US Security Interests in the ‘New Eastern Mediterranean’

ABSTRACTThis article analyzes the political utility of US drone strikes theoretically and deductively. Placing strikes within the context of the theorized political functions of force and considering how they fit into two grand strategies, restraint and selective engagement, I argue that these strikes buy the United States relatively little in the way of political effects assuring its own security because the terrorism threat they are intended to combat is a limited one within the skein of US global interests. Furthermore, their contribution to counter-terrorism efforts is likely to diminish with the adoption of armed drones by non-state actors. Drone strikes can, however, provide leverage over recalcitrant US client states while reassuring liberal partners and giving them some leverage over US choices. In addition, within the counter-terrorism sphere, drone strikes are less likely to inflame popular opinion than are alternative uses of force. This analysis contributes to an increasingly rigorous examination of the strikes’ role in US foreign and security policy.

The US has been the Indo-Pacific’s most important security actor since the Second World War. During this time its approach has been to retain its position of primacy in which it is the dominant military power and substantial hostile players are kept in abeyance. The basic aim of the US over this time has remained remarkably stable, however, the means through which it pursues that goal has varied considerably both in approach and effect. This chapter examines seven decades of US security policy in the region and does so in three parts. The first covers the thirty years from the end of the Second World War, a time in which US security policy led the country into major conflicts on the Korean Peninsula and Vietnam. The second part explains the part US security policy played in making the four subsequent decades the most stable and prosperous period in the region’s modern history. The third covers the period from the accession of Xi Jinping in 2012 until the end of the Trump Administration in 2020 and shows how the US continuing to pursue the same core strategy as it has for so many prior decades in spite of quite different geopolitical has helped produce more contested regional security dynamic.

Nuclear weapons, once thought to have been marginalized by the end of the Cold War, have returned with a vengeance to the centre of US security concerns and to a world bereft of the old certainties of deterrence. This is a major analysis of these new strategic realities. The George W. Bush administration, having deposed the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, now points to a new nuclear "Axis of Evil": Iran and North Korea. These nations and other rogue states, as well as terrorists, may pose key threats because they are "beyond deterrence", which was based on the credible fear of retaliation after attack. This new study places these and other developments, such as the clear potential for a new nuclear arms race in Asia, within the context of evolving US security policy. Detailing the important milestones in the development of US nuclear strategy and considering the present and future security dilemmas related to nuclear weapons this is a major new contribution to our understanding of the present international climate and the future. Individual chapters are devoted to the key issues of missile defenses, nuclear proliferation and Israel’s nuclear deterrent. This book will be of great interest to all students and scholars of strategic studies, international relations and US foreign policy.

This article explores the discursive performance and political significance of ‘American exceptionalism’ under President Obama. Moving beyond a critical examination of geopolitical identity, it investigates how representations of exceptionalism, understood as ideational construct of uniqueness and superiority, are linked to practices of US foreign and security policy that confirm, but also contest, established notions of American leadership in world politics. A particular focus lies on the 2012 presidential campaign, and how diverging ‘exceptionalist’ visions between Obama and Mitt Romney testified to competing ideas for American primacy and cooperative engagement. The article will further examine the cases of ‘leading from behind’ in Libya, American non-intervention against Assad in Syria, and US reactions to current crises concerning Ukraine and ISIS. The contextualisation of these episodes in contemporary, geopolitical discourse reveals how the practice of US foreign and security policy under Obama is shaped by a conflicted and paradoxical vision of post-American hegemony.

It is highly uncommon for major military powers to pursue foreign security policy that prioritizes the interests and needs of other countries over the national interest. The creation of US Africa C...

