Climate policy feasibility across Europe relies on the conditional middle

Sediment mitigation policies are closely linked with other agri-environmental policies and practices that control sedimentation can have impacts to a range of ecosystem services. It is therefore critical to understand the synergies and tradeoffs between sediment and other policies. Our case study is New Zealand, since it has an established emissions trading scheme and other climate and sediment policies. This paper employs an economic simulation model and non-market valuation techniques to explore the benefits and costs of sediment and climate policies in the form of payments for carbon sequestration in afforestation, highlighting the role of climate policy and its cascading effect on sediment reduction and other environmental impacts. We simulate a national sediment policy under different carbon prices and analyse the resulting impacts on water quality, greenhouse gasses, carbon sequestration, and agricultural incomes. Results indicate that the magnitude of the sediment outputs and agricultural incomes are strongly affected by climate policy, stressing the importance of jointly considering overlapping agri-environmental policies. Without climate policy, sediment loads reduce by 13.2% from the baseline, while having payments of $10/tCO2e for carbon sequestration in afforestation reduces sediment loads by 68.7% due to increase in afforestation area. In addition, agricultural incomes reduce without climate policy. Agricultural incomes become larger than in the baseline when having joint sediment and climate policies with a carbon price of $25/tCO2e and considering environmental benefits. However, marginal increase in afforestation area and incomes, and marginal decrease in sediment loads diminish with higher carbon prices.

Climate policy costs of spatially unbalanced growth in electricity demand: the case of datacentres in Ireland

There is increasing evidence that right-wing populist parties (RWPPs) and their supporters are hostile to climate and low-carbon energy policies. In this article, we provide a quantitative analysis of the effects of RWPP representation in the legislature and executive on climate and renewable energy policy for a number of countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development over the period 2007–2018. After controlling for other political, economic, and environmental factors, we find evidence for a significant and large negative effect of RWPPs in power on climate policy. Importantly, we also show that these negative effects vary with the proportionality of the electoral system and European Union membership. Both of these factors significantly moderate the negative influence of RWPPs. In countries with majoritarian electoral systems, the effects of RWPPs on climate policy work through both indirect legislative and direct executive routes. In contrast to climate policy, there is no overall significant relationship with renewable policy.

Climate change and climate policies will affect poverty reduction efforts through direct and immediate impacts on the poor and by affecting factors that condition poverty reduction, such as economic growth. This paper explores this relation between climate change and policies and poverty outcomes by examining three questions: the (static) impact on poor people's livelihood and well-being; the impact on the risk for non-poor individuals to fall into poverty; and the impact on the ability of poor people to escape poverty. The paper proposes four channels that determine household consumption and through which households may escape or fall into poverty (prices, assets, productivity, and opportunities). It then discusses whether and how these channels are affected by climate change and climate policies, focusing on the exposure, vulnerability, and ability to adapt of the poor (and those vulnerable to poverty). It reviews the existing literature and offers three major conclusions. First, climate change is likely to represent a major obstacle to a sustained eradication of poverty. Second, climate policies are compatible with poverty reduction provided that (i) poverty concerns are carefully taken into account in their design and (ii) they are accompanied by the appropriate set of social policies. Third, climate change does not modify how poverty policies should be designed, but it creates greater needs and more urgency. The scale issue is explained by the fact that climate will cause more frequent and more severe shocks; the urgency, by the need to exploit the window of opportunity given to us before climate impacts are likely to substantially increase.

For politics, people, or the planet? The political economy of fossil fuel reform, energy dependence and climate policy in Haiti

