Electoral Systems

The political history of Italy and Japan during the post-war period is strongly ­associated with two dominant parties: the Italian Christian Democrats (DC) and the Japanese Liberal Democrat Party (LDP). Notwithstanding this similarity, the electoral and party systems of the two countries differed. Italy had a fragmented and polarized multiparty system under proportional representation (PR), while Japan was known for the dominance of a single ruling party under the unusual single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system. However, in the 1990s, both countries experienced electoral system changes through the adoption of mixed electoral systems. Electoral reform was enacted first in Italy in 1993 and in the following year in Japan. Later in 2005, Italy switched from a mixed majoritarian electoral system (MMES) to a further “hybridized” electoral system, which gives a seat bonus to the party or coalition winning a plurality of votes, but in which seat allocation to coalition partners follows a proportional rule. In Japan, the MMES adopted in 1994 was changed as well, although in minor ways. For example, in the 1996 elections, the mixed system elected 300 MPs from single member districts (SMDs) and 200 from 11 PR districts; in the 2000 elections, the number of PR seats decreased from 200 to 180.KeywordsElectoral SystemParty SystemProportional RepresentationLiberal Democrat PartyCoalition GovernmentThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

JON FRAENKEL At first sight, the Pacific Islands seem like a graveyard for institutional determinist theories regarding the impact of electoral systems on party polarisation. Maurice Duverger’s well-known ‘sociological law’ was that first-past-the-post electoral rules tend to deliver two-party systems. Proportional representation (PR) systems were more loosely associated with multi-party settings.2 Yet in the Pacific, first-past-the-post using countries, such as the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea (1975-2002), have developed multipleparty systems. The PR using territories of New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Vanuatu have, at times, veered towards a two-camp polarisation around the issue of independence. Some firstpast-the-post-using democracies, such as Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia, have not witnessed the emergence of any party-based system at all. Neighbouring Kiribati, Nauru and Tuvalu have similar styles of loose and fluctuating parliamentary alliances but no election-oriented political parties, despite the first using a two round electoral system, the second a unique simultaneously tallied preferential voting system, and the third a block voting system in two-member constituencies. Electoral laws would appear to exert negligible sway over Pacific party systems. On closer examination, Duverger’s theory does shed some light on the direction of electoral incentives in some of the Pacific countries, once hedged with the necessary qualifications and confined to appropriate settings. Negative cases, where electoral laws do not bring about the anticipated party structures are not confined to Oceania. India and Canada, for example, have numerous political parties, but use first-past-thepost electoral systems. Guyana uses a list PR system but has a two-party centred system, as did Austria during 1945-1990. Much of the literature has consequently been aimed at heavily revising Duverger’s theories about the impact of electoral laws on party systems, either by emphasising that the critical association is in fact between district magnitude and the number of parties or by specifying the role of intervening variables, such as ethnic heterogeneity or the number of competing ‘issue dimensions’ to the political process.3 It is in situations where a single salient political cleavage (such as Labour/Conservative, or Catholic/Protestant) dominates the political order that distinct electoral laws may work in different directions, encouraging or limiting multi-partyism. In Fiji and New Caledonia, those varying electoral pressures on party systems exerted considerable influence over the success or failure of compacts aimed at mitigating ethnic conflict. In most South Pacific nations, the decolonisation issue did not prove an enduring The contribution of AusAID to this series is acknowledged with appreciation. Discussion Paper 2005/8 State, Society and Governance in Melanesia THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

