Nuclear Weapons and Strategy

During the 2000 presidential election, in that time before the September 11th terrorist attacks, the stump speeches of George W. Bush and his Democratic opponent, Al Gore, focused on protecting Social Security, saving American education, expanding Medicare, raising or lowering taxes, and readying the military. If science was mentioned at all, it was usually in the context of missile defense, global warming, or Gore’s role in creating the internet. With the exception of the debate over stem-cell research, science remains a background topic in the current campaign. Democratic candidate John Kerry has occasionally highlighted US science policy and used it against President Bush, charging that the administration has put politics and ideology ahead of science. “Let scientists do science again,” a headline on the Kerry election website says.Bush has responded, primarily through his science adviser, John Marburger, by pointing to the 44% increase in federal R&D since fiscal year 2001 and the record $132 billion in the administration’s FY 2005 R&D budget. “Kerry ignores President Bush’s record science investments,” reads a headline on the Bush reelection website.Kerry answers by noting that most of the R&D money is going for weapons systems and defense spending related to the war in Iraq, not basic science programs. Marburger and other administration officials point to several R&D initiatives, including new nanotechnology centers, the Moon/Mars space initiative, and the program to develop hydrogen fuel technology. In an effort to get the candidates to specifically address questions of interest to the science community, Physics Today has continued a tradition begun in 1976; it asked Bush and Kerry nine questions covering a range of science topics. Their answers, sometimes direct and sometimes vague, show fundamental differences on several key issues.On missile defense, Bush says his request of $10 billion in FY 2005 for development and deployment of such a system fulfills a pledge he made to the American people. Kerry says we should not be “falsely comforted by an untested and unproven defense system.”On global warming, Kerry talks of both near- and long-term programs to deal with the problem. Bush promotes his “comprehensive climate change strategy.” The candidates also address a host of other issues ranging from space exploration to energy policy. During the 2000 presidential election, in that time before the September 11th terrorist attacks, the stump speeches of George W. Bush and his Democratic opponent, Al Gore, focused on protecting Social Security, saving American education, expanding Medicare, raising or lowering taxes, and readying the military. If science was mentioned at all, it was usually in the context of missile defense, global warming, or Gore’s role in creating the internet. With the exception of the debate over stem-cell research, science remains a background topic in the current campaign. Democratic candidate John Kerry has occasionally highlighted US science policy and used it against President Bush, charging that the administration has put politics and ideology ahead of science. “Let scientists do science again,” a headline on the Kerry election website says.Bush has responded, primarily through his science adviser, John Marburger, by pointing to the 44% increase in federal R&D since fiscal year 2001 and the record $132 billion in the administration’s FY 2005 R&D budget. “Kerry ignores President Bush’s record science investments,” reads a headline on the Bush reelection website.Kerry answers by noting that most of the R&D money is going for weapons systems and defense spending related to the war in Iraq, not basic science programs. Marburger and other administration officials point to several R&D initiatives, including new nanotechnology centers, the Moon/Mars space initiative, and the program to develop hydrogen fuel technology. In an effort to get the candidates to specifically address questions of interest to the science community, Physics Today has continued a tradition begun in 1976; it asked Bush and Kerry nine questions covering a range of science topics. Their answers, sometimes direct and sometimes vague, show fundamental differences on several key issues.On missile defense, Bush says his request of $10 billion in FY 2005 for development and deployment of such a system fulfills a pledge he made to the American people. Kerry says we should not be “falsely comforted by an untested and unproven defense system.”On global warming, Kerry talks of both near- and long-term programs to deal with the problem. Bush promotes his “comprehensive climate change strategy.” The candidates also address a host of other issues ranging from space exploration to energy policy. 1Section:ChooseTop of page1 <<BushKerry2BushKerry3BushKerry4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerry Missile defense: The present administration is requesting more than $10 billion this year for development and deployment of a missile defense system. Many scientists say the system, given current and foreseeable technology, cannot be effective. What proof of effectiveness should be required before the system is fully deployed? Given the low-tech nature of terrorist attacks and the limited missile capabilities of North Korea and other hostile nations, does missile defense continue to be a wise investment? BushSection:ChooseTop of page1Bush <<Kerry2BushKerry3BushKerry4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerryOur policy is to develop and deploy, at the earliest possible date, a weapons system that would defend the United States homeland against nuclear attack, including ballistic missile defenses drawing on the best technologies available. Early in my administration, I called for the examination of the full range of available technologies and basing modes for missile defenses that could protect the United States, our deployed forces, and our friends and allies.The FY 2005 Defense Appropriations Act provides $10 billion that I requested for systems to defend against the threat from ballistic missiles. Later this year, the first components of America’s missile defense system will become operational, and we are on schedule for the next stages of the project. My administration will develop and deploy the technologies necessary to protect our people, fulfilling a pledge I made to the American people more than four years ago.KerrySection:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry <<2BushKerry3BushKerry4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerryA missile defense that works is a wise investment, but one that pours money into defenses at the expense of other immediate