Parading US Security Interests as African Security Policy

This book discusses US foreign and security policy in contemporary Eastern Mediterranean, against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine and renewed great power competition. It examines US relations with Tukey, Greece, and Cyprus and a balancing strategy in the region towards Russia. The author assesses the impact on Eastern Mediterranean politics and US interests, drawing on neorealist theories and the dynamics of an international system in transition and explores the impact of the global redistribution of power in regions which do not traditionally constitute top strategic priorities. Contributing to discussions on great power balancing strategies and taking into consideration the transition to a post-unipolar international system, this book will appeal to scholars and students of international relations, security studies, US foreign and security policy, great power, and Mediterranean politics.

In 1946, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recognizing the importance of the unity of military effort achieved by US forces during World War II, issued the "Outline Command Plan."This was the first in a series of documents specifying an arrangement now known as the Unified Command Plan.The plan divided the world into geographic regions and assigned responsibility to a designated military command for protecting US security interests in each region.This organizing principle has guided post-World War II US military operations.[1] Over the last 54 years, the Unified Command Plan has been revised 18 times in response to the changing strategic environment, advances in technology, and the growing global commitment of US forces.[2] Legislation adopted in 1979 specified that the Unified Command Plan be reviewed biennially.[3]The President approved the current Unified Command Plan on 13 October 1999.In this latest review there were no regional or functional changes pertaining to the continent of Africa.In fact, none of the language in the last two assessments directly addressed Africa.This is consistent with Department of Defense declarations that the United States has "very little traditional strategic interest in Africa," [4] but that assertion is itself somewhat puzzling in light of the fact that the United States has intervened militarily in the region more than 20 times since 1990.[5] Under the current Unified Command Plan, responsibility for the continent of Africa is divided among three of the five regional unified commands.The duties of the commands include developing joint operation plans to deter war and, if necessary, to guide the transition to war or to military operations other than war.[6]When hostilities start, the unified commands plan and conduct campaigns and major operations.[7] In addition to these purely military roles, the Commanders in Chief (CINCs) of the unified commands also have come to play important diplomatic roles by using US military resources to enhance access and influence while communicating regularly with senior foreign civil and military leaders on a variety of issues.[8] No other organization of the US government is manned or equipped to play a regional role of this magnitude.[9] Essentially, a unified command is the primary organization charged with protecting America's security interests in a geographic region of the world.It does this not only by managing US military resources in the region, but by building better security relations with the foreign countries in the region, endeavoring to build trust and "habits of cooperation" that permit quick agreement and common action to resolve regional conflict.Assisting America's diplomats in building coalitions and maintaining alliances is thus a key role of the unified commands.Such a role is particularly important in regions where US resources are limited.Because of the increased US engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa, and because the current regional unified commands are principally focused elsewhere, the time has come to rethink the Unified Command Plan as it regards Africa.The current plan cannot effectively protect America's security interests on that continent.It is unlikely to realize the articulated policy objectives of the United States in the region, and it should be revised to better secure those objectives. History of the Unified Command Plan and AfricaThe "Outline Command Plan" of 1946 established seven unified commands: Far East Command, Pacific Command, Alaskan Command, Northeast Command, Atlantic Fleet, Caribbean Command, and European Command.[10]None was assigned responsibility for the continent of Africa.

While Central and South America had never been subject to direct North American colonial rule as in the other two case studies of this book (the Ottoman and European empires in the Middle East and North Africa), since the Monroe Doctrine and its corollaries (G. Smith 1994) it has nonetheless been seen as within the unquestioned sphere of influence of the United States — the ‘unofficial empire’ (Poitras 1990, 106) where no foreign intervention was accepted. Material security interests behind this claim to the hemisphere were manifold. The Caribbean and Central and South America constitute the direct neighborhood of the United States which it wants to keep allied. The Caribbean and Central America especially are often referred to as the ‘third and fourth border’ of the United States due to their geographic proximity. Connected to this is the interest to keep the sea lanes free, most importantly the Panama Canal. In addition, but maybe less importantly, the United States has military bases in Central America and imports some strategic raw materials like oil, copper, and bauxite from the region and even though their amount does not seem vital to US security interests, George Kennan once called them ‘our raw materials’ (in P. H. Smith 2000, 126).

