Constitutional Principles of EU External Relations

This chapter examines the European Union’s (EU’s) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It tells the story of increasing co-operation between member states on foreign policy matters, first with European Political Co-operation (EPC) and, since the 1990s, with CFSP and a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The chapter highlights the internal dynamics and external events that drove the member states towards such co-operation and considers the most recent example of such efforts: the 2017 attempt to create a system of permanent structured co-operation (PESCO). However, it is noted that the EU remains far from having a truly supranational foreign policy and there remains a reluctance from member states to push much further integration, given states’ keen desire to remain sovereign in this area. Finally, the chapter considers the EU’s status as a ‘power’ in international relations, noting that it has diminished in important respects since 2003, but remains an important economic power.

The member states of the European Union (EU) coordinate, define, and implement foreign policy in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This policy area, often referred to as EU foreign policy, has a broad scope covering all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to security and defense. The CFSP is supported by a unique institutional framework, in which member states diplomats and officials from the EU institutions jointly make policy. It is led by the High Representative, who is the “face and voice” of EU foreign policy, and supported by the substantial European External Action Service and 140 EU delegations in other countries and international organizations. Because foreign policy is normally the business of sovereign states, the exceptional nature of the CFSP has long been a subject of inquiry. The CFSP has particularly puzzled advocates of the traditional theories of European integration and international relations, who have failed to appreciate what the EU does in the field of high politics. Given the absence of formal diplomatic recognition and a strong reliance on the resources of the member states, the EU is still not a full-fledged actor, yet it has a strong international presence nonetheless. Its presence and the gradual increase in “actorness” have also raised questions about whether the EU presents a different type of actor, a civilian or normative power, which derives its influence from nontraditional sources of power. Under the assumption that the EU has some actorness, the Europeanization of foreign policy has become an area of interest. Member states can act through the EU structure to achieve more impact internationally, can adjust national foreign policy on the basis of EU positions, and are socialized into greater European coordination. The relationship between national and EU foreign policy is thus a significant topic of debate. Finally, governance perspectives increasingly provide insight into the organization of the CFSP. How the member states and the EU institutions collectively coordinate, define, and implement EU foreign policy is not only an important question in itself but also matters for policy outcomes.

The expansion of European foreign and security policy co-operation since the 1970s imposes unique requirements on European Union (EU) member states, and the co- ordination of these various obligations presents a major challenge to the EU's pursuit of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP). However, the past decade has also seen significant progress toward the multi-level governance of EU foreign policy, particularly when compared to the limited policy co-ordination of the 1970s and 1980s. This article examines the relationship between institutional development and the multi-level governance of EU foreign policy, as represented by the CFSP. In particular, it explores: (1) the extent to which the CFSP policy space can be described in terms of multi-level governance; (2) the processes by which governance mechanisms influence the domestic foreign policy cultures of EU member states; and (3) how the interaction of domestic politics and governance mechanisms produces specific policy outcomes.

Foreign policy analysis (FPA) in a classical sense entails focusing on agents (individuals or groups of individuals). In the case of the European Union (EU), FPA becomes more problematic. Firstly, the question arises of what a foreign policy of the EU really means. This article defines EU foreign policy in a wider sense, namely along the lines of what is known as EU's external action. It focuses however on the security aspect of the EU's external action – the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its defence dimension, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Furthermore, a problem of identifying agents arises in the EU setting in large part because of the complex institutional setup of the CFSP/CSDP. Although final decisions are made at the level of the Council, the policy itself is drafted and prepared at lower levels of policy-making (working parties, committees and agencies) based in Brussels. This article proposes a discursive institutionalist model of analysis, applicable to any organization of the policy process. After presenting the model's ontological and epistemological positions, as well as theoretical underpinnings, the article elaborates on the different levels of information processing and meaning construction by actors and their role in setting the overall foreign policy discourse by shaping the coordinative discourses1 during this early phase of the policy-making process.

The UK’s decision to leave the European Union (EU) has presented innumerable challenges for both the leaving state and the EU. In these unchartered waters, the future of UK involvement in EU policies is very much in doubt. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has not been at the forefront of the debates about Brexit, despite the increasing focus on the EU’s global role, and the UK’s own vision of a ‘Global Britain’. The purpose of this article is to consider the past, present, and future role played by the UK in the CFSP since its inception in the Treaty on European Union. This necessitates consideration of how the CFSP might develop in the future and fulfil the goals of the recent Global Strategy. The article explores the UK’s constant opposition to greater integration in EU foreign policy and how it has purported to distance itself from the CFSP machinery. This can be contrasted with the UK’s apparent post-referendum enthusiasm for pursuing shared foreign policy goals. The future direction of the CFSP may not be affected to a significant degree by the UK’s departure. However, the CFSP will not necessarily become more integrated after Brexit. To achieve this, greater commitment will need to be shown by the EU27 to the aims of the CFSP, and other Member States will no longer be able to count on the UK as the lead voice of opposition or ‘brake’ on integration. If there is a continued desire for the UK to be involved in the CFSP, finding an acceptable model for cooperation is likely to prove a substantial, long-term challenge.