national security needs is not. And that’s what this administration has done. Missile defense should be one element of a comprehensive national security strategy. But a single-minded focus on this technology and the threat it is designed to meet ignores the very real danger of terrorism and our greatest danger—terrorists with weapons of mass destruction.John Edwards and I will be committed to developing a missile defense system that works, is fully tested, and geared to the threats we face. But I will refocus our efforts on preventing the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and dramatically accelerating the security of nuclear weapons and material in Russia and around the world. We will not sit by, falsely comforted by an untested and unproven defense system, while these threats continue to fester.2Section:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2 <<BushKerry3BushKerry4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerry Climate change: Virtually all reputable research in recent years has reinforced the scientific conclusion that global warming is a real and growing crisis caused, at least in part, by the burning of fossil fuels. Do you accept that scientific consensus? Under what circumstances would you regulate carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions? BushSection:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2Bush <<Kerry3BushKerry4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerryGlobal climate change is a serious long-term issue. In 2001, I asked the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to provide the most up-to-date information about the science of climate change. The academy found that considerable uncertainty remains about the effect of natural fluctuations on climate and the future effects climate change will have on our environment.My administration is now well along in implementing a comprehensive climate change strategy to advance the science, expand the use of transformational energy and carbon sequestration technologies, and mitigate the growth of greenhouse gas emissions in the United States and in partnership with other nations. I created the new US Climate Change Science Program (CCSP) to refocus the federal government’s climate research programs, for which my 2005 budget seeks nearly $2 billion to fund research across the federal government. The NAS endorsed the CCSP strategic plan, noting that it “articulates a guiding vision, is appropriately ambitious, and is broad in scope.”I also committed the nation to a goal of reducing American greenhouse gas intensity by 18% over the next 10 years, which would prevent more than 500 million tons of carbon emissions through 2012. To help achieve this goal, I created the Climate Vision program in 2003 to reduce the growth of greenhouse gas emissions by energy-intensive industrial sectors. Participants in the Climate Vision program account for between 40 and 45% of US greenhouse gas emissions. I have strongly supported over $4 billion in tax incentives for renewable and energy-efficient technologies, including wind and solar energy and hybrid and fuel-cell vehicles. Also, in April 2003, my administration raised the fuel economy standards for light trucks and SUVs [sport utility vehicles] for the first time since 1996, saving 3.6 billion gallons of gasoline. And in my 2003 State of the Union [address], I announced a $1.7 billion hydrogen fuel initiative to accelerate research that could lead to hydrogen-powered, no-emission vehicles within a generation.Additionally, my administration is participating in robust international partnerships to promote clean, renewable, commercially available fusion energy and to construct the $1 billion FutureGen project, which will test the latest technologies to generate electricity, produce hydrogen, and sequester greenhouse gas emissions from coal. KerrySection:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2BushKerry <<3BushKerry4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerryI recognize the risk of climate change, and I have outlined a balanced set of programs that will have impact both in the near term and over the long term. My plan will also provide balanced support for technology that can increase the efficiency and cut greenhouse emissions in transportation systems, buildings, and industry that are attractive to consumers and US producers. Our programs will encourage the use of renewable fuels such as ethanol and renewable electric generation that produce little or no net greenhouse gases. I will expand the production tax credit for wind and biomass energy to cover the full array of renewable energy sources and increase Department of Energy (DOE) research into renewable energy sources and their applications. And I will propose an aggressive program of research, standards, and incentives to accelerate electric generation from renewable energy. Clean coal technology can play a critical role, given technology to cut carbon dioxide emissions.My plan would encourage energy efficiency with programs such as updated fuel efficiency standards, new tax incentives for automakers to build the new, more efficient automobiles of the future, and tax incentives for families to purchase more energy-efficient cars, trucks, and SUVs.3Section:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2BushKerry3 <<BushKerry4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerry Science investment: There is concern in the science and economic communities that the US is losing its world leadership in the sciences, which they say bodes ill for future economic growth and global competitive-ness. To address that concern, should the US increase funding for basic science, and should the administration fully fund the 2001 bill, signed by the president, to double NSF’s budget? How would you reinvigorate science education for US-born students? What is the role of foreign scientists and students in the US scientific enterprise? BushSection:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2BushKerry3Bush <<Kerry4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerryIncluding my FY 2005 budget request, total federal R&D investment during the first term will have increased 44% to a record $132 billion in 2005. My FY 2005 budget request commits 13.5% of total discretionary outlays to R&D, the highest level in 37 years. In the context of the overall economy, federal R&D spending in the FY 2005 budget is the greatest share of GDP [gross domestic product] in over 10 years. Funding for basic research, the fuel for future technology development, is at an all-time high of $26.8 billion in FY 2005, a 26% increase over FY 2001. Funding for NSF during the four