Computing optimal strategy against quantal response in security games

While three deployed applications of game theory for security have recently been reported at AAMAS [12], we as a community remain in the early stages of these deployments; there is a continuing need to understand the core principles for innovative security applications of game theory. Towards that end, this paper presents PROTECT, a game-theoretic system deployed by the United States Coast Guard (USCG) in the port of Boston for scheduling their patrols. USCG has termed the deployment of PROTECT in Boston a success, and efforts are underway to test it in the port of New York, with the potential for nationwide deployment.PROTECT is premised on an attacker-defender Stackelberg game model and offers five key innovations. First, this system is a departure from the assumption of perfect adversary rationality noted in previous work, relying instead on a quantal response (QR) model of the adversary's behavior --- to the best of our knowledge, this is the first real-world deployment of the QR model. Second, to improve PROTECT's efficiency, we generate a compact representation of the defender's strategy space, exploiting equivalence and dominance. Third, we show how to practically model a real maritime patrolling problem as a Stackelberg game. Fourth, our experimental results illustrate that PROTECT's QR model more robustly handles real-world uncertainties than a perfect rationality model. Finally, in evaluating PROTECT, this paper for the first time provides real-world data: (i) comparison of human-generated vs PROTECT security schedules, and (ii) results from an Adversarial Perspective Team's (human mock attackers) analysis.

Risk factors for severe outcomes among members of the United States military hospitalized with pneumonia and influenza, 2000–2012

Measures the impact of armed US Coast Guard boardings on those aboard boarded vessels. A sample of fifty subjects (half members of a graduate class on “Maritime Crime and its Prevention”, half others), completed questionnaires after experiencing a (pre‐arranged but undisclosed) interception and boarding by a US Coast Guard Cutter of the vessel on which they were traveling. Subjects reported satisfaction with the conduct of the boarding, but experienced different anxiety levels during the encounter, ranging from low levels (one third), medium levels (one third) to relatively high levels of anxiety. Boarding parties should be concerned with the latter group. Training and sensitivity to deal with that group needs to be emphasized.

Fighting pollution

In 1993, the US Coast Guard proposed to construct two breakwaters and a debris boom to protect its existing pier and moored vessels inside Ediz Hook in Port Angeles Harbor, Washington. To assist the US Army Corps of Engineers -- Seattle District in determining the potential environmental impacts of the proposed breakwaters, Battelle/Marine Sciences Laboratory performed subtidal SCUBA surveys as specified in the Washington Department of Fisheries intermediate eelgrass/macroalgae habitat survey guidelines. The objectives of the subtidal surveys were to (1) quantify the shoot densities of eelgrass; (2) provide percent cover estimates for non-eelgrass macroalgae species; (3) develop a site map indicating the qualitative distribution of eelgrass/macroalgae species, substrate characterization, approximate depth contours, and the approximate location of the proposed project features; and (4) document the time and date of the surveys, turbidity/visibility, presence of invertebrate/vertebrate species, and anecdotal observations pertinent to habitat characterization of the project site. A total of 14 dives along 12 transects (T1--T12) were successfully completed between March 15 and March 17, 1993. Eelgrass was observed on all of the transects except T7 and T8 at the western debris barrier and T12 along the waterward margin of the existing T-pier. The vicinity of the proposed east breakwater had the highest eelgrass shoot densities (up to 89 shoots/m{sup 2}) observed by the divers. Macroalgae and invertebrate species diversity were also highest at the east breakwater site. The low eelgrass densities observed at the west debris barrier site (0 to 14 shoots/m{sup 2}) can be attributed mostly to the lack of suitable substrate. The existing layer of wood debris armoring the bottom at the west project site currently limits, and in the areas of heaviest deposition probably precludes, the growth of eelgrass. As was expected, no eelgrass was observed at the south breakwater site.

