Changes in Political Institutions and Party Systems

This is the third of three chapters on political party systems and structures of competition, and presents an overall review. In the first section, Approaches to the Classification of Party Systems: A Review it looks at the principal existing approaches to the classification of party systems, pointing to both their limits and possibilities when applied within comparative analysis. It then goes on in the second section, Party Systems and the Competition for Government, to underline the importance of understanding the structure of competition in any given party system, since in many ways the whole notion of a party system is centred on the assumption that there exists a stable structure of competition. Structures of competition can be seen to be either closed (and predictable) or open (and unpredictable), depending on the patterns of alternation in government, the degree of innovation or persistence in processes of government formation, and the range of parties gaining access to government. The emphasis in the third section, Party Systems and Electoral Outcomes, is on the need to distinguish between processes of electoral change on the one hand, and changes in party systems and the structures of competition on the other, a distinction which also allows the possibility of situations in which electoral change is the consequence rather than the cause of party system change.

Political party systems are an important element of political systems in Africa and elsewhere. They form the central intermediate institution between the general population and the government. Party systems represent and aggregate diverse political views and group interests, and they form coalitions that then form governments with potentially important consequences of democracy and political stability. Unlike the case in the period directly after independence, African party systems have been overwhelmingly multiparty since the 1990s. As a result, the literature has grown significantly, although most works focus on political parties rather than party systems. Many efforts have been devoted to classification, referring to the legal context as well as, more specifically, the number of relevant parties, the levels of institutionalization, and, less often, the degree of ideological or other polarization. While levels of institutionalization and ideological differences are generally not pronounced, more than half of African party systems have been one-party dominant, of which most are authoritarian. In contrast, two-party and pluralist-party systems, which make up approximately one half of all multiparty systems, are generally more democratic. Besides determining classifications, most analytical work focuses on the determinants of African party systems using quantitative and qualitative as well as macro- and micro-level methodologies. Three determinants are debated: first, ethnicity, which has been cited as the main social cleavage behind African party systems; however, while ethnicity matters, its effects vary and are limited; second, political institutions, especially electoral systems for legislative elections, which only partly explain fragmentation or other features; third, the performance of political parties and rationalist approaches. Scholars largely agree that all of these elements need to be taken into account. While certain functions of party systems may facilitate democratization and political stability or other outcomes, little empirical work exists on the consequences of party systems. Some evidence suggests that highly institutionalized, moderately fragmented, and polarized systems promote democracy. Future research faces many challenges, in particular the development of integrated theory and more fine-grained data, as well as an increased focus on the consequences of party systems.

The subject to which this essay is devoted concerns the relationship between conventional party politics and the formation of terrorist groups. Using several collections of aggregate data, this study examines the effect of changes in party politics from the 1960s to the 1970s on the appearances of terrorist groups in many nations. Changes in the number of parties in the system, fluctuations in their electoral performances and in their parliamentary representation from one decade to the other are linked to the number of terrorist groups active in different nations. A principal finding is that nations with many leftist parties have also tended to have many terrorist groups, irrespective of the latter's ideology or political outlook. The study maintains that understanding the dynamics of political party change in different nations provides insight into the origins of terrorist activity.

