Revolution. In Kill Jeff Davis: The Union Raid on Richmond, 1864, Venter steps out of his frequented area of study to provide an in-depth examination of the failed 1864 Kilpatrick-Dahlgren cavalry raid on Richmond. In this work, the author uncovers previously overlooked information, analyzes the reasons for the raid's failure, provides compelling evidence about the most controversial aspects of the action, and opens new ground in areas that other historians have overlooked. According to Venter, Brigadier General Judson "Kill-Cavalry" Kilpatrick and Colonel Ulric Dahlgren were chosen to lead a February 1864 raid on the [End Page 438] Confederate capital for the purpose of burning the city, freeing the Union prisoners at the infamous Libby and Belle Isle prisons, and capturing President Jefferson Davis and his cabinet. However, once defending home guardsmen killed a retreating Dahlgren in an ambush, a young gray-clad volunteer found paperwork on the colonel's body that included the planned assassination of Davis and his officials. This discovery, of course, created a firestorm. Southern firebrands frothed into a frenzy about the plot, threatening to assassinate President Abraham Lincoln and have all the cavalry prisoners who participated in the raid hanged. Kilpatrick publicly denied ordering anything more than the capture of Confederate officials, and his commanders denied ever knowing even that much about the plan. Weaving together an investigation about the players in this complex tale, Venter concludes that Lincoln, with whom both Kilpatrick and Dahlgren had discussed the raid, had no knowledge of the assassination order. Neither did Kilpatrick or any other Union officer. Instead, Venter believes that only two individuals knew of the murderous plot: Colonel Ulric Dahlgren and Secretary of War Edwin M. S tan ton. Venter argues that the raid failed for several reasons. Primarily, the secrecy that such a raid commanded was not maintained, and Dahlgren proved a poor choice for such an important component of the mission because he remained in extreme pain from a recent leg amputation. Beyond those factors, Venter identifies a lack of adequate guides, misrepresentative intelligence about the Richmond defensive force, lack of enough troops, bad weather, poor planning, unfamiliarity among officers and enlisted men (the force contained a mix of different cavalry units from different brigades), resentment among the officer corps, and confusing topography. Kilpatrick blamed the failure squarely on Major General Benjamin F. Butler's not marching his men to Richmond (as previously planned) from the southeast while Kilpatrick attacked from the north. Kill Jeff Davis also includes an examination into the authenticity of the Dahlgren papers, which Venter declares genuine based on his evidence. Furthermore, the author delves into the true identity of the African American guide that Dahlgren ordered hanged. However, evidence indicates that the guide was simply lost, not sabotaging the mission. This monograph is meticulously researched and well written, and it paints a clear portrait of a confusing and oftentimes intentionally misleading series of events. It should be on any Civil War scholar's shelf. Buck T. Foster University of Central Arkansas Copyright © 2017 The Southern Historical Association

Bibliographical Notices Statistical Report on the Sickness and Mortality of the Army of the United States . Compiled from the Records of the Surgeon-General's Office, embracing a period of five years, from January, 1855, to January, 1860. Prepared under the direction of Brevet Brigadier General Thomas Lawson, Surgeon General U. S. Army, by Richard H. Coolidge, M.D., Assistant Surgeon U.

Thaddeus Malanowski was born in 1922 in Stamford, Connecticut, as the son of Polish immigrants who came to