A commonly accepted framework for the development of policies and supporting regulations that address cybersecurity vulnerabilities and threats seems to be missing both domestically in the USA and in terms of international collaboration amongst maritime stakeholders. This research aimed at establishing the actions that would allow commonly accepted and established cybersecurity policies and regulations for the maritime transportation system (MTS) and the critical infrastructure connected to it. A multiple case-study design was adopted and in-depth interviews were conducted until data saturation was achieved with 12 US Coast Guard operational commanders. The results of the study suggest the need for greater collaborations among interested parties at the national (US Coast Guard, port authorities, etc.) and international level (International Maritime Organization, United Nations, etc.) for the establishment of mutually accepted cybersecurity as well as among private industries for sharing cyber intrusion data and protection best practices.

Traditional proactive network defenses deploy security resources in the network based on probabilistic policies to confuse potential attackers. However, this strategy can be exploited by stealthy attackers, leading to reduced efficiency and higher vulnerability. Game theory has been shown to provide a sound mathematical approach to overcome these deficiencies and determine an optimal defense strategy. However, existing game theoretic models typically either assume additive utility functions, or that the attacker can attack only one target. While such assumptions lead to tractable analyses, they miss key inherent dependencies that exist among different targets in current complex networks. In this chapter, we generalize the traditional security game model to the network scenario. We examine such a general security game from a theoretical perspective and provide a unified theoretical framework. In particular, we show that each security game is equivalent to a combinatorial optimization problem over a set system, which consists of defender’s pure strategy space. The key technique we use is based on projection of a polytope based transformation, and the ellipsoid method. We also provide several important applications of our developed framework, and show that for several problem classes, optimal defense strategies can be developed in polynomial time. Our approach paves the way for a deeper investigation into using game theoretic techniques for solving designing security mechanisms in networks, and we conclude by outlining a number of important future directions that need to be investigated.

This study examined whether the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2006 affected the United States (US) Coast Guard performance characteristics with respect to incident response. The periods analyzed consisted of a decade before versus a decade after implementation of the legislation. Using analysis of variance (ANOVA) and the p-value approach (p < 0.05), six hypotheses were tested to determine whether statistically significant differences in response attributes existed during the 10 years before versus the 10 years following the passing of the legislation. Four significant hypothesis-testing outcomes represented differences in the number of incidents, incident responses, cumulative lives lost, and lives lost after notification.

Even though the Ballast Water Management Convention (BWMC) (referred to herewith as the Convention) has been ratified and a few ballast water management systems (BMWS) have received US Coast Guard (USCG) type approval, many shipowners and operators are reticent to begin the significant process of planning for compliance with ballast water discharge and performance standards. This delay is most probably due to the uncertainty in the implementation dates in the BWMC and limited options of USCG type approved BWMS. These delays may result in significant ramifications for shipowners if the process for compliance is not fully evaluated. This process includes selecting, designing installation, purchasing, start-up and commissioning of BWMS. Clarity on the implementation schedule should be determined at the 71st session of the Marine Environmental Protection Committee of the International Maritime Organization (IMO MEPC 71) and allow shipowners to plan for compliance. An important aspect of implementation is developing a strong compliance plan. A central part of compliance is identifying possible problems and contingency options that may alleviate any potential port State control issues. The paper will identify possible problems and contingency measures to ensure ship operations are not impacted. An important issue is that the BWMC does not include provisions for contingency measures. The paper will also outline needed contingency measures to be addressed by the IMO in any amendments to the BWMC.

The collision between the USCGC Cuyahoga and the motor vessel Santa Cruz II resulted in psychological distress among the Coast Guard crewmen. The US Navy Special Psychiatric Rapid Intervention Team (SPRINT) was activated to provide mental health services to the Coast Guard survivors and others who had been affected by the disaster. The psychiatric records of the 18 survivors were examined and summarized, and combined with anecdotal comments made by SPRINT members. The most prominent psychological reactions among the survivors were shock, anger, sadness, and guilt. Spouses of the survivors dealt with bereavement and strove to understand their husbands' reactions. Variables identified by the SPRINT as being important to their success were communication with and support from the training center command, assurances of confidentiality to the survivors, and commencement of their work almost immediately following the collision.

