Dreamless Sleep, the Embodied Mind, and Consciousness

During my early introduction to architecture I found that I was motivated not only by matters pertaining to what architecture is, but also, to what it can do. Thus, the questions motivating this work derive from my education in architecture which, at their most rudimentary level, entail a deep fascination with the nature of space, and thus the problem of time. And, subsequently, a practical desire to understand the conditions that constituted experience, and thus perception, sensation and mind. My interest also developed from a general disposition towards others and world founded in principles of human equality and rights with respect to both freedom and responsibility. During my years practicing architecture, these questions as they were brought through the perspective of design continued to inspire me. At the same time, my interest in investigating these questions through theoretical and philosophical research persisted until my aspiration to engage in critical thought outpaced my desire to practice. Hence, a turn in career to work as an academic in the discipline of architecture and the area of architecture theory. This research may be perceived by some as situated outside the realm of architecture. However, this is not the case. My approach to architecture theory is not one that begins with a study of the object, or, for some, one might say the subject of architecture. That is, if the object is understood as the manifestation in thought, process or form of the building or built environment (real or conceived) itself; and if the subject is understood as the thought or idea emanating from the mind of the architect (as author). While there is much architecture theory advanced from this perspective lining my own bookshelves and utilized in my work as an educator. The concerns that have always called me towards thinking about architecture as the imagined and constructed world in which we live are those that query the very nature of concepts, notions, ideologies and intellectual constructions and beliefs upon which culture and society – architecture as both a cultural product and a social actor – are formed. This goes, as well, to the considerations that motivate my concern for people, not users or inhabitants as such, but as ontologically situated beings in the world. Accordingly, my work primarily deals with the content, history and effects of architecture as it relates to theories of space, time, the body, and cognition. Employing and developing theories and methods from disciplines including philosophy, cultural studies, literary theory, political, social and economic theory, cognitive psychology, and the neurosciences in the broadest sense. Admittedly, the nature of theoretical discourse has shown itself to be problematic over the past fifty-plus years; it has also proven to be transformative. Critical thinkers in the late 1960s developed a sustained critique of their philosophical predecessors – primarily in regard to Marx on one hand and Heidegger on the other – with a critique of social history and a displacement of metaphysics resulting in a repositioning of social and cultural discourse. Of course, the debate unfolded against the philosophical and aesthetic background of not only Marx and Heidegger, but also Nietzsche, Hegel and Freud on one hand, and Manet, Cézanne, Baudelaire and Mallarmé, Wagner and Debussy on the other. In architecture, the debate extended to Ruskin and Wölfflin, and to Wright and Corbusier, amongst others. This period, in itself, refers to an unprecedented artistic, scientific, economic, and technological mutation. Prevalent underpinnings remain identifiable, for instance an attack on the absolute nature of knowledge, which has brought about a fundamental rethinking of both the nature of consciousness, as well as a critique of science. As Foucault suggested, one of the great problems that arose in the 1950s was that of the political status of science and the ideological functions that it could serve. Another rebuke can be seen as the challenge to the primacy of truth as an adequation of subject to thing. This culminated in a radical critique of subjectivity resulting, some years later, in the so-called post-humanist-subject. In order to be rid of the subject itself, Foucault, in ‘Truth and Power’ (1977) argued that it was necessary to dispense with the essentialist subject both at the extremes and in-between the enlightenment’s humanist subject and its ideals of knowledge as self-constituting; as well as phenomenology’s fabrication of the subject as evolving through and embodying the course of history. Reflecting on this history, that post-war moment of theory, one cannot help but be struck by the complexity and the ambiguity of the adventure; qualities most evident in the fact that new spaces and new means of writing and drawing, of thinking and making emerged. Ideas that modified our understanding of both communication and the image, of both space and time. Discourses, when combined with a reflexivity within certain architectures and certain texts, rendered them somehow indefinitely open. In the 1960s, literary theory transformed thought on both sides of the Atlantic. For instance, Roland Barthes’s de-sanctioning of the biography-centric author, or the removal of authority from the author turned scriptor in ‘The Death of the Author’ (1967), or Julia Kristeva’s concept of intertextuality with ‘Word, Dialogue and Novel’ (1969). These works impacted our thinking on linguistic phenomena and the origin (or non-originality) of textual content and further, on the invention of new forms of writing and affective relations. Such theories informed and redirected thinking in architecture, for instance, Diana Agrest and Mario Gandelsonas’s work ‘Semiotics and Architecture: Ideological Consumption or Theoretical Work’ was published in the first issue of Oppositions, an architectural journal produced between 1973 and 1984 by the Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies in New York. With this, the influence of the French intellectual climate as well as the Italian discourse on semiotics was brought to the centre of Anglo-American discourse in architecture theory. The intellectual trajectory along which this history is traced and the terrain on which it now takes place will be recognisable to anyone familiar with the work of such thinkers as Henri Bergson, Louis Althusser, Gabriel Tarde, Walter Benjamin, Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan, Jean-Francois Lyotard, and, of course, Félix Guattari, Gilles Deleuze, and Maurizio Lazzarato. The importance of the radically original works that emerged in the seventies and eighties cannot be overestimated, for instance: Foucault’s Discipline and Punish and his lectures at the Collège de France, The Birth of Biopolitics, and Deleuze and Guattari’s Capitalism and Schizophrenia volumes Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus. These works, translated into English shortly after their original publication, were being read throughout many disciplines outside of philosophy including schools of architecture, and their influence can only be said to have increased. I share the above brief history so as to situate my work for those less familiar with the work of theory – whether architecture or otherwise – as this, too, is the intellectual trajectory and exploration along which my own work, as well as many of my contemporaries, travels. In my own work, the influence of the nineteenth/ twentieth-century French vitalist philosopher Henri Bergson – the great thinker of time and, as Walter Benjamin suggested, a seminal source to consult in considering the problem of experience – has quite profoundly informed my thinking and shaped its outcomes. Both with respect to time and space as well as body and brain, his influence is reflected in the title of this volume. That said, this is not a collection of chapters on Bergson’s philosophy. It is a collection on critical concepts I believe to be of importance for contemporary critique, delivered through topics that are relevant – at times directly and at others indirectly – to our current moment. This is a work of great commitment and it has sustained itself over time. It is my hope the reader finds some value in this as well.