The purpose of the article consists of complex research political and administrative aspects of the influence of the political system and activity of political parties on the forming of democratic principles of community development. During research uses on the complex of logical methods, in particular, comparatively-political, abstractly logical, and also scientific approaches: comparatively and bibliographic. In the article, complex research is presented politiсal-administrative aspects of the influence of the political system and activity of political parties on forming of democratic principles of community development. It is noticed that the determining line of the functioning of any political system is its interconnectedness with other subsystems of society, that is why national features have a degree of its democratizes and becoming a problem, and a method of functioning of power is the determining criterion of typologies of the political systems. Therefore at the research of influence of the political system on forming of democratic principles of community development, in particular, it is necessary to examine the aggregate of political institutes, relations and political and legal relations, which public relations are regulated by, viability and efficiency of functioning of that or other are provided as a system influence of which on development of the indicated principles is provided an implementation of its functions (normatively regulatory, informatively communicative et al). Is it set that becoming of the democratic system of public management in Ukraine remains foreground job of nowadays and factors which brake indicated becoming are at the same time selected, among which, in particular, disunity national elite, weakness of political institutes, political corruption. It allowed to come to the conclusion, that success of decision of this task on the domestic walks of life substantially depends on the combination of advantages of conservative and democratic types of acceptance and realization political-administrative decisions, which are examined as the quintessence of satisfaction of political requirements of individuals, task forces, and others like that in the process of adjusting of social relations. Taking into account its attention is accented on importance of prevailing foremost of state character in the activity of political parties, as main subjects of forming of political space, institutes of the state and optimization, politicaladministrative processes, what in Ukraine is not observed, that is the main factor of low efficiency of mechanism of responsibility of political power before electors. The scientific novelty of the article consists of execution complex research politiсal-administrative aspects of the influence of the political system and activity of political parties on forming democratic principles of community development. Practical meaningfulness of the article is related to the possibility of the subsequent use of its materials in an educational process and research secret services at research political-administrative aspects of the influence of the political system and activity of political parties on becoming of the modern system of democratic governance in Ukraine in the context of found out factors which generate considerable difficulties in relation to becoming of the indicated system on the domestic walks of life.

This article is part of the special cluster titled Parties and Democratic Linkage in Post-Communist Europe, guest edited by Lori Thorlakson, and will be published in the August 2018 issue of EEPS This article introduces a special section on parties and democratic linkage in post-communist Europe. It sets out the main objectives and research questions that guide the four articles in this special section, presenting these in the context of the comparative politics literature on party and party system change and democratic development. It introduces the key arguments of the articles in the section, arguing that the contributions identify regionally distinctive patterns of party and party system behaviour in Central and Eastern Europe. These patterns have fuelled a quest for more suitable conceptual and measurement tools and call for diversity in comparative analysis, combining intra and inter regional comparison.

Party systems represent parts of political systems which arise as a result of interactions between political parties. Party relations produce characteristics which place a particular party system within the typology of party systems. A number of factors can be considered in explaining the nature of party competition, most often placed within the categories of institutional and sociostructural factors. This paper analyses the impact of full and partial social cleavages on party systems. Given that the theory of social cleavages has proved insufficient in explaining party differences and the dynamics of party systems, especially in new democracies, we will improve the analysis by including the concept of partial social cleavages. This research shows the unequivocal influence of dominant social cleavages on the situation and changes in party systems. Although in some cases no changes in the type of party system have occurred, it can be concluded that exactly in those cases there exist permanent and ingrained social cleavages, but also partial cleavages which affect the relations in the party system at the given time. Identity issues stand out as the dominant topic in political competition, especially in the countries where ethnic relations have not been resolved.

Sound economic and social policies are important if countries wish to prosper and achieve sustainable development. It is far from guaranteed, however, that policymakers select and implement good policies, which provides a rationale for external policy support. Indeed, many organizations are engaged in supporting policy reform processes in recipient countries. This study investigates the limits and opportunities of supporting policy reform by focusing on four dimensions of support: conditional financing, policy dialogue, technical evidence and political institutions. Four findings follow from a review of the literature. First, without commitment on the recipient side, conditional financing is unlikely to induce policy reform. Second, when external actors acquire a seat at the policy dialogue table, it is important to detect (and influence) the beliefs policymakers hold. Third, outside parties should bring sound evidence to the table about the costs, benefits, and effectiveness of their policy proposals. Finally, supporting changes in political institutions without considering general equilibrium effects can be counterproductive. The study concludes with a discussion and some avenues for future research in this field.

(1999). Parties, elections and cleavages: Israel in comparative and theoretical perspective. Israel Affairs: Vol. 6, Parties, Elections and Cleavages: Israel in Comparative and Theoretical Perspective, pp. 1-10.