In the early 1960s, Franco's Spain began to experience a rapid process of economic growth, which was encouraged by US diplomacy as it would underpin the stability required by the US defence program in the country. However, American officials felt that such an accelerated economic development should be orderly since chaotic modernization might spark social turmoil that would compromise the US geo-strategic objectives in Spain. The article unravels the US public diplomacy programs to steer Spanish society along with a stable development path based on US-inspired capitalism and alliance with the Western bloc. It examines the cultural, educational, and informational means employed by the US government in a bid to channel the socio-economic upheaval occurring in Spain in a direction that was compatible with US security interests. We also argue that modernization theory provided the ideological and intellectual framework for US persuasion efforts to harness Spain's socio-economic ferment. Nevertheless, the ‘development model’ promoted by the dictatorship generated inequalities and conflicts that fuelled anti-American sentiment among sectors of Spanish society called to play a role in the future post-Franco transition.

In this chapter, I introduce the topic by showing that US-India relations could be characterized as estranged and were marked by dramatic oscillations. Following this discussion, I will refer to the construction of security issues/problems related to India and security policies toward India within the discourse from Roosevelt through Bush Sr. during five periods. As the chapter will demonstrate, the US security policies toward India were often tied to the US containment policy—they were constructed as more important—which limited other policy options toward India within the discourse.

The aim of this article is to analyse the US security policy during the presidency of Joe Biden, with the main emphasis on military security and its importance for the Baltic states, which perceive the US as the main guarantor of their security. This is particularly important in the context of challenges related to China’s expansion in the region or Russia’s display of strength. Based on realist theories of international relations, using methods of content analysis, synthesis, and comparison, it was possible to analyse the role of the so-called B3 Baltic states in US foreign policy. There is no doubt that the US is positioning itself as one of the key strategic partners of the B3 states; therefore, in this context, it is necessary to consider the US strategic options toward the B3, which have evolved along with the change in the geopolitical situation in the European region. The Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine confirmed the decisive response of the B3 states, perceiving Russia as a threat to the security of the region. The time frame is limited to Biden’s four-year term in 2021–2024. For research purposes, the contemporary literature in the field of political science and security was used, as well as primary sources related to US decisions and presidential statements that are relevant to this article.

(2003). Absolute gains, relative gains, and US security policy on China This paper is translated from a Chinese version published at World Economics and International Politics, 11, 2002, pp. 17–21. Defense & Security Analysis: Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 309-317.

The Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996 was the greatest challenge to Sino‐American relations in several decades. This study examines the crisis and its implications for US security policy. It outlines US policy toward the defense of Taiwan, discusses the US response to Beijing's military intimidation of Taiwan and analyzes several of the major lessons gleaned from the crisis. The paper suggests that, while China's aggressive behavior should not lead to a dramatic shift in the American position toward Taiwan's defense, some modest adjustments in policy may be warranted.

The article discusses the position of burden sharing in the US security policy vis-à-vis its European allies. It argues that this issue has always been important for the US administration, but never to the extent it is today. This is due to several factors, including: (a) current White House America First policy, which embraces a critical position against international institutions and emphasizes the importance of economic elements of US multi- and bilateral relationships; (b) reluctance of some of European allies—with Germany as the biggest concern for the US—to keep defense expenditures on the level of 2% of GDP, including 20% for major equipment, as it is required by NATO financial guidelines; and (c) a scale of US overpayment, which is lesser than presented by US officials. I suggest that burden sharing will remain a priority for the current US government and would cause certain economic and political-military (new posture of US troops in Europe) consequences.

This book provides a descriptive and analytical narrative of the evolution of US foreign policy towards Iraq at the supra-national (global), national (Arab Iraq) and sub-national (Iraqi Kurdistan) levels. The book is unique in that it presents a sophisticated insight into the two major components of US Iraq policy. To achieve this, it addresses US foreign policy towards both Arab Iraq and an entirely original analysis on US policy towards the Iraqi Kurds as components of a larger US Iraq policy, dictated by the supreme US Grand Strategy. The book also examines whether US foreign policy towards Iraq has been one of continuity or change – a dimension that has not been illustrated in any other publication. The book deals intelligently and at great length with the events surrounding US Iraq policy in three distinct phases, going back to, 1979 with regard to Arab Iraq, and 1961 in respect to the Kurdish liberation movement, covering all subsequent US administrations including the Obama presidency. It provides a thorough examination of US interests in Iraq and reasons for the 2003 invasion and its aftermath. It also engages with the intellectual roots of US foreign policy, presenting an intricate reaction of views, objectives and agendas. This work will be of interest to students and scholars of Middle East studies, US Foreign Policy and Security studies.

