Deemphasizing Nuclear Weapons in Nuclear Deterrence: The Case for Conventional Counterforce

Nuclear weapons, once thought to have been marginalized by the end of the Cold War, have returned with a vengeance to the centre of US security concerns and to a world bereft of the old certainties of deterrence. This is a major analysis of these new strategic realities. The George W. Bush administration, having deposed the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, now points to a new nuclear "Axis of Evil": Iran and North Korea. These nations and other rogue states, as well as terrorists, may pose key threats because they are "beyond deterrence", which was based on the credible fear of retaliation after attack. This new study places these and other developments, such as the clear potential for a new nuclear arms race in Asia, within the context of evolving US security policy. Detailing the important milestones in the development of US nuclear strategy and considering the present and future security dilemmas related to nuclear weapons this is a major new contribution to our understanding of the present international climate and the future. Individual chapters are devoted to the key issues of missile defenses, nuclear proliferation and Israel’s nuclear deterrent. This book will be of great interest to all students and scholars of strategic studies, international relations and US foreign policy.

Over the past eighteen months, a substantial breakdown has taken place in the domestic consensus on nuclear policies in Europe and the United States. In Europe, mass demonstrations have occurred against the deployment of new US cruise and Pershing II ballistic missiles. These include not only young protesters, ecologists, and other cause-adopters. Many middle-aged, middle-class, conservative Europeans have also joined. Especially among the Protestant churches, leaders have condemned in ethical and religious terms the development and possession of nuclear weapons, nuclear deployments, nuclear strategy and nuclear deterrence.

The principal challenge for US nuclear deterrence policy in an era of mutual assured destruction capabilities has been to use the threat of nuclear retribution to deter Soviet actions that, however aggressive, do not directly threaten American national survival. The United States seeks to use nuclear threats to deter not only all-out nuclear attack on the United States, but major nuclear or conventional aggression against NATO and also limited, presumably counterforce, blows against America. Nuclear weapons are to serve as an umbrella protecting not only America's cities and society, but US allies and US military forces as well.

Since coming to power, North Korea's Kim Jong-un regime has been upgrading its nuclear forces through four nuclear weapons tests and hundreds of test launches of nuclear weapons delivery systems. The North Korean regime has pursued distinct actions to assert its status as a nuclear power following the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Notably, it first specified in the preamble to the amended Constitution in 2012 that it was a nuclear state, and then enacted the Nuclear Weapons States Act in 2013 to disclose its comprehensive nuclear strategy to the public. Afterwards, the regime declared the “completion of national nuclear forces” in 2017, and replaced the Nuclear Weapons States Act (2013) with the Nuclear Forces Policy Act in 2022. While the North Korean regime has been limited in its capacity to pursue nuclear retaliation against the United States, its redrafting of its nuclear legislation has signaled a fundamental change in its nuclear strategy as well as an active will to use nuclear weapons. The new enactment of the Nuclear Forces Policy Act (2022) presents a shift from a “no-first-use (NFU)” nuclear policy to a more aggressive stance that conditionally permits “first-use.” This change coincides with the recent focus of the Kim Jong-un regime on the development of tactical nuclear weapons. Therefore, it should be noted that the newly enacted Nuclear Forces Policy Act carries different implications from the traditional approaches of nuclear weapons states.

Studies related to international security that focus on conflict issues, military strategy and nuclear weapons became relevant during the ongoing Cold War. However after the Cold War, issues such as nuclear strategy were no longer a major problem, instead issues like economic, technological, social and human rights became more relevant. Thus, the urgency of describing North Korea’s post-Cold War nuclear strategy and it’s impacts on security stability in East Asia is an interesting discussion. This study aims to describe how North Korea's nuclear strategy post-Cold War and how it affects the security stability of East Asia. Method applied is qualitative with a case study approach which will be anaylzed using the deterrence theory and securit dilemma. The results of the research show that North Korea's post-Cold War nuclear strategy has affected security stability in the East Asia region, which is shown from the responses of Japan, South Korea, and China which experienced a security dilemma from North Korea's nuclear proliferation deterrence. North Korea's post-Cold War nuclear strategy by carrying out nuclear proliferation ultimately created a security dilemma in the East Asian region.

