Common Visual Preference for Curved Contours in Humans and Great Apes.

Non-human great apes – chimpanzees, gorillas, bonobos, and orangutans – are threatened by agricultural expansion, particularly from rice, cacao, cassava, maize, and oil palm cultivation. Agriculture replaces and fragments great ape habitats, bringing them closer to humans and often resulting in conflict. Though the impact of agriculture on great apes is well-recognized, there is still a need for a more nuanced understanding of specific contexts and associated negative impacts on habitats and populations. Here we review these contexts and their implications for great apes. We estimate that within their African and South-East Asian ranges, there are about 100 people for each great ape. Given that most apes live outside strictly protected areas and the growing human population and increasing demand for resources in these landscapes, it will be challenging to balance the needs of both humans and great apes. Further habitat loss is expected, particularly in Africa, where compromises must be sought to re-direct agricultural expansion driven by subsistence farmers with small fields (generally <0.64 ha) away from remaining great ape habitats. To promote coexistence between humans and great apes, new approaches and financial models need to be implemented at local scales. Overall, optimized land use planning and effective implementation, along with strategic investments in agriculture and wildlife conservation, can improve the synergies between conservation and food production. Effective governance and conservation financing are crucial for optimal outcomes in both conservation and food security. Enforcing forest conservation laws, engaging in trade policy discussions, and integrating policies on trade, food security, improved agricultural techniques, and sustainable food systems are vital to prevent further decline in great ape populations. Saving great apes requires a thorough consideration of specific agricultural contexts.

Milk macronutrients from great apes differed throughout lactation. Milk macronutrients but not IgA from non-human great apes and humans were quite similar. Milk protein was greater in Gorilla compared with Orangutan.

Human joint action seems special, as it is grounded in joint commitment—a sense of mutual obligation participants feel towards each other. Comparative research with humans and non-human great apes has typically investigated joint commitment by experimentally interrupting joint actions to study subjects’ resumption strategies. However, such experimental interruptions are human-induced, and thus the question remains of how great apes naturally handle interruptions. Here, we focus on naturally occurring interruptions of joint actions, grooming and play, in bonobos and chimpanzees. Similar to humans, both species frequently resumed interrupted joint actions (and the previous behaviours, like grooming the same body part region or playing the same play type) with their previous partners and at the previous location. Yet, the probability of resumption attempts was unaffected by social bonds or rank. Our data suggest that great apes experience something akin to joint commitment, for which we discuss possible evolutionary origins.

The cross-reactivity of five different rabbit polyclonal antibodies to human IgG and IgG subclass (IgG1, IgG2, IgG3, and IgG4) was determined by competitive ELISA with nine nonhuman primate species including five apes, three Old World monkeys, and one New World monkey. As similar to those previously reported, the reactivity of anti-human IgG antibody with plasma from different primate species was closely related with phylogenic distance from human. Every anti-human IgG subclass antibody showed low cross-reactivity with plasma from Old World and New World monkeys. The plasma from all apes except for gibbons (Hylobates spp.) showed 60 to 100% of cross-reactivity with anti-human IgG2 and IgG3 antibodies. On the other hand, chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes and Pan paniscus) and orangutan (Pongo pygmaeus) plasma showed 100% cross-reactivity with anti-human IgG1 antibody, but gorilla (Gorilla gorilla) and gibbon plasma showed no cross-reactivity. The chimpanzee and gorilla plasma cross-reacted with anti-human IgG4 antibody at different reactivity, 100% in chimpanzee and 50% in gorilla, but no cross-reactivity was observed in orangutan and gibbon plasma. These results suggest the possibilities that the divergence of "human-type" IgG subclasses might occur at the time of divergence of Homo sapience from Hylobatidae, and that the molecular evolution of IgG1 as well as IgG4 is different from that of IgG2 and IgG3 in great apes, this is probably caused by different in development of immune function in apes during the course of evolution.