The paper begins with the debate about the stability, the structure and the relevance of attitudes to foreign policy and argues that the cognitive aspect of the issue has a crucial bearing on whether one comes down on the side of the ‘conventional wisdom’ (the so-called Almond–Lippmann consensus) or the side of the ‘revisionists’ in this debate. It goes on to suggest, however, that the underlying issue is not one of ‘true attitudes’ versus ‘non-attitudes’ but rather a matter of where any particular set of attitudinal responses is located on a real-to-random continuum. Having considered some evidence concerning the public’s knowledge of the European Union, the paper puts forward four hypotheses concerning the negative impact of lower levels of knowledge on the structure of attitudes. With some minor qualifications, the four hypotheses are supported by the Eurobarometer data analysed. Attitudes to a European common foreign and security policy are particularly susceptible to variations in knowledge, and the conclusion is drawn that, at lower levels of knowledge, such attitudes come suspiciously close to the wrong end of the real-to-random continuum. THE DEBATE ABOUT ATTITUDES TO FOREIGN POLICY The quality of public opinion on foreign policy is a much-debated matter. What is now dubbed ‘the conventional wisdom’ took a dim view of public opinion in this area. It argued four propositions: public attitudes to foreign policy lack an adequate knowledge base, they are unstructured, they are unstable, and they have no relevance for policy-making. The argument was encapsulated as early as  in Almond’s view that ‘foreign policy attitudes among most Americans lack intellectual structure and factual content. Such superficial psychic states ∗ An earlier version of this paper was presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Boston, September, . The paper was submitted to IJPOR  January, . The final version was received  February, .  World Association for Public Opinion Research                 are bound to be unstable since they are not anchored in a set of explicit values and means ends calculations or traditional compulsions’ (Almond, , p.). The ‘conventional wisdom’ regarding the nature of foreign policy attitudes has come in for sustained criticism in recent years, to the extent that it might be said that the revisionist view is now in the ascendant. However, the revisionist critique is not as comprehensive or as telling as might appear at first sight. This can be seen by considering the four propositions (in reverse order to that in which they have just been listed). The last proposition—regarding the relevance of public opinion to the making of foreign policy—can be set aside as an issue that follows from rather than being directly part of the problem of the quality of attitudes to foreign policy. In one sense, it is a normative issue: weakly formed attitudes (if such they be) ought not to have any effect on foreign policy. To the extent that it is not a normative issue, it is open to empirical investigation, but that investigation is distinct from the question of what is the nature of public opinion on foreign policy. In regard to the allegation that attitudes to foreign policy are unstructured or unconstrained, the revisionist response makes a distinction between general foreign policy orientations and abstract beliefs, on the one hand, and specific foreign policy attitudes and opinion on immediate issues, on the other. It then argues that, while constraint might be lacking in relation to views on particular matters, it does obtain at the level of general orientations and beliefs. Two quotations illustrate the point: We take strong exception to the conventional wisdom that in the face of this uncertainty, the public is unable to connect its foreign policy attitudes together or connect them to its political behaviour. . . . The common theme in this research is that while citizens’ specific foreign policy attitudes may not be consistently related to one another or to political evaluations, more general foreign policy orientations play a stronger role in foreign policy decision-making (Hurwitz and Peffley, ,