Paul Mitchell and Rick Wilford (eds), Politics in Northern Ireland. PSAI Press/Westview, 1998; 352pp; 0813335280 (pb) £22.30 Ruth Dudley Edwards, The Faithful Tribe: An Intimate Portrait of the Loyal Institutions, Harper Collins, 1999; xvi + 448 pp; 0002558637 (hb) £17.99. Kevin Haddick‐Flynn, Orangeism: The Making of a Tradition, Wolfhound Press, 1999; 448pp; 0863276598 (hb) £30 George Mitchell, Making Peace The inside story of the making of the Good Friday Agreement. Heinemann, 1999; 192pp; 0434007552 (hb) £17.99. Sabine Wichert, Northern Ireland Since 1945 (2nd ed), Longman, 1999; 269pp; 0582326788 (pb) £13.99 James Anderson and James Goodman (eds), Dis/Agreeing Ireland: Contexts, Obstacles, Hopes, Pluto Press; 284pp; 0745312802 (hb) £45 Gerard Murray, John Hume and the SDLP: Impact and Survival in Northern Ireland. Irish Academic Press, 1998; 328pp; 071656441(hb) £29.50 David Miller (ed), Rethinking Northern Ireland. Longman, 1998; 328 pp; 0582302870 (pb) £14.99 Paul Hainsworth (ed), Divided Society: Ethnic Minorities and Racism in Northern Ireland, Pluto Press, 1998; 288pp; 0745311962 (hbk) £45, 0745311954 (pb) £14.99 Marie‐Therese Fay, Mike Morrissey and Marie Smith (eds), Northern Ireland's Troubles: The Human Costs. Pluto Press, 1999; 229pp; 0745313795 (hb) £40 J. Anthony Gaughan (ed), Memoirs of Senator James G. Douglas: Concerned Citizen. UCD Press, 1998; xii+212pp; 1900621193 (hb) £24.99. Walter McDonald, Some Ethical Questions of Peace and War with introduction by Tom Garvin; UCD Press, 1998, ‐ first published 1919, xx+140pp; 1900621185 (pb) £9.95. P. S. O'Hegarty The Victory of Sinn Féin with introduction by Tom Garvin; UCD Press, 1998 ‐ first published 1924, xx+164pp; 1900621177 (pb) £10.95. James Lydon, The making of Ireland from ancient times to the present. Routledge, 1998; 440 pp; 0415013488 (pb) £19.99 Peter Hart, The I.R.A. and Its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork, 1916–1923. Clarendon Press, 1998; 350pp; 0198205376 (hbk) £40 David McCullagh, A Makeshift Majority: The First Inter‐party Government, 1948–51. Institute of Public Administration, 1998; 340pp; 1872002692 (pb) £18. Eithne MacDermott, Clann na Poblachta, Cork University Press. 1998. 248pp; 1859181872 (pb) £12.95 Conor Cruise O'Brien, Memoir: My Life and Themes. Poolbeg Press, 1998; 460pp; 1853718777 (hb) £20.00. Richard English and Joseph Morrison Skelly (eds), Ideas Matter: Essays in Honour of Conor Cruise O'Brien, Poolbeg Press, 1998; 1853718823 £12.99 Mike Cronin, Sport and Nationalism in Ireland: Gaelic Games, Soccer and Irish Identity since 1884. Four Courts Press, 1999; 224pp; 1851824081 (hb) £35, 1851824561 (pb) £14.95 Eunan O'Halpin, Defending Ireland: the Irish State and its Enemies Since 1922. Oxford University Press, 1999; xvi + 382pp; 0198204264 (hbk) £29.95 William Crotty and David E. Schmitt (eds), Ireland and the Politics of Change. Longman, 1998; 250 pp; 0582328942 (pb) £14.99 Neil Collins (ed), Political Issues in Ireland Today (2nd ed.), Manchester University Press, 1999; 210pp; 0719054044 (pb) £12.99, 0719054036 (hb) £40 Frank Barry (ed), Understanding Ireland's Economic Growth. Macmillan, 1999; 256pp; 0333733622 (hbk) £45 Bobby McDonagh, Original Sin in a Brave New World: An account of the negotiation of the Treaty of Amsterdam. Institute of European Affairs, 1998; 1874109400 (pb) £15 Peter Mair, Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations. Clarendon, 1998; 244pp; 019829235 (pb) £15.98 David Broughton and Mark Donovan (eds), Changing Party Systems in Western Europe. Pinter, 1999. 315pp; 1855673282 (pb) £16.99 Bill McSweeney (ed), Moral issues in international affairs: problems of European integration. Macmillan, 1998; 265pp; 0312211287 (hbk) £35 Chrystel Hug, The Politics of Sexual Morality in Ireland. Macmillan Press, 1999; 296pp; 0333662172 (pb) £16.99 Rick Wilford and Robert L Miller (eds), Women, Ethnicity and Nationalism: The politics of transition. Routledge, 1998; 224pp; 0415171377(pb) £14.99, 0415171369(hb) £45 Michael Marsh and Paul Mitchell (eds), How Ireland Voted 1997. PSAI Press/Westview, 1999; 335pp; 0813332184 (pb) £17.50 Yvonne Galligan, Eilis Ward and Rick Wilford (eds), Contesting Politics: Women in Ireland, North and South. PSAI Press/ Westview, 1999; 278 pp; 0813334179 (pb) £19.50