To answer tantalizing questions such as whether animals are moral or how morality evolved, I propose starting with a somewhat less fraught question: do animals have normative cognition? Recent psychological research suggests that normative thinking, or ought-thought, begins early in human development. Recent philosophical research suggests that folk psychology is grounded in normative thought. Recent primatology research finds evidence of sophisticated cultural and social learning capacities in great apes. Drawing on these three literatures, I argue that the human variety of social cognition and moral cognition encompass the same cognitive capacities and that the nonhuman great apes may also be normative beings. To make this argument, I develop an account of animal social norms that shares key properties with Cristina Bicchieri's account of social norms but which lowers the cognitive requirements for having a social norm. I propose a set of four early developing prerequisites implicated in social cognition that make up what I call naïve normativity: (1) the ability to identify agents, (2) sensitivity to in-group/out-group differences, (3) the capacity for social learning of group traditions, and (4) responsiveness to appropriateness. I review the ape cognition literature and present preliminary empirical evidence supporting the existence of social norms and naïve normativity in great apes. While there is more empirical work to be done, I hope to have offered a framework for studying normativity in other species, and I conclude that we should be open to the possibility that normative cognition is yet another ancient cognitive endowment that is not human-unique.

To answer tantalizing questions such as whether animals are moral or how morality evolved, I propose starting with a somewhat less fraught question: do animals have normative cognition? Recent psychological research suggests that normative thinking, or ought-thought, begins early in human development. Recent philosophical research suggests that folk psychology is grounded in normative thought. Recent primatology research finds evidence of sophisticated cultural and social learning capacities in great apes. Drawing on these three literatures, I argue that the human variety of social cognition and moral cognition encompass the same cognitive capacities and that the nonhuman great apes may also be normative beings. To make this argument, I develop an account of animal social norms that shares key properties with Cristina Bicchieri’s account of social norms but which lowers the cognitive requirements for having a social norm. I propose a set of four early developing prerequisites implicated in social cognition that make up what I call naïve normativity: (1) the ability to identify agents, (2) sensitivity to in-group/out-group differences, (3) the capacity for social learning of group traditions, and (4) responsiveness to appropriateness. I review the ape cognition literature and present preliminary empirical evidence supporting the existence of social norms and nave normativity in great apes. While there is more empirical work to be done, I hope to have offered a framework for studying normativity in other species, and I conclude that we should be open to the possibility that normative cognition is yet another ancient cognitive endowment that is not human-unique. Originally published as: Andrews, K. (2020). Naïve Normativity: The Social Foundation of Moral Cognition. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 6(1), 36-56. https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2019.30

Kevan A. C. Martin, a neurobiologist and director of the Institute of Neuroinformatics—a joint institute of the University of Zurich and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology—has a moral dilemma. For the past four years, he has not hired any postdoctoral fellows or PhD students. He feels he cannot take them on in good conscience because he cannot guarantee they will be able to do research. It was another moral debate that put him in this position; his work on rhesus macaques has been put on hold and he is uncertain when, or if, it will resume in Switzerland. > …the real impact on primate labs might come from pending revisions to legislation in Europe and the USA that could potentially end research on apes and monkeys altogether In 2004, the Swiss Constitution was changed to acknowledge “the dignity of living beings,” which, according to Martin, was intended to address concerns about transgenic experimentation, rather than animal research in general. Nevertheless, the change resulted in some members of a local external advisory committee on animal experimentation legally challenging the 2006 renewal of Martin's license to use the monkeys for neurobiological research. Similar legal action was taken against Daniel Kiper at the same institute, whose research on brain plasticity in monkeys has relevance for stroke patients. A third researcher, whose work on motor systems has implications for patients with spinal cord damage, has decided to leave Switzerland (Staub, 2007). All three of these projects were approved by the Zurich Canton's Veterinary Office, which controls experiments on animals. Martin's case has been working its way through the Swiss courts and is finally before Switzerland's Federal Supreme Court. In the meantime, Martin, who established the Institute in Zurich with Rodney Douglas 13 years ago, has been limited to using post‐mortem monkey brains. These are …

