South China Sea tensions will intensify in 2020

Risk factors for severe outcomes among members of the United States military hospitalized with pneumonia and influenza, 2000–2012

This article explores the impact of the Spratly Islands dispute on security relations between China and Southeast Asia after the Cold War. It is argued that the dispute reflects and promotes the emergence of a regional order combining deterrence with consultation and limited co-operation. The balance of power between China, Southeast Asia, and the United States promotes the emergence of a structure of deterrence. Within this structure, the approaches of China and Southeast Asia to diplomacy and international law allow for the development of a regional dialogue and a code of conduct based on consultation and co-operation on non-controversial issues. Consequently, the seeds of an order are emerging in the South China Sea that combines the extremes of deterrence and co-operation. Introduction The Spratly Islands in the South China Sea are located at the intersection of the security spheres of China and Southeast Asia. As such, the dispute between China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei over this area is not merely a difference of opinion on rights to territory and maritime space. It brings to the fore incompatibilities between the practices China and the countries of Southeast Asia normally employ to ensure peace and stability in their regional environment. The implications of this dispute for the development of mechanisms of deterrence and co-operation between China and the countries of Southeast Asia have tended to be overlooked in the scholarly debate. The Spratly dispute is treated as a peripheral, yet potentially explosive, aspect of Sino--Southeast Asian relations. It is regarded as a product rather than a determinant of their security practices. [1] The Spratlys have been a sore point in the relationship between China and the Southeast Asian claimant states for decades . The dispute oscillates between conflict and co-operation without reaching the stage of crisis or resolution. [2] This protracted stalemate suggests that the dispute is at the fringes of the security agendas of China and Southeast Asia, compared with more pressing security concerns such as the regional financial crisis of the late 1990s and the Taiwan problem. At the same time, the nationalist overtones inherent in the justifications of territorial and maritime claims, coupled with a continuous military build-up in the Spratly area, suggests that the dispute will at some point wreak havoc on peace in the South China Sea. The problem with the dominant approaches to the study of the Spratly dispute is the tendency to overlook the fact that, in the 1990s, it has turned into an arena where the compatibility of the security practices of China and Southeast Asia were tested. During the Cold War, Chinese security policies were directed against the subregional environment of Northeast Asia. By contrast, most of the countries of Southeast Asia formulated their security outlook within the confines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). However, the increasing importance of the maritime resources of the South China Sea, and the allowances for extensive maritime zones in international law, have made China and Southeast Asia increasingly important variables in each other's security equations. This article argues that the Spratly dispute has profound implications for regional peace and stability because it promotes the development of a new order in the South China Sea between China and the Southeast Asian states. [3] By bringing representatives of contending security practices together around an issue of conflict, the Spratly dispute has changed the security practices of China and Southeast Asia. The dispute highlights differences in the approach of the two entities to the balance of power, diplomacy, and international law. As the contending parties attempt to find solutions to the problems coming to the fore, the seeds of a new order emerge, representing a compromise between the security practices employed by China and Southeast Asia. …

Measures the impact of armed US Coast Guard boardings on those aboard boarded vessels. A sample of fifty subjects (half members of a graduate class on “Maritime Crime and its Prevention”, half others), completed questionnaires after experiencing a (pre‐arranged but undisclosed) interception and boarding by a US Coast Guard Cutter of the vessel on which they were traveling. Subjects reported satisfaction with the conduct of the boarding, but experienced different anxiety levels during the encounter, ranging from low levels (one third), medium levels (one third) to relatively high levels of anxiety. Boarding parties should be concerned with the latter group. Training and sensitivity to deal with that group needs to be emphasized.

