Chapter 11 - Case Study: The Nuclear Security Summit Process and Its Outcomes

Securing radioactive sources has become increasingly important given the rising threat of radiological terrorism. While radiation safety has long been established in most applicable industries, the importance of nuclear and radiological source security has lagged behind in nonnuclear material specific industries, such as academic institutions and medical facilities. To evaluate the attitudes and behaviors regarding nuclear security culture, an assessment of nuclear and radiological material practices was developed and conducted on 73 radioactive material users at a university. The survey portion of the assessment was comprised of a series of questions segregated into four categories: policy, enforcement, leadership, and behavior. Nuclear security awareness questions formed a subset of the questionnaire. Users were classified by their radioactive material experience and work classification: student, faculty, or other staff. Of the users surveyed, 9% were also interviewed face-to-face to further expand on their views of nuclear security culture. Results of the assessment showed that students from the work classification group as well as the cohort of radioactive material users with 2-5 y of experience possessed a greater degree of awareness towards nuclear security compared to faculty and other more experienced radioactive material users. Relative to students and faculty, other staff from the work classification group faced some difficulty judging the enforcement of policies, adequacy of inspection, and job performance review related to nuclear security. The response from all three groups emphasized the need to enhance threat-response preparedness and greater communication among stakeholders.

The subject of this paper is scientific description of the terms nuclear security and nuclear safety, with reference to international legal aspects and necessary holistic approach to these concepts. Taking into account that there are overlapping and inconsistent use of the abovementioned terms in both domestic and foreign literature, the aim of this paper is to describe them precisely, point to the main differences and similarities in terminology, in order to enable their understanding, adequate use in scientific and professional literature, as well as holistic approach in practice. The connection between the terms stems from their common goal - protection of people and the environment from harmful influence of radioactivity, whereas the terms diverge in areas where the requirements for achieving nuclear security and nuclear safety are in complete contradiction. Nuclear security refers to the protection of nuclear materials and facilities from unauthorized access, theft and abuse, with primary focus being on preventing criminal activities. Nuclear safety, on the other hand, has an aim to prevent accidents in nuclear facilities, as well as to protect people and the environment from potentially harmful influence of radioactivity. Holistic approach requires integration of nuclear security and safety measures, in order to achieve synergy between the two concepts, and, at the same time, make sure that their implementation does not jeopardize one another. This way, societies and states can reduce risks to nuclear materials and facilities, both from unauthorized access and potential hazards arising from nuclear processes and facilities.

The international community has spent considerable time, money, and effort attempting to establish a series of national and regional Centres of Excellence (COEs), also known as Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres (NSSCs). These Centres tend to have a wide variety of objectives, structures, and methods of delivery. Unsurprisingly, no internationally accepted standard exists on how they should operate. The IAEA has produced some excellent guidance (TECDOC 1734), but by virtue of its role cannot provide standards for benchmarking success. Against this backdrop, the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) launched the WINS Academy, an initiative to provide practitioners with opportunities to earn certification in Nuclear Security Management. Underpinning the programme is certification against the ISO 9001 and ISO 29990 quality management standards, which provide an internationally recognised external benchmark of quality; demonstrate credibility, competence and professionalism; and give potential employers and others in the industry an objective measurement of participants’ knowledge. WINS recommends that NSSCs follow a similar model, in which their participants receive an evaluation leading to qualification or certification, and utilizing professional standards developed by a recognised, respected certifying body rather than developing their own ad hoc arrangements, which are ultimately unsustainable. With the end of the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process, sustainability is the key consideration for many nuclear security training centres; WINS has sought political and industry commitments to sustain security training programmes, and these efforts were recognised in a Joint Statement on Certified Training for Nuclear Security Management at the 2016 NSS.

The chapter examines how states develop nuclear security systems as they navigate the lengthy journey of building a new civilian nuclear sector. It outlines the steps set out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which states must follow sequentially to establish a civilian nuclear industry. In so doing, the chapter focuses on the hurdles states have needed to overcome to establish national regulatory and legal frameworks and implement physical protection systems for the first time, and also highlights where opportunities have arisen. Accordingly, the chapter considers the gap between the ideal and the reality, comparing the standards set by the IAEA with what individual states have been able to accomplish. In order to highlight differences in national approaches, the chapter utilizes two case studies: Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). At the time of writing, Turkey is in the final stages of operationalizing its first nuclear power plant (NPP), while the UAE’s first reactor went online in 2020. The development of the nuclear industry in each country is explored in order to understand how nuclear security systems might diverge. While implementation inevitably differs between states, nuclear security is an intrinsic and non-delineable aspect of the broader nuclear sector. In this process, what might be considered ‘norms’ of the global nuclear security regime are established, although perceptions about security might also evolve.