Iranians and the Bomb: Elite Cues and Support and Opposition to the Development of Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear Weapons as Symbols: The Role of Norms in Nuclear Policy Making

This article aims to assess the strategic implications of North Korea's nuclear development. It calls into question the conventional wisdom that Pyongyang's atomic weapons will not only undermine the state of deterrence on the Korean peninsula, but also will trigger a nuclear domino effect throughout East Asia. A nuclear-armed North Korea, I argue, still cannot win a major victory over the South and the United States; Pyongyang's bombs somewhat decrease—rather than increase, as many believe—the risk of US preventive attack. And the regional US military presence as well as the available missile defence technology is sufficient to persuade Seoul and Tokyo not to pursue nuclear arsenals for the foreseeable future. While I reject the alarmist view, I find that North Korea's armament nevertheless carries two significant—albeit less grave—risks that have received little scholarly scrutiny. First, I argue that the risk of inadvertent war through pre-emption will increase with Pyongyang's armament. I also argue that the strengthening of US alliances in the region as well as the US development of a missile defence capability in response to the North Korean threat could exacerbate the security dilemmas among major powers. I conclude, however, that these potential dangers do not markedly threaten regional stability.

The basic framework of Japan’s nuclear policy, consisting of four pillars, was established just before the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was opened for signature in 1968. Since then, the security environment in modern Japan, surrounded by three nuclear-armed states (China, North Korea, and Russia) that are willing or not hesitant to change the status quo by force, has increasingly become more challenging. The new National Security Strategy of Japan made public in December 2022 states that “Japan’s security environment is as severe and complex as it has ever been since the end of World War II”. Despite this severe security environment, there is no indication of significant changes in the basic framework of Japan’s nuclear policy. However, with increasing discussions in the Japanese security community that the strike capability gap with China needs to be filled with nuclear weapons and that Japan should promote nuclear operational integration with the United States, Japan’s security policy may rely more on nuclear weapons, which could end up conflicting with Japan’s current nuclear disarmament policy, even while the basic framework as above remains the same, in particular unless and until the strike capability gap is addressed by fielding counterstrike capabilities. Such policy decisions should be made in a balanced manner so that these would not create a significant security dilemma and not increase the risk of military conflict in the region, in which case the possibility of escalation to the risk of nuclear weapons use cannot be ruled out.

Reducing the risks of nuclear war to humanity

: The February 2007 agreement reached with North Korea to shut down its nuclear reactor and give up its nuclear weapons program was heralded by many as a significant breakthrough following the shock of North Korea's nuclear weapons test in October of the previous year. This optimistic assessment, however, fails to consider the significant hurdles that will confront negotiators as they attempt to fulfill the promise of the February accord. The North Korean regime s hierarchy of nuclear motivations including its perception of the security, leverage and prestige offered by the possession of nuclear weapons as well as the significant time and energies it has invested in developing a nuclear device, make an actual verifiable dismantling of this program unlikely. Further, the historical tendency for negotiations with North Korea to produce few positive results bodes ill for future success. Extant hurdles are further compounded by a U.S. negotiation position that heightens North Korea's security concerns, leaves little room for compromise, and has, unwittingly, encouraged North Korea s development of nuclear weapons. Without some unforeseen and dramatic change in position by either side, the ongoing negotiations regarding North Korea s nuclear weapons program are unlikely to succeed in the near term. The best hope lies in gaining a complete understanding the North Korean position and developing a flexible strategy of engagement and containment. Such a strategy could address the security concerns of the Kim regime while limiting North Korea's ability to proliferate nuclear technology and providing security for the U.S. and its allies. Such an approach, however, would likely require the U.S. to set aside, at least temporarily the potentially costly and unrealistic goal of North Korean denuclearization.

Soon after nuclear weapons devastated the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Bernard Brodie and several colleagues wrote "The Absolute Weapon," which predicted that the atomic bomb would revolutionize international politics. In "TheAbsolute Weapon Revisited," a group of noted scholars explores the contemporary role of nuclear weapons in the world after the end of the Cold War. Although superpower rivalry has faded, the complexities of living with nuclear weapons remain.Working from different theoretical perspectives, the contributors offer a set of provocative assessments of nuclear deterrence and the risks of nuclear proliferation and disarmament. Some argue that assured destruction capabilities remain important, while others argue that nuclear deterrence will be increasingly irrelevant. Arms control, crisis stability, and continuity and change in nuclear doctrine as well as new issues such as virtual nuclear states and information warfare, are some of the issues addressed by the contributors to "The Absolute Weapon Revisited." The contributors are Zachary Davis, Colin S. Gray, Richard J. Harknett, Ashok Kapur, Robert Manning, William C. Martel, Eric Mlyn, John Mueller, J. V. Paul, George Quester, and James J. Wirtz.This book will be of interest to scholars, policymakers and students interested in issues of nuclear strategy and deterrence, arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament, international security and peace studies.T. V. Paul is Associate Professor of Political Science, McGill University, and the author of "AsymmetricConflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers." James J. Wirtz is Associate Professor of Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, and the author of "The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure at War." Richard Harknett is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Cincinnati, and the author of numerous articles on security affairs.