Fighting pollution

In 1993, the US Coast Guard proposed to construct two breakwaters and a debris boom to protect its existing pier and moored vessels inside Ediz Hook in Port Angeles Harbor, Washington. To assist the US Army Corps of Engineers -- Seattle District in determining the potential environmental impacts of the proposed breakwaters, Battelle/Marine Sciences Laboratory performed subtidal SCUBA surveys as specified in the Washington Department of Fisheries intermediate eelgrass/macroalgae habitat survey guidelines. The objectives of the subtidal surveys were to (1) quantify the shoot densities of eelgrass; (2) provide percent cover estimates for non-eelgrass macroalgae species; (3) develop a site map indicating the qualitative distribution of eelgrass/macroalgae species, substrate characterization, approximate depth contours, and the approximate location of the proposed project features; and (4) document the time and date of the surveys, turbidity/visibility, presence of invertebrate/vertebrate species, and anecdotal observations pertinent to habitat characterization of the project site. A total of 14 dives along 12 transects (T1--T12) were successfully completed between March 15 and March 17, 1993. Eelgrass was observed on all of the transects except T7 and T8 at the western debris barrier and T12 along the waterward margin of the existing T-pier. The vicinity of the proposed east breakwater had the highest eelgrass shoot densities (up to 89 shoots/m{sup 2}) observed by the divers. Macroalgae and invertebrate species diversity were also highest at the east breakwater site. The low eelgrass densities observed at the west debris barrier site (0 to 14 shoots/m{sup 2}) can be attributed mostly to the lack of suitable substrate. The existing layer of wood debris armoring the bottom at the west project site currently limits, and in the areas of heaviest deposition probably precludes, the growth of eelgrass. As was expected, no eelgrass was observed at the south breakwater site.

A commonly accepted framework for the development of policies and supporting regulations that address cybersecurity vulnerabilities and threats seems to be missing both domestically in the USA and in terms of international collaboration amongst maritime stakeholders. This research aimed at establishing the actions that would allow commonly accepted and established cybersecurity policies and regulations for the maritime transportation system (MTS) and the critical infrastructure connected to it. A multiple case-study design was adopted and in-depth interviews were conducted until data saturation was achieved with 12 US Coast Guard operational commanders. The results of the study suggest the need for greater collaborations among interested parties at the national (US Coast Guard, port authorities, etc.) and international level (International Maritime Organization, United Nations, etc.) for the establishment of mutually accepted cybersecurity as well as among private industries for sharing cyber intrusion data and protection best practices.

This study examined whether the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2006 affected the United States (US) Coast Guard performance characteristics with respect to incident response. The periods analyzed consisted of a decade before versus a decade after implementation of the legislation. Using analysis of variance (ANOVA) and the p-value approach (p < 0.05), six hypotheses were tested to determine whether statistically significant differences in response attributes existed during the 10 years before versus the 10 years following the passing of the legislation. Four significant hypothesis-testing outcomes represented differences in the number of incidents, incident responses, cumulative lives lost, and lives lost after notification.

Introduction: Dentistry is the field that brings back one’s smile. It is this field that teaches about the importance of oral hygiene. Dental education varies in all Southeast Asian and South Asian countries. Aim: To compare dental education concerning fee structure, dentist population ratio, and year of graduation between South Asian and Southeast Asian countries. Methodology: This study was conducted to the comparison of dental education in South Asian and Southeast Asian countries. Southeast Asian countries were classified as Group A and South Asian countries were classified as Group B. Data was retrieved from manual and electronic databases using search engines (Pubmed, google scholar, Web of Science). In this study, the keywords were Dentistry, Southeast Asian, South Asian, Dental colleges, and Dentist population ratio used in the search. Result: This study determined the difference between dental education, dentist population ratio, and the dentist’s average salary among Group A and B. The number of Dental colleges was the maximum in India (71%) among all other Group A and B. Conclusion: Nevertheless South Asia had a plethora of colleges, and high-paying dental jobs were possible only in Southeast Asian countries. Hence substantial numbers of dental colleges with proper apportionment and job contentment is obligatory for better treatment outcome of patients.

