The US Coast Guard Vessel Inspection Programme: A Probability Analysis

This study investigates the probabilities of vessel safety and pollution inspections by type of vessel by the U.S. Coast Guard based upon individual vessel inspections for the years 1992-2001. Probit estimates of vessel safety (versus pollution) inspection equations suggest that fishing, passenger, recreation and tug boats are less (more) likely to be inspected for safety (pollution), whereas tank barges and U.S. flag vessels are more (less) likely to be inspected for safety (pollution). Also, vessel safety and pollution inspection probabilities by vessel type vary by Coast Guard district and time. The probability of a U.S. flag vessel being inspected for safety has increased over the time period of the study. The results bring into question the effectiveness of the Coast Guard in reducing the oil-spill pollution of tank barges and improving the safety of fishing boats.

Risk factors for severe outcomes among members of the United States military hospitalized with pneumonia and influenza, 2000–2012

Measures the impact of armed US Coast Guard boardings on those aboard boarded vessels. A sample of fifty subjects (half members of a graduate class on “Maritime Crime and its Prevention”, half others), completed questionnaires after experiencing a (pre‐arranged but undisclosed) interception and boarding by a US Coast Guard Cutter of the vessel on which they were traveling. Subjects reported satisfaction with the conduct of the boarding, but experienced different anxiety levels during the encounter, ranging from low levels (one third), medium levels (one third) to relatively high levels of anxiety. Boarding parties should be concerned with the latter group. Training and sensitivity to deal with that group needs to be emphasized.

Fighting pollution

In 1993, the US Coast Guard proposed to construct two breakwaters and a debris boom to protect its existing pier and moored vessels inside Ediz Hook in Port Angeles Harbor, Washington. To assist the US Army Corps of Engineers -- Seattle District in determining the potential environmental impacts of the proposed breakwaters, Battelle/Marine Sciences Laboratory performed subtidal SCUBA surveys as specified in the Washington Department of Fisheries intermediate eelgrass/macroalgae habitat survey guidelines. The objectives of the subtidal surveys were to (1) quantify the shoot densities of eelgrass; (2) provide percent cover estimates for non-eelgrass macroalgae species; (3) develop a site map indicating the qualitative distribution of eelgrass/macroalgae species, substrate characterization, approximate depth contours, and the approximate location of the proposed project features; and (4) document the time and date of the surveys, turbidity/visibility, presence of invertebrate/vertebrate species, and anecdotal observations pertinent to habitat characterization of the project site. A total of 14 dives along 12 transects (T1--T12) were successfully completed between March 15 and March 17, 1993. Eelgrass was observed on all of the transects except T7 and T8 at the western debris barrier and T12 along the waterward margin of the existing T-pier. The vicinity of the proposed east breakwater had the highest eelgrass shoot densities (up to 89 shoots/m{sup 2}) observed by the divers. Macroalgae and invertebrate species diversity were also highest at the east breakwater site. The low eelgrass densities observed at the west debris barrier site (0 to 14 shoots/m{sup 2}) can be attributed mostly to the lack of suitable substrate. The existing layer of wood debris armoring the bottom at the west project site currently limits, and in the areas of heaviest deposition probably precludes, the growth of eelgrass. As was expected, no eelgrass was observed at the south breakwater site.

A commonly accepted framework for the development of policies and supporting regulations that address cybersecurity vulnerabilities and threats seems to be missing both domestically in the USA and in terms of international collaboration amongst maritime stakeholders. This research aimed at establishing the actions that would allow commonly accepted and established cybersecurity policies and regulations for the maritime transportation system (MTS) and the critical infrastructure connected to it. A multiple case-study design was adopted and in-depth interviews were conducted until data saturation was achieved with 12 US Coast Guard operational commanders. The results of the study suggest the need for greater collaborations among interested parties at the national (US Coast Guard, port authorities, etc.) and international level (International Maritime Organization, United Nations, etc.) for the establishment of mutually accepted cybersecurity as well as among private industries for sharing cyber intrusion data and protection best practices.

This study examined whether the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2006 affected the United States (US) Coast Guard performance characteristics with respect to incident response. The periods analyzed consisted of a decade before versus a decade after implementation of the legislation. Using analysis of variance (ANOVA) and the p-value approach (p < 0.05), six hypotheses were tested to determine whether statistically significant differences in response attributes existed during the 10 years before versus the 10 years following the passing of the legislation. Four significant hypothesis-testing outcomes represented differences in the number of incidents, incident responses, cumulative lives lost, and lives lost after notification.

