Electoral and party system effects on ruling party durability

Political party systems are an important element of political systems in Africa and elsewhere. They form the central intermediate institution between the general population and the government. Party systems represent and aggregate diverse political views and group interests, and they form coalitions that then form governments with potentially important consequences of democracy and political stability. Unlike the case in the period directly after independence, African party systems have been overwhelmingly multiparty since the 1990s. As a result, the literature has grown significantly, although most works focus on political parties rather than party systems. Many efforts have been devoted to classification, referring to the legal context as well as, more specifically, the number of relevant parties, the levels of institutionalization, and, less often, the degree of ideological or other polarization. While levels of institutionalization and ideological differences are generally not pronounced, more than half of African party systems have been one-party dominant, of which most are authoritarian. In contrast, two-party and pluralist-party systems, which make up approximately one half of all multiparty systems, are generally more democratic. Besides determining classifications, most analytical work focuses on the determinants of African party systems using quantitative and qualitative as well as macro- and micro-level methodologies. Three determinants are debated: first, ethnicity, which has been cited as the main social cleavage behind African party systems; however, while ethnicity matters, its effects vary and are limited; second, political institutions, especially electoral systems for legislative elections, which only partly explain fragmentation or other features; third, the performance of political parties and rationalist approaches. Scholars largely agree that all of these elements need to be taken into account. While certain functions of party systems may facilitate democratization and political stability or other outcomes, little empirical work exists on the consequences of party systems. Some evidence suggests that highly institutionalized, moderately fragmented, and polarized systems promote democracy. Future research faces many challenges, in particular the development of integrated theory and more fine-grained data, as well as an increased focus on the consequences of party systems.

This chapter examines the empirical relationship between electoral systems, party system characteristics, cabinet stability and the fate of pluralist democracy in interwar Europe. Its main objective is to test basic notions in a literature which has been characterized by Lawrence Mayer (1980b: 335) as follows: The collapse of parliamentary democracies in Europe prior to World War II generated a search for the internal weakness of such systems. Out of this search came a suggestion from several quarters that multiparty parliamentary democracies were more prone to cabinet instability than were two-party systems. Parliamentary democracies, beset with such cabinet instability, cannot govern effectively. Therefore, it was suggested, such unstable systems were readily replaced by more authoritarian political regimes that appeared better able to provide for the efficient functioning of that system. KeywordsElectoral SystemParty SystemProportional RepresentationParliamentary DemocracyInterwar PeriodThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

E LECTORAL ARRANGEMENTS character electoral districts, election mechanisms, and proportion votes needed to win have been credited with influencing party systems in various ways. Bi-partyism generally is related to use single-member district, plurality election system (SMD/PE). While some assert that party dualism is caused, or at least reinforced, by use this election system, others simply note that bi-partyism is associated or coexistent with SMD/PE. Multi-partyism is held to be related similarly to use multi-member district, proportional representation election system (MMD/PR). Two eminent students party systems Schattschneider and Duverger appear to have been especially influential in securing acceptance for these interpretations. Schattschneider, writing in 1942 about Party Government, left no doubt that to his mind party system is direct consequence American election system, or system representation, explaining that widespread use in this country SMD/PE operates to exaggerate representation winning party and to give second party a monopoly opposition by discriminating harshly against third parties.' Duverger, on basis a much broader survey party systems, came to a similar set conclusions in his Political Parties.2 Saying that the party system and electoral system are two realities that are indissolubly linked, he offers formulae that MMD/PR encourages multi-partyism while SMD/PE encourages two-partyism. In oft-quoted statement, Duverger writes that the simplemajority single-ballot system favors two-party system. Of all hypotheses that have been defined in this book, this approaches most nearly perhaps a true sociological law. An almost complete correlation is observable between simplemajority single-ballot system and two-party system; dualist countries use simple-majority vote and simple-majority vote countries are dualist. He persists by stating that SMD/PE is capable maintaining established dualism in spite schisms in old and birth new parties and of re-establishing dualism when it has been destroyed by appearance a third party. Similarly Duverger asserts that MMD/PR favors multi-partyism, its multiplicative effect being such that it puts an end to any tendency toward a two-party system... . Cautions have been raised against unqualified acceptance association SMD/PE with two-party systems. Wildavsky has voiced criticisms and doubts on

