English

IGAD's Progress in Regional Integration and the Role of the AU

This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the nexus between regional conflict, peace, security, and development in Africa, drawing on the case of two African regional economic communities (RECs): the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). It provides a background to the comparative study of peacebuilding in West Africa and the Horn of Africa. In this regard, it conceptualises the linkages between regional integration and development both about the experiences of ECOWAS and IGAD and also the challenges they face. The chapter also engages the highlights of such issues based on case studies drawn from each region, and comparative studies of both critical elements of the regional development and peacebuilding nexus, while providing a broad overview of the structure and contents of the book.

The process of close integration in Eastern Africa has resulted in changes in trade structures and production processes across borders. This paper presents the transformations taking place in trade exchange in one of the initiatives of the African community: the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). This paper offers a multidimensional analysis of the changes in foreign trade structures of IGAD states, for example, trade creation effects, changes in competitiveness, trade concentration or the similarities of IGAD’s trade with selected economic integration communities in Sub-Saharan Africa. In order to ensure uniformity in this analysis, the study is based on data compiled by international organizations, mainly the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the World Trade Organization (WTO).

ABSTRACTThis article aims to review the East Africa regional organization Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) mediation efforts in Sudan and South Sudan and to contextualize them within the broader context of regionalization in post-Cold War Africa. The idea of using sub-regional organizations to solve interstate conflicts derived from the interwoven phenomena of increasing Western isolationism toward Africa and the growing number of conflicts in the post-Cold War continent. Against this backdrop, the intervention of IGAD in the conflict between northern and southern Sudan in the 1990s and 2000s illustrates how proactive intervention and mediation by a regional organization may contribute to the resolution of intrastate conflicts. IGAD’s mediation efforts were in demand again when it turned out that South Sudan’s historic achievement of independence was overshadowed by internal strife, which has, since 2013, escalated to a large-scale conflict. In this context, the article will try to explore whether IGAD’s accumulated institutional experience over many years of active mediation has marked a new direction of regional activism in East Africa.

The study perceives the ‘state’ as a collection of various institutions that execute core functions that are all basic for the survival of a certain political community. Based on this definition, state-building refers to the process of constructing new institutions, reconstructing old institutions, and consolidating the existing state institutions for the protection of social cohesion and the promotion of economic development and political stability within a given state. Accordingly, the principal objective of this study is to examine the symbiosis between state-building and regional integration in the Horn of Africa by taking the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Member States as a Case Study. The researchers argue that any attempt at regional integration will never be achieved in regions that consist of weak, failed, or fragile states. Unlike other regions in Africa and elsewhere, regional integration in the Horn of Africa is at an early stage, as the region is dominated by fragile and insecure states. The study used both primary and secondary data to reveal the symbiosis between state-building and regional integration.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the possible effect of international remittances on the economic growth in three selected economies of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) member countries, namely, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. Remittance inflows have emerged as a key link between human mobility and development. However, empirical findings on the nexus between remittances and economic growth are either conflicting or at most mixed. This paper explores the effects of remittances from international migration inflows on the economic growth of three IGAD member countries. The study uses quantitative analysis that encompasses the above-mentioned countries using the World Bank's annual data from 1990 to 2017. The novelty of this study is that it uses different approaches to solicit the short-run and the long-run nexus between economic growth and remittance flow. The pooled estimation result from fully modified least squares (FMOLS) shows that the logarithm of remittances impacts the dependent variable, economic growth, positively but not statistically significant. The Kao panel residual cointegration test shows that the null hypothesis is not sufficiently supported by the data. There is a statistically significant long-run relationship between the variables in the series.

Introductioncross-border mobility of persons with Tuberculosis (TB) is a global public health concern. We aimed at documenting health systems´ potential bottlenecks and opportunities in pulmonary TB continuum of care in cross-border expanses of East and Horn of Africa.Methodsa cross-sectional program assessment with descriptive analysis of TB services, health staff capacities, diagnostic capacities, data management and reporting, and treatment outcomes. Data were extracted from health facility TB registers and semi-structured key informant interviews conducted in selected 26 cross-border sites within the 7 member states of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) region.Resultsthe overall cross-border TB cure rate in the year preceding the study (37%) was way beneath the global target with considerable variations amongst the study countries. The restricted support to the cross-border health facilities was mediated and even exacerbated by expansive distances from the respective capital cities. Restricted geographical access to the facilities by cross-border populations was a longstanding challenge. Substantial staffing gaps, TB service delivery capacity needs and inadequate diagnostics were noticeable. The TB control guidelines were not harmonized between the countries and the inter-country referral systems were either absent or inappreciable, contributing to ineffective cross-border referrals and transfers. The frail linkages between stakeholders were contemptible, but increasing governments´ commitments in tackling infectious diseases were encouraging.Conclusioncross-border TB interventions should drive regional TB policies, strategies and programs that sustain countries´ coordination, harmonization of management guidelines, advocacy for increased human resources support, enhanced capacity building of cross-border TB staff, adequate diagnostics equipping of the cross-border health facilities and seamless transfer and referral of patients traversing boundaries.