years of my administration has increased 30% over FY 2001 to $5.7 billion in FY 2005. NSF’s broad support for basic research, particularly at US academic institutions, provides not only a central source for discovery in many fields but also encourages and supports development of the next generation of scientists and engineers. Moreover, in fulfilling its mission, NSF has used its funding efficiently and effectively.As for the American scientific enterprise, it is important in this information and technological age that our students receive a first-rate science education, just as they receive quality instruction in reading, writing, and math. The federal government has no control over local curricula, and it is not my job to tell states and local boards of education what they should teach in the classroom. Nevertheless, the No Child Left Behind Act, one of my proudest legislative achievements this term, is improving our schools and, consequently, the teaching of science. NCLB requires, for the first time, assessments in science to give us better information about how our students are performing and how to improve instruction in science. I have also proposed creating the Presidential Math and Science Scholars Fund to provide $100 million in grants to low-income students who study math or science. This will ensure that America’s graduates have the training they need to compete for the best jobs of the 21st century.I also value the contributions that foreign scientists and students make to our nation’s scientific enterprise, while recognizing the importance of safeguarding our security. We will continue to welcome international students and scientists while implementing balanced measures to end abuses of the student visa system. My administration has already achieved several notable successes in reducing delays now being experienced by some visa seekers. We have increased security while speeding up the clearance process; approximately 1000 back-logged applications have already been cleared out.KerrySection:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2BushKerry3BushKerry <<4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerryFor three years, the Bush administration has squandered America’s leadership in the world, putting politics before science and doing nothing to create jobs while our workers fall further behind. The administration has proposed cuts for scientific research and grossly distorted and politicized science on issues from mercury pollution to stem-cell research. This approach not only limits the research that our scientists are doing today, it undermines important discoveries of tomorrow and threatens America’s critical edge in innovation. I will reverse this course by restoring America’s scientific leadership, helping find new cures, moderating healthcare costs, and developing new technologies that will create good jobs. I will boost support for the physical sciences and engineering by increasing research investments in agencies such as NSF, the National Institutes of Health, DOE, NIST, and NASA. This funding will help with the broad areas of science and technology that will provide the foundations for economic growth and prosperity in the 21st century.4Section:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2BushKerry3BushKerry4 <<BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerry Nuclear weapons: Does the US need to develop a new class of nuclear weapons to deal with the changing threats of the 21st century? Is there any circumstance in which you would support the resumption of nuclear testing? BushSection:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2BushKerry3BushKerry4Bush <<Kerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerryThe Nuclear Posture Review, released by my administration in January 2002, noted that the nation’s nuclear infrastructure had atrophied since the end of the cold war and that the evolving security environment requires a flexible and responsive weapons complex infrastructure. To that end, my FY 2005 budget reflects an increase over the 2004 enacted level in the weapons activities account, which encompasses the stockpile stewardship programs. There is no current need for testing due to the sophistication of computer modeling and other new technologies, but we must maintain the capability to test in case such testing becomes necessary in the future to ensure the safety and reliability of our defensive arsenal. We have not identified any need for developing new nuclear weapons. KerrySection:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2BushKerry3BushKerry4BushKerry <<5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerryNo, and a Kerry–Edwards administration will stop this administration’s program to develop a new class of nuclear weapons. This is a weapon we don’t need, and it undermines our ability to persuade other nations to forego development of these weapons.5Section:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2BushKerry3BushKerry4BushKerry5 Nuclear There is serious concern many that could or a nuclear in a US Do you the US is doing to and control of nuclear weapons and material both in the US and BushSection:ChooseTop of administration in has more to and control nuclear weapons and material than US weapons and are and both the Department of Defense and are to make more My administration has increased funding to weapons and material in the Union and has by years the schedule the administration for security in We are with Russia to end the production of and to weapons for of weapons. the my administration the to or and material We have already weapons material from several our in its for nuclear weapons. To against we the international in a global effort to account and of sources that could be used in such We activities in over 40 on this as well as with international the Energy the the and the of Defense we have dramatically our ability to that could be a threat to us and to our friends and my administration the billion initiative to support and nuclear safety in the This of the international is to a more of nation’s highest must be preventing from to nuclear weapons and the material to make We must in a global partnership with other nations to prevent the spread of these weapons. the Bush administration’s have in the have the we need to advance our security. September they have not nearly to and on the while the nuclear from and North Korea have Our security requires an immediate change of I have proposed a comprehensive strategy to of weapons and including an of programs to all nuclear weapons and within the and at research in the within four production of new material for nuclear weapons by a global on production