Under what conditions can populist leaders achieve success in different democratic systems? What opportunities do other political players have against autocratic intrigues? Are the formal institutions of the United States strong enough to resist President Trump’s violation of norms? These are the main questions of this volume, which collects various approaches to examine the impact of populism on liberal democracy. Since November 2016, one camp of scholars has interpreted Trump’s political rise and doings as a series of attempts to destroy liberal democracy, while another other camp is relatively sanguine thanks to its solid faith in the political institutions of the United States. As an important example of the former, Levitsky and Ziblatt’s (2018) book How Democracies Die focuses on the ongoing erosion of democratic norms, like “mutual toleration” between political competitors and “forbearance”, as a minimum level of cooperation. They argue that if unwritten rules are violated, the system of democracy will be undermined. The authors of this volume also express their concerns about political processes, but most of them belong to the latter, more optimistic group. According to Kurt Weyland and Raúl Madrid, President Trump can do serious damage in some policy areas (such as environmental and foreign policy). But he cannot achieve major institutional transformations and undermine American democracy. Despite the great virtue of the moderate and systematic approach of the book, there is a feeling that scientists in the two camps are still speaking past each other. Weyland and Madrid’s analysis propounds a cross-national framework for studying populists in government, which emphasizes the role of the political institutions and the parties but slightly underestimates the softer aspects of politics, such as democratic norms. As experts of democratic processes and populism in various regions, the authors aim to offer comparative lessons from Europe and Latin America, where populism was able to achieve significant political success. Unlike these regions, the United States’ political and social context does not favor populist actors. In the introduction, Weyland and Madrid determine four types of obstacles that prevent further expansion of populism. First, the separation of powers is linked to the federal and presidential system of government. Sovereign institutions and almost equal power relations between the two parties in Congress make it difficult to concentrate power. The next impediment to autocratic maneuvers is the stable and cohesive two-party system, which means for Trump not only a strong opposition but a decentralized Republican party, on which he has no direct influence. The massive polarization of American politics has helped the president seize power, but at the same time, it precludes him from further strengthening. Third, prevailing political and social cleavages, the percentage of ethnic groups and classes of the electorate are not favorable to a populist shift because there is no way for Trump to build a broad coalition. Finally, the absence of a crisis does not allow Trump to appear as a savior of the nation. Based on these barriers, Weyland and Madrid predict a democratic backlash “in which the leaders of both parties agree to enact reforms designed to prevent future violations of democratic norms” (p. 33). However, not all authors share this optimistic view, some of them more explicitly warn the dangers of the American populist phenomenon. Including the introduction and conclusion, the book consists of seven chapters. The individual studies highlight different aspects of the analytical framework presented above (e.g. party systems and strategies, social cleavages). The first three chapters provide comprehensive insights on populist cases from Latin America, East-Central and Western Europe and draw illuminating assumptions concerning Trump’s presidency. In the following, the focus is on the United States and the likely impacts on the public sphere of Trump's politics. We begin the examination of the book with the political context in which populist leaders gain power. The story of a populist ascension usually starts within a state of emergency: countries of Latin America and East-Central Europe were suffering a prolonged crisis when a political leader emerged and took power. As Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser examines, after the takeover, a personalistic “strongman” implemented economic reforms and at the same time promoted broad institutional transformations, and even introduced new constitutions (Chapter 1). As the cases of Fujimori and Chávez show, effective crisis management or increasing welfare expenditures can legitimize the efforts of populist presidents to govern without constraint. Among the countries studied the Netherlands and the United States are notable exceptions. Populists got power in developed democracies in the absence of a social crisis by bringing deeply divisive issues to the forefront such as immigration, Islam, and national identity. It is important to note that their impact on the political systems is more limited than the impact of populist counterparts in weaker democracies. How could populist leaders concentrate so much power in their