A SHIFT towards interest-driven, opportunity-based and more voluntary actions by combining bottom-up with top-down elements (Falkner, 2016).Interactive learning and experimentation at different levels of global governance have become highly important, and these complex global interactions are increasingly regarded not as obstacles but as opportunities for innovation and interactive learning (Sovacool, 2011).Global climate governance relates not only to the legal system of the climate regime but also to various public and private initiatives at different scales and across sectors.Scholars studying the complex multi-actor and multi-sector characteristics of the system have therefore begun to conceptualize global multi-level climate governance as an opportunity structure for the generation and diffusion of climate-related innovation.The topic of this special issues is climate governance within a multi-level and multi-sectoral global system.The work argues that global climate governance today aims essentially to activate the dynamic potential of each level of the global governance system, the level of world regions as well as the level of provinces and local communities.Horizontal peer-to-peer learning between countries, cities and regions, as well as vertical up-scaling of best practice, has created a dynamic of change.The cross-sectoral approach has become important as far as the mobilizing of economic interests (e.g. in the construction sector) and the use of co-benefits is concerned.This special issue intends to offer a better understanding of the nature and variety of, and linkages between, initiatives taken and governance functions delivered within the broader 'climate governance landscape ' (Betsill et al., 2015).It analyses various climate governance activities in the European Union (EU), India and China through a systemic perspective.The EU may be regarded as the strongest regional sub-system of the global system, although the BRICS countries of China and India play a comparable role, as countries both with a similar scope and with explicit multi-level climate policy activities.The systematic dimension of global climate governance is described in the introductory article 'Multi-level climate governance as a global system' by Martin Jnicke.The author analyses the potential of the global climate governance system, which is characterized by a multiplicity of access points and incentives for innovation and interactive learning.It is regarded as a 'multi-impulse-system', where the sum of even weak impulses from different parts of the system can play the role of a strong instrument.The global multi-level climate governance structure is also characterized by a specific global knowledge base and a global policy arena, allowing for climate-related agenda-setting and the mobilization of interests at each level.It is taken as an opportunity structure for ambitious innovation-based climate strategies based on interactive lesson-drawing from best practice.The lesson to be learned at all levels of the system is the potential for economic co-benefits related to the socio-technical system of clean-energy innovation and the global clean-energy market.The following article, 'The EU system of multi-level climate governance', by Martin Jnicke and Rainer Quitzow provides an overview of the regional structure of the global climate governance system.The authors understand the EU as a system where 'multi-level reinforcement' has been observed several times and which can be considered as a leader by example in global climate governance.They point to the fact that the EU has the world's highest share of green electricity and since 1990 has made the largest reduction to its greenhouse gas emissions.They attribute the EU's relatively successful performance in climate and energy governance to two main factors: (1) multi-level reinforcement and (2) the mobilization of economic interests at different levels of governance through low-carbon industrial policy.While the multi-impulse system has fostered

South Sudan, which gained independence in 2011, has been engulfed in violence and conflict periodically since that time. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has played a major role in brokering peace talks between the respective parties. This role, as well as the role of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), which recently authorised, through Security Council Resolution 2304, the deployment of a 4000-member Regional Protection Force (RPF) to Juba is discussed. This piece aims to provide an insight into some of the challenges and legal developments associated with ensuring lasting peace, addressing (and preventing) the allegations of widespread violations of international law, as well as the internal armed conflict affecting South Sudan, in light of the nature of responses from the international community.

Application of real time S2S forecasts over Eastern Africa in the co-production of climate services

The buzzword ‘inclusion’ has taken peace research by storm and seeped into studies on the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and peace processes facilitated by African regional organisations. Apparently resonating with the normative preferences of donors and researchers, inclusion has taken root in policies on peace and security. However, the understandings of inclusion in peace processes remain diffuse in research and policy, and the research discourse seems far removed from the praxis of ‘peace deal-making’ in Africa. Therefore, this chapter turns the focus from APSA’s pillars to its peace processes and (self-)critically reflects on the concepts, methods and merits of researching inclusive peace-making. Focusing on policy discourses, actor groups and mechanisms for inclusion in peace processes, the chapter discusses the practice of civil society inclusion in peace-making in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Southern African Development Community (SADC), focusing on the peace processes facilitated by the two organizations in South Sudan and Zimbabwe, respectively.