of new of nuclear weapons and by development of the new generation of nuclear accelerating in US and nuclear and reducing of in nuclear weapons programs in hostile including by with North Korea to ensure the and of its nuclear weapons program and a global effort to prevent from the necessary to build nuclear weapons. international efforts to by and and as well as improving the security a presidential to prevent nuclear terrorism who will focus on a effort to all nuclear weapons and around the world and prevent a nuclear terrorist of Energy than of and have not in a comprehensive US energy policy. years into the future, what do you the US energy should How would you the US in that BushSection:ChooseTop of and energy is critical to America’s and homeland security. We will be more and more we are on foreign sources of energy. The of a comprehensive and balanced national energy policy has been one of my During my first in I proposed a national energy policy that would our energy production and systems, reduce our on foreign promote efficiency and increase domestic production from all of energy including renewable energy and continue to our economy and create new jobs. We will continue to with on the energy to the administration has nearly all of the more than in the comprehensive national energy policy that not as increasing reliability R&D to help prevent and the to its of million to provide energy security in case of of have proposed an program of research, and standards that would increase the efficiency of energy use and use of new energy sources that can ensure a and while reducing the risk of climate change. The program would be supported in by a billion energy security and from federal and gas the in by I have to around the and a of that can meet US needs both in the term and for in the Given the long time required to over energy investments such as of and trucks, industrial and we must a broad set of new technologies as as possible we have any of US energy use in the near term, many of the most control systems, and other technologies to improve the energy of buildings, and industrial that the US to reduce its on from the and I will set for fuels such as I will support research and incentives that will dramatically increase use of from wind and other renewable And I will encourage development of technology and nuclear generation with high standards for stewardship and of Nuclear recent by that nuclear is the best energy source to meet the US while protecting the renewable energy can be deployed on a Do you increasing the use of nuclear If what would you do with the BushSection:ChooseTop of support the further development of nuclear technologies as a clean, and to meet this nation’s future energy Nuclear for of our This which no pollution or greenhouse gas can play an expanding role in our energy future while the we with energy national energy policy several to encourage increased use of nuclear and to the that through the Nuclear my administration is with industry to the for an of a new US nuclear within the next years. through the the United States is with around the to develop a next generation of more and more nuclear that can also produce hydrogen and my administration has made a to the nuclear and the of a long-term at We are ahead with the of a to the Nuclear at the end of this administration is also committed to and in new technologies that will change the we generate I committed the United States to the international fusion energy as in is a important to test the of nuclear fusion as a source of and the of a nearly source of energy the that long-term of Nuclear can play an role in energy while reducing the risk of climate key such as nuclear nuclear and security must be John Edwards and I will ensure safety and science We George Bush’s plan to over the of a Kerry–Edwards administration will on science. John Edwards and I do not support as a nuclear and will that nuclear and transportation only on the of science and that to and the John Edwards and I will George Bush and to from a for an NAS study to is the as to long-term and or some other technology. an international to scientific for nuclear and nuclear from terrorist John Edwards and I will improve and security at nuclear In we will nuclear to to improve including measures to reduce to the an of National National Nuclear the national weapons continue to be with security spending and What would you to improve at the Does the current plan of the to the risk of the in the of the war on BushSection:ChooseTop of national are doing to deal with the threats of the 21st are a in our efforts to improve homeland are the source of technological and are helping the war on With their at the highest level in years, National National and National are also on the edge of defense research, protecting the nation’s infrastructure from terrorist attacks, and developing a that the of a nuclear This is we billion on weapons research and production in FY 2004 and I for billion for We must and security My administration has made effort to improve the the weapons do and one of efforts is that in all areas of central to the war on we can use our more and focus on his or of national play a critical role in our nuclear weapons stockpile and that our nation’s nuclear weapons are and The national also have an important role in preventing the spread of weapons of mass and in science for our nation’s have a of our nation’s but this record has been by and security at the has been John Edwards and I are committed to and and restoring the at these critical national of is being to the long-term of to the and Many scientists the will money from science How do you the importance of science exploration What is the funding between the BushSection:ChooseTop of I announced my for the future of America’s space exploration this will the of both and science will as to the and other vehicles continue to their and of to we have systems on and around a system and one on its to the for cannot be by the most or the most We need to and and for And only are of to the by space we our on the we are developing a new exploration to our This will be by and its first no than will to the as as and no than and use it as a for the We will with to the and for future will with the goal of and there for of Edwards and I will continue America’s long tradition of leadership in and space exploration as of a program to broad for this will not to programs such as the Bush administration’s Program that from in the with no or will in new programs to set by scientific in and other Our administration will on the of the scientific to the most for research and the most for these the of or are most to the 2004 American of