The article examines the peculiarities of the formation and development of multiparty system in the regions at the present stage of Russia’s political development. The article analyzes the processes of transformation of the Russian party system in the context of systematic changes in the mechanisms of legislative regulation of their party and political activities. The aim of the study is to determine the degree of influence of the regional party system on the exercise of political power in Russian regions. This is necessary to determine the main directions for improving the system of party legislation in the process of establishing a new political system. Conclusions. As a result of the conducted research, a number of unresolved contradictions in the formation and development of the modern Russian regional party system have been identified. These contradictions do not allow this type of party system to achieve the level of influence that would give them the opportunity to really and effectively participate in the current political process. It can be argued that the party systems that have developed today in the regions are lagging behind in their development in comparison with the all-Russian party system. The author concludes that in order to change the current situation, it is necessary to improve the quality of representation from political parties in regional and municipal authorities. In order for political parties in the regions to articulate the interests and needs of various social groups, they must have the necessary power resources in making decisions on the leadership and management of the region. One of such ways to increase the level of influence of the regional party system is, in the author’s opinion, the reform of party legislation in the direction of creating broader opportunities, both for creating parties of different political spectrum and for increasing their power capabilities.

JON FRAENKEL At first sight, the Pacific Islands seem like a graveyard for institutional determinist theories regarding the impact of electoral systems on party polarisation. Maurice Duverger’s well-known ‘sociological law’ was that first-past-the-post electoral rules tend to deliver two-party systems. Proportional representation (PR) systems were more loosely associated with multi-party settings.2 Yet in the Pacific, first-past-the-post using countries, such as the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea (1975-2002), have developed multipleparty systems. The PR using territories of New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Vanuatu have, at times, veered towards a two-camp polarisation around the issue of independence. Some firstpast-the-post-using democracies, such as Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia, have not witnessed the emergence of any party-based system at all. Neighbouring Kiribati, Nauru and Tuvalu have similar styles of loose and fluctuating parliamentary alliances but no election-oriented political parties, despite the first using a two round electoral system, the second a unique simultaneously tallied preferential voting system, and the third a block voting system in two-member constituencies. Electoral laws would appear to exert negligible sway over Pacific party systems. On closer examination, Duverger’s theory does shed some light on the direction of electoral incentives in some of the Pacific countries, once hedged with the necessary qualifications and confined to appropriate settings. Negative cases, where electoral laws do not bring about the anticipated party structures are not confined to Oceania. India and Canada, for example, have numerous political parties, but use first-past-thepost electoral systems. Guyana uses a list PR system but has a two-party centred system, as did Austria during 1945-1990. Much of the literature has consequently been aimed at heavily revising Duverger’s theories about the impact of electoral laws on party systems, either by emphasising that the critical association is in fact between district magnitude and the number of parties or by specifying the role of intervening variables, such as ethnic heterogeneity or the number of competing ‘issue dimensions’ to the political process.3 It is in situations where a single salient political cleavage (such as Labour/Conservative, or Catholic/Protestant) dominates the political order that distinct electoral laws may work in different directions, encouraging or limiting multi-partyism. In Fiji and New Caledonia, those varying electoral pressures on party systems exerted considerable influence over the success or failure of compacts aimed at mitigating ethnic conflict. In most South Pacific nations, the decolonisation issue did not prove an enduring The contribution of AusAID to this series is acknowledged with appreciation. Discussion Paper 2005/8 State, Society and Governance in Melanesia THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

Party Systems

Electoral Strategies in Mixed Systems of Representation

Concerns about electoral integrity are tied to debates about democracy and democratic backsliding. The potential for democratic backsliding increases with the perceived stakes of the political game. Electoral systems matter because they affect the stakes of the game. They influence how ideological polarization in the party system is produced and processed. They also influence the extent to which group differences become politicized and how peacefully politicized differences are managed. The relationship between electoral rules and electoral integrity depends on many contextual factors. High electoral integrity can be achieved under both majoritarian and proportional rules given the right conditions. Empirically, we find no consistent differences in the level of electoral integrity across majoritarian and proportional electoral systems when we average across different economic, social, and political contexts. We encourage scholars to more closely examine the contextual effects of electoral systems on electoral integrity in future work.