hands? Kevin Deegan-Krause presents East-Central European ethno-nationalistic versions of populism where the concentration of power in parliamentary systems allowed for populist leaders to hijack democratic institutions (Chapter 2). Filling public institutions with functionaries, making uneven political conditions by legislation, state capture, eliminating independent media, intimidation of critics and opponents—are only a few devices from the toolbox to dismantle democratic pluralism. Weak institutions of Latin American and East-Central European democracies were unable to resist these radical transformations. The political structure of the United States is different because the system of checks and balances disperses power among political actors. This arrangement of horizontal accountability normally precludes that the President circumvents either the legislature or the jurisdiction. Trump has serious power of appointment, and he can violate democratic norms. But his position is weaker than the position of populist leaders in European parliamentary systems. Nevertheless, as Deegan-Krause and Bonikowski argue in their chapters, Trump’s transgressive style and the unpredictable consequences of his actions can erode formal institutions. Institutional weakness cannot be understood without the assessment of political power relations. As Orbán’s supermajority illustrates, a hegemonic populist actor can shape institutions in his image, thereby making them dysfunctional. Bertjan Verbeek and Andrej Zaslove show a different constellation, where the governing party is not in the dominant position (Chapter 3). The “parliamentary system of government forces the chief executive to forge a majority support coalition, which is not easy to do in Italy’s multi-party system” (p. 97) or in the Netherlands. Most European and Latin American populist leaders have risen in a fragmented party system with low legitimacy. Many can rely on a loyal, highly personalized party (e.g. Berlusconi, Mečiar, Orbán) which works as an effective machinery for obtaining political resources. In contrast, Trump came to power in a well-established two-party system with limited influence on the Republican Party. Moreover, there is an apparent cleavage inside the GOP between the old party elite, who lost its gatekeeping role, and the movement-based membership (Tea Party), who puts controversial cultural issues at the forefront. According to Kenneth Roberts, the high level of ideological and party polarization not only demoralizes, but it tends to politicize public institutions, and ultimately, it will erode the legitimacy of the system (Chapter 5). Escalating polarization and “movementization” led to radical changes in the electoral arena, because “they sorted voters into rival and increasingly hostile partisan camps, strengthening partisan identities” (p. 137). The social and ethnic structure of the United States prevents the formation of a broad social coalition for Trump. As Bart Bonikowski presents, the American president’s rhetorical style combines an exclusionary view of nationalism with anti-elite and authoritarian components which undoubtedly distorts political discourse and increases polarization (Chapter 4). This type of populism can be attractive for less-educated voters who make up a smaller part of the electorate, while in turn, the educated electorate and ethnic minorities stigmatized by Trump may also be mobilized to support Democrats. In this sharply divided political field, moralistic political views and antagonistic partisan identities reinforce social and political cleavages. According to Verbeek and Zaslove, one of the most important positive effects of populism on liberal democracy is to integrate those voices of those felt excluded. New issues and movements could reach out to disenchanted political orphans to rise above an outsider-leader who looks like “one of us”, but on the negative side, moralistic and militant rhetoric deepen further existing divisions and produce new ones. Polarization is one of the main motifs of the book that turns up chapter by chapter. As Madrid and Weyland state in the conclusion, “the high levels of political polarization in the United States pose a significant obstacle to efforts by Trump to obtain the electoral dominance that other populists have used to consolidate power and transform their countries’ political institutions” (p. 169). This antagonism in the US suitably explains why we should not be afraid of a rapid autocratic turn, but it is not reassuring when we think of the destruction of democratic norms. Formal institutions can function as fortresses (for a while), but as Roberts finds, the extent of democratic deterioration largely depends on the strategy of Republicans. Most likely the party leadership will stand by Trump, not only supporting him in legislation and appointments but also defending his anti-democratic behavior. So, is the glass of water half-full or half-empty? The answer depends on whether the emphasis is on the institutions or the action. The great value of this volume is that it presents different views and aspects of populism that the readers can compare with each other. It is highly recommended to scholars interested in the theories of populism and democracy.