ABSTRACTThis article analyzes the political utility of US drone strikes theoretically and deductively. Placing strikes within the context of the theorized political functions of force and considering how they fit into two grand strategies, restraint and selective engagement, I argue that these strikes buy the United States relatively little in the way of political effects assuring its own security because the terrorism threat they are intended to combat is a limited one within the skein of US global interests. Furthermore, their contribution to counter-terrorism efforts is likely to diminish with the adoption of armed drones by non-state actors. Drone strikes can, however, provide leverage over recalcitrant US client states while reassuring liberal partners and giving them some leverage over US choices. In addition, within the counter-terrorism sphere, drone strikes are less likely to inflame popular opinion than are alternative uses of force. This analysis contributes to an increasingly rigorous examination of the strikes’ role in US foreign and security policy.

No terrorist atrocities on the scale of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon have occurred since 11 September. The military campaign in Afghanistan and the post-11 September global counter-terrorist mobilisation have probably compromised al-Qaeda's operational capability. The strategic attention of the US has thus expanded from countering transnational terrorism to stemming the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). President George W. Bush confirmed this policy evolution when he included Iraq, Iran and North Korea in an 'axis of evil' in his 29 January State of the Union message. At the same time, fuelled by broader concerns about American unilateralism, Washington's European allies and partners have re-asserted their preference for diplomacy in handling threats that the US tends to consider more amenable to being neutralised through force or threatened force. These transatlantic differences in threat perceptions and responses have potentially significant implications for the campaign against transnational terrorism, dealing with 'rogue states' and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Most gaps, however, are not unbridgeable.

Studies related to international security that focus on conflict issues, military strategy and nuclear weapons became relevant during the ongoing Cold War. However after the Cold War, issues such as nuclear strategy were no longer a major problem, instead issues like economic, technological, social and human rights became more relevant. Thus, the urgency of describing North Korea’s post-Cold War nuclear strategy and it’s impacts on security stability in East Asia is an interesting discussion. This study aims to describe how North Korea's nuclear strategy post-Cold War and how it affects the security stability of East Asia. Method applied is qualitative with a case study approach which will be anaylzed using the deterrence theory and securit dilemma. The results of the research show that North Korea's post-Cold War nuclear strategy has affected security stability in the East Asia region, which is shown from the responses of Japan, South Korea, and China which experienced a security dilemma from North Korea's nuclear proliferation deterrence. North Korea's post-Cold War nuclear strategy by carrying out nuclear proliferation ultimately created a security dilemma in the East Asian region.

This article advances a strategic theory on the benefits of integrated deterrence for the US alliance network in East Asia. After assessing the role of nuclear weapons in the region and tracing the evolution of US strategic thought on nuclear policy in East Asia, we evaluate the emerging risks and challenges of contemporary regional nuclear policy. We argue that over-reliance on nuclear weapons may exacerbate Sino-American tensions and pose difficulties for ally reassurance, especially against the backdrop of growing partisan politics in the United States. We outline and evaluate an alternative theory of integrated deterrence, which would prioritize the development of conventional counterforce capabilities and de-center nuclear weapons in the deterrence of nuclear threats. We assess this approach in relation to the escalation and entrapment risks posed by the current theory of regional nuclear deterrence. Finally, we reflect on the implications of US nuclear strategy in a changing regional nuclear environment.

