Regionalising Security: The APSA and External Partners

This article examines how the African Union (AU) has handled Africa's peace and security challenges since 2002, defines what has been successful and what remains aspirational. It does so by examining how the AU has responded, from using sanctions against coups, to deploying peacekeeping missions and mediating in conflicts. An African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) has developed since 2002, including a Peace and Security Council, an African Standby Force, a Continental Early Warning System and a Panel of the Wise. This sounds impressive, but the operationalization record is patchy: AU-deployed missions have been fully dependent on external donors; harmonization is a major problem; serious questions remain over AU capacity; and some of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are developing at a quicker pace than the AU. Given these circumstances and its internal capacity deficit, the AU will likely struggle to exercise oversight of regional processes, including the development of regional standby force arrangements. APSA is clearly based on a liberal peace model, yet democratic systems, respect for human rights and good governance aren't always in place in African countries, and the self-interest of elites continues to be a constraint on APSA and its success. Over the last decade the AU has found a voice and, despite some setbacks, it has shown through AMISOM in Somalia that it is capable of conducting a successful peacemaking operation. Its biggest challenge is not making the decision to intervene or deploy forces, but the capacity of most African states to deploy effectively. APSA's dependence on external partners needs to diminish over the next decade if better African solutions are to be found to peace and security challenges in the continent. Yet, the internationalized nature of crises such as the one in Mali in 2012–13 requires international partnerships. Not all of Africa's security problems can be solved by Africa alone, but APSA does provide a vision framework for African and external partnership.

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is the umbrella term for the key African Union (AU) mechanisms for promoting peace, security and stability on the continent. More specifically, it is “an operational structure for the effective implementation of the decisions taken in the areas of conflict prevention, peace-making, peace support operations and intervention, as well as peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction”. APSA is envisioned as a means by which Africa can take a greater role in managing peace and security on the continent, with the objective of offering “African solutions to African problems”. This study critically explores the extent to which APSA (such as the African Standby Force (ASF) and Panel of the Wise (PoW) have been successful in achieving their institutional objectives, as well as the degree to which they are able to contribute to the work of the African Union Peace and Security Council (AU PSC). The findings of the study reveal that the African Standby Force's potential as a tool for the maintenance of peace and security on the continent depends on the political consensus (political buy-in) and predictable sources of financing. Vis-? -vis the Panel of the Wise, the study has discovered that the role of the Panel has been undermined by geo-political dynamics, limited mandate, membership size and its institutional design.

The last two decades have seen African countries adopt a new security approach through the activities of regional economic communities (RECs) and the African Union’s (AU) African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). This article argues that despite progress in conflict prevention and the promotion of peace, defence and security through the APSA and RECs, challenges do remain. In particular, factors such as financial costs involved, the inadequate funds available for peace and security missions, conflicting interests and lack of agreement, poor co- ordination and inadequate human and logistics capacity have constrained the ability of African countries to achieve their peace and security agenda. Thus, for peace and security efforts being undertaken by the AU and RECs to be effective, the actors involved should have not only the requisite capacity but also political will and commitment, and cooperation among members and with the international community should remain crucial to the process.

The Memorandum of Understanding between the African Union (AU) and the Regional Economic Communities (REC) and Regional Mechanisms (RM) signed in 2008 identifies subsidiarity as an ordering principle of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). This was the first reference to the subsidiarity principle within the African context in a process of diffusion from the European context. Through process tracing and an analysis of hard and soft law documents of APSA this paper identifies that imitation was the mechanism of diffusion in 2008 in a process led by African agency and with Europe as a normative power. This result contributes to an investigation into the challenges that the APSA faces into becoming fully operational.

This study explores the African Union's (AU) response to escalating security challenges, including military coups and regional instabilities, through a posthumanist lens that interrogates the interplay of technology, humanity, and governance within the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). By examining APSA’s frameworks, the research highlights how emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI) and hybrid threat systems, reshape conflict dynamics and demand new ethical governance models. A mixed-methods approach integrates qualitative analysis of AU documents and secondary data from technologists with quantitative assessment of peace operation metrics, such as deployment efficiency and technological integration. . Key findings reveal systemic gaps in APSA, including funding shortages, delayed decision-making, and overreliance on external technological support, compounded by uneven regional capacities among Regional Economic Communities (RECs). The posthumanist perspective underscores the need to reframe African solutions by balancing technological advancements with human-centered ethical considerations, ensuring AI and digital systems enhance rather than destabilize security. The study advocates for adaptive governance frameworks that integrate RECs and prioritize local innovation to address hybrid threats. Implications point to a redefined technology-society nexus, where ethical AI deployment and regional collaboration strengthen APSA’s resilience. This research contributes to posthumanist discourse by situating African security within global debates on technology’s role in shaping future governance and stability.