The collision between the USCGC Cuyahoga and the motor vessel Santa Cruz II resulted in psychological distress among the Coast Guard crewmen. The US Navy Special Psychiatric Rapid Intervention Team (SPRINT) was activated to provide mental health services to the Coast Guard survivors and others who had been affected by the disaster. The psychiatric records of the 18 survivors were examined and summarized, and combined with anecdotal comments made by SPRINT members. The most prominent psychological reactions among the survivors were shock, anger, sadness, and guilt. Spouses of the survivors dealt with bereavement and strove to understand their husbands' reactions. Variables identified by the SPRINT as being important to their success were communication with and support from the training center command, assurances of confidentiality to the survivors, and commencement of their work almost immediately following the collision.

Managers need a framework for assessing various kinds of risk and uncertainty that will continue to confront corporate decision makers as the 9/11 event plays out over the following months and years. The authors suggest an innovative scenario process, one that provides business continuity planning and medium‐term operational planning with a more rigorous analytical grounding, but without overburdening the process with excessive and ultimately counter‐productive complexity. The authors have introduced alternative scenario‐based tools to respond to this specific need for continuity assurance and near‐term operations planning. Case one: business continuity planning (BCP) for the management of one leading global financial services firm committed to a process of identifying and remedying gaps in the recoverability of its key assets. Workshops developed strategies that would close unacceptable asset recovery gaps in two scenarios. Case two: medium term operational planning for a professional services firm in the weeks that followed 9/11 evaluated the plausible range of impacts on their business and operations as the USA and the world took action and terrorist groups responded further. Case three: three years ago the US Coast Guard developed scenarios for very long range strategic planning for their long view project. The Coast Guard developed ten basic strategies from these scenarios. The fourth strategy was “Acquire full maritime domain awareness”. The goal was to give the Coast Guard the ability to acquire, track, and identify in real time any vessel or aircraft entering America’s maritime domain. Maritime domain awareness (MDA) turned out to be highly relevant for USCG decision making both before and after 9/11. Of all the major US federal services involved in the 9/11 response operation, the Coast Guard was singled out for its agility and preparedness.

Even though the Ballast Water Management Convention (BWMC) (referred to herewith as the Convention) has been ratified and a few ballast water management systems (BMWS) have received US Coast Guard (USCG) type approval, many shipowners and operators are reticent to begin the significant process of planning for compliance with ballast water discharge and performance standards. This delay is most probably due to the uncertainty in the implementation dates in the BWMC and limited options of USCG type approved BWMS. These delays may result in significant ramifications for shipowners if the process for compliance is not fully evaluated. This process includes selecting, designing installation, purchasing, start-up and commissioning of BWMS. Clarity on the implementation schedule should be determined at the 71st session of the Marine Environmental Protection Committee of the International Maritime Organization (IMO MEPC 71) and allow shipowners to plan for compliance. An important aspect of implementation is developing a strong compliance plan. A central part of compliance is identifying possible problems and contingency options that may alleviate any potential port State control issues. The paper will identify possible problems and contingency measures to ensure ship operations are not impacted. An important issue is that the BWMC does not include provisions for contingency measures. The paper will also outline needed contingency measures to be addressed by the IMO in any amendments to the BWMC.

Among the variety of oil spill response countermeasures, including mechanical, chemical, in-situ burning and bioremediation, deployment of chemical dispersants has been successfully utilized in numerous oil spills. This paper will review the history of the United States Coast Guard (USCG) C-130 Air Dispersant Delivery System (ADDS) capability, deployment in remote areas, and associated challenges. ADDS consists of a large tank with dispersant(e.g., 51,000 pounds), owned and operated by an industry partner, used aboard USCG C-130 aircraft designed to be ADDS capable as specified in various agreements for marine environmental protection missions. ADDS is a highly complex tool to utilize, requiring extensive training by air crews and industry equipment technicians to safely and properly deploy during an oil spill response. In 2011, the Commandant of the USCG, Admiral Papp reaffirmed the USCG's C-130 ADDS capability during a hearing before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries and the Coast Guard. The use of ADDS in remote areas creates unique challenges, such as logistical coordination between the USCG and spill response industry partners and maintaining proficiency with personnel. It is critical for federal, state, and local agencies, industry, and academia to understand the history and challenges of ADDS to ensure the successful utilization of this response tool in an actual oil spill incident.