It was long assumed that only humans can distinguish the living from the dead. Renewed interest in this question over the last decade has led several authors to assert that non-human primates are also aware of death. We investigate this issue by comparing the behaviours of monkeys and great apes toward helpless conspecifics, basing our analysis on published reports. We first examine the behaviours of mothers towards the body of their dead offspring. They may carry the corpse for days or more before abandoning it. They groom, inspect and protect it, sometimes allowing group members to explore it, and rare cases of cannibalism have been reported. No significant difference is observed in the way that monkeys and great apes treat the bodies of infants. We then examine responses to collapsed (still able to move and react) and inanimate (unresponsive or dead) conspecifics. Monkeys and great apes guard, care for and inspect their helpless partners, and also manipulate and mobilise them. Through these actions, individuals may inform themselves about the state of their partners, test their responsiveness and/or attempt to rouse them. It appears that only chimpanzees and gorillas show violent action such as display behaviours and the rough treatment of bodies. They can also make distress calls, and periods of “stunned silence” sometimes occur in chimpanzees, indicating that they are experiencing intense emotion. Finally, we argue that while both monkeys and great apes detect body dysfunction through the victims’ inability to wake up and move, only great apes can understand that something serious has happened. The signs of emotional disturbance reported in them indicate that they may believe that inanimate conspecifics have entered a state of “dormancy”, meaning that they are unlikely to regain wakefulness. However, there is no evidence that any non-human primates are aware of mortality.

Differential Expression and Function of the CD33-Related Siglecs between Humans and Great Apes.

Long terminal repeats (LTRs) are common retrovirus-related sequences spread throughout the human genome. We previously reported the human-specific integration of one LTR (DQLTR3) located 15 kb upstream of HLA DQB1. To elucidate the contribution of retroviral sequences to the variability and phylogenetic background of HLA DQB1 we investigated another LTR (DQLTR13), located 1.3 kb upstream of HLA DQB1, in German families, great apes, and Old World monkeys. Within German families, DQLTR13 presence was strongly linked to HLA DQB1*0302, *0303, and *0402 haplotypes. All other haplotypes had a low frequency or were devoid of DQLTR13. Phylogenetic analysis of DQLTR13 and adjacent nucleotide sequences in humans and non-human primates revealed a high degree of similarity and recent origin of HLA DQB1*0302, *0303, and *0402. Nevertheless, two lineages leading to DQB1*0301 and *0302 were generated by an ancient split of a DQB1*0301, *0302 progenitor. A third lineage consisting of DQB1*05/*06-related sequences may have evolved from the DQB1*0302 lineage, and a DQB1*0201-related sequence shared common ancestry with DQB1*0301. Among the human haplotypes, HLA DQB1*0201 and *0301 are linked to two different DQA1 alleles. Based on the small genetic distance of DQLTR13 as well as the adjacent sequences on these haplotypes, we suggest that a recent recombination is responsible for these associations. In the analysis of nonhuman primate species, we detected DQLTR13 in two lowland gorillas, dating the integration at at least 8 million years ago. We therefore conclude that noncoding sequences up to 1.3 kb upstream of DQB1 provide novel insight into the generation of MHC gene diversity.

Visual preference was evaluated in a male agile gibbon. The subject was raised by humans immediately after birth, but lived with his biological family from one year of age. Visual preference was assessed using a free-choice task in which five or six photographs of different primate species, including humans, were presented on a touch-sensitive screen. The subject touched one of them. Food rewards were delivered irrespective of the subject's responses. We prepared two types of stimulus sets. With set 1, the subject touched photographs of humans more frequently than those of other species, recalling previous findings in human-reared chimpanzees. With set 2, photographs of nine species of gibbons were presented. Chimpanzees touched photographs of white-handed gibbons more than those of other gibbon species. The gibbon subject initially touched photographs of agile gibbons more than white-handed gibbons, but after one and two years his choice patterns resembled the chimpanzees'. The results suggest that, as in chimpanzees, visual preferences of agile gibbons are not genetically programmed but develop through social experience during infancy.