In 2002 the inclusion of North Korea by the Bush administration within the 'axis of evil' portended a break from the Clinton policy of engagement. Despite the apparent inconsistencies of this categorisation, North Korea's undoubted possession of some weapons of mass destruction capability seemed to make it a possible target for US containment if not preemption. However, Pyongyang's chief motive in such weapons development might actually be to guarantee regime survival. The revelation that North Korea had been developing a covert uranium enrichment program led US policymakers in the Bush administration to contemplate a policy of quarantine and containment. The wider policy community is divided on the question of whether Pyongyang was seeking a new bargain with the US, or whether this program was intended to produce a deterrent from possible US attack. These alternatives prescribe, respectively, a new negotiating approach or a strategy designed to dissuade. But the actual policy choice hinges on the outcome in Iraq.

children of darkness are evil because they know no law beyond the self. They are wise, though evil, because they understand the power of self-interest. The children of light are virtuous because they have some conception of a higher law than their own will. They are usually foolish because they do not know the power of self-will. They underestimate the peril of anarchy in both the national and international community. Clearly it has become necessary for the children of light to borrow some of the wisdom of the children of darkness; and yet be careful not to borrow too much. -- Reinhold Niebuhr The Children of Light and The Children of Darkness, 1944 The tragic events of 11 September 2001 have given Americans a painful reminder of the evil that men are capable of inflicting on others, as Reinhold Niebuhr warned long ago, witnessing the destruction wrought by Nazi Germany. The World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks dealt heavy blows to the American liberalism that sees humankind as perfectible and on a steady historical march toward democracy and international peace. That dark day jarred American innocence and alerted us to the hatred of the United States that seethes in the Middle East and the lengths to which adversaries will go to harm our citizens and interests. The day should serve as a loud wake-up call that adversaries want to inflict massive devastation on the United States and would be able to accomplish this task more readily if armed with chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. Al Qaeda was working feverishly along these lines, judging from documents and plans captured in the Afghanistan campaign. Other sub-state actors may foll ow al Qaeda's lead. The substantial infrastructure needed to support weapons of mass destruction programs--particularly for nuclear weapons--and their delivery systems such as aircraft and ballistic missiles, however, will likely remain more within the reach of nation-states than sub-state actors. The Bush Administration casts the American military campaign as a against terrorism. That characterization might be useful as oratory but is amorphous and causes considerable confusion. After all, is a method or tactic of warfare, not an entity. A against terrorism is akin to a on war, which comes perilously close to the crusading liberalism of Woodrow Wilson and his to end all wars. A against terrorism is an open-ended pledge that causes potential international partners to step back from cooperation in areas where they share interests with the United States out of fear that the next American steps could be sharply at odds with their interests. The Bush Administration would have been wiser to call the American military campaign what it is--a war to destroy the al Qaeda network, and the regimes and entities that support it, and to deter others from lending any support to the network responsible for slaughtering thousands of innocent American civilians in our homeland. Such directness would have lent a strategic clarity needed to link ends and means in statecraft, reinforced the war's objectives, and reduced a fair amount of second-guessing and downright back-stabbing at home and abroad. When President Bush surveyed the global geopolitical landscape through his post-9/11 lenses in his State of the Union address, he rightly viewed major threats to American security as coming from Iraq, Iran, and North Korea--his axis of evil. Bush's characterization was a rhetorical means to succinctly capture three nation-state threats, although it mistakenly suggested that there is an active concert of planning or conspiring between Baghdad, Tehran, and Pyongyang. What these countries do share is robust weapons of mass destruction capabilities and delivery systems coupled with political intentions to work against US interests. …

In his article, Matthew Fuhrmann challenges the conventional wisdom about the relationship between civilian nuclear cooperation and nuclear weapons proliferation.1 The literature on nuclear proliferation focuses on the demand side and explains decisions to acquire nuclear weapons on the basis of security threats, hegemonic ambitions, national identity, or related factors.2 The role of civilian technical nuclear cooperation is generally discounted as a motivating factor in the acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities. Fuhrmann argues that there is a causal connection between peaceful nuclear cooperation and proliferation and that civilian nuclear assistance over time increases the likelihood that states will initiate nuclear weapons programs. The implications of the notion that civilian nuclear technology promotes nuclear proliferation are disturbing, because they lead to the conclusion that the central bargain of the nuclear nonproliferation regime—namely, access to civilian nuclear technology in return for the renunciation of nuclear weapons—is not viable and that instead the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) might be a vector for the spread of nuclear weapons technology. The central thesis of Fuhrmann’s article seems implausible. Nuclear proliferation is exceedingly rare. One hundred eighty-nine states are members of the NPT, including ave nuclear states. There are only four states that are not members of the NPT and that have nuclear weapons. Of the four, the last one to make the decision to go nuclear and that received civilian nuclear assistance started its nuclear program in 1972. North Korea went nuclear in the absence of civilian nuclear assistance.3 Belarus, Kazakhstan, Correspondence: Nuclear Cooperation and Proliferation