This article presents survey data on the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It focuses explicitly on two aspects: the internal constitution and achievements of the APSA; and coordination and cooperation with external actors, such as Regional Economic Communities, the United Nations and the European Union. The survey, conducted between October 2011 and December 2012, targeted 198 security experts in international organisations, think tanks, academia and non-governmental organisations. It reveals the APSA's current stage of development, achievements and challenges.

The buzzword ‘inclusion’ has taken peace research by storm and seeped into studies on the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and peace processes facilitated by African regional organisations. Apparently resonating with the normative preferences of donors and researchers, inclusion has taken root in policies on peace and security. However, the understandings of inclusion in peace processes remain diffuse in research and policy, and the research discourse seems far removed from the praxis of ‘peace deal-making’ in Africa. Therefore, this chapter turns the focus from APSA’s pillars to its peace processes and (self-)critically reflects on the concepts, methods and merits of researching inclusive peace-making. Focusing on policy discourses, actor groups and mechanisms for inclusion in peace processes, the chapter discusses the practice of civil society inclusion in peace-making in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Southern African Development Community (SADC), focusing on the peace processes facilitated by the two organizations in South Sudan and Zimbabwe, respectively.

In this book I have tried to assess whether security cooperation has contributed to changes in EU-Africa relations. Framed within the context of an institutionalised interregionalism, the book conducts the examination of EU-Africa relations as a process of shared norms, values and practices, thereby constituting an institution. In the preceding two chapters, two examples of security cooperation were examined to illustrate the extent of the changes occurring within the institution of EU-Africa relations. These two cases focused on the EU’s efforts to support the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) of the AU through capabilitybuilding for: (1) peace support operations (the AMANI AFRICA Cycles); and (2) the fight against the illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW. While both cases are reflective of the EU’s commitment to APSA, they have resulted in different outcomes. Further, the extent to which the two cases have been transformative of the standard operating procedures (SOPs) of EU-Africa relations also varies.

This chapter critically explores how the African Union (AU) understands and interprets the global norms around gender and security found in the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda. It shows how the WPS agenda is situated within the AU’s African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) while taking into account the local/regional gender regime including regional action plans (RAPs). To do so, the chapter maps out ways in which gender intersects with security when global and local norms interact within a regional security institution. Drawing on a selection of case studies, this chapter demonstrates that there is now a well-established network of frameworks that embed WPS on the continent. It concludes that this has been informed by a certain understanding of feminism and a new pan-Africanist push via the AU and women’s movements on the continent. Indeed, the chapter highlights the adoption of National Action Plans (NAPs) in seventeen member states as one of the primary achievements of the AU women’s movement. This chapter thus offers a unique perspective on the regional institutionalization process of the WPS agenda.

The author presents the tentative results of ongoing research into a new paradigm for peace and security in Africa. The empirical foundation of the research is the result of a triangulation of research methods that involved literature study, reflexive journaling and thematic analysis. The discussion aims to determine how China can contribute to the renewal of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The aim is achieved by discussing and analysing the current APSA, including the challenges experienced, as well as the policy commitments and security activities of China in Africa. The research concludes that China is building a military intervention capacity to protect its interests in Africa. However, a new metaphor is needed that will bring solutions to the peace and security challenges of Africa. In this regard China can play an important role in assisting the APSA to focus on issues such as social transformation, capacity building for socio-economic development, and education aimed at peace and security.

Since its establishment in 2002, the African Union (AU) has accorded particular importance to the establishment of a robust mechanism for effectively responding to conflicts in Africa. This emerging mechanism established under the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC Protocol) is known as the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Central to the APSA is the PSC, which, like the UN Security Council, is ‘a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts’. The PSC is vested with expansive powers covering the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa. In this context, the PSC Protocol not only makes numerous direct references to human rights but it also assigns the PSC with specific responsibilities vis-a-vis the protection of human rights. Despite the PSC's express mandate with respect to human rights and the crucial importance and link of human rights to peace and security in Africa, little has however been written and discussed on the subject of human rights from the perspective of the works of the PSC and generally within the context of AU initiatives for the promotion, maintenance and restoration of peace and security in Africa. In an effort to contribute towards filling this lacuna, this article seeks to consider the place of human rights within the mandates of the PSC and the need for and the extent to which they are integrated into the PSC's work for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa

This chapter examines the fundamental challenges of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) by studying its institutional structure, including the relationship with Regional Economic Communities (RECs). It reviews the obstacles faced by APSA to effectively achieve its goals as a regional framework comprising the Peace and Security Council, Panel of the Wise, Continental Early Warning System, African Standby Force (ASF) and Peace Fund. Thereafter it examines two AU-led peace operations, the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB), to assess its effectiveness. The chapter focuses on the ASF as a mechanism to react and prevent the escalation of conflict situations in the region. Importantly, the authors critically analyse challenges related to the Westphalian nature of modern African States and highlight how pan-Africanism offers a way out of this impasse. Finally, the chapter argues that the ASF can catalyse regional integration.