Nuclear security includes the prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer, or other malicious acts involving nuclear or other radioactive substances or their associated facilities. The presentation begins by discussing the concept and its importance, then moves on to consider threats--insider threat, sabotage, diversion of materials--with considerable emphasis on the former. The intrusion at Pelindaba, South Africa, is described as a case study. The distinction between nuclear security and security of radiological and portable sources is clarified, and the international legal framework is touched upon. The paper concludes by discussing the responsibilities of the various entities involved in nuclear security.

Research reactors are required (in accordance with the Safeguards Agreement between the State and the IAEA) to maintain a system of nuclear material accounting and control for reporting quantities of nuclear material received, shipped, and held on inventory. Enhancements to the existing accounting and control system can be made at little additional cost to the facility, and these enhancements can make nuclear material accounting and control useful for nuclear security. In particular, nuclear material accounting and control measures can be useful in protecting against an insider who is intent on unauthorized removal or misuse of nuclear material or misuse of equipment. An enhanced nuclear material accounting and control system that responds to nuclear security is described in NSS-25G, Use of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security Purposes at Facilities, which is scheduled for distribution by the IAEA Department of Nuclear Security later this year. Accounting and control measures that respond to the insider threat are also described in NSS-33, Establishing a System for Control of Nuclear Material for Nuclear Security Purposes at a Facility During Storage, Use and Movement, and in NSS-41, Preventive and Protective Measures against Insider Threats (originally issued as NSS-08), which are available in draft form. This paper describes enhancements to existing material control and accounting systems that are specific to research reactors, and shows how they are important to nuclear security and protecting against an insider.

In 2009, President Barack Obama announced from Prague’s Hradcany square that “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security” was nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists, and world leaders listened. A year later, 47 of these leaders responded to Obama’s call “to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years” when they gathered in Washington, DC, for the first Nuclear Security Summit. Since then, nearly 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) have been removed from 10 countries. And both Russia and the United States have worked hard on HEU destruction efforts—48 metric tons and 7 metric tons, respectively. In March, 50 nations are taking part in the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. But how can these countries ensure that the momentum toward a global nuclear security culture isn’t lost, and the Seoul summit does not devolve into just another gathering? Three authors explore this question: from the United States, Sharon Squassoni; from Turkey, Mustafa Kibaroglu (2012); and from India, Rajiv Nayan (2012). The authors are nuclear security experts and members of the Fissile Materials Working Group, which publishes a monthly column at www.thebulletin.org.

In 2009, President Barack Obama announced from Prague’s Hradcany square that “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security” was nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists, and world leaders listened. A year later, 47 of these leaders responded to Obama’s call “to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years” when they gathered in Washington, DC, for the first Nuclear Security Summit. Since then, nearly 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) have been removed from 10 countries. And both Russia and the United States have worked hard on HEU destruction efforts—48 metric tons and 7 metric tons, respectively. In March, 50 nations are taking part in the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. But how can these countries ensure that the momentum toward a global nuclear security culture isn’t lost, and the Seoul summit does not devolve into just another gathering? Three authors explore this question: from the United States, Sharon Squassoni (2012); from Turkey, Mustafa Kibaroglu (2012); and from India, Rajiv Nayan. The authors are nuclear security experts and members of the Fissile Materials Working Group, which publishes a monthly column at www.thebulletin.org.

Ghana has significantly improved its nuclear security infrastructure over the years. However, as threats increase by the day and new applications of nuclear and radiological technology are designed and implemented, Ghana must develop a rigid and comprehensive approach to mitigating the negative impacts on its nuclear security while improving prevention, detection, and deterrence of nuclear and radiological terrorism within its geographical space. This paper overviews the approaches adopted by Ghana to build a strong nuclear security regime within the past decade. These include improving legal frameworks for nuclear security by establishing an independent Nuclear Regulatory Authority; assessing nuclear security culture in facilities; strengthening nuclear security capabilities at facilities that hold radioactive materials by improving physical protection systems for deterrence and detection; and building strong and effective collaboration and cooperation with various stakeholders, both locally and internationally, to distribute responsibility and provide technical and logistic support to build a stronger nuclear security regime. Ghana also identified developments in human capacity in areas of nuclear security as a relevant approach to improving its nuclear security and has thus collaborated with the IAEA and the University of Ghana to establish a graduate school for training Ghanaians and Africans in nuclear-related disciplines.