The article considers the specifics of conducting election campaigns in majority, mixed and proportional electoral systems. It is substantiated that the type of electoral system determines the nature of the election campaign and allows to determine the main types of electoral technologies used to win. Concepts such as "electoral system", "majority electoral system", "proportional electoral system", "mixed electoral system", "political brand", "party brand" have been studied. The focus is on the fact that the notion of elections is not limited to the act of voting, it is a much broader notion that takes place within an election campaign, the nature of which is determined by the type of electoral system already exercised. It is focused on the fact that in the majority electoral system it is important to focus on building a brand of politics, and in the proportional electoral system – the brand of the party. It is determined that all election campaigns, depending on the type of electoral system, were radically different from all previous election campaigns conducted in Ukraine: new channels of communication, new election technologies and means of manipulation. However, despite the availability of media technology, politicians continue to use outdated manipulative technologies. It is substantiated that the pro-government political force chooses one or another type of electoral system, given the possibility of obtaining the largest number of votes. Electoral technologies such as "administrative resource", "double" and "election grids" have been studied. It is shown that the process of virtualization has formed not only new forms of organization of public communication and analytics in politics, but also led to a radical change in the organization and conduct of elections. It is shown that there are universal electoral technologies that are used in any electoral system. It is concluded that media technologies are becoming more important today during election campaigns.

Electoral systems matter. They are a crucial link in the chain connecting the preferences of citizens to the policy choices made by governments. They are chosen by political actors and, once in existence, have political consequences for those actors. They are an important object of study for anyone interested in the political process, and in this book we subject them to systematic analysis.In addition to some comparative chapters, the book contains full accounts of the operation of electoral systems in 22 countries: France, the UK, Germany, Italy, Israel, Spain, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, The Netherlands, Ireland, Hungary, Russia, Australia, Canada, India, the USA, Japan,New Zealand, Chile, and South Africa. The book provides detailed analyses of the operation of a diverse set of electoral systems in their national context. Each chapter explains how the electoral system really works in the given country, examining the strategic incentives the system provides to voters, candidates, and parties. All country chapters have a common format and structure. Successive sections analyze: the institutional context; how each electoral system was chosen historically; how the current electoral system operates (the rules, mechanics, and ballot structure); and the political consequences of the current system (the impact on the party system, the internal life of parties, and the impact on parliament and government formation). Each country chapter then contains a final section which focuses on the politicization of electoral institutions. In recent years many countries have changed their electoral systems, either entirely or in part so there is a strong focus on the processes of electoral reform, both historically and prospectively. The book concentrates on the real world 'politics', as well as the 'political science' of electoral systems.The book will be of interest to those concerned with the practical political business of electoral reform. The book contains a wealth of evidence about the performance of various kinds of proportional representation and of non-PR systems. This will be invaluable for anyone interested in the question: 'What would be the best electoral system for my country?'

A normatively desirable feature of representative government is for the diversity of ideological choices on offer in the party system to reflect the diversity of policy views in the electorate. Building on the work of Ezrow, and relying on Eurobarometer data which suggest that the degree of public opinion diversity is stable over time, the authors analyse how voting systems mediate the diversity of views in parliament, a variable they label party system dispersion. The paper's central question is: to what extent does party system dispersion remain stable over time? Presented are theoretical arguments that party system dispersion will be more stable in countries that feature single‐member district (SMD) voting systems than in proportional representation (PR) systems. Using cross‐national data on 25 countries over 363 elections, the authors present results that support this hypothesis: they find that proportional representation systems are characterised by fluidity in party system dispersion, whereas party system dispersion in SMD countries remains stable from election to election. The implications of the findings are surprising – to the extent that party platforms reflect the diversity of public opinion within an electoral system, the results suggest that SMD systems do a better job at reflecting the diversity of public opinion viewpoints than do PR systems.

This paper shows how an uneven electoral system in Japan shapes political parties' mobilization strategies by utilizing a majoritarian electoral system with heterogeneous district magnitudes, which in turn contributes to the gap in turnout across districts. Scholars have long debated the relationship between electoral systems and turnout; it is known that countries with proportional representation electoral systems – those with larger district magnitude – tend to have higher turnout rates than countries with majoritarian electoral systems, especially single-member district (SMD) systems. The current discussion on turnout and district magnitude of an electoral system assumes a monotonic relationship between these factors: the larger the district magnitude of the electoral system, the more (or less) participatory the electorate, due to competitiveness and mobilization efforts by political parties and other relevant groups. In contrast, this paper shows a mixed relationship between district magnitude of the electoral system and party mobilization and subsequent turnout, investigating a majoritarian electoral system with uneven district magnitude in the Japanese Upper House. During the survey period, the party system in Japan consisted of two major parties and a few smaller parties; consequently, the two major parties focused their efforts on SMDs in order to maximize their seat share, while smaller parties focused their resource on districts electing more than two members (where they have some chance to elect their party's candidates). In combination, these party strategies have resulted in the lowest mobilization and turnout rates in districts with two members.