The purpose of this brief essay is twofold: (1) to clarify what it is to study anything scientifically and show that consciousness cannot, in principle, be studied scientifically, and (2) to examine the aim and methods of cosmology and show that cosmology cannot, in principle, be a science. The essay can be read by ignoring any and all references to Advaita Vedānta (non‐dualistic Vedānta). My reason for referring to Advaita Vedānta is simply the fact that these two truths were long ago discovered and taught by Advaita Vedānta, which is at once Jñāna‐Yoga (The Way of Knowledge) and mysticism, unsurpassed and unsurpassable.

This article focuses on the processes that lead to awareness of our own emotions, which deserve particular attention in contemporary models of emotional consciousness. The subjective component of emotion, or emotional experience, was for a long time the most neglected aspect in the study of emotions although it already constituted the initial point of discussion in the famous William James still asked question : What is an emotion? More than a century later, contemporary theories debate about this heritage. We examine the successive historic contributions to the question of the determinants of our own emotional experience: from James-Lange bodily changes to cognitive appraisal theories, also relating the major role that the fundamental emotions theory attributed to facial expressions. Twenty years after the debate about primacy of cognition or emotion, both physiological-somatic and cognitive components are integrated in contemporary approaches to emotions. However, their respective degree of implication varies according to the different levels of emotional consciousness which are modelized. It is on the last level that present models focus, level that leads to consciousness of our emotional experience, benefiting from the contributions of cognitive neurosciences. Models differ according to the role devoted to neuronal substrates in determining emotional experience, but they converge on the specification of a last level of consciousness, which is the only one that allows the subject to be conscious of emotion as it is experienced (feeling) and that what he is experiencing is an emotion. Then, different models of emotional consciousness account for different varieties of emotion experience and also for various cases of << unconscious >> emotions, that is occurrence of emotion with a lack of awareness.