The task of building an effective security architecture facing the European Union is extremely important in that the approach to its solution will determine the nature of the relations between the countries in the region in the future. An analysis of the processes of building a common security and defense policy (EUSR) of the EU is impossible without addressing the interrelated problems: security in the EU with the European Union's place in the Euro-Atlantic processes and in the world at large. The development of the SPBO has a significant impact on all countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, which explains the relevance of its further study by national science. Until the scientific and legal literature has addressed the issue of forming and developing a common security and defense policy in the EU. In many ways, this is explained by the relatively short period of existence of the ESDC as a phenomenon, with the result that, in most cases, the study focused on considering the formation, rather than the functioning, of the ESDC mechanisms designed to prepare the EU component for further work. First of all, we are referring to studies on various aspects of the history and current activities of the European Union. In addition, the authors analyze the common issues of European security: from the problems of building security models for Europe to issues related to the activities of European regional military-political organizations on the security and interaction of European and US countries in the field of the common security and defense policy of the EU. Other authors have considered some aspects in the process of becoming an EU Security Council. However, the existing work does not allow for a holistic picture of the process of forming and developing a common foreign and security policy of the EU, in turn, the continued development of a common foreign and security policy of the EU necessitates the development of new aspects of identified issues and generalizations. In this article, the author focuses on highlighting the main stages of the EUSF formation and its importance for the effective functioning of the EU as a whole. There are four main stages in the development of the common security and defense policy: the first stage (1992-1997) is the signing of the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties; the second stage (1998-2002), when the EU declared its intention to form an ESDP in Saint-Malo (1998), as well as the decisions taken at the Cologne, Helsinki, Nice, Lachen summits; the third stage (since 2003), the Berlin Plus agreement was reached (March 2003). The Council of Europe adopted the first European Security Strategy (December 2003); and the final stage began with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009. Within this framework, the European Union is trying to adequately respond to some of the new challenges that emerge in the process of globalization, shaping European identity.

The purpose of this chapter is to show the increasing importance of the role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. Although the Treaties expressly exclude the jurisdiction of the ECJ in this area, certain changes brought about by the Treaty in this field could significantly enhance its role in shaping the European foreign policy.The chapter is divided in three substantive parts. The first part will briefly analyse the general rule in the Treaty of the lack of the jurisdiction of the ECJ in the field of CFSP and the reasons for this. Whereas the sensitivity of the area and the willingness of the Member States to keep their sovereignty in this field is a legitimate reason for the lack of jurisdiction, it is less clear why the Court does not have jurisdiction to rule on actions for annulment for the breach of essential procedural requirements in the adoption of CFSP acts as well on questions of compatibility of CFSP acts with human rights. The second part will deal with the questions of delimitation between pillars/areas. Pre-Lisbon, the first pillar had absolute preference over the second and third pillar. Lisbon changes this approach: not only shall the implementation of the CFSP not affect the exercise of the Union competences under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), but the implementation of these policies shall not affect the exercise of the Union competences under CFSP. The third part will discuss restrictive measures. In this field, the Treaty now distinguishes between three types of restrictive measures: measures intended to prevent and combat terrorism, measures against third countries and restrictive measures against natural or legal persons. The review of the latter is subjected to the jurisdiction of the ECJ, which is a novelty under the Treaty. It will be analysed how this new exception to the non-jurisdiction rule could influence cases such as Kadi and Al Barakaat.

ABSTRACTIn this article I enquire into the sources of legitimacy of the European Union's (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy. I suggest that as the EU has moved beyond intergovernmentalism in this policy field, it cannot derive its legitimacy solely from the national systems of the member states. It must establish an additional channel of legitimacy, which is derived directly from the EU. Challenging the conventional position on the legitimacy of global governance institutions, I further suggest that EU institutions can only make a reasonable claim to prevail over the member states in this policy field if they contribute to enhance the normative status of the foreign policy. That the co-operative endeavour is mutually beneficial is not a sufficient basis for the legitimacy of EU foreign policy. Drawing on a deliberative perspective, I suggest that we may expect to find two mutually reinforcing sources of legitimacy at the EU level. However, these would mainly contribute to enhance the external legitimacy of the CFPS. Paradoxically, they may at the same time constrain the internal legitimacy of the EU's foreign policy.

As discussed earlier in this volume, Europeanization was originally preoccupied with studies of what, prior to the Lisbon Treaty, were termed first pillar policies and for a considerable time was not employed in research on European foreign policy. Given the highly sensitive nature of this area for member states, it is unsurprising that foreign policy was the "last suspect" when searching for the impact of the EU. The constant paradox of European foreign policy has been the coexisting desire of the member states that the EU become a more meaningful actor in international relations; and their deep reluctance to pool competences in foreign and security policies. Despite this, since the very beginnings of cooperation in these fields through European Political Co-operation (EPC) in the 1970s, we have been able to observe a gradual but nonetheless considerable transformation in the manner, structures, and processes in and through which the national foreign policies of the member states are conducted, and in their actual content.KeywordsMember StateForeign PolicySecurity PolicyLisbon TreatyPolitical DirectorThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