The article "US Policy in Southeast Asia in the context of the "turn in the Asia-Pacific region"" analyzes Washington's strategic reorientation towards the Asia-Pacific region, aimed at strengthening its position in the face of China's growing influence. Key aspects of American policy are considered, including the military-strategic presence, economic initiatives (the Indo-Pacific Strategy and participation in the CPTPP), as well as diplomatic cooperation with regional partners, including the ASEAN countries. Special attention is paid to the goals of the United States: curbing Chinese ambitions in the South China Sea and supporting multilateral cooperation. The author explores the evolution of approaches of various administrations (from B. Obama to D. Biden), emphasizing the changes in the implementation of the "U-turn". Challenges are highlighted, including balancing between allied commitments, internal political contradictions in the United States, and the ambiguous reaction of Southeast Asian countries to increased competition between the great powers. The study is based on a comparative analysis of the approaches of the three American administrations (Obama, Trump, Biden) to the implementation of the strategy in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as on the basis of official documents (National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy), public statements by the presidents and diplomatic initiatives). Institutional analysis of the role and effectiveness of the multilateral structures and alliances created by the United States as tools for deterring China The scientific novelty of the study lies in a systematic and comparative analysis of the evolution of the "pivot to Asia" strategy over the course of three US administrations, demonstrating not a paradigm shift, but a tactical adaptation of a single strategic goal. Despite tactical and stylistic differences, all three administrations (Obama, Trump, Biden) pursued a common strategic goal – to contain China's growing influence and preserve American leadership in the Asia-Pacific region. Obama relied on multilateral economic (TPP) and diplomatic instruments. Trump moved to open confrontation, protectionism, and an emphasis on bilateral power and trade deals. Biden synthesized approaches, returning to the rhetoric of multilateralism and working with allies, but preserving and strengthening the tough anti-China core of Trump's strategy, as well as institutionalizing the QUAD format. The deepening US-China rivalry poses serious challenges for ASEAN, forcing it to maneuver and threatening its unity and central role in the regional architecture.

Even though the Ballast Water Management Convention (BWMC) (referred to herewith as the Convention) has been ratified and a few ballast water management systems (BMWS) have received US Coast Guard (USCG) type approval, many shipowners and operators are reticent to begin the significant process of planning for compliance with ballast water discharge and performance standards. This delay is most probably due to the uncertainty in the implementation dates in the BWMC and limited options of USCG type approved BWMS. These delays may result in significant ramifications for shipowners if the process for compliance is not fully evaluated. This process includes selecting, designing installation, purchasing, start-up and commissioning of BWMS. Clarity on the implementation schedule should be determined at the 71st session of the Marine Environmental Protection Committee of the International Maritime Organization (IMO MEPC 71) and allow shipowners to plan for compliance. An important aspect of implementation is developing a strong compliance plan. A central part of compliance is identifying possible problems and contingency options that may alleviate any potential port State control issues. The paper will identify possible problems and contingency measures to ensure ship operations are not impacted. An important issue is that the BWMC does not include provisions for contingency measures. The paper will also outline needed contingency measures to be addressed by the IMO in any amendments to the BWMC.

The collision between the USCGC Cuyahoga and the motor vessel Santa Cruz II resulted in psychological distress among the Coast Guard crewmen. The US Navy Special Psychiatric Rapid Intervention Team (SPRINT) was activated to provide mental health services to the Coast Guard survivors and others who had been affected by the disaster. The psychiatric records of the 18 survivors were examined and summarized, and combined with anecdotal comments made by SPRINT members. The most prominent psychological reactions among the survivors were shock, anger, sadness, and guilt. Spouses of the survivors dealt with bereavement and strove to understand their husbands' reactions. Variables identified by the SPRINT as being important to their success were communication with and support from the training center command, assurances of confidentiality to the survivors, and commencement of their work almost immediately following the collision.