Electoral Strategies in Mixed Systems of Representation

ABSTRACTThis article explores how replacement rules for midterm vacancies affect legislative turnover in the context of majoritarian and proportional electoral systems. The differing electoral rules and replacement procedures for the two chambers of the Australian parliament over more than a century permit an analysis of the complex interplay between institutional rules, party strategy, and patterns of representation between 1901 and 2013. Since 1901, the Australian House of Representatives has been committed to single member electoral systems and by-elections for filling midterm vacancies, but major changes to both the electoral system and midterm replacement rules for the Australian Senate have played a critical role in enhancing party control of Senate careers.

Political knowledge about electoral rules: Comparing mixed member proportional systems in Germany and New Zealand

Electoral System and Political Parties - Preliminary Notes to the Colombia Case

E LECTORAL ARRANGEMENTS character electoral districts, election mechanisms, and proportion votes needed to win have been credited with influencing party systems in various ways. Bi-partyism generally is related to use single-member district, plurality election system (SMD/PE). While some assert that party dualism is caused, or at least reinforced, by use this election system, others simply note that bi-partyism is associated or coexistent with SMD/PE. Multi-partyism is held to be related similarly to use multi-member district, proportional representation election system (MMD/PR). Two eminent students party systems Schattschneider and Duverger appear to have been especially influential in securing acceptance for these interpretations. Schattschneider, writing in 1942 about Party Government, left no doubt that to his mind party system is direct consequence American election system, or system representation, explaining that widespread use in this country SMD/PE operates to exaggerate representation winning party and to give second party a monopoly opposition by discriminating harshly against third parties.' Duverger, on basis a much broader survey party systems, came to a similar set conclusions in his Political Parties.2 Saying that the party system and electoral system are two realities that are indissolubly linked, he offers formulae that MMD/PR encourages multi-partyism while SMD/PE encourages two-partyism. In oft-quoted statement, Duverger writes that the simplemajority single-ballot system favors two-party system. Of all hypotheses that have been defined in this book, this approaches most nearly perhaps a true sociological law. An almost complete correlation is observable between simplemajority single-ballot system and two-party system; dualist countries use simple-majority vote and simple-majority vote countries are dualist. He persists by stating that SMD/PE is capable maintaining established dualism in spite schisms in old and birth new parties and of re-establishing dualism when it has been destroyed by appearance a third party. Similarly Duverger asserts that MMD/PR favors multi-partyism, its multiplicative effect being such that it puts an end to any tendency toward a two-party system... . Cautions have been raised against unqualified acceptance association SMD/PE with two-party systems. Wildavsky has voiced criticisms and doubts on

BackgroundEnsuring the security and trustworthiness of a digitized and automated electoral process remains a significant challenge in democratic systems. As digital voting systems are increasingly being investigated worldwide, ensuring the integrity of the process using robust security measures is of great importance. This paper presents a simplified model to enhance electoral integrity by leveraging Blockchain technology in the context of Oman’s digital voting system. The model uses Blockchain technology to create a secure and trustworthy voting environment, addressing key vulnerabilities in digital electoral systems.MethodsThe research utilized a quantitative approach, employing an experimental design methodology using open-source software to simulate voting systems. Synthetic population data is used to operate these systems, while advanced biometric authentication technologies verify voter identities. Blockchain technology is leveraged to ensure secure vote recording, with smart contracts used to authenticate voters and securely record votes. Additionally, synchronous transactions are executed for both voter registration and voting processes, enhancing the overall security and efficiency of the system.ResultsThe experimental results show that Blockchain enhances electoral integrity and security in Oman’s voting system, improving elections’ transparency and reliability. The performance evaluation of the model focuses on efficiency, reliability, and scalability metrics. Asynchronous transactions are utilized to improve processing time for voter registration and voting. Election administrators can manage, monitor, and certify election results, while Ethereum nodes ensure decentralized verification and transparency in the voting process.ConclusionThis research offers insights for policymakers to consider Blockchain for electoral reforms, addressing issues like data integrity, fraud prevention, and transparency to boost voter trust. A strong regulatory framework and public awareness are crucial for successful implementation. Pilot projects are needed to assess Blockchain’s practical impact. Oman could lead global innovation in electoral technology, though infrastructure and public resistance challenges must be managed.