In this dialogue Derk Pereboom and Marcel Brass discuss the free will problem from the perspective of philosophy and cognitive neuroscience. First, they give their opinion on how the two disciplines contribute to the free will problem. While Pereboom is optimistic regarding the contribution of science, Brass is more pessimistic and questions the usefulness of an empirical approach to the question whether free will exists or not. Then they outline their position on the free will problem. The idea of a transcendental agent is discussed in more detail. Furthermore, it is discussed whether free will scepticism is a politically, socially, psychologically viable position. Pereboom argues that promoting the idea of free will scepticism can have a positive impact on retributive emotions and the political practice regarding retributive punishment. Brass argues that retributive emotions are deeply rooted in evolution and therefore difficult to change via high-level beliefs about free will. Finally, the future of the free will debate is discussed. Both agree that the dialogue between philosophy and psychology should be intensified. Philosophy can benefit from taking empirical research more seriously. Psychology and neuroscience can benefit from philosophy by appreciating the sophistication and conceptual clarity of the philosophical debate. Both have to find a common language and define common problems that can be tackled from both perspectives.

The present article is a conceptual discussion about cognitive neuroscience and its interface with human development. For this purpose, we begin with a brief history of cognitive neuroscience, emphasizing its interdisciplinary nature. Afterwards we discuss some concepts of neuropsychology such as perceptual and cognitive development, general development of the nervous system, the formation of the brain, synaptic plasticity and cellular and molecular bases of cognition. Finally we emphasize that there is no way to separate the behavior from its biological basis, understanding that the nervous system is a necessary condition for the occurrence of behavior, thoughts and feelings, though it may not be a sufficient condition for the emergence of consciousness and behavioral phenomena.

Long recognized as a defi ning feature of religion, prayer, paradoxically, has received only sporadic empirical attention. Recent investigations in the U.S. and the Netherlands have sought to address this gap by exploring the topic of prayer in programmatic fashions, signifi cantly advancing the state of the art in terms of measurement of the practice of private prayer. The present paper fi rst offers one way to integrate and expand the contemporary prayer literature using a conceptual analysis of religion. Second, challenges and possibilities associated with moving from this synthetic defi nition to neuroimaging work are examined within the framework of social cognitive neuroscience.

The computational method and model of Module of Modeling of Computational Systemic Mind Under Uncertainty is oriented on use as plug-in in systems of Artificial Intelligence, which are characterized by the ability to be self-organized and to operate computationally, intellectually, autonomously, systemically and continuously real time, under uncertainty, in inhomogeneous subject areas, in unknown in advance situations and scenarios of processing, through of perception, extraction, identification, classification, situational fuzzy control and actualizing of relevant unstructured data, information, knowledge, objects, models, processes, graphical and gestural images, extracted from languages and reality, for representation their in corresponding repositories and organizing on their basis of processes of Perception, Reasoning, Systems Thinking and Cognition under uncertainty and Fuzzy Environment, using methods of application of principles of Situational Control and Systems Approach, main aspects of Fuzzy Logic, Linguistics, Computational Mind, Cognitive Science, Artificial Intelligence and developed methods of: (a) Situational Control of data, information, knowledge, objects, models and processes, (b) Perception the reality of environment, (c) Knowledge Representation, Generalization and their Explanation, (d) Fuzzy Inference, (e) Decision making and Planning decisions, (f) Intelligent User Interface, (g) Control of Dialogue, (h) Reasoning and Systems Thinking, and (i) Cognition at whole.