It was a speech designed to arouse Americans at home: it ended up sowing fear and hatred abroad. In his State of the Union address, President Bush's now famous assertion that Iran, Iraq and North Korea constituted an 'axis of evil' that threatened world peace, suggested, without any evidence, some sort of alliance such as the 'axis powers' of World War II (Germany, Italy and Japan). His statement put the three countries 'on notice' and helped put the US on a higher level of war preparation. A year on, Index examines the state of these three nations, and speculates particularly on the bizarre — and counter-productive — inclusion of Iran (Aryeh Neier, p22). Though we have heard much about their governments and leaders, little is heard from the citizens of these countries. Index reports from inside 'the axis of evil' (p20), finding out who these people are, how they live, what their newspapers are saying (p58), what they feel about their governments and their futures. As we know, Iraqi citizens live in a state of fear, trapped between a hugely repressive regime and devastating sanctions: Faleh Jabar tells us how they are dealing with this (p29). Meanwhile, as the world waits to see what will happen next, the US administration is trying to insulate us, through that subtlest form of censorship, euphemism, from what war does to human beings. 'Serious consequences', 'collateral damage', 'regime change', ' taking out', 'cleansing' — this is warspeak, shrouding war's bitter reality. And the face of war has changed. Violence has become more fragmented — 152 small wars you may have missed have been fought since World War II. They have often involved massive displacements of people. Conflicts are seen as more threatening to the world's security, and military intervention is used to defend human rights. Index looks at some of the controversial debates, many of them going on behind closed doors, about the way that humanitarian aid is delivered, and its consequences. While Caroline Moorehead (pl48), in her disturbing and instructive article on life in post-war Afghanistan, tells us that 'humanitarian intervention has become more uncertain, more precarious and more political', David Rieff (pl96) warns that humanitarian aid workers, by moving from the principle of neutrality to advocacy for intervention in civil wars and ethnic cleansing, are losing sight of their purpose. •

IntroductionNorth Korea is no longer the isolated communist country it has been portrayed as for the last half century. In recent years North Korea has entered into diplomatic ties with i3 countries, giving them a total of i49 formally established international relationships, compared to i36 such relationships just three years ago. This is no less significant than the i84 ties to countries that South Korea has, considering South Korea has been an active partner with the U.S. and many other countries in the free world for the last half century.There are few countries that are watched, studied, and monitored as much as North Korea is. The country has been receiving much attention recently for two reasons. The first reason is a decade-long economic decline that has led to speculation that millions of North Koreans have starved to death. No one knows for sure how many North Koreans died from food shortages in the 1990s because North Korea restricts most media reporters. U.S. Congressional sta∂ers who have visited the country concluded that from 1995 to 1998 between 900,000 and 2.4 million people died from starvation, with deaths peaking in 1997 (Kirk, 1998). International aid organizations estimate that the number of starving people ranges from 2.8 to 3.5 million (Noland, Robinson & Wang, 200i).The second reason is the political fallout from being branded, along with Iran and Iraq, in President Bush's 2002 State of the Union address as the axis of evil (Bush, 2002). In the address, North Korea was described as a regime arming itself with missiles and weapons of mass destruction while starving its citizens. The majority of Americans (59%) believe that North Korea is a major problem, but of those surveyed a greater number of people support a diplomatic relationship between the United States and North Korea. The Harris Poll conducted in November 2000 showed support for a diplomatic relationship with North Korea by 69% of Americans, 63% of Japanese, and 70% of South Koreans (Polling Report.com, 2003). The percentages in these three countries may have spiraled upward as the result of the Iraq war.North Korea has adopted economic reforms as of July 2002 to improve its market system, and has revealed nuclear energy programs to deter U.S. military threats. The World Food Program has been a lifeline to sustain one-third of the 23 million North Koreans. We have yet to see results from the economic policies.Four Reasons to Do Business with North KoreaThere are four compelling reasons to do business with North Korea: (i) its potential economic growth, (2) a peaceful political future, (3) the availability of a highly motivated workforce, and (4) its strategic geographic location. This paper explores each of these four reasons in order to shed a brighter light for Far-Eastern prospects than the common dark picture drawn by some ultra-conservative viewers.Reason One: Potential Economic GrowthToday North Korea is seen by people around the world as the recipient of a vast amount of economic aid. Between 1996 and 2004 North Korea became the largest recipient of U.S. aid in Asia, with annual contributions totaling more than $i billion in food, conditional fuel oil, and medical supplies. The relationship with the Clinton administration was much friendlier than has been the Bush era relationship. In the late 1990s, the U.S. allowed the easement of 50-year-old trade sanctions with North Korea that fell under the Trading with the Enemy Act. In conjunction with the easement of trade sanctions, North Korea hosted U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright for an unprecedented three-day visit to Pyongyang in 2000. President Clinton himself was tentatively planning to visit the country, though the trip did not materialize.Improving diplomatic relations with North Korea is not a question for only the United States. North Korea's positive relationship with countries around the world presents a more favorable environment for commerce than in the past. …