This article sets out to examine the extent of party system change in Scandinavia since the ‘earthquake elections’ in the early 1970s witnessed the parliamentary breakthrough of new parties and, in particular, the rise of a populist radical right. It deploys an analytical framework derived from Berglund and Lindström's five‐party Scandinavian model and an identification of the ‘core structures’ of the frozen party system in the region. In assessing party system change the significance of changes in the patterns of interaction between parties at the elite level, that is in the governmental and parliamentary arenas, is emphasised over and above electoral change. It is argued that the core features of the Scandinavian party systems have changed much less since 1970 than the structure of party competition and that the single most important development in the party politics of the region has been that the historic non‐socialist groupings have acquired increased ‘relevance’ as coalition parties both severally and collectively. The article concludes by asking: ‘so what?’ Can an indication of the extent of party system change be of assistance in understanding the wider workings of the political system and the operation of the legislative process?

"Book Review: David Broughton and Mark Donovan (eds.), Changing Party Systems in Western Europe (London: Pinter, 1999), pp. xix, 307, £ 16.99." Political Science, 51(1), pp. 103–104

This paper aims to demonstrate that cults and cultic institutions are a crucial element for understanding the processes producing different regional outcomes after the fall of the Hittite empire. In this paper, cults are understood as normative cosmic forces defining tempo and worldview of ancient societies. Cultic institutions can be identified as physical spaces defined by purity, charged with real and symbolic value, and led by specialists whose competence is recognised by the community. Instead of being a by-product of political complexity, they are a driving force behind the power dynamics because they are perceived as such in a bottom-up perspective, but also often by main political actors in search of legitimation of their power. This paper examines the interconnections between cultic and political institutions in the territory under the Hittite empire and in the same space after the empire’s demise. We aim to distinguish between processes of resilience, reorganisation, and transformation as they occurred in particular micro-regions previously controlled by the empire, including the Upper Euphrates, South-Central Anatolia, North-Central Anatolia, Cilicia, and the Northern Levant; this will demonstrate both the importance of such a micro-regionally defined study, as well as the shared coincidence of cultic and political institutional change. It will become evident that cultic continuity coincided with the resilience of political institutions, and changes in the cultic landscape corresponded to political reorganisations or transformations in post-Hittite Anatolia and north Syria.

The purpose of this paper is to introduce the political parties and party system in Korea and provide a basic analysis for comparative study among the Asian countries. First, I would explain the distinguishing characteristics of the political parties and party system in Korea. I will then show how this system evolved by using the concept of the cartel party and cartelized party system. Finally, the kind of measures that have been introduced to improve democracy and party politics will be discussed. Whether these efforts are working or not will be addressed from the perspectives of the two different party models.The nature of the political system in Korea can be gleaned by examining three main aspects of the cartelized party system, namely, national subsidies, electoral system, and entry barriers against new or minor parties. After an examination of some of the institutions of the cartelized party system in Korea, the Korean party system may be deemed, by and large, to be moving towards a plural competitive system, one that is more accommodating of new or minor parties.

Deliberative democracy is a revolutionary political ideal that requires fundamental changes in political institutions, bases of collective decision making, and the distribution of resources. Perhaps because of its revolutionary character, accounts of deliberation in political theory thus far have offered little guidance for actors in actually-existing democratic circumstances. This article develops an ethical account of deliberative democratic action under imperfectly just conditions characterized by material and political inequality and failures of reciprocity. Under such conditions, appropriate principles of action can resolve the tension between deliberation and confrontational political activism. The logic of this account parallels the justification for civil disobedience: the extent of permissible deviation from deliberative norms increases according to the adversity of political circumstances. This ethical account is composed of principles of deliberative activism, applications of those principles to four kinds of increasing unfavorable circumstances, and a menu of institutional and political strategies that increase deliberative inclusion and equality.