One of the most prominent developments in 20(superscript th) century western philosophy was the outburst of analytical philosophy. Not only can we find its influence within the fields of linguistic analysis, the philosophy of science and the philosophy of the mind, we can also see its impact in the study of political philosophy. Quentin Skinner stands out as one of the most important theorists. Besides making clear the implication of speech-act theory in Skinner's methodology, the purpose of this article is to respond to a common critique of Skinner: namely that Skinner seems to overemphasize the importance of the author's intention to restore the meaning of texts, since this accentuation of intention leads to a seemingly unacceptable conclusion that the literal meaning of the texts itself is non-essential. The author of this article, however, tries to argue that this critique is based on a misunderstanding of Skinner's idea. Since, for Skinner, meaning is a cluster concept which contains several levels of significance, it would be far from enough to merely focus on the literal meaning of any text. To fully understand a work, it is necessarily to take into account the author's intention.

The human brain connectome is a new and rapidly developing project in neuroscience. The pattern of structural and functional connectivity in the brain is not fixed, but is continuously changing in response to experiences. Ex­ploring these phenomena opens a powerful arsenal of analyses and computational approaches that could provide important new insights into clinical and cognitive neuroscience. The aim of the present study was to investigate the structural plasticity of the cortical areas of the brain during a memory task performance using functional MRI. Fifteen right-handed male subjects and fourteen right-handed female subjects were scanned during memory par­adigm performance. The scanning of the participants was performed with a 3Т MRI system - GE Discovery 750 w with a protocol including structural scan - Sag 3D T1 F-BRAVO FSPGR, slice thickness 1 mm, matrix 256N…256, flip angle 10о and standard block design functional scan - 2D EPI, slice thickness 3 mm, matrix 64N…64, TR (rep­etition time) - 3000 msec, TE (echo time) -30, flip angle 90о. Data were analysed using the SPM 12 (Statistical Paramertic Mapping) software running on MATLAB R2015 for Windows. The level of statistical significance was set at P < 0.05. Statistical significance in brain cortical activation was not found between males and females. We found reliable occipital and temporal signal response across the block design contrasts with statistically significant differenc­es within the groups in both genders. The results highlighted several detailed differences between males and fe­males and potential future directions in brain activation studies.

In explaining the reasons for sustained existence of tolerance in Indian philosophical mind and continuation of tolerant practices in socio-political life, Amartya Sen argues that tolerance is inherently a social enterprise, which may appear as contingent, but for all intents and purposes is persistent. Basing his thesis that is opposed to Cartesian dualism, which makes a distinction between mind and body, Sen submits that Indian system of universalizing perception finds a subtle form of connection between mind and body. He expands the ancient core worldview, Vasundhara kutumbakam (entire world as one family) as a secular tolerant civil code,1which makes a connection between the transcendental and the pragmatic planes of consciousness, and reconstructs a thesis about tolerance around human consciousness, which is collectivized and anchored in an acknowledged public space in society that is joined together psychologically as well as philosophically. Tolerance as consciousness can be regarded a necessary condition for playing the role of intentionality as stipulated by classical philosophy (Advaita Vedanta; buddhi, or intelligence as in Samkhya and Yoga). Aware of this ancient wisdom that accepts relativism as an impasse over some evaluative matter, Sen avoids the pitfalls of cultural relativism in tolerance by offering an argument that is based on the metaphysics of Advaita Vedanta and other religious and secular literature, and epitomizes an internationalizing virtue in tolerant traditions. I would examine some interconnected issues, such as the ethical “perimeter” of Sen’s philosophical observation of totalized value system and Indian tolerant attitudes in real life, etc., raising the broader question about the location of cultural identity in relation to supranational state organization. My chief argument is that Sen has been able to observe a connection between the Advaita Vedantic moral philosophy that informs that viewed from the Brahmanic perspective of absolute knowledge in unity, the apparent subject of duality is not the ultimate subject. My conclusion is that valuing of tolerance, individual liberty as well as civil rights is a particular contribution of Western thinking and philosophy; the Western advocates of these rights often provide ammunition to the non-Western critics of tolerance and human rights.