NATO's nuclear deterrence posture has since the late 1950s involved risk-and responsibility-sharing arrangements based on the presence of US nuclear weapons in Europe. Since 1991 gravity bombs, deliverable by US and allied dual-capable aircraft, have been the only type of US nuclear weapons left in Europe. Although many other factors are involved in the alliance's deterrence posture and in US extended deterrence—including intercontinental forces, missile defences, non-nuclear capabilities and declaratory policy—recent discussions in the United States about NATO nuclear deterrence have focused on the future of the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe. The traditional view has supported long-standing US and NATO policy in holding that the risk- and responsibility-sharing arrangements based on US nuclear weapons in Europe contribute to deterrence and war prevention; provide assurance to the allies of the genuineness of US commitments; and make the extended deterrence responsibility more acceptable to the United States. From this perspective, no further cuts in the US nuclear weapons presence in Europe should be made without an agreement with Russia providing for reductions that address the US—Russian numerical disparity in non-strategic nuclear forces, with reciprocal transparency and verification measures. In contrast, four schools of thought call for withdrawing the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe without any negotiated Russian reciprocity: some military officers who consider the weapons and associated arrangements unnecessary for deterrence; proponents of ambitious arms control measures who accept extended deterrence policies but view the US weapons in Europe as an obstacle to progress in disarmament; nuclear disarmament champions who reject extended nuclear deterrence policies and who wish to eliminate all nuclear arms promptly; and selective engagement campaigners who want the United States to abandon extended nuclear deterrence commitments to allies on the grounds that they could lead to US involvement in a nuclear war.

Exploring how the United States manages its still-powerful nuclear arsenalArms control agreements and the end of the Cold War have made the prospect of nuclear war a distant fear for the general public. But the United States and its principal rivals—China and Russia—still maintain sizable arsenals of nuclear weapons, along with the systems for managing them and using them if that terrible day ever comes.Managing U.S. Nuclear Operations in the 21st Centuryfocuses on how theories and policies are put into practice in managing nuclear forces in the United States. It addresses such questions as: What have been the guiding priorities of U.S. nuclear strategy since the end of the Cold War? What nuclear attack options would the president have during a war? How are these war plans developed and reviewed by civilian and military leaders? How would presidential orders be conveyed to the uniformed men and women who are entrusted with U.S. nuclear weapons systems? And are these communications systems and supporting capabilities vulnerable to disruption or attack? The answers to such questions depend on the process by which national strategy for nuclear deterrence, developed by civilian leaders, is converted into nuclear war plans and the entire range of procedures for implementing those plans if necessary. The chapter authors have extensive experience in government, the armed forces, and the analytic community. Drawing on their firsthand knowledge, as well as the public record, they provide unique, authoritative accounts of how the United States manages it nuclear forces today. This book will be of interest to the national security community, particularly younger experts who did not grow up in the nuclear-centric milieu of the Cold War. Any national security analyst, professional, or government staffer seeking to learn more about nuclear modernization policy and the U.S. nuclear arsenal should be interested in this book. It should also be of interest to professors and students who want a deep understanding of U.S. nuclear policy.

: The above statement was excerpted from Bernard Brodie's 1959 study Strategy in the Missile Age. As originally drafted, it was meant to describe US policy-makers in the early years of the US and Soviet nuclear competition. The phenomenon reflected in this statement is currently manifested in India's nuclear strategy The dawn of the nuclear weapons age in 1945 gave birth to not only a new form of more powerful explosive, but also to a new focus in military strategies. In particular, it gave new emphasis and meaning to the age-old concept of deterrence. In the US, among the most influential early thinkers on the strategic and political significance of nuclear weapons and deterrence was Bernard Brodie. Fifty years after the first nuclear explosion, nuclear weapons programs have taken on strategic and political significance on the Asian sub-comment This paper analyzes Indian nuclear strategy in the context of Brodie's theories on nuclear strategy. It focusing on three critical areas. First, we look at the importance of the Indian concept of recessed deterrence and its absence in Brodie's writings. Then, we discuss the Indian object of deterrence. Finally, we analyze India's retaliatory capability in the context of Brodie's recommendations for effective deterrence. In analyzing these areas it becomes clear that India's nuclear strategy does not fully accord with Brodie's strategic recommendation for stability in the nuclear age. As presaged in the opening quote, this, may be due to a deeper rejection of the concept of nuclear retaliation.