Kenya's political meltdown in the aftermath of the contentious 2007 elections tested the solidity and sturdiness of regional mechanisms tasked with conflict resolution in East Africa. Despite years of elaborate attempts to build diverse institutions for early warning, conflict prevention and management within the rubric of the East African Community (EAC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Eastern Africa was unprepared for the civil conflict that engulfed its leading member state. Instead, the more distant African Union (AU) launched a mediation initiative under the leadership of former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, which largely marginalised regional actors. Despite Kenya's gradual recovery, the absence of regional institutions for conflict resolution presents a worrying trend in a region that is still characterised by profound intra- and interstate conflicts.

Over the years, Sudan, especially the south, caught the eye of the world with images of war, including children suffering from malnutrition, child soldiers, rape victims, amputees and images of slavery. The situation in Darfur is no better now than it was before. It is grim. The eruption of violence in the Abyei region during the referendum in the south leaves a lot of question marks over the future of the region. Hundreds of thousands of Sudanese are abroad as refugees thanks to the conflicts that have dogged the region for decades. Now, an overwhelming majority -almost 99%- have voted for an independent South Sudan. Companies are lobbying for contracts, governments are sending emissaries and the world is watching. Is peace finally being realised in Sudan? Is this what Dr John Garang envisioned for the south? Veteran diplomat, Daniel Rachuonyo Mboya was Kenya's first Ambassador to Sudan and also the first Special Envoy to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Secretariat for the Peace Initiative in Sudan. In this interview he expresses his opinion about the referendum in South Sudan and the future of the volatile region.

A Sudanese civil war began in 1983. For more than two decades, the government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) fought over resources, power, the role of religion in the state, and self-determination. In 1993 a regional peace initiative under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was launched. The UN supported the IGAD initiative over the years. On 20 July 2002, the parties signed the Machakos Protocol, in which they reached specific agreement on a broad framework. Another civil war erupted in Darfur in 2003 between the government of Sudan and its allied militia, and other armed rebel groups. For several years, the African Union (AU) led international political efforts to seek a solution to the crisis. In April 2004 a ceasefire agreement was signed, In July 2004 the AU’s political initiatives were complemented by the deployment of AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to monitor and observe the compliance of the parties to the ceasefire agreement. On 9 January 2005 the Government of the Sudan and SPLM/A signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The CPA included agreements some autonomy for the south, and more equitable distribution of economic resources, including oil. On 24 March 2005 the UN Security Council (UNSC) decided to establish the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) in order to support implementation of the CPA (UNSC Res 1590/2005).KeywordsMilitary PersonnelArmed GroupAfrican UnionImminent ThreatPolitical AspirationThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Much ink has flowed on the question of the relationship between regionalism and multilateralism. There is still, however, no definitive answer. So the debate goes on. Is regionalism a substitute or a complement to multilateralism? Put another way, is regionalism a building block or a stumbling block to multilateralism? The re-invigoration of regionalism in developing countries over the past decade has given a new twist to the old debate. Developing countries are increasingly turning to regionalism as a strategy for development (UNCTAD, 2005). But their regionalism is part of a multilevel strategy which needs to be synchronised with their national development plans aswell as their efforts to achieve development friendlymultilateral trade rules in the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Developing countries are increasingly concerned about how to achieve coherence between development, regionalism andmultilateralism. Themultilateral trade system (MTS) is currently in a state of flux as the outcome of the Doha DevelopmentAgenda is yet unknown. Nevertheless, the regional trade agreements (RTAs) that are currently being negotiated all depend on WTO rules. Moreover, the policy space that developing countries need to carry out their national development plans, is increasingly determined by the market access rules of the WTO. In short, developing countries are faced with an increasingly complex, multilevel process in which they are trying to combine trade and development (Abbugatas, 2004). The concept ofmultilevel governance (Marks et al., 1996) emerged in the European Union (EU) where it was used to explain the increasing complexity of policy making in the 1990s. It was a period of upheaval resulting from the far reaching structural change that was uprooting many traditional policy practices across Europe. As a consequence of that change a new model of multilevel governance (MLG) began to take shape that challenged the traditional state-centric model. Has the experience of the EU generated a hypothesis that could be generalised to other systems of governance? That question has received growing interest in the academic literature. “Is there Room for the Multilateral in Multilevel Governance?” McGowan (2001) asked, and explored the emergence of multilevel governance in three sectors of the new trade agenda. The conference on “Globalisation, Multilevel Governance andDemocracy”, held at Queen’s University in Canada (2002), explored comparative aspects of MLG in regional and global governance. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which has worked extensively on regulatory reform since the 1990s, has now produced a study onMultilevel Regulatory Governance that for the first time concentrates on the