The Buzz about Inclusion in Peace Research

This article examines how the African Union (AU) has handled Africa's peace and security challenges since 2002, defines what has been successful and what remains aspirational. It does so by examining how the AU has responded, from using sanctions against coups, to deploying peacekeeping missions and mediating in conflicts. An African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) has developed since 2002, including a Peace and Security Council, an African Standby Force, a Continental Early Warning System and a Panel of the Wise. This sounds impressive, but the operationalization record is patchy: AU-deployed missions have been fully dependent on external donors; harmonization is a major problem; serious questions remain over AU capacity; and some of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are developing at a quicker pace than the AU. Given these circumstances and its internal capacity deficit, the AU will likely struggle to exercise oversight of regional processes, including the development of regional standby force arrangements. APSA is clearly based on a liberal peace model, yet democratic systems, respect for human rights and good governance aren't always in place in African countries, and the self-interest of elites continues to be a constraint on APSA and its success. Over the last decade the AU has found a voice and, despite some setbacks, it has shown through AMISOM in Somalia that it is capable of conducting a successful peacemaking operation. Its biggest challenge is not making the decision to intervene or deploy forces, but the capacity of most African states to deploy effectively. APSA's dependence on external partners needs to diminish over the next decade if better African solutions are to be found to peace and security challenges in the continent. Yet, the internationalized nature of crises such as the one in Mali in 2012–13 requires international partnerships. Not all of Africa's security problems can be solved by Africa alone, but APSA does provide a vision framework for African and external partnership.

The last two decades have seen African countries adopt a new security approach through the activities of regional economic communities (RECs) and the African Union’s (AU) African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). This article argues that despite progress in conflict prevention and the promotion of peace, defence and security through the APSA and RECs, challenges do remain. In particular, factors such as financial costs involved, the inadequate funds available for peace and security missions, conflicting interests and lack of agreement, poor co- ordination and inadequate human and logistics capacity have constrained the ability of African countries to achieve their peace and security agenda. Thus, for peace and security efforts being undertaken by the AU and RECs to be effective, the actors involved should have not only the requisite capacity but also political will and commitment, and cooperation among members and with the international community should remain crucial to the process.

In assessing change through a New Institutionalist lens, changes within an institution often require the inclusion of new structures. Certainly, in assessing security as a potential change, the inclusion of new structures, which are able to support new capabilities and processes, is worth examination. The most important of these new structures for EU-AU security cooperation is, of course, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). This chapter provides an overview of development of regional capabilities for governing security leading to the creation of the APSA. Unlike other assessments of the APSA, however, this chapter also seeks to highlight the role of key external actors: the United States, China and the EU. Moreover, it evaluates the consolidation of regional capabilities, including the global and regional legal instruments that account for the development of regional security institutions.

The Memorandum of Understanding between the African Union (AU) and the Regional Economic Communities (REC) and Regional Mechanisms (RM) signed in 2008 identifies subsidiarity as an ordering principle of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). This was the first reference to the subsidiarity principle within the African context in a process of diffusion from the European context. Through process tracing and an analysis of hard and soft law documents of APSA this paper identifies that imitation was the mechanism of diffusion in 2008 in a process led by African agency and with Europe as a normative power. This result contributes to an investigation into the challenges that the APSA faces into becoming fully operational.

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is the umbrella term for the key African Union (AU) mechanisms for promoting peace, security and stability on the continent. More specifically, it is “an operational structure for the effective implementation of the decisions taken in the areas of conflict prevention, peace-making, peace support operations and intervention, as well as peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction”. APSA is envisioned as a means by which Africa can take a greater role in managing peace and security on the continent, with the objective of offering “African solutions to African problems”. This study critically explores the extent to which APSA (such as the African Standby Force (ASF) and Panel of the Wise (PoW) have been successful in achieving their institutional objectives, as well as the degree to which they are able to contribute to the work of the African Union Peace and Security Council (AU PSC). The findings of the study reveal that the African Standby Force's potential as a tool for the maintenance of peace and security on the continent depends on the political consensus (political buy-in) and predictable sources of financing. Vis-? -vis the Panel of the Wise, the study has discovered that the role of the Panel has been undermined by geo-political dynamics, limited mandate, membership size and its institutional design.