La participación de la República de Angola en la Arquitectura de Paz y Seguridad Africana representa, en el actual contexto subsahariano, el ejemplo de la búsqueda de la afirmación de una potencia regional emergente que, a través de una Política Exterior participativa, influyente y comprometida, apuesta por una dualidad estratégica equilibrada, en la que usa sus Fuerzas Armadas como un instrumento de cooperación militar y de resolución de conflictos en su espacio de interés coyuntural. Este artículo procura desmitificar este paradigma y reflexionar sobre los posibles intereses de Angola en el ámbito de su participación en la Arquitectura de Paz y Seguridad Africana, en un marco de desarrollo y afirmación de sus capacidades militares, con el empleo consecuente de sus Fuerzas Armadas como mecanismo activo de su Política Exterior de afirmación regional y continental.

Three Scenarios for Asia's Changing Regional Order Renato Cruz De Castro (bio) Prior to Donald Trump's presidential inauguration on January 20, 2017, several East Asian leaders were concerned about the fate of the Obama administration's rebalancing strategy toward the Asia-Pacific in particular and U.S. foreign policy in the region more generally. They suspected already that President Trump would ignore the region, given that one of his first official decisions was to withdraw the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Neither was their apprehension assuaged by a subgroup of White House national security officials who tried to soften or rectify the president's statements on a range of issues from the South China Sea to the notorious activities of extremist groups in Southeast Asia.1 The public airing of discord within the administration also generated confusion and doubt about the credibility of U.S. foreign policy commitments in Asia. Trump's decision to withdraw from the TPP, his quirky temperament, his lack of strategy for the Indo-Pacific region, and his personal concern regarding Islamic militancy in the Middle East made analysts and Asian statesmen doubt whether he would heed former president Barack Obama's advice that "engaging in the Asia-Pacific is critical to America's future prosperity and security."2 Along with China's growing economic and strategic clout and increasing tensions in several regional flashpoints, all these factors made many pessimistic about the future of U.S. foreign policy in East Asia and the durability of the regional security order. Andrew Yeo's recent work Asia's Regional Architecture: Alliances and Institutions in the Pacific Century offers a fresh and reassuring outlook on the future of Asia's security order and U.S. foreign policy in the region. In the book, Yeo argues that Asia's regional institutions are more powerful and resilient than the whims of the United States' current, eccentric president. He observes that political leaders' choices and actions [End Page 139] are framed within a larger temporal and historical context, making it difficult for new and inexperienced decision-makers to reverse existing ideas and institutions that were created to articulate states' core interests and values. He maintains that Asia's security architecture reflects greater stability and continuity; thus, it can withstand and even outlive the Trump administration's inconsistent signals regarding long-term U.S. intentions and policy toward the region. Using historical institutionalism as a theoretical framework, the book examines the evolution of Asia's regional security order. Yeo explores the beginnings and development of U.S. bilateral security alliances as well as the modes of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) toward fostering multilateralism in Asia. He observes that while this system of bilateral alliances remains an important means of ensuring national security and regional stability, regional institutional structures are also being used by several states to organize and address emerging security and economic challenges. He assumes that bilateralism and multilateralism are complementary rather than contradictory. This raises two questions: how do bilateral and multilateral institutions interact, and how are old and new institutions layered and integrated? Yeo traces how the emergence of the postwar bilateral alliance system in the 1950s and the formation of ASEAN in the late 1960s led to the creation of the complex patchwork of overlapping bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral institutions that currently constitute Asia's security architecture. However, despite the region's new multilateralism and the proliferation of several patchworks of regional institutions, Cold War relics such as the U.S. system of bilateral alliances and ASEAN remain at the core of this architecture. The book then examines how the Trump administration's actions and China's foreign policy goals can affect the regional order. Yeo notes that despite Trump's erratic statements on U.S. policy toward Asia, the actions of the United States appear to encourage some degree of stability and continuity in the regional architecture. Interestingly, he maintains that China does not actually want to overhaul this regional security architecture. Instead, it wants greater influence in the region and simply seeks to fill the void that the United States and its allies have left. Yeo is skeptical...

The role of the African Peace and Security Architecture in the implementation of Article 4(h)