Managers need a framework for assessing various kinds of risk and uncertainty that will continue to confront corporate decision makers as the 9/11 event plays out over the following months and years. The authors suggest an innovative scenario process, one that provides business continuity planning and medium‐term operational planning with a more rigorous analytical grounding, but without overburdening the process with excessive and ultimately counter‐productive complexity. The authors have introduced alternative scenario‐based tools to respond to this specific need for continuity assurance and near‐term operations planning. Case one: business continuity planning (BCP) for the management of one leading global financial services firm committed to a process of identifying and remedying gaps in the recoverability of its key assets. Workshops developed strategies that would close unacceptable asset recovery gaps in two scenarios. Case two: medium term operational planning for a professional services firm in the weeks that followed 9/11 evaluated the plausible range of impacts on their business and operations as the USA and the world took action and terrorist groups responded further. Case three: three years ago the US Coast Guard developed scenarios for very long range strategic planning for their long view project. The Coast Guard developed ten basic strategies from these scenarios. The fourth strategy was “Acquire full maritime domain awareness”. The goal was to give the Coast Guard the ability to acquire, track, and identify in real time any vessel or aircraft entering America’s maritime domain. Maritime domain awareness (MDA) turned out to be highly relevant for USCG decision making both before and after 9/11. Of all the major US federal services involved in the 9/11 response operation, the Coast Guard was singled out for its agility and preparedness.

This study investigates the probabilities of vessel safety and pollution inspections by type of vessel by the US Coast Guard based upon individual vessel inspections for the years 1992–2001. Probit estimates of vessel safety (versus pollution) inspection equations suggest that fishing, passenger, recreation and tug boats are less (more) likely to be inspected for safety (pollution), whereas tank barges and US flag vessels are more (less) likely to be inspected for safety (pollution). Also, vessel safety and pollution inspection probabilities by vessel type vary by Coast Guard district and time. The probability of a US flag vessel being inspected for safety has increased over the time period of the study. The results bring into question the effectiveness of the Coast Guard in reducing the oil-spill pollution of tank barges and improving the safety of fishing boats.

Among the variety of oil spill response countermeasures, including mechanical, chemical, in-situ burning and bioremediation, deployment of chemical dispersants has been successfully utilized in numerous oil spills. This paper will review the history of the United States Coast Guard (USCG) C-130 Air Dispersant Delivery System (ADDS) capability, deployment in remote areas, and associated challenges. ADDS consists of a large tank with dispersant(e.g., 51,000 pounds), owned and operated by an industry partner, used aboard USCG C-130 aircraft designed to be ADDS capable as specified in various agreements for marine environmental protection missions. ADDS is a highly complex tool to utilize, requiring extensive training by air crews and industry equipment technicians to safely and properly deploy during an oil spill response. In 2011, the Commandant of the USCG, Admiral Papp reaffirmed the USCG's C-130 ADDS capability during a hearing before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries and the Coast Guard. The use of ADDS in remote areas creates unique challenges, such as logistical coordination between the USCG and spill response industry partners and maintaining proficiency with personnel. It is critical for federal, state, and local agencies, industry, and academia to understand the history and challenges of ADDS to ensure the successful utilization of this response tool in an actual oil spill incident.