In 2019, the Donald Trump administration rejected the draft Treaty on the Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Space (PPWT) in the UN Conference on Disarmament and instead created the Space Force, the first new US military service branch established in decades. The administration had to overcome a series of obstacles to achieve this, though, including public opposition from powerful government actors, the absence of a coherent strategic vision guiding the creation of a Space Force, and entrenched bureaucratic resistance. This article adopts the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) theory to show how Trump administration officials changed their dominant narratives in defense policy. By portraying the United States as the “hero” that faced increasing space security threats from “villains,” Russia and China, the policy narrative promoted conditions in which the president could more easily advance the “solution” to the problem: establishment of the Space Force. Specifically, this study identifies five rhetorical themes used to help shape the policy narrative and then codes the content of 132 different declarations and national space directives from administration officials, with 3982 datapoints, over a 20‐year period. The article finds evidence of narrative strategies that promoted US security interests and vilified the actions of China and Russia in the lead‐up to changes in the strategic force posture. It concludes with a discussion of the added value of the NPF model and the need for more in‐depth analysis of inflection points in different space narratives around the world and in multilateral forums for space governance.

In the early 1960s, Franco's Spain began to experience a rapid process of economic growth, which was encouraged by US diplomacy as it would underpin the stability required by the US defence program in the country. However, American officials felt that such an accelerated economic development should be orderly since chaotic modernization might spark social turmoil that would compromise the US geo-strategic objectives in Spain. The article unravels the US public diplomacy programs to steer Spanish society along with a stable development path based on US-inspired capitalism and alliance with the Western bloc. It examines the cultural, educational, and informational means employed by the US government in a bid to channel the socio-economic upheaval occurring in Spain in a direction that was compatible with US security interests. We also argue that modernization theory provided the ideological and intellectual framework for US persuasion efforts to harness Spain's socio-economic ferment. Nevertheless, the ‘development model’ promoted by the dictatorship generated inequalities and conflicts that fuelled anti-American sentiment among sectors of Spanish society called to play a role in the future post-Franco transition.

National unity and independence, territorial integrity, people's sovereignty and national security are the supreme priority for any sovereign and independent country across the world. The essence of national unity and security is the most important and highly sensitive issue for Nepal in account of its geopolitical sensitivities and geostrategic balance as Nepal is located between two giant nuclear countries and rising global powers – India and China. Analyzing the national interests and national security policy of all three countries – India, China and the US, it is open secret that they have direct strategic, defense and security interests in Nepal. They, therefore, have strategic rivalry to extend their political, diplomatic, economic, strategic, defense and security and cultural influence in Nepal because of its geopolitical importance and geostrategic sensitivity. The emerging triangular strategic rivalry may undermine Nepal’s national interests and national security in the future as their rivalry gets intensified. It is a grave situation for Nepal which will have significant immediate as well as long-term implications. Nepal, therefore, should thoughtfully study to analyze the emerging global powers’ defense, military, security and foreign policies and strategies and should protect and preserve Nepal’s national interests and national security maintaining diplomatic and strategic balance among them.

ABSTRACTThis article analyzes the political utility of US drone strikes theoretically and deductively. Placing strikes within the context of the theorized political functions of force and considering how they fit into two grand strategies, restraint and selective engagement, I argue that these strikes buy the United States relatively little in the way of political effects assuring its own security because the terrorism threat they are intended to combat is a limited one within the skein of US global interests. Furthermore, their contribution to counter-terrorism efforts is likely to diminish with the adoption of armed drones by non-state actors. Drone strikes can, however, provide leverage over recalcitrant US client states while reassuring liberal partners and giving them some leverage over US choices. In addition, within the counter-terrorism sphere, drone strikes are less likely to inflame popular opinion than are alternative uses of force. This analysis contributes to an increasingly rigorous examination of the strikes’ role in US foreign and security policy.

: As described in the recent Department of Defense Statement to Congress, security assistance involves the United States in pursuing its national interests and aiding other nations in preserving their own national security. This paper is an assessment of the future utility of security assistance as a major US foreign policy and security instrument, focusing on its arms transfer element. In this presentation an historical as well as contemporary perspective will be provided for evaluating the program's relevancy to continue US security objectives. Furthermore, an examination of the political-military structure will be undertaken, keeping in mind the program's coherency to its domestic and international political environments. finally, an appraisal of the program's viability for the 1990s will be given, highlighting, the sources of international instability, addressing the dichotomy of arms sales and arms control; the regional and international impact on security assistance and, an assessment of its utility in the recent Gulf Crisis.

Foreign and security policy were not areas in which Prime Minister Cameron was seeking to renegotiate the relationship between the UK and the European Union (EU), but security may be a key issue in the EU referendum. The untangling of Britain's foreign and security policy from the EU following a Brexit vote would be relatively uncomplicated. The EU's arrangements for collective foreign and security policy, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), are conducted on an intergovernmental basis which allows the UK to preserve independence in its diplomacy while allowing for the coordination of policy where interests are held in common with other member states. The UK retains substantial diplomatic and military capabilities which would allow it to continue to pursue a separate national foreign, security and defence policy in the case of either a ‘Leave’ or ‘Remain’ outcome.