This paper describes the important regulatory changes underway in the United States (US) that will dramatically affect the design, construction, and operation of offshore terminals for importing liquefied natural gas (LNG). Numerous US oil and gas companies are developing projects to build offshore terminals for importing LNG into the US. As the offshore LNG terminal concept applies new technology, regulatory and technical design rules that will apply to these facilities are rapidly evolving. With the passage of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, the Deepwater Port Act of 1974 (DWPA) (33 USC 1501-1524) has been amended to include natural gas, fundamentally altering the regulatory process for offshore LNG terminals. Whereas the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the US Coast Guard (USCG) previously played important roles in permitting and regulating onshore LNG facilities, the USCG and the US Maritime Administration (MARAD) now share the primary responsibility of regulating these facilities offshore, with subsidiary roles played by other federal agencies and the involved states. This paper examines the USCG's new role in offshore LNG terminal development, as well as the major requirements the DWPA imposes on applicants. The USCG will soon publish implementing regulations. DWPA requirements that previously applied to oil, now provide clues regarding the likely environmental review process. Although the USCG will be moving to the Department of Homeland Security, siting and operational oversight for deepwater ports is expected to remain with the Secretary of the Department of Transportation (SECDOT). This paper examines the Deepwater Port regulatory process and describes how these complex licensing requirements could affect the proposed siting, commercial viability, and environmental regulatory review of offshore LNG terminals. This paper also examines current efforts by various classification societies to develop technical guidance regarding the design, construction, and ongoing maintenance of offshore LNG terminals. The ABS Guidance Notes on Building and Classing Offshore LNG Terminals will be presented as an example of classification society efforts to fill the US regulatory void that currently exists for the technical requirements of offshore LNG terminals. In conclusion, this paper proposes a process to combine current regulations with classification society guidance as an effective means of developing appropriate design, construction, and operational requirements for offshore LNG terminals. Such a process may be helpful to US regulators in expediting the regulatory approval process for offshore LNG terminals currently being developed. Finally, this paper assists developers of offshore LNG terminals in understanding the complex US regulatory process and developing effective strategies to expedite critical regulatory approvals. The US Regulatory Scheme for LNG Terminals Prior to the passage of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 by Congress, and its signing by President Bush on November 25, 2002, FERC had jurisdiction over the siting of LNG import terminals under Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act. FERC asserted that this authority applied to both onshore and offshore LNG terminals.

Subject South China Sea dispute. Significance Tensions relating to the South China Sea grew in the last quarter of 2019, as Beijing and Washington continue to compete for primacy in the Asia-Pacific region. ASEAN and China are attempting to negotiate a Code of Conduct (CoC) for the waters, where there are conflicting territorial and jurisdictional claims involving China, Taiwan and several South-east Asian countries. Impacts As the United States becomes more preoccupied with domestic politics in 2020, China will seek to advance its influence in Asia. The US Coast Guard will step up operational deployments to South-east Asia. ‘Minilateralism’ (small-scale multilateralism) among South-east Asia’s middle powers will undermine regional notions about ASEAN centrality.

Seabirds are known to be vulnerable to biotoxins produced by harmful algal blooms (HABs). The ingestion of prey contaminated with biotoxins such as domoic acid can cause disorientation, seizures, morbidity, and mortality (Work and others 1993). During November 2007 in Monterey Bay, California, an unprecedented stranding of live and dead seabirds highlighted plumage fouling as an emerging mortality factor during harmful algal bloom (HAB) events. The fouling agent was a proteinaceous foam derived from the cellular breakdown of the dinoflagellate Akashiwo sanguinea. This foam coated seabird plumage in a manner similar to fouling by petroleum oil (Hartung 1967; McEwan and Koelink 1973; National Research Council 1985), causing waterlogging, hypothermia, morbidity, and mortality in the California birds (Jessup and others 2009). During late October 2009 along the southern Washington and northern Oregon State coasts, algal blooms caused another seabird plumage fouling event, where several bird species were coated in a foam surfactant. Water and feather samples confirmed that this dinoflagellate bloom was also A. sanguinea (Dr. Raphael Kudela, University of California Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA, pers. comm.). Du and others (in press) describe the conditions that facilitated the A. sanguinea bloom off the Oregon coast and propose that the source of the bloom was southward transport of cells from a massive September bloom that first occurred off the Washington coast. Similar to the 2007 California event, the foam produced by the WashingtonOregon bloom reduced the waterproofing of birds’ plumage, causing hypothermia in individual birds and leading to the stranding of hundreds of debilitated live and dying seabirds on public beaches. During this event, volunteers and federal, state, and local resource management agencies collected as many birds as possible for rescue and rehabilitation from the Long Beach Peninsula, WA; Fort Stevens State Beach, OR; and Cannon Beach, OR. Most of the birds collected were initially delivered to the Wildlife Center of the North Coast (WCNC) rehabilitation facility in Astoria, OR, where volunteers observed that birds were cold, weak, stressed, and starving. Due to the magnitude of this event, the WCNC facility was quickly overwhelmed by hundreds of collected seabirds, which included Common Loons (Gavia immer), Common Murres (Uria aalge), Pacific Loons (G. pacifica), Red-throated Loons (G. stellata), Surf Scoters (Melanitta perspicillata), and Western and Clark’s Grebes (Aechmophorus occidentalis and A. clarkii). Birds were subsequently transferred to facilities that were better equipped to handle large numbers of seabirds for rehabilitation, including the International Bird Rescue Research Center (IBRRC) in Cordelia, CA (n 5 479 birds), and Progressive Animal Welfare Society (PAWS) in Lynnwood, WA (n 5 125). Some birds responded well to supportive care and were eventually 1 We dedicate this manuscript to the men and women at US Coast Guard Air Station Sacramento, who donated their time and use of the C-130 Hercules aircraft to transport seabirds. This same Coast Guard aircraft crashed off the coast of San Diego, CA on 30 October 2009, within days of responding to the HAB event documented in this manuscript. All hands on board that aircraft were lost. We honor their memory and service. GENERAL NOTES