Electoral systems matter. They are a crucial link in the chain connecting the preferences of citizens to the policy choices made by governments. They are chosen by political actors and, once in existence, have political consequences for those actors. They are an important object of study for anyone interested in the political process, and in this book we subject them to systematic analysis.In addition to some comparative chapters, the book contains full accounts of the operation of electoral systems in 22 countries: France, the UK, Germany, Italy, Israel, Spain, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, The Netherlands, Ireland, Hungary, Russia, Australia, Canada, India, the USA, Japan,New Zealand, Chile, and South Africa. The book provides detailed analyses of the operation of a diverse set of electoral systems in their national context. Each chapter explains how the electoral system really works in the given country, examining the strategic incentives the system provides to voters, candidates, and parties. All country chapters have a common format and structure. Successive sections analyze: the institutional context; how each electoral system was chosen historically; how the current electoral system operates (the rules, mechanics, and ballot structure); and the political consequences of the current system (the impact on the party system, the internal life of parties, and the impact on parliament and government formation). Each country chapter then contains a final section which focuses on the politicization of electoral institutions. In recent years many countries have changed their electoral systems, either entirely or in part so there is a strong focus on the processes of electoral reform, both historically and prospectively. The book concentrates on the real world 'politics', as well as the 'political science' of electoral systems.The book will be of interest to those concerned with the practical political business of electoral reform. The book contains a wealth of evidence about the performance of various kinds of proportional representation and of non-PR systems. This will be invaluable for anyone interested in the question: 'What would be the best electoral system for my country?'

The purpose of this paper is to introduce the political parties and party system in Korea and provide a basic analysis for comparative study among the Asian countries. First, I would explain the distinguishing characteristics of the political parties and party system in Korea. I will then show how this system evolved by using the concept of the cartel party and cartelized party system. Finally, the kind of measures that have been introduced to improve democracy and party politics will be discussed. Whether these efforts are working or not will be addressed from the perspectives of the two different party models.The nature of the political system in Korea can be gleaned by examining three main aspects of the cartelized party system, namely, national subsidies, electoral system, and entry barriers against new or minor parties. After an examination of some of the institutions of the cartelized party system in Korea, the Korean party system may be deemed, by and large, to be moving towards a plural competitive system, one that is more accommodating of new or minor parties.

This article aims to highlight the contextual impact of proportional representation (PR) rules on the intersectional representation of gender and ethnic groups. We assert that the combination of the institutional and sociodemographic context generates barriers and opportunities for the inclusion of intersectional identity groups in politics. We analyse how the sociodemographic make up of the district electorate influences parties’ and voters’ behaviour within PR systems to shape electoral outcomes in Brussels local elections. We focus on parties’ list composition strategies and candidates’ personal score to determine parties’ and voters’ leverage on representational outcomes. Our research demonstrates that ethnic minority male and female candidates experience a similar advantage on their ethnic majority counterparts in the (s)election process, and that their advantage grows as districts get more diverse. We show that ethnic minority candidates’ advantage comes mainly at the expense of ethnic majority women, while ethnic majority men’s dominant position is not affected by the sociodemographic context. This research emphasizes the importance of local context factors for intersectional groups representation. Our study overall calls for a clear definition of intersectional categories and the social cleavage(s) they represent within societies in order to understand political inequalities and opportunities.