This article presents survey data on the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It focuses explicitly on two aspects: the internal constitution and achievements of the APSA; and coordination and cooperation with external actors, such as Regional Economic Communities, the United Nations and the European Union. The survey, conducted between October 2011 and December 2012, targeted 198 security experts in international organisations, think tanks, academia and non-governmental organisations. It reveals the APSA's current stage of development, achievements and challenges.

This study explores the African Union's (AU) response to escalating security challenges, including military coups and regional instabilities, through a posthumanist lens that interrogates the interplay of technology, humanity, and governance within the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). By examining APSA’s frameworks, the research highlights how emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI) and hybrid threat systems, reshape conflict dynamics and demand new ethical governance models. A mixed-methods approach integrates qualitative analysis of AU documents and secondary data from technologists with quantitative assessment of peace operation metrics, such as deployment efficiency and technological integration. . Key findings reveal systemic gaps in APSA, including funding shortages, delayed decision-making, and overreliance on external technological support, compounded by uneven regional capacities among Regional Economic Communities (RECs). The posthumanist perspective underscores the need to reframe African solutions by balancing technological advancements with human-centered ethical considerations, ensuring AI and digital systems enhance rather than destabilize security. The study advocates for adaptive governance frameworks that integrate RECs and prioritize local innovation to address hybrid threats. Implications point to a redefined technology-society nexus, where ethical AI deployment and regional collaboration strengthen APSA’s resilience. This research contributes to posthumanist discourse by situating African security within global debates on technology’s role in shaping future governance and stability.

Inter-governmental authority on development (IGAD) as a regional bloc is operating with a lot of impediments that delayed the organization from attaining greater economic integration. The objective of this study was to show the ways in which IGAD can actualize credible economic integration in the region, though the best is yet to come. Qualitative data collection approaches (interview and literature as primary and secondary data sources respectively) were employed. Finding of this study revealed that multi-level governance (MLG) model is the suitable approach to make IGAD successful in realizing greater economic integration. Decentralization of power, effective participation, designing specific objectives, sharing the lows as well as the highs, and establishing standing technical committee were the main strategies to effectuate MLG model on IGAD integration context. The major internal IGAD integration impediments were the presence of poor governance structure and weak leadership, the existence of weak Secretariat, the absence of annual meeting and the lack of cross-border institution. Whereas, the external hindering factors were the existence of longstanding political instability, armed conflicts and emergence of terrorist groups, lack of political determination, overlapping membership, similarity of import-export goods and the absence of uniformity among member states in undertaking responsibilities. In the nutshell, IGAD regional integration process is slow in its pace and needs urgent re-revitalization with the concept of MLG model. In order to make IGAD viable regional bloc re-revitalization of the IGAD governance structure with the concept of MLG model, having ordinary summit to address strategic agenda of the organization and drawing lessons from the EU integration process as the EU decentralized power along its layers of governance structure were recommended. Key words: Horn of Africa, Inter-governmental authority on development (IGAD), multi-level governance, regional economic communities, regional economic integration.

ABSTRACTThis article aims to review the East Africa regional organization Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) mediation efforts in Sudan and South Sudan and to contextualize them within the broader context of regionalization in post-Cold War Africa. The idea of using sub-regional organizations to solve interstate conflicts derived from the interwoven phenomena of increasing Western isolationism toward Africa and the growing number of conflicts in the post-Cold War continent. Against this backdrop, the intervention of IGAD in the conflict between northern and southern Sudan in the 1990s and 2000s illustrates how proactive intervention and mediation by a regional organization may contribute to the resolution of intrastate conflicts. IGAD’s mediation efforts were in demand again when it turned out that South Sudan’s historic achievement of independence was overshadowed by internal strife, which has, since 2013, escalated to a large-scale conflict. In this context, the article will try to explore whether IGAD’s accumulated institutional experience over many years of active mediation has marked a new direction of regional activism in East Africa.