To what extent was U.S. President Donald J. Trump’s populist foreign policy agenda supported by the Republican Party (GOP) in Congress? A bourgeoning literature on Congress and U.S. foreign policy has identified increasing partisan disagreement on international issues. Trump’s “America First” policy may have further incited division and ideological controversies. At the same time, the 45th U.S. president’s foreign and security policies were, to a large degree, at odds with traditional GOP policy positions. To understand executive–legislative relations on foreign and security policy during the Trump administration, and in particular the role of the GOP, this paper first investigates voting records in Congress during the Obama and Trump presidencies. The analysis reveals that the reaction to Trump’s “America First” doctrine was not uniform and that parts of the GOP asserted themselves against the president. To explain the sources of this variance, the article focuses on two policy areas with varied GOP positioning: arms control (pro Trump) and foreign aid (contra Trump). In sum, the analysis reveals that some Republicans with traditionalist views (the so-called GOP establishment) opposed some of Trump’s anti-internationalist policies, in particular those that contradicted long-standing GOP preferences regarding vital U.S. security interests. At the same time, Republicans supported Trump on issues where the GOP could continue its policy preference, on arms control in particular.

This chapter is focused on Lithuania’s perspective on European strategic autonomy, addressing it against the backdrop of Russia’s war against Ukraine, agreement on the European Union Strategic Compass, and discussions about the evolution of the Common Security and Defence Policy. The chapter focuses on Lithuania’s national interests as perceived by political elites and depicted in national foreign and security policy strategies. It discusses the emerging national discourse on ESA and how national positions change as this concept evolves. The chapter also addresses the foreign and security policy gains Lithuania might attain under the development of the EU CSDP and the ESA. Finally, it discusses Lithuania’s perception of how regional autonomy per se affects regional relations with the strategic transatlantic partners, particularly the USA.

This chapter provides a critical discussion of the mediatization of policy in general, and of EU foreign and security policy in particular. A common argument in public debate and research is that the media logic is increasingly affecting how policy is formulated. Brommesson and Ekengren are critical of this (as they see it) oversimplified perspective, and they analyse EU foreign and security policy from the opposite point of view in this chapter. Foreign policy is usually described as a conservative policy area, in as much as it is informed by a long-term perspective, and foreign policy is not the subject of public debate to the same extent as other policy areas. Based on this reverse perspective, the authors ask whether policy actors are actually taking advantage of the opportunities provided by mediatization to strengthen long-term policy objectives. The chapter sheds light on the relationship between policy and mediatization through a comparative analysis of two important strategy documents of EU foreign and security policy: the European security strategy of 2003 and the EU global strategy of 2016. The authors discuss the overarching question of whether the formulation of EU foreign and security policy is dominated by media logic, in other words, whether this policy has been mediatized.

This chapter analyses the variations in foreign, security, and defence policy as well as the consequences of a possible fragmentation on the positioning of the Union as a united global force. Since ‘security and defence policy’ is separated from ‘foreign and security policy’, one of the key questions concerns the dividing line between the two areas. Is it possible for Member States not to participate in the security and defence integration or does the single legal order of the Union prevents this variation? A second question concerns the more general possibilities for closer or enhanced cooperation. And, finally, a third question is to what extent the proposed new EU Constitutional Treaty further consolidates the somewhat fragmented legal regime on differentiation in the area of foreign, security, and defence policy.