Ensuring the security and trustworthiness of a digitized and automated electoral process remains a significant challenge in democratic systems. As digital voting systems are increasingly being investigated worldwide, ensuring the integrity of the process using robust security measures is of great importance. This paper presents a simplified model to enhance electoral integrity by leveraging Blockchain technology in the context of Oman's digital voting system. The model uses Blockchain technology to create a secure and trustworthy voting environment, addressing key vulnerabilities in digital electoral systems. The research utilized a quantitative approach, employing an experimental design methodology using open-source software to simulate voting systems. Synthetic population data is used to operate these systems, while advanced biometric authentication technologies verify voter identities. Blockchain technology is leveraged to ensure secure vote recording, with smart contracts used to authenticate voters and securely record votes. Additionally, synchronous transactions are executed for both voter registration and voting processes, enhancing the overall security and efficiency of the system. The experimental results show that Blockchain enhances electoral integrity and security in Oman's voting system, improving elections' transparency and reliability. The performance evaluation of the model focuses on efficiency, reliability, and scalability metrics. Asynchronous transactions are utilized to improve processing time for voter registration and voting. Election administrators can manage, monitor, and certify election results, while Ethereum nodes ensure decentralized verification and transparency in the voting process. This research offers insights for policymakers to consider Blockchain for electoral reforms, addressing issues like data integrity, fraud prevention, and transparency to boost voter trust. A strong regulatory framework and public awareness are crucial for successful implementation. Pilot projects are needed to assess Blockchain's practical impact. Oman could lead global innovation in electoral technology, though infrastructure and public resistance challenges must be managed.

The credibility and clarity of electoral systems are vital for maintaining the public’s confidence in democratic governance. However, there are significant problems with traditional voting methods, including the possibility of fraud, a lack of transparency, and delays in results announcement and verification. This study addresses these enduring problems by putting forth a unique blockchain-based electoral voting mechanism. Blockchain functions as an immutable, decentralized digital ledger that can guarantee that every vote is safe, private, and open to public auditing. The suggested architecture uses smart contracts for automated and tamper-proof vote storage, incorporates robust cryptographic techniques for voter authentication, and uses consensus procedures for decentralized result verification. In terms of data security, system efficiency, and scalability, a blockchain-based solution outperforms current techniques, according to a comparison with traditional and electronic voting models. Practical issues including scale, accessibility for various demographics, and regulatory framework adaptation are also covered in the study. In the end, the results confirm that blockchain has the potential to transform electoral processes in the future by bringing in more dependable, transparent, and secure technologies. KEYWORDS – Electoral systems, Blockchain voting, Digital Ledger, Cryptography, Voter Authentication, Decentralized Voting, Electoral Transparency, Data Security, Tamper-Proof Voting, Public Auditing, Regulatory Framework, Block chain in Democracy, Election Integrity.

Political scientists have not paid sufficient attention to the driving forces of ruling party stability, although other areas of political stability, such as democratic stability, leadership stability and cabinet stability have been studied extensively. This research fills a significant gap. It focuses on electoral rules and political party systems to explain ruling party durability. It demonstrates the following: (1) ruling parties’ hazard rates under the first-past-the-post systems are initially lower than those under proportional representation rules, but this tendency reverses over time, and (2) ruling parties’ hazard rates under two-party systems are initially lower than those under multiparty systems, but this too reverses.