Managers need a framework for assessing various kinds of risk and uncertainty that will continue to confront corporate decision makers as the 9/11 event plays out over the following months and years. The authors suggest an innovative scenario process, one that provides business continuity planning and medium‐term operational planning with a more rigorous analytical grounding, but without overburdening the process with excessive and ultimately counter‐productive complexity. The authors have introduced alternative scenario‐based tools to respond to this specific need for continuity assurance and near‐term operations planning. Case one: business continuity planning (BCP) for the management of one leading global financial services firm committed to a process of identifying and remedying gaps in the recoverability of its key assets. Workshops developed strategies that would close unacceptable asset recovery gaps in two scenarios. Case two: medium term operational planning for a professional services firm in the weeks that followed 9/11 evaluated the plausible range of impacts on their business and operations as the USA and the world took action and terrorist groups responded further. Case three: three years ago the US Coast Guard developed scenarios for very long range strategic planning for their long view project. The Coast Guard developed ten basic strategies from these scenarios. The fourth strategy was “Acquire full maritime domain awareness”. The goal was to give the Coast Guard the ability to acquire, track, and identify in real time any vessel or aircraft entering America’s maritime domain. Maritime domain awareness (MDA) turned out to be highly relevant for USCG decision making both before and after 9/11. Of all the major US federal services involved in the 9/11 response operation, the Coast Guard was singled out for its agility and preparedness.

This study investigates the probabilities of vessel safety and pollution inspections by type of vessel by the US Coast Guard based upon individual vessel inspections for the years 1992–2001. Probit estimates of vessel safety (versus pollution) inspection equations suggest that fishing, passenger, recreation and tug boats are less (more) likely to be inspected for safety (pollution), whereas tank barges and US flag vessels are more (less) likely to be inspected for safety (pollution). Also, vessel safety and pollution inspection probabilities by vessel type vary by Coast Guard district and time. The probability of a US flag vessel being inspected for safety has increased over the time period of the study. The results bring into question the effectiveness of the Coast Guard in reducing the oil-spill pollution of tank barges and improving the safety of fishing boats.

Among the variety of oil spill response countermeasures, including mechanical, chemical, in-situ burning and bioremediation, deployment of chemical dispersants has been successfully utilized in numerous oil spills. This paper will review the history of the United States Coast Guard (USCG) C-130 Air Dispersant Delivery System (ADDS) capability, deployment in remote areas, and associated challenges. ADDS consists of a large tank with dispersant(e.g., 51,000 pounds), owned and operated by an industry partner, used aboard USCG C-130 aircraft designed to be ADDS capable as specified in various agreements for marine environmental protection missions. ADDS is a highly complex tool to utilize, requiring extensive training by air crews and industry equipment technicians to safely and properly deploy during an oil spill response. In 2011, the Commandant of the USCG, Admiral Papp reaffirmed the USCG's C-130 ADDS capability during a hearing before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries and the Coast Guard. The use of ADDS in remote areas creates unique challenges, such as logistical coordination between the USCG and spill response industry partners and maintaining proficiency with personnel. It is critical for federal, state, and local agencies, industry, and academia to understand the history and challenges of ADDS to ensure the successful utilization of this response tool in an actual oil spill incident.

Europe and the countries adjacent to the South China Sea (SCS) share a long and very contradictory history. European powers colonized most of the countries in South-East Asia, but the fighters against colonialism also relied on European ideas and ideologies like nationalism and socialism. Until today, the conflict parties in the SCS base their claims on legal norms and concepts developed in Europe during the era of colonialism. Though the European Union is one of the biggest trade partners and investors in the SCS area, Brussels did not work out a convincing political strategy accompanying and protecting its economic interests. In 2012 the EU started some initiatives for a stronger political engagement in this part of the world, but these initiatives were not consolidated and elaborated in the years to follow. Nevertheless, Europe could offer a lot of—positive and negative—experiences in common management of resources, in coping with an asymmetric conflict constellation etc., which might be helpful to find a solution for the conflicts in SCS. To put these experiences into effect an intensive and sustainable political dialogue is needed which may lead to a partnership between the two regions based on equal footing and mutual benefit.