The chapter provides an analytical overview of India’s approach to nuclear security. It details the legal and institutional steps India has taken to strengthen its nuclear security credentials, while capturing some of the internal political debates that provide an Indian perspective on nuclear security. The chapter also focuses on the logic for India’s nuclear security policy by examining the country’s growing atomic energy sector as well as the changing threat environment. While this chapter does not provide a fully comprehensive narrative of India’s nuclear security approach, it does discuss some of the challenging aspects, such as nuclear and radiological material control and accounting systems, security culture, the insider threat, and nuclear regulation. The chapter’s concluding section identifies areas that India needs to strengthen further in order to improve nuclear security measures as well as external perceptions of India’s nuclear security policy.

The increasing concerns over the use of nuclear materials for malevolent purposes (i.e., terrorist attacks) have fueled the interest in developing technologies that can detect hidden nuclear material before its use. The process of detecting and identifying nuclear materials for non-reported purposes is under the umbrella of nuclear security. Among several areas that contribute to the security and safeguards of nuclear materials, radiation data analytics has recently been marked as an area of high potential. Therefore, there is an increasing trend in applying machine learning for developing data analysis methods applied to radiation signals aiming at identifying patterns of interest associated with nuclear materials. This chapter aspires in providing a comprehensive survey and discussion of machine learning and data analytics methods pertained to nuclear security. The chapter will also discuss further trends and how data analytics can further enhance nuclear security by effectively analyzing radiation data.KeywordsMachine learningData analyticsNuclear securityRadiation data

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the key multilateral global nuclear governance body, describes itself as the ‘global platform’ for nuclear security efforts, with a ‘central role’ in facilitating international cooperation in the field. After initial contestation among member states about whether the IAEA’s mandate encompassed it, nuclear security has now been universally accepted as a valuable mainstream IAEA activity. Although states still insist that nuclear security is primarily their responsibility, the Agency’s programme continues to evolve and grow and can barely meet demand for its services. It has been particularly effective in promulgating recommendations for enhancing nuclear security at the national level and in advising and assisting states in striving for higher standards. Since the end of the Nuclear Security Summit process in 2016, the IAEA has taken on the role of principal conference convenor, involving a ministerial meeting and increasingly creative technical presentations and side events. The Agency faces the usual dilemmas of international organizations in being constrained by what its member states will allow and by financial and technical limitations. This can result in modest advances after painstaking negotiations and lowest-common-denominator approaches. With a more expansive mandate, sharper prioritization and evaluation of its activities, and guaranteed funding through the regular budget, the IAEA could make a significantly greater contribution to preventing nuclear terrorism.

A cornerstone of both nuclear safeguards and the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC) is nuclear material accountancy of which nuclear material accounting is a key component. In 2008, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published Nuclear Material Accounting Handbook for use by States and their organisations in their application of nuclear material accounting. Recognising the important role of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control (NMAC) in nuclear security, in 2015 the IAEA published an implementation guide 'Use of nuclear material accounting and control for nuclear security purposes at facilities'. The aim of this paper is to bring out important features of both the publications; one for safeguards and another for nuclear security. This paper also highlights some of the challenges that member States may come across in applying NMAC as we understand from safeguards directed to nuclear security.

This chapter traces the evolution of international law related to the weaponization of nuclear and other radioactive materials, focusing in particular on the law pertaining to preventing acts of nuclear terrorism. International efforts to control atomic energy have evolved substantially since the only use of nuclear weapons, against Japan, in 1945. Unlike for chemical and biological weapons, whose legal regimes are centred on total bans of such weapons, the legal regime for nuclear weapons founded in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons codifies a situation in which certain States retain weapons, pledging to negotiate toward disarmament, while others forego them and submit to a system of verification to ensure no diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The recognition that physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities from acts such as theft and sabotage was also highly important to both non-proliferation and radiation safety, but was not provided for under the safeguards system set up to detect and deter diversion by States of nuclear material to non-peaceful purposes, precipitated the nuclear security framework, starting with physical protection recommendations developed under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Subsequent developments related to nuclear security have been driven primarily by two issues: first, concerns regarding vulnerability of a significant amount of nuclear and other radioactive material, not necessarily part of weapons programmes, particularly following the end of the Cold War; and second, the threat that terrorists would obtain and use such materials. The latter issue came to the fore in the wake of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, displaying a new strain of mass-casualty international terrorism. These attacks were a transformative event for the area of nuclear security, leading to a number of actions aimed at strengthening the international legal framework. However, from the beginning, nuclear security has been formulated as fundamentally a national responsibility of States pursuant, where applicable, to certain international obligations. National sensitivities continue to affect the extent to which States are willing to enter into legally binding agreements. With that in mind, the present chapter looks at methods by which the law evolves and considers how they have been put into practice with respect to nuclear security in light of said national sensitivities and in response to perceived threats.

Estimating nuclear proliferation and security risks in emerging markets using Bayesian Belief Networks