The article examines the features of the institutional and legal mechanism of the Union in the field of security and defence from its founding under the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 to the current stage under the Lisbon Treaty in 2007. The legal characteristics of the EU institutions, that deals with the defence and security of Member States is provided. In particular, the activities of the European Council, the Council of the EU, the European Parliament, as well as the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy were analyzed. It is established that the institutional component of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy is characterized by the preservation of the sovereign powers of the Member States, as the development and decision-making at the highest level takes place through intergovernmental bodies of the Union. The powers of subsidiary bodies established by decisions of the EU Council are studied. The activities of the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee, the EU Military Staff, the European Defence Agency, and the Committee on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management are analyzed. In particular, the Political and Security Committee is the central executive body of the Union and a kind of "engine" of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Especially important is his work on crisis management and finding the most optimal solutions in this direction. The EU Military Committee is the highest military body of the European Union, which manages all military activities within the EU. The EU Staff is the Union's main military expert body, tasked with early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning in line with the European Security Strategy. The European Defence Agency is a center of cooperation in the field of defence policy between Member States, EU institutions and third countries. It is noted that the EU institutional mechanism in the field of security and defence is represented not only by purely military but also by civilian structures, among which the Committee on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management is the key. It has been found that the above institutions have sole executive powers and are not empowered to make legally binding decisions for Member States. It is concluded that one of the trends in the development of the EU institutional mechanism in the XXI century is so-called military-civil synergy, which occurs through cooperation between military and civilian structures of the Union, whose activities are aimed at achieving systematic goals in security and defence issues.

Foreign and security policy were not areas in which Prime Minister Cameron was seeking to renegotiate the relationship between the UK and the European Union (EU), but security may be a key issue in the EU referendum. The untangling of Britain's foreign and security policy from the EU following a Brexit vote would be relatively uncomplicated. The EU's arrangements for collective foreign and security policy, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), are conducted on an intergovernmental basis which allows the UK to preserve independence in its diplomacy while allowing for the coordination of policy where interests are held in common with other member states. The UK retains substantial diplomatic and military capabilities which would allow it to continue to pursue a separate national foreign, security and defence policy in the case of either a ‘Leave’ or ‘Remain’ outcome.

It is likely that the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) objection in Opinion 2/13 regarding the absence of judicial remedies in certain Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) areas can hardly be accommodated in a future revised Accession Project to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This is basically due to obstacles to proceeding with reform of the EU Treaties or establishing an ECHR reservation clause. However, as a matter of fact, the exact dimension of this problem seems to be quite relative. First of all, this is because recent ECJ case-law is gradually eroding the Court’s lack of competence, in particular, after Rosneft. Next, this is because, in those cases where there is still an absence of effective judicial protection, national courts – as EU ordinary courts – could fill this gap. Finally, this gap could also be filled by creating accountability mechanisms in the area of human rights within the framework of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions.

Common Security and Foreign Policy of the European Union so far is still dominated by nation-states, especially in the security and military affairs, the position of major Member States such Britain, France and Germany, have absolute impact on the EU decision-making process. Over the years, the relationship between the EU and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been continually wavering affected by the United States and international situations. For some key international issues, the EU Member States the might show different position due to their national interests resulting in the lack of a common China Policy for the EU. This paper will firstly review the relations between the EU and China from political and economic aspects on two theoretical bases, New Realism and Neo-liberalism. Then, to analyze the barriers and challenges encountered in the bi-lateral interaction over these years. Secondly, the paper will review the relations be-tween Germany and China in different periods of German government, and discuss how Germany interacts with China under the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. Last but not the least, the paper will assay the impact of the special partner-ship relations” between Germany and China during Merkel government on the EU’s China Policy.

Germany’s policy towards the European Union (EU)’s evolving foreign policy manifests itself in different dimensions of the EU’s foreign policy process. As a member state of the EU, Germany frequently but not always supports the establishment of new norms and institutional structures, thus either seeking to strengthen or weaken EU competences vis-à-vis member states and entities (polity). Similar to other member states, the biggest economic power in the EU also either seeks to bolster or undercut, or otherwise influence the process of EU foreign policy coordination through using unilateral means or colluding with outside powers, such as the US, Russia, or China (politics). Last but not least, Berlin may or may not support a common or joint policy decision or strategy of the EU towards a specific conflict, i.e. the Yugoslavian wars, or a policy area such as migration. This chapter examines different concepts of how to tackle the interaction between German and EU foreign policy, dwelling on theoretical explanations and the empirical work done on different regional and functional policies. It also assesses Germany’s constitutional policy towards the Common European Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), focusing on the role of societal actors in the process. The chapter also traces Germany’s substantial policy contribution in a number of cases, testing the hypothesis that Germany’s CFSP policy has become more intergovernmental over time.