The Islands of Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket are separated from the Massachusetts mainland by Vineyard and Nantucket Sounds; water between the two islands flows through Muskeget Channel. The towns of Edgartown (on Martha's Vineyard) and Nantucket recognize that they are vulnerable to power supply interruptions due to their position at the end of the power grid, and due to sea level rise and other consequences of climate change. The tidal energy flowing through Muskeget Channel has been identified by the Electric Power Research Institute as the strongest tidal resource in Massachusetts waters. The Town of Edgartown proposes to develop an initial 5 MW (nameplate) tidal energy project in Muskeget Channel. The project will consist of 14 tidal turbines with 13 providing electricity to Edgartown and one operated by the University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth for research and development. Each turbine will be 90 feet long and 50 feet high. The electricity will be brought to shore by a submarine cable buried 8 feet below the seabed surface which will landfall in Edgartown either on Chappaquiddack or at Katama. Muskeget Channel is located between Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket. Its depth ranges between 40 and 160 feet in the deepest portion. It has strong currents where water is transferred between Nantucket Sound and the Atlantic Ocean continental shelf to the south. This makes it a treacherous passage for navigation. Current users of the channel are commercial and recreational fishing, and cruising boats. The US Coast Guard has indicated that the largest vessel passing through the channel is a commercial scallop dragger with a draft of about 10 feet. The tidal resource in the channel has been measured by the University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth and the peak velocity flow is approximately 5 knots. The technology proposed is the helical Gorlov-type turbine positioned with a horizontal axis that is positively buoyant in the water column and held down by anchors. This is the same technology proposed by Ocean Renewable Power Company in the Western Passage and Cobscook Bay near Eastport Maine. The blades rotate in two directions capturing the tides energy both during flood and ebb tides. The turbines will be anchored to the bottom and suspended in the water column. Initial depth of the turbines is expected to be about 25 feet below the surface to avoid impacting navigation while also capturing the strongest currents. The Town of Edgartown was initially granted a Preliminary Permit by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) on March 1, 2008, and has recently received a second permit valid through August 2014. The Preliminary Permit gives Edgartown the exclusive right to apply for a power generation license for power generated from the hydrokinetic energy in the water flowing in this area. Edgartown filed a Draft Pilot License Application with FERC on February 1, 2010 and an Expanded Environmental Notification Form with the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA) Office at the same time. It expects to file a Final License Application in late 2013. Harris Miller Miller & Hanson (HMMH) of Burlington Massachusetts is acting as the Project Manager for the Town of Edgartown and collaborating with other partners of the project including the University of Massachusetts - Dartmouth's Marine Renewable Energy Center and the Massachusetts Clean Energy Center. HMMH was awarded a grant under the Department of Energy's Advanced Water Program to conduct marine science and hydrokinetic site-specific environmental studies for projects actively seeking a FERC License. HMMH, on behalf of the Town, is managing this comprehensive study of the marine environment in Muskeget Channel and potential impacts of the tidal project on indicator species and habitats. The University of Massachusetts School of Marine Science and Technology (SMAST) conducted oceanographic studies of tidal currents, tide level, benthic habitat, and potential for biofouling and foundation scouring. Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, cooperating with SMAST, developed an oceanographic model to predict changes in sediment transport as a result of the proposed tidal energy project. Provincetown Center for Coastal Studies prepared background material on protected species - including whales, seals, and sea turtles - in the project area and implemented an initial tagging program to record location specific information on seals and sea turtles. HMMH communicated research plans and findings with local stakeholder groups, state and federal resource agency staff, and the ocean power industry. The information is being used to prepare environmental permit applications and obtain approvals for project construction.