International cooperation for purposes of infectious and tropical disease control goes back to at least the 14th century, when early concepts of quarantine were introduced in Dubrovnik on the Adriatic Coast of Croatia [1], [2], and to the later date of 1851, when Europe held its first International Sanitary Conference for multilateral cooperation to prevent the spread of cholera and, subsequently, plague and yellow fever [3]. Such efforts led to a series of international sanitary treaties and conventions and ultimately to the formation of the Pan American Health Organization and the later establishment of the World Health Organization (WHO) [3], [4]. Some scholars trace our current framework for global health diplomacy to the writings of Dr. Peter G. Bourne in his role as special assistant for health issues to US President Jimmy Carter [5] and later (during the first years of the 21st century) to the launch of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the release of the “Report of the Commission for Macroeconomics and Health”, when global health was placed squarely in the international diplomacy arena [6]. Among the driving forces for these activities was an urgent need for diplomatic collaboration to combat pandemics caused by HIV/AIDS and seasonal and avian influenza, which came with the revelation that such diseases are threats to economic development and both national security and foreign policy interests [7]. There were also practical considerations concerning potential bioterrorist threats and situations that required international diplomacy, such as when Indonesia balked at sharing its time-sensitive avian influenza data or when Nigeria and Pakistan halted polio and other immunization initiatives because of religious tensions [7]–[11]. In 2007, foreign ministers from seven countries—Brazil, France, Indonesia, Norway, Senegal, South Africa, and Thailand—issued the landmark “Oslo Ministerial Declaration” that formally linked global health to foreign policy [12]. At that time, Kickbusch et al. defined global health diplomacy in terms of processes by which governments and civil societies both “position health in foreign policy negotiations” and create new types of “global health governance” [13], [14]. More recently, Kickbusch and Lokeny defined it as a “system of organization and communications and negotiation processes that shape global policy environment in the sphere of health and its determinants” [15]. A key element of modern global health diplomacy is that “no longer do diplomats just talk to other diplomats”, but instead a variety of experts in different areas and disciplines are now brought in to solve timely global health issues [13]. Katz et al. [9] have since categorized different aspects of global health diplomacy to include the following: (1) core diplomacy, referring to “classical Westphalian negotiations” between nations leading to bilateral and multilateral treaties, such as the recent WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and International Health Regulations (IHR) 2005; (2) multistakeholder diplomacy, i.e., negotiations between or among nations and international agencies such as WHO, the GAVI Alliance, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); and (3) informal diplomacy, which includes peer-to-peer scientific partnerships, private funders such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, and even some government employees from USAID or the US military working more or less independently in the field due to unique circumstances [9]. Michaud and Kates have identified similar forms of global health diplomacy [16]. Kickbusch and Lokeny have also noted recently that the WHO director-general made frequent mention of health diplomacy in her remarks at the January 2013 executive session [15]. Among the factors responsible for this emphasis are globalization associated with the renewed emphasis on “soft power”, security policy, trade agreements, and policies concerning the environment and international development, as well as the inclusion of health issues as part of the United Nations and summits held by various government organizations and agencies, such as the Group of Eight (G8) and Group of Twenty (G20) nations, the European Union (EU), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) countries [15]. Still another factor is the increasing use of health attaches embedded in foreign delegations and agencies and increasing dialogue with low- and middle-income countries [15]. With regards to the G20 (and their BRICS-country components), I introduced the term “blue marble health” to refer to the unexpectedly high neglected disease burden among the poor living in emerging economies and even some G20 countries, circumstances such that these nations could drastically reduce global burdens of neglected diseases by taking greater responsibility for their own health concerns [17], [18].

COOPERATING FOR PEACE AND SECURITY Evolving Institutions and Arrangements in a Context Changing US Security Policy Bruce D. Jones, Shepard Forman, and Richard Go wan, editors New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 348 pp, US $85.00 cloth ISBN 978-0-521-88947-6It is a platitude the conversation on multilateralism global institutions have not adapted to 21st century realities. Setting the record straight is the first reason to pay attention to this volume edited by Bruce Jones, Shepard Forman, and Richard Gowan. The table contents serves as a reminder the transformations have occurred over the last 20 years. Despite not being reformed itself, the UN security council has strengthened peacekeeping, created international courts, stepped into counterterrorism, and diversified its toolbox for preventing the proliferation weapons mass destruction. It has also added legal and regulatory efforts to its usual crisis-management work, and, as David Malone argues in his contribution to the volume, has even advanced a new understanding international sovereignty.Yet this book is more than just a list changes have taken place and problems remain unsolved. Rather, it builds upon Helga Haftendorn's, Robert Keohane's, and Celeste Wallander's claims, made in their 1999 book, Imperfect Unions, that the ability an institution to thrive, or even to survive, depends on its adaptability and that adaptation requires organisations be sensitive not only to general changes in their environment, but specifically to the interests and foreign policy preferences their most important members (313).The editors and contributors Cooperating for Peace and Security rely on the distinction between two worlds international security. Washington is a prominent actor in the first one, which deals with its national security priorities, proliferation, and terrorism. Its in the second world - focused on such issues as humanitarianism, peacekeeping, and international criminal justice - oscillates between benign ignorance and disruption, even as the United States devotes considerable sums to international cooperation and arrangements on these issues. Obviously, even in the so-called first world, the American is not free from historical fluctuations and traditional ambivalence, as Stewart Patrick skilfully demonstrates. Most the book's essays address his fundamental questions of whether the UN could serve as an effective collective security organization, capable confronting the main threats the twenty-first century - and whether the United States [is] willing to allow it to play such a role (39).Still, in both worlds there was only a limited extent to which the United States, for all its unrivaUed power, shaped the evolution the multilateral security architecture in the post-Cold War era (9). The book therefore analyzes the roles - diplomatic brokers, resources contributors, norm entrepreneurs - played by others, be they states (such as the UK on humanitarianism) or international secretariats (the UN itself) in these efforts to adapt and innovate so as to deal more effectively with the threats and challenges a quickly changing international system.None the essays pretends these reforms have been perfect. The book is not shy about the fact many them foUowed crises, some missed their target, and a few significant and needed reforms did not take place at aU. But most the authors are also quick to assert there are no quick or easy fixes for current chaUenges. …