A SHIFT towards interest-driven, opportunity-based and more voluntary actions by combining bottom-up with top-down elements (Falkner, 2016).Interactive learning and experimentation at different levels of global governance have become highly important, and these complex global interactions are increasingly regarded not as obstacles but as opportunities for innovation and interactive learning (Sovacool, 2011).Global climate governance relates not only to the legal system of the climate regime but also to various public and private initiatives at different scales and across sectors.Scholars studying the complex multi-actor and multi-sector characteristics of the system have therefore begun to conceptualize global multi-level climate governance as an opportunity structure for the generation and diffusion of climate-related innovation.The topic of this special issues is climate governance within a multi-level and multi-sectoral global system.The work argues that global climate governance today aims essentially to activate the dynamic potential of each level of the global governance system, the level of world regions as well as the level of provinces and local communities.Horizontal peer-to-peer learning between countries, cities and regions, as well as vertical up-scaling of best practice, has created a dynamic of change.The cross-sectoral approach has become important as far as the mobilizing of economic interests (e.g. in the construction sector) and the use of co-benefits is concerned.This special issue intends to offer a better understanding of the nature and variety of, and linkages between, initiatives taken and governance functions delivered within the broader 'climate governance landscape ' (Betsill et al., 2015).It analyses various climate governance activities in the European Union (EU), India and China through a systemic perspective.The EU may be regarded as the strongest regional sub-system of the global system, although the BRICS countries of China and India play a comparable role, as countries both with a similar scope and with explicit multi-level climate policy activities.The systematic dimension of global climate governance is described in the introductory article 'Multi-level climate governance as a global system' by Martin Jnicke.The author analyses the potential of the global climate governance system, which is characterized by a multiplicity of access points and incentives for innovation and interactive learning.It is regarded as a 'multi-impulse-system', where the sum of even weak impulses from different parts of the system can play the role of a strong instrument.The global multi-level climate governance structure is also characterized by a specific global knowledge base and a global policy arena, allowing for climate-related agenda-setting and the mobilization of interests at each level.It is taken as an opportunity structure for ambitious innovation-based climate strategies based on interactive lesson-drawing from best practice.The lesson to be learned at all levels of the system is the potential for economic co-benefits related to the socio-technical system of clean-energy innovation and the global clean-energy market.The following article, 'The EU system of multi-level climate governance', by Martin Jnicke and Rainer Quitzow provides an overview of the regional structure of the global climate governance system.The authors understand the EU as a system where 'multi-level reinforcement' has been observed several times and which can be considered as a leader by example in global climate governance.They point to the fact that the EU has the world's highest share of green electricity and since 1990 has made the largest reduction to its greenhouse gas emissions.They attribute the EU's relatively successful performance in climate and energy governance to two main factors: (1) multi-level reinforcement and (2) the mobilization of economic interests at different levels of governance through low-carbon industrial policy.While the multi-impulse system has fostered

For decades the eu claimed for itself political leadership in fighting climate change. Less than two years from now to the global climate conference in Paris (in 2015), however, the eu’s climate policy stands at a cross roads: The eu can leave its impact weak or it decides to strengthen it showing global leadership in international climate policy making again. The situation is similar in Germany. Europe’s self-styled climate policy leader and architect of an economy-wide energy transformation (“Energiewende”) that followed the Fukushima events in 2011, the country now finds itself embattled by industry, political interest groups and consumers, and it risks losing track. If political leaders wish to save the “Energiewende” – certainly one of the boldest political reforms in decades – they need to get serious about putting it into practice.

Germany has reduced its emissions of greenhouse gases more than almost any other industrialized democracy and is exceeding its ambitious Kyoto commitment. Hence, it is commonly portrayed as a climate-policy success story, but the situation is actually much more complex. Generalizing Germany's per-capita emissions to all countries or its emissions reductions to all industrialized democracies would still very likely produce more than a two-degree rise in global temperature. Moreover, analyzing the German country-case into eleven subcases shows that it is a mixture of relative successes and failures. This analysis leads to three main conclusions. First, high relative performance and high environmental damage can coexist. Second, we should see national cases in a differentiated way and not only in terms of their aggregate performances. Third, researchers on climate policies should more often begin with outcomes, work backward to policies, and be prepared for some surprises. Ironically, the most effective government interventions may not be explicit climate policies, such as the economic transformation of eastern Germany. Moreover, the lack of policy-making in certain areas may undercut progress made elsewhere, including unregulated increases in car travel, road freight, and electricity consumption. Research on climate and environmental policies should focus on somewhat different areas of government intervention and ask different questions.

The countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have commonly been regarded as climate and energy policy laggards blocking more ambitious EU decarbonization targets. Although recent literature has increasingly acknowledged the differences in national positions on energy and climate issues among these states, there has been little comprehensive evidence about their positioning on EU climate and energy policies and the domestic interests which shape government preferences. The article addresses this gap by tracing the voting behavior of six CEE countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania) on EU energy-related legislation in the Council of Ministers between 2007–2018. The article shows that the contestation of energy policies, particularly of climate-related legislation, in the Council of Ministers has increased over time and that these six CEE countries have indeed most often objected to the adoption of EU legislation. The CEE states do not, however, have a common regional positioning on all EU energy policies. Voting coalitions among the six CEE countries differ substantially across energy policy areas. The lack of a common regional position and changing national preferences have enabled the adoption of a relatively ambitious EU Energy and Climate Package for 2030. The differences in national voting patterns are explained by the evolving interests and the ability of key domestic political and economic actors to adapt to and explore benefits from the ever-expanding EU energy and climate policies.