G-quadruplexes (G4s) are noncanonical DNA secondary structures formed by runs of guanines (stems) connected by other nucleotides (loops). These structures are enriched at regulatory regions such as promoters, CpG islands, untranslated regions (UTRs), enhancers, and replication origins, where they play key roles in transcription and replication. Although prior studies have demonstrated that G4s exhibit higher mutation rates than canonical DNA, little is known about the substitution patterns and selection acting specifically on G4 stems and loops. In this study, we utilized Telomere-to-Telomere (T2T) genome assemblies from human and two non-human great apes (chimpanzee and Bornean orangutan) to analyse substitution spectra and selective constraints within G4s, focusing on differences between stems and loops. We observed that fixed nucleotide substitutions leading to the gain or loss of G4 structures are more frequently located at stems, while those in G4s conserved across species are more often found at loops. On the other hand, single-nucleotide polymorphisms had similar frequencies between stems and loops. To evaluate selection, we employed two approaches: we computed the ratio of substitution to polymorphism frequencies at stems versus loops and performed phylogenetic modeling using PhyloFit. Both methods consistently revealed that stems of shared G4s experience stronger purifying selection than loops, particularly at promoters, enhancers, and UTRs. Our results provide novel insights into the sequence variation and selection of G4s, informing our understanding of their contributions to genome evolution and function.

Identifying cognitive capacities underlying the human evolutionary transition is challenging, and many hypotheses exist for what makes humans capable of, for example, producing and understanding language, preparing meals, and having culture on a grand scale. Instead of describing processes whereby information is processed, recent studies have suggested that there are key differences between humans and other animals in how information is recognized and remembered. Such constraints may act as a bottleneck for subsequent information processing and behavior, proving important for understanding differences between humans and other animals. We briefly discuss different sequential aspects of cognition and behavior and the importance of distinguishing between simultaneous and sequential input, and conclude that explicit tests on non-human great apes have been lacking. Here, we test the memory for stimulus sequences-hypothesis by carrying out three tests on bonobos and one test on humans. Our results show that bonobos' general working memory decays rapidly and that they fail to learn the difference between the order of two stimuli even after more than 2,000 trials, corroborating earlier findings in other animals. However, as expected, humans solve the same sequence discrimination almost immediately. The explicit test on whether bonobos represent stimulus sequences as an unstructured collection of memory traces was not informative as no differences were found between responses to the different probe tests. However, overall, this first empirical study of sequence discrimination on non-human great apes supports the idea that non-human animals, including the closest relatives to humans, lack a memory for stimulus sequences. This may be an ability that sets humans apart from other animals and could be one reason behind the origin of human culture.

A 47-yr-old multiparous female bonobo ( Pan paniscus) tested positive for pregnancy on a routine urine test. Because this geriatric animal was considered postreproductive, oral contraception had been discontinued. Sequential transabdominal ultrasound evaluations were performed under voluntary behavior and revealed that the uterus contained a mass of heterogenous tissue which was rapidly increasing in size. Due to a lack of normal fetal development and the ultrasonographic appearance of the uterine tissue, a molar pregnancy was suspected. Ovariohysterectomy was performed, and a complete hydatidiform mole was confirmed through human chorionic gonadotropin levels as well as gross and histological examination of the uterus. To the authors' knowledge, this is the first time a complete molar pregnancy has been reported antemortem in a nonhuman great ape, although a single case of partial hydatidiform mole was previously documented in a chimpanzee on postmortem examination. This case describes the successful medical and surgical management of complete molar pregnancy in a bonobo and provides support for extending the age range of birth control recommendations in geriatric captive great apes that exhibit active breeding behavior.

Bayesian classification and inference of occupant visual preferences in daylit perimeter private offices