Cyber deception has great potential in thwarting cyberattacks [1, 4, 8]. A defender (e.g., network administrator) can use deceptive cyber artifacts such as honeypots and faking services to confuse attackers (e.g., hackers) and thus reduce the success rate and effectiveness of attacks. However, the attackers are often diverse and some attackers may be aware of the deception and adapt to the defender's strategy. Therefore, when the defender designs the deception strategy, he needs to take into account the attacker's strategic response. Game theory is suitable for such strategic interaction between the defender and the attacker. Building upon our previous work on security games,[2, 3] we developed a series of game-theoretic models for cyber deception, as well as algorithms to compute the equilibrium or the optimal defender strategy in the games. The first model we proposed is the Cyber Deception Game, a zero-sum Stackelberg game between the defender and an adversary. In this game, the defender is tasked to protect a set of targets, where each target corresponds to a system or a node in a network. Each target has a true configuration, which consists of a set of attributes, e.g., an operating system, services hosted, etc. The defender can choose an observed configuration for each target when responding to probes and scans that may be launched by the attacker. The observed configuration can be different from the true configuration and thus the deception. The attacker, after collecting information about the observed configuration, chooses which target to attack. We show that finding the defender's optimal strategy is NP-hard and provides mixed-integer linear programming (MILP)-based algorithms to compute the optimal deception scheme, and also several heuristic algorithms. In a follow-up work,[7] we extended this game model to a general-sum one, which captures the fact that the cost for the defender may not always be equal to the gain of the attacker. The general-sum nature of this new game model leads to new computational challenges. We provided a Fully Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme (FPTAS) for solving the game and designed a MILP-based algorithm together with several techniques to speed up the computation. In a recent work,[5] we proposed a new attack graph-based Stackelberg security game model and analyze the optimal deception strategy the defender can use. In contrast to previous models, the attacker in this new game can take sequential actions to reach the targets, which is modeled as taking a path on the attack graph. The defender can strategically manipulate the attack graph through deceptive actions in addition to allocating defensive resources to protect important targets from attackers. We provided a MILP-based solution for a special class of attack graphs and a neural architecture search-based method for general directed acyclic attack graphs. We empirically demonstrated the benefit of deception in all these game models and the scalability of the algorithms. This talk features an introduction to these models and algorithms, together with a discussion on future research directions for game theory-based cyber deception.

This paper describes the important regulatory changes underway in the United States (US) that will dramatically affect the design, construction, and operation of offshore terminals for importing liquefied natural gas (LNG). Numerous US oil and gas companies are developing projects to build offshore terminals for importing LNG into the US. As the offshore LNG terminal concept applies new technology, regulatory and technical design rules that will apply to these facilities are rapidly evolving. With the passage of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, the Deepwater Port Act of 1974 (DWPA) (33 USC 1501-1524) has been amended to include natural gas, fundamentally altering the regulatory process for offshore LNG terminals. Whereas the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the US Coast Guard (USCG) previously played important roles in permitting and regulating onshore LNG facilities, the USCG and the US Maritime Administration (MARAD) now share the primary responsibility of regulating these facilities offshore, with subsidiary roles played by other federal agencies and the involved states. This paper examines the USCG's new role in offshore LNG terminal development, as well as the major requirements the DWPA imposes on applicants. The USCG will soon publish implementing regulations. DWPA requirements that previously applied to oil, now provide clues regarding the likely environmental review process. Although the USCG will be moving to the Department of Homeland Security, siting and operational oversight for deepwater ports is expected to remain with the Secretary of the Department of Transportation (SECDOT). This paper examines the Deepwater Port regulatory process and describes how these complex licensing requirements could affect the proposed siting, commercial viability, and environmental regulatory review of offshore LNG terminals. This paper also examines current efforts by various classification societies to develop technical guidance regarding the design, construction, and ongoing maintenance of offshore LNG terminals. The ABS Guidance Notes on Building and Classing Offshore LNG Terminals will be presented as an example of classification society efforts to fill the US regulatory void that currently exists for the technical requirements of offshore LNG terminals. In conclusion, this paper proposes a process to combine current regulations with classification society guidance as an effective means of developing appropriate design, construction, and operational requirements for offshore LNG terminals. Such a process may be helpful to US regulators in expediting the regulatory approval process for offshore LNG terminals currently being developed. Finally, this paper assists developers of offshore LNG terminals in understanding the complex US regulatory process and developing effective strategies to expedite critical regulatory approvals. The US Regulatory Scheme for LNG Terminals Prior to the passage of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 by Congress, and its signing by President Bush on November 25, 2002, FERC had jurisdiction over the siting of LNG import terminals under Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act. FERC asserted that this authority applied to both onshore and offshore LNG terminals.