The subject of the article is the process of transformation of the landscape of Lower Lusatia – German’s second-largest lignite mining region – shown in the context of contemporary development trends and energy and climate policy. The experience of the last few decades has shown a variety of objectives, directions of development and activities leading to the formation of a new image and landscape identity of the region. The transformation of the landscape of Lower Lusatia is a process of change that is linked to industrial heritage, the tourist potential of the renewed landscape and the energy value based on lignite mining and the acquisition of renewable energy sources. The combination of these three processes is the basis and determinant of creating the current identity of the region. It is also an area of often conflicting interests resulting from various environmental, social and economic conditions. A factor that has a decisive influence on the development of the region is the climate and energy policy implemented in Germany, taking into account environmental objectives, economic needs and social interests to varying degrees. Limiting the adverse consequences of climate threats has now become one of the key strategic actions of the region, reflected both in planning documents and political decisions, as well as in the real landscape. The aim of the article is to show the possibilities and limitations of modern climate and energy policy and to determine the extent of its impact on the landscape, spatial and social transformation of the Lower Lusatia region. The research is also an attempt to answer the question whether the implementation of the adopted energy goals will be sufficient to change the landscape of the region in a sustainable way and sufficient for its development and improvement of the living conditions of its inhabitants.

Integrating mitigation and adaptation into climate and development policy: three research questions

The objective of our paper is to scrutinize the ongoing dynamics surrounding waste and climate policies within the federal democracies of Brazil and Canada. Our research design is guided by four primary inquiries. Firstly, we look at the integration of the circular economy concept within waste and climate policies. Secondly, we explore the extent to which concerns regarding solid waste are assimilated into climate mitigation and adaptation strategies. Thirdly, we assess the degree to which social inclusion is upheld as foundational principle within climate and waste policies. Lastly, we investigate the governance practices that have been put in place to promote effective intergovernmental and state-society cooperations. Initially, we illuminate the commonalities and disparities between Brazilian and Canadian federalism, emphasizing the challenges of policy coordination—a critical prerequisite for a smooth integration and successful execution of solid waste and climate policy initiatives. In the core section of our paper, we adopt a comparative lens to analyze both policy domains, focusing on (a) institutional frameworks, competencies, and the characteristics of the policy-making processes in each country; (b) legislative measures, programs, plans, and policy instruments to elucidate the policy fields and the linkages between them. We conclude our paper by juxtaposing the experiences of both countries and suggesting potential ways for mutual learning to improve federal democratic responses in tackling these complex and interlinked challenges.

Ambitious climate policy through centralization? Evidence from the European Union

Member states of the United Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC) are urged to limit its emission in order to maintain global temperature to 1.5 degrees Celsius that is textualised in the Glasgow Climate pact. In order to implement the mandate, Indonesia introduced several policies at national level. However, emerging issues in the public sector challenges the implementation of climate policy: fragmented agencies. This research attempts to address two questions; How fragmenting agencies impacts the implementation of climate policies? How can the implementation be possible amidst the emergence of fragmented agencies? This research utilises normative-empirical methods, where it would normatively analyse environmental policy agenda problems in selected ministries as public sector actors, while it would empirically examine the impact on the issue. This research shows that the issue of fragmented agencies in Indonesia has become the main obstacle in implementing climate policies due to the unsynchronized sectoral policy with the current climate policies in each ministry, where such fragmentation then obstructs good environmental governance. Furthermore, the implementation of Indonesia’s environmental and climate policies would not be optimally implemented if the aforementioned issue cannot be resolved through each ministries agenda restructuration. Another recommendation is to utilise the Penta Helix method in optimising climate policy implementation by multisectoral cooperation in climate policy.

This article analyzes how U.S. climate change politics and policy making are changing in the public, private and civil society sectors, and how such changes are likely to influence U.S. federal policies. It outlines the current status of U.S. climate change action and explores four overlapping pathways of policy change: (1) the strategic demonstration of the feasibility of climate change action; (2) the creation and expansion of markets; (3) policy diffusion and learning; and (4) the creation and promulgation of norms about the need for more aggressive climate change action. These four pathways seek to fruitfully draw from rationalist and constructivist approaches to policy analysis, without collapsing or confusing the different logics. Building on this analysis, it predicts that future federal U.S. climate policy will include six major components: (1) A national cap on GHG emissions; (2) A national market based cap‐and‐trade GHG emissions trading scheme; (3) Mandatory renewable energy portfolio standards; (4) Increased national product standards for energy efficiency; (5) Increased vehicle fleet energy efficiency standards; and (6) Increased federal incentives for research and development on energy efficiency issues and renewable energy development. In addition, expanding federal climate policy may bring about significant changes in U.S. foreign policy as U.S. international re‐engagement on climate change is likely to occur only after the development of more significant federal policy.