Consequences of electoral systems in Africa: a preliminary inquiry

For decades, Latin America’s troubled experience with democracy has served as a testing ground for theories on democratization and political regimes. Today, most countries in the region have established democratic institutions, and a return to full-fledged authoritarianism is unlikely. However, these regimes are often at odds with the electoral, constitutional, liberal, and representative attributes that are associated with democratic regimes. Even though elections are the only means of access to public office in most of the region, they frequently involve high levels of clientelism, harassment of the opposition, and unfair advantages for incumbents. Although the separation of powers is central to the constitutional design in most countries, a generalized tendency exists toward the concentration of power in the national executive through formal or informal mechanisms. In some countries, party systems have collapsed (e.g., Peru and Venezuela); in other countries, parties have become increasingly detached from civil society (e.g., Chile and Mexico), and, in others, social movements have transformed the party system (e.g., Bolivia). The institutional ecology of many of these countries has also become one of the most diverse in the world, as representative institutions coexist with other forms of democratic decision making, such as plebiscites, participatory budgeting, citizen assemblies, national conferences, community councils, local and indigenous autonomies, town hall meetings, and constituent processes. These challenges to the liberal model of democratic governance have in many cases followed victories by left-wing parties and candidates, who have launched major efforts to overhaul their political systems. As a result, Latin America’s experience with democracy since the 1980s has thrown new light on old questions in political science, such as the relationship between institutional design and democratic stability, the performance of democratic institutions in contexts of low state capacity, or the interaction between political and economic inequalities. The region has also inspired new research agendas on the rise of ethnic-based social movements and democratic consolidation, on the electoral consequences of neoliberalism, and on the implications of direct and participatory democracy for effective governance. Most importantly, the particularities of Latin American democracies have problematized our definitions of democracy itself. This has generated new scholarly efforts to replace the democratic/authoritarian dichotomy with more fine-grained classifications of hybrid regimes, to identify multiple “varieties of democracy” or “democratic systems,” and to develop more precise measurement instruments to evaluate regime types around the world. This article offers an overview of current research on Latin American democracies. The first section presents general introductions to the topic, as well as efforts to produce normative assessments of changes in the quality of democracy in each country. The second section cites works that have drawn on the peculiarities of the Latin American experience to reconceptualize the notion of democracy itself. In the rest of the article, empirical research on specific aspects of democratic politics is organized in eight general categories: elections, separation of powers, popular participation, interest representation and political inequalities, state capacity and democratic responsiveness, new democratic institutions, local democracy, and the rise and fall of leftist governments.

The investigation of electoral systems' effects in post-communist democracies has so far led to very surprising results. The effect of electoral systems in Central and Eastern Europe appears 'not [to] be the same' as in the rest of the world (Golder, 2002, p. 24); several studies conclude (Clark and Golder, 2006, p. 693; Grzymala-Busse, 2006, p. 421; Moraski and Loewenberg, 1999) that the common models that are valid in the rest of the world seem not to hold when they are tested on post-communist countries in Europe. Attempts to explain patterns of party systems through electoral systems often lead to results that fundamentally contradict common knowledge on electoral systems.1

The political history of Italy and Japan during the post-war period is strongly ­associated with two dominant parties: the Italian Christian Democrats (DC) and the Japanese Liberal Democrat Party (LDP). Notwithstanding this similarity, the electoral and party systems of the two countries differed. Italy had a fragmented and polarized multiparty system under proportional representation (PR), while Japan was known for the dominance of a single ruling party under the unusual single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system. However, in the 1990s, both countries experienced electoral system changes through the adoption of mixed electoral systems. Electoral reform was enacted first in Italy in 1993 and in the following year in Japan. Later in 2005, Italy switched from a mixed majoritarian electoral system (MMES) to a further “hybridized” electoral system, which gives a seat bonus to the party or coalition winning a plurality of votes, but in which seat allocation to coalition partners follows a proportional rule. In Japan, the MMES adopted in 1994 was changed as well, although in minor ways. For example, in the 1996 elections, the mixed system elected 300 MPs from single member districts (SMDs) and 200 from 11 PR districts; in the 2000 elections, the number of PR seats decreased from 200 to 180.KeywordsElectoral SystemParty SystemProportional RepresentationLiberal Democrat PartyCoalition GovernmentThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.