The general question of our paper concerns the relationship between Bayesian models of cognition and predictive processing, and whether predictive processing can provide explanatory insight over and above Bayesian models. Bayesian models have been gaining influence in neuroscience and the cognitive sciences since they are able to predict human behavior with high accuracy. Models based on a Bayesian optimal observer are fitted on behavioral data. A good fit is hence interpreted as human subjects “behaving” in a Bayes’ optimal fashion. However, these models are performance-oriented and do not specify which processes could give rise to the observed behavior. Here, David Marr’s (Marr 1982) levels of analysis can help understand the relationship between performance- and process-oriented models or explanations. Bayesian models are situated at the computational level since they specify what the system (in this case the brain) does and why it does it in this manner. Although Bayesian models can constrain the search space for hypotheses at the algorithmic level, they do not provide a precise solution about how a system realizes the observed behavior. Here predictive processing can shed more light on the underlying principles. Predictive processing provides a unifying functional theory of cognition and can thus i) provide an answer at the algorithmic level by answering how the brain realizes cognition, ii) can aid in the interpretation of neurophysiological findings at the implementational level.

A reflexão e a discussão sobre o papel da especificação genética e da experiência na aquisição de uma função e no desenvolvimento de um indivíduo traduz um debate fascinante e muito atual entre quem trabalha na área do desenvolvimento do comportamento. Acerca do desenvolvimento do comportamento humano e da influência da herança biológica e do meio ambiente estabeleceram-se posições desencontradas e, por vezes, exclusivistas. De um lado, os adeptos da herança genética excluem a possibilidade da influência do meio ambiente. Do outro lado, os adeptos do meio ambiente excluem a herança genética. Existe também uma posição eclética, conciliando ambos os extremos. Além disso, no âmbito das próprias tendências surgem matizes diferenciadoras. Trata-se, portanto, de um assunto bastante polémico ao qual dedicamos este trabalho numa perspetiva das Neurociências. Abordaremos a neuroplasticidade cerebral como a capacidade que o sistema nervoso possui de mudar e adaptar-se, em resposta a estímulos internos e externos, induzindo alterações estruturais e / ou funcionais, ao longo da vida. A plasticidade cerebral constitui um dos pilares dos processos de aprendizagem e de memória. Quando se aprende e se memoriza ou quando se descobre algo desconhecido, a nova experiência deixa uma marca que se traduz em alterações no cérebro. Em suma, o papel das Neurociências no domínio das Ciências da Educação vai ganhando corpo e o conceito de neuroplasticidade é uma condição sine qua non para se tentar estabelecer uma ligação entre a educação, o comportamento e o cérebro.

In this paper, I examine the relationship between social cognition and religious cognition. Many cognitive theories of religion claim that these two forms are somehow related, but the details are usually left unexplored and insights from theories of social cognition are not taken on board. I discuss the three main (groups of) theories of social cognition, namely the theory-theory, the simulation theory and enactivist theories. Secondly, I explore how these theories can help to enrich a number of cognitive theories of religion. The theories I discuss are Stewart Guthrie’s anthropomorphism, Justin Barrett’s hyperactive agency detection device, Jesse Bering’s existential theory of mind, Pascal Boyer’s minds with full strategic access and Tanya Luhrmann’s porous theory of mind. Finally, I look at how enrichment with insights from social cognition can help to combine different existing theories of religious cognition into a unified framework.

Push and Pull Between the Public and Professional

In the debate on any landscape, historically developed processes of interpretation resonate. The way, for example, in which we make use of the Lamotrekese landscape for intercultural comprehension is preceded by an understanding which is strongly object-oriented. In contrast, to my mind, Lamotrek is a socially constructed environment used and thus also created by actors.