In this book I have tried to assess whether security cooperation has contributed to changes in EU-Africa relations. Framed within the context of an institutionalised interregionalism, the book conducts the examination of EU-Africa relations as a process of shared norms, values and practices, thereby constituting an institution. In the preceding two chapters, two examples of security cooperation were examined to illustrate the extent of the changes occurring within the institution of EU-Africa relations. These two cases focused on the EU’s efforts to support the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) of the AU through capabilitybuilding for: (1) peace support operations (the AMANI AFRICA Cycles); and (2) the fight against the illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW. While both cases are reflective of the EU’s commitment to APSA, they have resulted in different outcomes. Further, the extent to which the two cases have been transformative of the standard operating procedures (SOPs) of EU-Africa relations also varies.

The author presents the tentative results of ongoing research into a new paradigm for peace and security in Africa. The empirical foundation of the research is the result of a triangulation of research methods that involved literature study, reflexive journaling and thematic analysis. The discussion aims to determine how China can contribute to the renewal of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The aim is achieved by discussing and analysing the current APSA, including the challenges experienced, as well as the policy commitments and security activities of China in Africa. The research concludes that China is building a military intervention capacity to protect its interests in Africa. However, a new metaphor is needed that will bring solutions to the peace and security challenges of Africa. In this regard China can play an important role in assisting the APSA to focus on issues such as social transformation, capacity building for socio-economic development, and education aimed at peace and security.

This chapter critically explores how the African Union (AU) understands and interprets the global norms around gender and security found in the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda. It shows how the WPS agenda is situated within the AU’s African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) while taking into account the local/regional gender regime including regional action plans (RAPs). To do so, the chapter maps out ways in which gender intersects with security when global and local norms interact within a regional security institution. Drawing on a selection of case studies, this chapter demonstrates that there is now a well-established network of frameworks that embed WPS on the continent. It concludes that this has been informed by a certain understanding of feminism and a new pan-Africanist push via the AU and women’s movements on the continent. Indeed, the chapter highlights the adoption of National Action Plans (NAPs) in seventeen member states as one of the primary achievements of the AU women’s movement. This chapter thus offers a unique perspective on the regional institutionalization process of the WPS agenda.

Since its establishment in 2002, the African Union (AU) has accorded particular importance to the establishment of a robust mechanism for effectively responding to conflicts in Africa. This emerging mechanism established under the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC Protocol) is known as the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Central to the APSA is the PSC, which, like the UN Security Council, is ‘a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts’. The PSC is vested with expansive powers covering the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa. In this context, the PSC Protocol not only makes numerous direct references to human rights but it also assigns the PSC with specific responsibilities vis-a-vis the protection of human rights. Despite the PSC's express mandate with respect to human rights and the crucial importance and link of human rights to peace and security in Africa, little has however been written and discussed on the subject of human rights from the perspective of the works of the PSC and generally within the context of AU initiatives for the promotion, maintenance and restoration of peace and security in Africa. In an effort to contribute towards filling this lacuna, this article seeks to consider the place of human rights within the mandates of the PSC and the need for and the extent to which they are integrated into the PSC's work for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa

South Sudan, which gained independence in 2011, has been engulfed in violence and conflict periodically since that time. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has played a major role in brokering peace talks between the respective parties. This role, as well as the role of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), which recently authorised, through Security Council Resolution 2304, the deployment of a 4000-member Regional Protection Force (RPF) to Juba is discussed. This piece aims to provide an insight into some of the challenges and legal developments associated with ensuring lasting peace, addressing (and preventing) the allegations of widespread violations of international law, as well as the internal armed conflict affecting South Sudan, in light of the nature of responses from the international community.

Over the years, Sudan, especially the south, caught the eye of the world with images of war, including children suffering from malnutrition, child soldiers, rape victims, amputees and images of slavery. The situation in Darfur is no better now than it was before. It is grim. The eruption of violence in the Abyei region during the referendum in the south leaves a lot of question marks over the future of the region. Hundreds of thousands of Sudanese are abroad as refugees thanks to the conflicts that have dogged the region for decades. Now, an overwhelming majority -almost 99%- have voted for an independent South Sudan. Companies are lobbying for contracts, governments are sending emissaries and the world is watching. Is peace finally being realised in Sudan? Is this what Dr John Garang envisioned for the south? Veteran diplomat, Daniel Rachuonyo Mboya was Kenya's first Ambassador to Sudan and also the first Special Envoy to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Secretariat for the Peace Initiative in Sudan. In this interview he expresses his opinion about the referendum in South Sudan and the future of the volatile region.