This article investigates the US foreign and security policy with regard to the responsibility to protect (R2P). Based on the analysis of expert interviews and official documents, it traces the US position on R2P across critical junctures between the principle's 2005 adoption at the UN World Summit and its latest invocations in the Syrian crises of 2013. It discusses the recent atrocity prevention agenda of the US Government as ambitious and as a still evolving operationalisation of R2P. The article reveals several patterns in US attitude and practices towards R2P across recent administrations: the avoidance of new obligations in international law despite a general supportive attitude towards R2P; a deeply-rooted pragmatism that leads to the development of practical tools that follow-up on the principles it commits to, even if R2P language had to be avoided in domestic politics; and a constant balancing act between domestic- and international-level politics.

ABSTRACTFor decades, Africa lay at the periphery of US security policy. Attention to the continent intensified after the 9/11 terrorist attacks amid claims that East Africa and the Sahel had become hubs of terrorist activity. Despite this shift, US analysts and policymakers continue to frame security threats in Africa using a traditional, Cold War-influenced paradigm. Commonly used indicators are based on mainstream security studies, which provides a narrow view of security. Using Critical Security Studies, this article provides a broader and more inclusive assessment of security threats in Africa.

In 1946, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recognizing the importance of the unity of military effort achieved by US forces during World War II, issued the "Outline Command Plan."This was the first in a series of documents specifying an arrangement now known as the Unified Command Plan.The plan divided the world into geographic regions and assigned responsibility to a designated military command for protecting US security interests in each region.This organizing principle has guided post-World War II US military operations.[1] Over the last 54 years, the Unified Command Plan has been revised 18 times in response to the changing strategic environment, advances in technology, and the growing global commitment of US forces.[2] Legislation adopted in 1979 specified that the Unified Command Plan be reviewed biennially.[3]The President approved the current Unified Command Plan on 13 October 1999.In this latest review there were no regional or functional changes pertaining to the continent of Africa.In fact, none of the language in the last two assessments directly addressed Africa.This is consistent with Department of Defense declarations that the United States has "very little traditional strategic interest in Africa," [4] but that assertion is itself somewhat puzzling in light of the fact that the United States has intervened militarily in the region more than 20 times since 1990.[5] Under the current Unified Command Plan, responsibility for the continent of Africa is divided among three of the five regional unified commands.The duties of the commands include developing joint operation plans to deter war and, if necessary, to guide the transition to war or to military operations other than war.[6]When hostilities start, the unified commands plan and conduct campaigns and major operations.[7] In addition to these purely military roles, the Commanders in Chief (CINCs) of the unified commands also have come to play important diplomatic roles by using US military resources to enhance access and influence while communicating regularly with senior foreign civil and military leaders on a variety of issues.[8] No other organization of the US government is manned or equipped to play a regional role of this magnitude.[9] Essentially, a unified command is the primary organization charged with protecting America's security interests in a geographic region of the world.It does this not only by managing US military resources in the region, but by building better security relations with the foreign countries in the region, endeavoring to build trust and "habits of cooperation" that permit quick agreement and common action to resolve regional conflict.Assisting America's diplomats in building coalitions and maintaining alliances is thus a key role of the unified commands.Such a role is particularly important in regions where US resources are limited.Because of the increased US engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa, and because the current regional unified commands are principally focused elsewhere, the time has come to rethink the Unified Command Plan as it regards Africa.The current plan cannot effectively protect America's security interests on that continent.It is unlikely to realize the articulated policy objectives of the United States in the region, and it should be revised to better secure those objectives. History of the Unified Command Plan and AfricaThe "Outline Command Plan" of 1946 established seven unified commands: Far East Command, Pacific Command, Alaskan Command, Northeast Command, Atlantic Fleet, Caribbean Command, and European Command.[10]None was assigned responsibility for the continent of Africa.