This book discusses US foreign and security policy in contemporary Eastern Mediterranean, against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine and renewed great power competition. It examines US relations with Tukey, Greece, and Cyprus and a balancing strategy in the region towards Russia. The author assesses the impact on Eastern Mediterranean politics and US interests, drawing on neorealist theories and the dynamics of an international system in transition and explores the impact of the global redistribution of power in regions which do not traditionally constitute top strategic priorities. Contributing to discussions on great power balancing strategies and taking into consideration the transition to a post-unipolar international system, this book will appeal to scholars and students of international relations, security studies, US foreign and security policy, great power, and Mediterranean politics.

The US has been the Indo-Pacific’s most important security actor since the Second World War. During this time its approach has been to retain its position of primacy in which it is the dominant military power and substantial hostile players are kept in abeyance. The basic aim of the US over this time has remained remarkably stable, however, the means through which it pursues that goal has varied considerably both in approach and effect. This chapter examines seven decades of US security policy in the region and does so in three parts. The first covers the thirty years from the end of the Second World War, a time in which US security policy led the country into major conflicts on the Korean Peninsula and Vietnam. The second part explains the part US security policy played in making the four subsequent decades the most stable and prosperous period in the region’s modern history. The third covers the period from the accession of Xi Jinping in 2012 until the end of the Trump Administration in 2020 and shows how the US continuing to pursue the same core strategy as it has for so many prior decades in spite of quite different geopolitical has helped produce more contested regional security dynamic.

What explains South Korean public opinion on nuclear weapons development? Despite the US security commitment, most South Koreans consistently support independent nuclear weapons development. To solve this puzzle, we investigate the mechanisms of security threat and security commitment under which individuals develop their opinion on nuclear proliferation. An original survey of 1,988 South Korean adults shows empirically supported correlates of South Korean public opinion on nuclear proliferation. Public support for proliferation is largely shaped by external security threats: nuclear threats from North Korea and China, but also the latent nuclear superiority of Japan. Public opposition to proliferation is fostered by the perceived credibility of the US security commitment, but not by its perceived effectiveness. The results provide insights into South Korean public opinion on nuclear proliferation and can inform the design of a nonproliferation policy tailored to South Korea.

For the past decade, the globalized world has been struggling to adapt to an abnormal degree of uncertainty. Amidst a global pandemic, contemporary international relations are increasingly resembling trying to play roulette at a casino in the middle of an earthquake—all bets are off. For many years, different authors have consistently predicted the collapse of the post-revolutionary Iranian regime—and have consistently failed. One could say that the demise of the Iranian regime has become the most unexpected event that can be expected in the Middle East. By applying the concept of antifragility first developed by Nassim Taleb, the present chapter proposes that this event, although repeatedly forecast, has not occurred because Iran has become an antifragile State: a country with the ability to positively leverage a complex set of circumstances amidst excruciating uncertainty. Recalling that Iran was designated a State sponsoring international terrorism, later described as a “rogue State” bent on developing nuclear weapons and part of an “axis of evil”, the present chapter discusses how the regime devised a whole-of-society strategy leveraging the Iranian armed forces whereby three elements—ideology, ingenuity and asymmetry—are deployed in a variable geometry. Firstly, the issue will be framed in the context of recent events, followed by an assessment of U.S. foreign policy and the “rogue State” discourse. Secondly, the chapter elaborates further on the idea of a whole-of-society strategy focusing on the three elements of Iran’s antifragility toolbox with special consideration given to the role played by Iranian armed forces. Finally, a set of conclusions is proposed in view of the most recent geopolitical developments.

This article explores the discursive performance and political significance of ‘American exceptionalism’ under President Obama. Moving beyond a critical examination of geopolitical identity, it investigates how representations of exceptionalism, understood as ideational construct of uniqueness and superiority, are linked to practices of US foreign and security policy that confirm, but also contest, established notions of American leadership in world politics. A particular focus lies on the 2012 presidential campaign, and how diverging ‘exceptionalist’ visions between Obama and Mitt Romney testified to competing ideas for American primacy and cooperative engagement. The article will further examine the cases of ‘leading from behind’ in Libya, American non-intervention against Assad in Syria, and US reactions to current crises concerning Ukraine and ISIS. The contextualisation of these episodes in contemporary, geopolitical discourse reveals how the practice of US foreign and security policy under Obama is shaped by a conflicted and paradoxical vision of post-American hegemony.